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Abstract!
!The!rise!of!women’s!rights!movements!in!the!Middle!East!has!a!long,!varied,!and!complex!historical!trajectory,!which!makes!it!a!challenging!area!of!comparative!study.!!This!thesis!explores!the!development!of!notions!of!cultural!authenticity!and!womanhood,!and!how!women!struck!bargains!with!men!around!such!notions,!by!looking!at!the!rise!of!women’s!rights!discourses!and!movements!in!Egypt!and!Iran!from!1880!to!1980.!!More!specifically,!it!investigates!how!changing!notions!of!‘cultural!authenticity’!and!‘womanhood’!affected!the!relationship!between!‘nationalism’!and!‘feminism’,!women’s!relationship!with!modernizing!states,!and!‘female!activism’!within!revolutionary!and!Islamist!opposition!movements.!!1880!was!chosen!as!the!starting!period!of!this!study!to!assess!the!modernist!and!nationalist!debates!of!the!late!19th!century,!which!incorporated!new!women’s!rights!discourses!in!both!cases.!!1980!was!chosen!as!an!end!point!as!the!Iran'Iraq!war,!and!the!advent!of!‘Islamic!feminism’!debates!over!the!next!decades!in!both!Iran!and!Egypt,!introduced!new!factors!and!issues,!which!would!not!have!been!possible!to!assess!properly!within!the!scope!of!this!study.!!The!two!countries!were!selected!not!only!for!their!political!significance,!but!because!of!key!differences,!particularly!in!terms!of!dominant!language!and!religion,!to!help!challenge!generalizations!about!‘Arab!versus!non'Arab!culture’,!and!notions!of!a!monolithic!‘Islam’,!‘Muslim!culture’,!and/or!the!Middle!East.!!Differences!between!regional!cases!need!to!be!highlighted!to!avoid!generalizations!and!simplified!readings!of!women’s!histories.!!This!thesis!places!its!original!contributions!within!existing!historiography!on!women’s!movements!in!Iran!and!Egypt,!contributing!to!the!wider!debates!on!women’s!histories!and!‘feminisms’!in!the!Middle!East.!!Its!arguments!contribute!to!existing!historiography!on!women!and!nationalism,!women!and!revolution,!and!women!and!the!state!in!Iran,!Egypt,!and!wider!studies!on!Middle!Eastern!women’s!histories.!!!
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Thesis Introduction 
 
Abstract 
Women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  women’s	  rights	  in	  Islam	  remain highly charged and politicised	  subjects.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  women’s	  rights	  discourses	  and	  movements in the Middle East has a long, varied, and complex historical trajectory, which makes it a challenging area of comparative study.  This thesis explores the development of notions of cultural authenticity and womanhood, and how women struck bargains with men around such notions, by looking at 
the	  rise	  of	  women’s	  rights discourses and movements in Egypt and Iran from 
1880	  to	  1980.	  	  More	  specifically,	  it	  investigates	  how	  changing	  notions	  of	  ‘cultural	  
authenticity’	  and	  ‘womanhood’	  affected	  the	  relationship	  between	  ‘nationalism’	  
and	  ‘feminism’,	  women’s	  relationship	  with	  modernising	  states,	  and	  ‘female	  
activism’	  within	  revolutionary	  and	  Islamist	  opposition	  movements.	  	    
1880 was chosen as the starting period of this study to assess the modernist and nationalist debates of the late 19th century, which incorporated 
new	  women’s rights discourses in both cases.  1980 was chosen as an end point as the Iran-Iraq	  war,	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  ‘Islamic	  feminism’	  debates	  over	  the	  next	  decades in both Iran and Egypt, introduced new factors and issues, which would not have been possible to assess properly within the scope of this study.  The two countries were selected not only for their political significance, but because of key differences, particularly in terms of dominant language and religion, to help challenge generalisations	  about	  ‘Arab versus non-Arab	  culture’,	  and	  notions	  of	  a	  
monolithic	  ‘Islam’,	  ‘Muslim	  culture’,	  and/or	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Differences	  
 7 
between regional cases, whether they share a common language and/or religion, need to be highlighted to avoid generalisations and simplified readings of 
women’s	  histories.	  	   
Edited	  volumes	  like	  Lila	  Abu	  Lughod’s	  Remaking Women: Feminism and 
Modernity in the Middle East1,	  or	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti’s	  Gendering the Middle East: 
Emerging Perspectives,2 where different country cases like Iran, Egypt, Palestine, and Turkey were looked at separately according to different themes, highlighted the value of more and different comparative studies.  Articles like Valentine 
Moghadam’s	  study	  on	  Iran	  and	  Algeria3 highlighted the need for a historical lens 
through	  which	  to	  evaluate	  comparative	  studies	  on	  women’s	  movements	  in	  these	  regions.  More recent publications from writers like Sridevi Nair have argued the 
‘transnational	  turn’	  in	  academic	  fields,	  particularly	  women’s,	  gender, and sexuality studies, has challenged west-centric scholarship, theories, and research methods, leading to new questions on ‘what	  constitutes	  feminism,	  who	  the	  
feminist	  subject	  is’.4 
This thesis places its original contributions within existing historiography 
on	  women’s	  movements	  and	  rights	  in	  Iran	  and	  Egypt,	  contributing	  to	  the	  wider	  
debates	  on	  women’s	  histories	  and	  ‘feminisms’	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  A	  direct	  and	  detailed historical comparison between the cases of Iran and Egypt fills a gap within the existing historiography, which so far has not compared these two country-cases in this comprehensive and specific manner.  It attempts to offer a 
                                                 1 Lila Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998). 2 Deniz Kandiyoti, Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives (London, I.B. Tauris, 1996). 3 Valentine	  M.	  Moghadam,	  ‘Feminism	  in	  Iran	  and	  Algeria:	  Two	  Models	  of	  Collective	  Action	  for	  
Women’s	  Rights’,	  Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 1, April 2003. 4 Sridevi Nair, Transnationalism and Women of Color Courses: Diversity, Curricula, and New 
Pedagogies	  of	  ‘Race’, Feminist Teacher, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-17. 
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new interpretive layer by comparing developments in each case over a continuous 100-year period.  The observations and arguments of this thesis contribute to existing historiography on women and nationalism, women and revolution, and women and the state in Iran, Egypt, and wider studies on Middle 
Eastern	  women’s	  histories.	  	  Moreover,	  arguments	  on	  women’s	  contribution to, and the effects of important events on women in Iran and Egypt, such as the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution, 1919-1922 Egyptian Revolution, 1952 Free Officers coup, 1953 Iranian Coup, and the 1979 Iranian Revolution add to wider and more balanced historiography on these events, by highlighting 
women’s	  stories	  and	  contributions	  within	  them. 
 
Analytical framework, Literature Review, and Thesis Arguments 
 
Terminology and Historiography  
Feminism is, a complex, slippery, and politicised word, which makes its use as a descriptive term problematic.  In 2003 Iranian writer Muhammad Khosrow 
Panah	  asked	  ‘what	  is	  a	  feminist?’,	  ‘who	  is	  a	  feminist?’,	  defining it ‘in	  the	  modern	  sense as a person who is pro-women,	  protects	  women’s	  rights	  and	  struggles to 
improve	  their	  way	  of	  life’,	  but	  added	  that	  some	  ‘so-called feminists’	  were	  not	  motivated by these principles, but only by personal gain.5  He argued that no new 
research	  on	  Iranian	  women’s	  history	  had	  been	  made,	  and	  that	  most	  of	  the	  recent	  studies were politically motivated.  In his 2002 publication, Tahrir	  al	  ma’rah	  
                                                 5 Muhammad Hussein Khosrow Panah, Hadaf’ha	  va	  mubarizah-i-Zan-i Irani az Inqilab-i 
Mashrutah ta Saltanat-i Pahlavi, (Tehran, Nashr-i-Payam-i Imruz, 2003), p. 285. 
 9 
bayn al-Islam wa al-Gharb (Women’s	  Liberation	  between	  Islam	  and	  the	  West),	  
Muhammad	  Alwan	  rejected	  notions	  of	  ‘western	  feminism’	  and	  argued	  that	  
following	  the	  west’s	  model	  would	  be	  a	  ‘harmful	  failure’	  for	  Muslim	  women.6  
A host of Arab and Iranian writers like Amal al-Subki, Sawsan Naiji, Hoda el-Saada, Afsaneh Najmabadi, Pardis Qandahari7 and Pari Shaykh al-Islami8, have 
stressed	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  ‘woman’s	  question’	  and	  the	  challenges	  this	  
creates	  for	  academic	  researchers.	  	  Writing	  on	  the	  early	  Egyptian	  women’s	  movement (1919-1952), Amal al-Subki argued that researchers looking into 
women’s	  issues	  feel as though	  they	  are	  ‘walking	  on	  a mine field, in every danger 
of	  colliding	  with	  sensitive	  social	  traditions’,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  for	  
scholars	  to	  conduct	  scientific	  research	  on	  women’s	  issues	  without	  being	  
confronted	  with	  ‘traditions	  and	  notions	  linked to religion, most of which are not at the heart of religion, but are used as a terrible weapon in the face of any 
researcher	  looking	  for	  the	  truth’.9 Najmbadi, El-Saada, and Azzah Baydoun have strongly emphasised the use of gender perspectives to revise official historical 
narratives,	  underlining	  its	  potential	  to	  challenge	  society’s	  collective	  memory,	  and	  as such, social and national identity formation.10  
                                                 6 Muhammad	  ‘Alwan,	  Tahrir al-marʼah bayna al-Islam wa-al-Gharb: iftiraʼat gharbiyah wa-
haqaʼiq Islamiyah (Cairo:	  M.	  ‘Alwan,	  2002),	  p. 5. 7 Pardis Qandahari, Zan va qudrat: barʹrasi-i mardumʹshinakhti-i ʻarsahʹha va masadiq-i qudrat 
dar chand khanavadah-yi Tihrani, (Tehran, muʻavanat-i Pizhuhishi-i Pizhuhishkadah-i Mardumʹshinasi, 2003). 8 Pari Shaykh al-Islami, Zan dar Iran va Jahan/Zanan-i Ruznamahnigar va Andishmand-i Iran: 
Nakhustin Pazhuhish dar'barah-i Zanan-i Ruznamahnigar, (Tehran: S.n, 1973). 9 Amal Kamil Bayumi al-Subki, al-Harakah al-Nisaʾiyah fi Misr ma Bayn al-Thawratayn, 1919-
1952, (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Misriyah al-ʿAmmah lil-Kitab, 1986), p. 3. 10 Hoda el-Sadda, Zaman al-Nisa’	  wa	  al-Dhakira al-Badila:	  Majmu‘at	  Abhath, co-ed. Hoda al-Sadda, Sumayyah Ramadan, Umaymah Abu Bakr, (Cairo: The Women and Memory Forum, 1998), p. 1; Afsaneh Najmabadi, Hikayat-i-Dukhtaran-i Quchan: Az Yadraftehayeh inqilab-i Mashruteh, (Tehran, Rawshangaran, 1995), p. 180-181; Azzah Sharara Baydoun, al-Gandar, Matha Taqulin? Al-Sha’i‘	  wa	  al-Waqi’	  fi	  Ahwal	  al-Nisa’,	  (Beirut:	  Dar	  al-Saqi, 2012), p. 18-19, 24. 
 10 
 In Feminism, Islam, and Nation, Margot Badran wrote that while the 
Arabic	  Academy	  in	  Cairo	  had	  recently	  adopted	  ‘Abawiya’	  to	  denote	  patriarchy,	  it	  
had	  not	  yet	  adopted	  ‘a	  word	  for	  feminism’.11 Yet, ‘feminism’s multiple meanings, which change over time, space, and location, complicate its interpretation and translation in different contexts.  This is complicated further by troubled 
historical	  narratives	  and	  dichotomous	  notions	  of	  ‘East	  versus	  West’	  in	  these	  countries.  Rather than look for exact translations, or question the appropriateness of its application in such contexts, perhaps it is more useful to trace how women in these countries chose to define their own actions, and what terminology they used to describe their varied and interconnected activities.  Al-
Nisa’iya/	  Nisa’i (women related, feminine), al-Harakah al-Nisa’iya (the	  women’s	  movement), al-Ittihad Al-Nisa’i al-Masri/l’Union	  Feministe	  Egyptienne (The 
Egyptian	  Women’s	  Union/the Egyptian Feminist Union), al-Nahdha al-Nisa’iya 
(women’s	  awakening/renaissance)	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  Bidari-i Zan/Zanan (woman/women’s	  awakening),	  Huquq-i Zan/Zanan (woman/women’s	  rights),	  
Azadi-i Zan/Zanan (woman/women’s	  liberation), Nehdat-i Zanan (women’s	  awakening/movement) in Iran, were among the many terms used to illustrate 
changing	  ideas	  of	  womanhood	  and	  women’s	  rights in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
 Consequently,	  this	  thesis	  engages	  with	  feminism,	  women’s	  rights,	  and	  female activism (in English, Arabic, and Persian) as observational terms, through which it explores how women in these countries defined their own activities, 
what	  they	  included	  or	  excluded	  as	  ‘women’s	  rights’	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time,	  
                                                 11 Margot Badran, Feminism, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 19. 
 11 
and how they went about negotiating changes to these definitions over this period.   Where the same source is available in both languages, both versions are used to compare wording/language. In the early 20th century female education formed a core aspect	  of	  what	  Egyptians	  and	  Iranians	  defined	  as	  ‘women’s	  rights’, 
and	  much	  of	  women’s	  social	  and	  nationalist	  activities	  were	  centred on this issue.  While this remained a crucial part	  of	  women’s	  rights activism, other aspects such as female employment, the vote, and greater political participation became central issues in later years and during particular time periods.  For instance, women and men negotiated around changing ideas of female employment; in other words, what constituted	  appropriate	  jobs	  (women’s	  rights)	  for women at one point in time, changed and began to include new and broader possibilities. 
Similarly	  the	  type	  of	  ‘activism’	  women	  took	  part	  in,	  and	  how	  they conducted their activism changed over time as well.  Not only did female 
‘activism’	  encompass	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  changing	  activities,	  from	  social	  work,	  education, journalism, writing, advocacy, political activism etc., but many women took part in multiple and different activities at the same time, so that some social work or educational activities overlapped with, or led to greater political activism.12  For	  instance,	  ‘women’s	  activism’	  directly	  after	  the	  Iranian	  Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 was largely defined through independent social work and educational activities, however, by the 1960s it had come to include and overlap with political advocacy for suffrage, and lobbying for changes to existing legislation on women and the family.  By the late 1970s 
                                                 12 Nadje al-Ali, Secularism,	  Gender	  and	  the	  State	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  The	  Egyptian	  Women’s	  
Movement, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 6. 
 12 
the definition of female activism in Iran had expanded to include guerrilla or militant activity against the state.   
Furthermore,	  the	  term	  ‘women’	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  lump	  together	  diverse	  categories of female actors with different social, political, and ideological views, or women from different social, economic, ideological, and political backgrounds.  
As	  Khater	  and	  Nelson	  argue,	  it	  is	  ‘misleading to	  talk	  of	  “women”	  as	  if	  they	  
constituted	  some	  abstract	  all	  inclusive,	  homogeneous	  entity’.13  Moreover, 
concepts	  such	  as	  ‘class’	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  came	  to	  encompass	  different	  socio-economic and ideological characteristics.  For instance, as Khater and Nelson argue, late 19th and early 20th century	  Egyptian	  ‘classes’	  were	  predominantly defined through Turko-Circassian elites and landowners, urban-
guilds,	  merchants	  and	  peasants.	  	  However,	  Egypt’s	  colonial	  experience	  and	  the	  advent of capitalism led to the emergence of new socio-economic	  classes,	  ‘a	  
national	  bourgeoisie,	  a	  comprador	  class,	  and	  the	  petite	  bourgeoisie’.14  Furthermore, during later decades, certain ideological movements appealed to particular classes, producing new or different linkages across society.  For 
instance,	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  appealed	  to	  the	  ‘petite	  bourgeoisie’	  in	  Egypt, 
while	  the	  communist	  movement	  was	  directed	  at	  a	  ‘middle	  class	  vanguard’.15  
The interrelationship or intersectionality between individual social factors such as gender, class, race, and communal factors such as nationalism, state, and socio-political movements, calls for an approach to changing terminology rather than the use of single definitions.  This thesis, therefore, 
                                                 13 Akram Khater and Cynthia Nelson, Al-Harakah al-Nissa’iyah:	  The	  Women’s	  Movement	  and	  Political Participation in Modern Egypt, Women’s	  Studies	  International	  Forum, Vol. 11, No. 5, 1998, pp. 465-483.  14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 
 13 
favours a constructivist approach to non-static terms, such as woman/women, activism, feminism, western, western feminism, international feminism, imperialist, culture, nationalism/nation, state, state feminism, radicalism, upper-class, middle-class, grassroots, lower-class, Islamism, modernism/modern, secular, traditional, or religious. Rather than a single definition, this work charts the transformation of multiple social and political discourses and the different 
types	  of	  women’s	  rights	  activism	  demonstrated	  throughout	  this	  period.	  	   In so doing, it sheds light	  on	  the	  changes	  to	  women’s	  social	  and	  political	  activities,	  their different strategies in negotiating such changes, and the implications of 
these	  changes	  for	  women’s	  rights	  movements,	  feminism,	  nationalism,	  and	  revolution in these countries.   
 
Thesis Arguments, and Historiography 
This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  rise	  of	  women’s	  rights	  discourses	  and	  movements	  in	  Egypt and Iran from several perspectives, asking a number of key questions concerning ‘al-mas’alah al nisa’iyya’	  and	  ‘masale-i-zan’ (the ‘woman’s	  question’	  in	  Egypt and Iran, respectively) as it does so.  One such viewpoint is through the analysis of wider ideological, social, and political movements, especially nationalist, revolutionary, and Islamist opposition movements, to see how they 
shaped	  women’s	  discourses	  and	  how	  women’s	  discourses	  simultaneously	  shaped these wider movements.  Another perspective is provided through the analysis of power systems, such as the state; specifically how women’s	  relationship with modernising states affected the dominant discourses of the 
period,	  and	  how	  this	  in	  turn	  affected	  women’s	  activities.	  	  Historical	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transformation of non-static terms such as nationalism, womanhood, western, modern, etc. and the construction of new terms such as 
‘gharbzadeghi/westoxified’,	  are	  used	  to	  analyse	  notions of authenticity (discussed in the final section), providing another angle through which to 
analyse	  how	  limits	  on	  women’s	  activities	  were	  revised	  in	  response	  to	  these	  changes.  These approaches are used to ask, how did women negotiate their own definitions and ideas with the patriarchal forces around them?  Echoing Joan 
Wallach	  Scott’s	  argument	  on gender as a marker for power, Deniz Kandiyoti and Margot Badran have pointed to the crucial role gender plays in state attempts to compete for power,16 while Geraldine Heng has argued that feminism under threat or control of the state may adapt to conduct its activity along informal or less obvious lines.17  In fact, as gender plays a crucial role in all political attempts to compete for power, these arguments apply to gendered interactions within nationalist, revolutionary, and state contexts.    
Patriarchal Bargaining 
Studies	  on	  women’s	  history	  and	  feminism	  have	  evolved	  considerably	  over	  the	  last 30 years, pointing to the need for more theoretical and interdisciplinary approaches.  Since	  its	  publication	  in	  1982	  Kumari	  Jayawardena’s	  influential	  book	  
Feminism and Nationalism in The Third World has been widely cited by many 
scholars.	  	  Yet,	  her	  argument,	  that	  ‘women’s	  movements	  were	  to	  some	  extent	  
determined	  by	  the	  wider	  social	  movements	  of	  which	  they	  formed	  a	  part’,	  implied	  
that	  women’s	  behaviour	  within	  such	  movements	  was	  somewhat	  passive	  or	  
                                                 16 Margot	  Badran,	  ‘Competing	  Agenda:	  Egypt’,	  in	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti,	  Women, Islam and the State, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 201-202, p.228. 17 Geraldine	  Heng,	  ‘A	  Great	  Way	  to	  Fly:	  Nationalism,	  the	  State	  and	  the	  Varieties	  of	  Third	  World	  
Feminism’,	  in	  M	  Alexander,	  C.T	  Mohanty	  (eds.),	  Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, 
Democratic Futures, (New York, London: Routledge, 1997), p.44 
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reactive, rather than pro-active and formative, and thus diminished their agency as negotiators of their own gender.  Her arguments rested on assumed 
conceptions	  of	  ‘feminist	  resistance’,	  which	  did	  not	  satisfactorily	  highlight the different and sometimes un-expected	  forms	  ‘women’s	  resistance’	  could	  take	  in	  different scenarios.  Such assumptions led her to make judgements that while 
women	  in	  these	  societies	  had	  ‘achieved	  political	  and	  legal	  equality	  with	  men	  at	  
juridical	  level’	  they	  had	  ‘failed	  to	  make	  any	  impression	  on	  women’s	  
subordination	  within	  patriarchal	  structures	  of	  family	  and	  society’.18 
 In	  contrast,	  Kandiyoti’s	  1988	  article,	  ‘Bargaining	  with	  Patriarchy’,	  drew	  attention to different, and less typical negotiation strategies used by women in a variety of different socio-economic situations.  It argued that within kin-based family and labour systems in some sub-Saharan, Central-Asian, South-Asian and Middle Eastern societies, different patriarchal forms presented women with distinct rules and concrete constraints, which required them to strategise 
differently,	  with	  each	  ‘patriarchal	  bargaining’	  strategy	  holding	  different	  gender	  implications19.  In 1998 and 2006, Kandiyoti retrospectively criticised some of 
her	  article’s	  analytical	  framework,	  ‘simplifying	  assumptions’,	  and	  use	  of	  ‘ideal	  
types’	  to	  discuss	  different	  forms	  of	  male	  dominance.20  Incorporating these re-
evaluations,	  ‘patriarchal	  bargaining’	  theory	  nevertheless	  draws	  attention	  to	  how	  
women’s	  rights	  bargains,	  particularly	  short	  and	  medium-term strategies, may 
end	  up	  validating	  or	  reinforcing	  some	  patriarchal	  systems.	  	  Kandiyoti’s	  argument	  
that	  such	  bargains	  are	  ‘constantly	  subject	  to	  renegotiation’	  as	  contextual	  factors	  
                                                 18 Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, (London: Zed Books, 1986). 19 Deniz	  Kandiyoti,	  ‘Bargaining	  with	  Patriarchy’,	  Gender and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3, Sep. 1988. 20 Rema Hammami, Reflections: Deniz Kandiyoti, Interviewed by Rema Hammami, Development 
and Change, Vol. 37, Issue 6, 2006, p.1349. 
 16 
change, draws attention to less typically conceptualised/assumed forms of 
‘resistance’21 by showing, as Frances S. Hasso argues, how feminist resistance 
can	  often	  be	  ‘built	  into,	  or	  easily	  work	  within	  subordinating	  structures	  without	  
undermining	  them’.22   
This	  thesis	  extends	  Kandiyoti’s	  theory	  of	  ‘patriarchal	  bargaining’	  to	  test	  its historical implications within wider socio-political contexts in Egypt and Iran. It looks at how women negotiated different types of patriarchal bargains around changing and intersecting notions of womanhood and authenticity.  As part of this bargain itself included what types of activities became permissible, and what patriarchal limits were upheld or redrawn around such activities, the changing 
nature	  of	  ‘women’s	  activism’	  and	  definitions	  of	  ‘women/womanhood’	  are	  emphasised throughout this thesis to ask questions such as, how did women balance their bargaining between competing patriarchal forces?  Given their intersectional identities, what sort of tensions or overlaps occurred between 
men	  and	  women’s	  multiple	  bargains	  and	  their	  multiple	  identities,	  and	  how	  did	  
such	  tensions/overlaps	  affect	  their	  actions	  and	  the	  development	  of	  women’s	  movements in these countries?  Moreover, patriarchal bargaining (bargains made with patriarchal forces to alter the status for certain groups of women) is not necessarily gender specific, in that both men and women can strike bargains with dominant patriarchal players in pursuit of change and different rights. Similarly both men and women can act as patriarchal forces, when their actions fortify the dominant patriarchal power or discourse of the period, or challenge the efforts of women (and men) in resisting that power.     
                                                 21 Ibid. 22 Frances	  S.	  Hasso,	  ‘Bargaining	  with	  the	  Devil:	  States	  and	  Intimate	  Life’,	  Journal of Middle East 
Women's Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 2014, p. 109. 
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Consequently this thesis argues that both women and men continuously struck bargains with patriarchal forces within nationalist, revolutionary, Islamist movements, and the state, actively altering and contributing to these phenomena as they did so.  However, gender bargains within these contexts were multi-player, multi-lateral processes.  Male and female actors within nationalist, revolutionary, Islamist movements, and the state incorporated multiple identities, bringing complex variables to the negotiating table.  Moreover, 
players’	  bargaining	  powers	  changed	  over	  time	  in	  response	  to	  changing	  socio-economic and political factors.   
This	  thesis	  will	  show	  that	  women’s	  bargaining	  power	  did	  not	  necessarily	  decrease under increasingly patriarchal or dictatorial states, nor did they necessarily increase during periods of revolutionary or nationalist activity.  Rather, it will show that the terms of their bargains changed, and that the leverage of certain groups of women changed vis-à-vis the particular patriarchal context within which they operated.  For instance, state feminists (meaning women that the state looked to co-opt and that looked to be co-opted by the state), increased their leverage within that particular power system by striking 
bargains	  around	  common	  women’s	  rights	  goals,	  while	  female	  members	  of	  revolutionary groups improved their bargaining position by joining revolutionary or opposition groups that offered them greater social and/or political space.  Women manoeuvred and amended their strategies around changing patriarchal limits to better confront the dominant patriarchal discourse of the period, in order to improve the situation for certain groups/classes of women.  Similarly, patriarchal players appropriated elements of dominant 
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women’s	  rights	  discourses	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  offering	  their	  own	  gender	  definitions in order to assert power.   
Moreover, this thesis argues that patriarchal players were also engaged in patriarchal rivalry or	  ‘patriarchal	  battles’	  with	  their opponents, that is, power battles centred on definitions	  of	  womanhood/women’s	  roles	  and	  notions of gender/gender relations.  The state, in particular, as a patriarchal player, attempted to maintain dominance over patriarchal rivals (such as political opposition groups or the Islamist movement) by balancing between repressive tactics, and negotiating bargains with rival patriarchal powers, often with negative effects for women’s	  rights	  movements	  and	  women’s	  rights in general.   
Bargaining with Nationalism and the Nation-State 
The intersection of feminism and nationalism is a complex area of study that engages scholars from diverse academic fields. Many writers link the beginning of women’s	  rights	  activity in the Middle East with early nationalist movements in the region.   Jayawardena	  has	  argued	  that	  women’s	  movements	  in	  the	  ‘third	  
world’	  were	  influenced	  by	  wider	  social	  factors,	  and	  thus	  resulted	  from,	  and	  formed a part of, wider social and political movements in their societies.23 Scholars like Leila Ahmed, Amal al-Subki, Latifa Mohammad Salim, Buthayna Sha‘ban, and Muhammad al-Jawawadi have linked the 1919 Egyptian Revolution, a nationalist independence movement, with the beginning of serious Egyptian 
women’s rights activism. 24  Similarly for Iran, scholars like Janet Afary, Parvin 
                                                 23 Jayawardena. 24 Leila Ahmed, Feminism and Feminist Movements in the Middle East: Preliminary Explorations 
in	  Turkey,	  Egypt,	  Algeria	  and	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Yemen,	  Women’s	  Studies	  Forum, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1982; Amal Kamil Bayumi al-Subki, p. 15; Latifah Muhammad Salim, al-Marʼah al-Misriyah wa-
al-Taghyir al-Ijtimaʻi, 1919-1945, (Cairo: al-Hayʼah al-Misriyah al-ʻAmmah lil-Kitab, 1984), p. 45; 
Buthayna	  Sha‘ban, al-Marʼah al-ʻArabiyah fi al-Qarn al-ʻIshrin, (Damascus: Dar al-Mada lil-
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Paidar, and Eliz Sanansarian have pointed to the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution as a key event in awakening their political consciousness, and driving women’s	  rights	  activity	  in	  its aftermath amongst more educated classes of women.25   While writers like Soha Abdel Kader, and Muhammad Kamal Yaha have 
argued	  that	  the	  first	  calls	  for	  women’s	  reform	  in	  Egypt	  came	  from	  men like Qasim Amin,26 later studies by Ahmed27, Beth Baron28, Margot Badran29 and Lila Abu-Lughod30 argued that women’s	  participation	  in	  the	  1919	  Revolution was a continuation or development of their earlier activities as writers and journalists.   Iranian writers like Pari Shaykh al-Islami and Afsaneh Najmabadi have criticised the masculinist (tarikh-i muzkar) readings	  of	  women’s	  histories	  and nationalist contributions, calling for gendered readings and further research on these 
‘hidden	  histories’.31  However, as these masculinist histories formed part of national construction processes,	  gaps	  on	  women’s	  roles within existing historiography are just as telling as emphasised narratives.  For instance, 
Najmabadi’s	  research	  on	  the	  ‘Story of the Daughters of Quchan’ showed how Iranian historians deliberately excluded this story because it did not fit the 
                                                                                                                                           
Thaqafah wa-al-Nashr, 2000), p. 73; Muhammad al-Jawwadi.  Mudhakkirat al-Marʼah al-Misriyah: 
al-Thawrah wa-al-Hurriyah, (Cairo: Dar al-Khayyal, 2004), p. 27. 25 Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social 
Democracy and the Origins of Feminism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Eliz Sanasarian, The	  Women’s	  Rights	  Movement	  in Iran: Mutiny, 
Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1982). 26 Soha Abdel Kader, Egyptian Women in a Changing Society (London: Lynne Rienner, 1987), p. 50; Muhammad Kamal Yahya, al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyah li-Tahrir al-Marah al-Misriyah fi al-‘asr al-
hadith: dirasah ‘an makanat al-marah fi al-mujtama’ al-Misri khilala al-qarn al-tasi’ ‘ashar (Cairo: al-Hayah al-Misriyah al-‘Ammah lil-Kitab, 1983), p. 5.  27 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of A Modern Debate, (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1992), p.185 28 Beth Baron, The	  Women’s	  Awakening	  in	  Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 193. 29 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 3. 30 Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women, p. 261. 31 Shaykh al-Islami, pp.180-181. 
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dominant, accepted narrative of the Constitutional Revolution.32  Thus, Najmabadi joins scholars like Anthony D. Smith, Ruth Wodak, and Tamar Mayer33 in highlighting the special role that myths and historical memories play in defining the nation and national identity, and how cultural rituals are used to sustain such national constructions.34  It is in this context that the arguments of scholars like Chatterjee, Anthias, Yuval-Davis, Mayer, Kandiyoti, and Peterson, on women’s	  special roles as 
‘cultural	  carriers’	  of	  the community or nation,35are crucial in understanding the ways in which women negotiated bargains with changing patriarchal forces in their societies.  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  examples	  of	  women’s	  renegotiation	  of	  patriarchal bargains within nationalist movements, revolutionary movements, and the state, is assessed to analyse their motives, approaches, and the effects 
such	  bargains	  had	  over	  time	  on	  women’s rights movements and on definitions of womanhood.   This thesis argues overall that women often sought the role of cultural carriers or symbols/protectors of national culture as a crucial part of ongoing, revised, and new patriarchal bargains with nationalist movements, revolutionary/opposition groups, and the State.  That is, women renegotiated bargains around their ability to represent, symbolise, carry and protect new and 
                                                 32 Najmabadi, Hikayat, pp.1701-174. 33 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991); Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, Karin Liebhart, The Discursive Construction of National Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Tamar Mayer, Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the 
Nation ed. Tamar Mayer (London: Routledge, 2000). 34 Najmabadi, Hikayat, pp, 2, 7. 35 Floya Anthias, Nira Yuval-Davis, Jo Campling, Woman- Nation-State, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 85, 143, 155; Partha Chatterjee; The	  Nationalist	  Resolution	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Question,	  in Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History, ed. Sangari and Vaid, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p. 243; V. Spike Peterson, Sexing Political Identities/Nationalism as Heterosexism, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 1:1, 1999, p. 47; Tamar Mayer, pp. 7, 10, 18; Deniz Kandiyoti, Identity and its Discontents: Women and the Nation, WLUML DOSSIER 26, 2004, pp. 49, 51. 
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changing notions of cultural and national authenticity (discussed below), particular at times of heightened political change or instability.   During periods when the nationalist movement or the state became increasingly intolerant of independent feminist activity, women manoeuvred around these increasing limits using a variety of resistance approaches: 
bargaining	  ‘from	  within’	  or	  along	  official	  lines	  (state	  feminists),	  bargaining	  with	  various influential or oppositional patriarchal forces within the state (opposition, revolutionary, and Islamic groups) and/or using less obtrusive voices through journalism and independent social work.  Women responded to 
changing	  levels	  of	  male	  hostility	  to	  women’s	  rights	  activism	  by	  fine-tuning their negotiating skills to maintain their struggles in less obvious ways.   As the following thesis chapters will demonstrate, Egyptian and Iranian nationalist movements at the start of the 20th century provide examples of different forms of bargaining, as some women chose to initiate independent 
women’s	  rights	  activity	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  disappointment	  from	  male-nationalists, while others maintained their affiliation to patriarchal nationalist parties and leaders, preferring to bargain from within.  Similarly, during periods of no independent feminism or political repression, such as the 1930s and 1960s/1970s in Iran, or the 1960s and 1970s in Egypt, some female activists were able to negotiate exceptional spaces for their activity within the state by striking bargains around common goals.  Bargains between patriarchal state players and female activists were often motivated by individual goals and ambitions, which sometimes conflicted with the wider agenda/views of their class, or political/ideological group.  
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Patriarchal Rivalry between the State and the Opposition  
The state also bargained with patriarchal forces within the opposition, often employing a dual strategy of balancing between repression and negotiation, to maintain its power.  This thesis will argue that by employing such dual tactics in its ‘patriarchal	  battles’, the Egyptian and Iranian states (under Nasser, Sadat and both Pahlavi Shahs) produced a far more contradictory than conservative stance 
on	  women’s	  rights,	  by	  promoting	  conflicting	  notions	  of	  modern	  womanhood	  as	  they compromised	  on	  women’s	  rights	  in order to appease and control patriarchal/political rivals.	  	  Moreover,	  by	  sacrificing	  women’s	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  appease Islamist opponents in the 1960s and 1970s, the Egyptian and Iranian states maintained, promoted, and redefined the historically constructed dichotomy between Islam and feminism.  
Bargains with Islam 
The discourses of Islam and women’s	  rights/feminism, though often presented as a static dichotomy, have been historically formulated by multiple, interconnected, and changing notions, around which women struck patriarchal bargains in different contexts.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  contemporary	  ‘Islamic 
feminism’	  is	  also	  a	  form	  of	  patriarchal bargaining, which had an earlier historical precedent than most contemporary debates suggest.36  Some scholars such as Miriam Cooke37, Nayereh Tohidi38, Saba Mahmood39 and Margot Badran40 have 
                                                 36 Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, Dilemmas of Islamic and Secular Feminists and Feminisms, Journal of 
International	  Women’s	  Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, May 2008, p. 108; Ziba	  Mir	  Hosseini,	  ‘Islam	  and	  Feminism: Whose Islam? Whose Feminism?, Contestation:	  Dialogue	  on	  Women’s	  Empowerment, Issue 1, 2010; Valentine M. Moghadam, Islamic Feminism and its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate, Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4, Summer 2002, pp.1135-1171. 37 Miriam Cooke, Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism Through Literature, (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
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pointed to contemporary ‘Islamic	  feminism’s’ links with the late 19th/early 20th century Islamic modernist movement.  However, their approach is still a-
historical	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  satisfactorily	  assess	  how	  	  ‘Islamic	  feminism’	  or	  
‘Islamic	  women’s discourses’	  developed	  or	  changed	  in	  response	  to	  wider	  socio-political factors, or how these ideas influenced, or were influenced by, other developing women’s discourses.  This thesis will show that Islam and women’s	  rights discourses intersected right from the start of the period under examination, as they intersected with secular ideas, modernist ideas, nationalism and changing forms of patriarchy, and thus Islamic women’s rights discourses or 
forms	  of	  ’Islamic	  feminism’, as a product of this intersection, have been developing since, continuously modifying and altering their bargaining strategies in response to changing socio-political factors, such as the growth of political Islamism, or the establishment of Islamic states.   
Furthermore, this thesis will explore how Iranian and Egyptian feminist discourses incorporated Islamic, modernist, and secular ideas to varying degrees, resulting in different forms and levels of Islamic and secular-grounded feminisms co-existing and inter-bargaining with each other at all times.  Thus, it is misleading and historically inaccurate to promote the notion of ‘Islamic	  
feminism’	  as a more authentic alternative to other women’s	  rights discourses in 
                                                                                                                                           38 Nayereh	  Tohidi,	  ‘Islamic	  Feminism:	  Perils	  and	  Promises’,	  Woodrow Wilson International Centre 
For Scholars, Middle East Project, October 2001, pp.141. 39 Saba Mahmood, The Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 1962-, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.82-94; Margot	  Badran,	  ‘Between	  Secular	  and	  Islamic	  
Feminism/s:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Beyond’,	  Journal of Middle East Women’s	  Studies, Vol.1, No.1, 2005, pp.6-28. 40 Margot	  Badran,	  ‘Toward	  Islamic	  Feminisms:	  A	  Look	  at	  the	  Middle	  East’,	  in	  Hermeneutics and 
Honor:	  Negotiating	  Female	  “Public”	  Space	  in	  Islamic/Ate	  Societies, Asma Afsaruddin, Anan Ameri (eds), (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1999), pp. 168-169. 
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these societies, over which writers like Haideh Moghissi41 have critiqued the arguments of scholars like Valentine Moghadam42, Margot Badran43, and Saba Mahmood,44 as different forms, including many secular women’s	  rights	  discourses or feminisms, developed out of the same processes and mutually influenced each other.  At the heart of all religiously, Islamic, or secular grounded patriarchal bargains, lies the ever-persistent	  question	  of	  ‘cultural	  authenticity’,	  which continues to cast a shadow over different forms and notions of Middle-Eastern feminisms. 
Cultural Authenticity 
Debates on Middle Eastern	  women’s	  movements	  have	  been	  plagued	  by	  perpetual	  questions of authenticity; specifically whether or not the origins of such 
movements	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  ‘indigenous’/’authentic’	  factors,	  as	  opposed	  to	  foreign, specifically western sources.  Thus, while most scholars link the 
beginnings	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  women’s	  movements	  to	  their	  corresponding	  nationalist revolutions, they disagree over whether or not feminism in these societies was an indigenous development.  Leila Ahmed and Thomas Phillip are among those who argue feminism is essentially western, while others like Badran and Jayawardena argue that feminism was an indigenous development and not a product of Western imposition.45  Contemporary	  debates	  on	  ‘Islamic	  
                                                 41 Haideh	  Moghissi,	  ‘Islamic	  Feminism	  Revisited’,	  Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2011, pp. 76-84.   42 Moghadam,	  ‘Islamic	  Feminism	  and	  Its	  Discontents’. 43 Badran,	  ‘Understanding	  Islam,	  Islamism	  and	  Islamic	  Feminism’,	  Journal	  of	  Women’s	  History, Vo. 13, No.1, 2001, pp. 47-52. 44 Saba	  Mahmood,	  Feminist	  ‘Theory,	  Embodiment,	  and	  the	  Docile	  Agent:	  Some	  Reflections	  on	  the	  
Egyptian	  Islamic	  Revival’,	  Cultural Anthropology, Vo. 16, No. 2, 2001, 202-236. 45 Leila	  Ahmed,	  ‘Feminism	  and	  Feminist	  Movements	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Preliminary	  Explorations	  
in	  Turkey,	  Egypt,	  Algeria	  and	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Yemen’,	  Women’s	  Studies	  Forum, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1982; Thomas	  Philip,	  ‘Feminism	  and	  Nationalist	  Politics	  in	  Egypt’	  in	  Lois	  Beck	  and	  Nikkie	  Keddie, Women in the Muslim World, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
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feminism’	  reflect	  these	  disagreements, as debates remain plagued by the historically disconcerting relationship between Islam and feminism and 
conflicting	  ideas	  of	  ‘authenticity’.	  	  Some	  scholars,	  like	  Nayereh	  Tohidi, remain engaged in this exercise,	  pointing	  to	  historical	  examples	  of	  ‘contemporary 
Islamic	  feminism’	  to	  prove	  its	  ‘authenticity’.46  However, such debates and exercises often underline and ask the wrong questions, as they often inadvertently validate the idea of authenticity as something essential, rather than as a social construct within history. 
A host of scholars have emphasised women’s	  privileged	  role	  as	  symbols	  and markers of cultural authenticity, and how patriarchal movements have used this to the detriment of women.  Mohanty, Narayan and Chatterjee have pointed to how the dichotomy of nationalism and Imperialism in such societies led to a 
‘cultural	  competition’	  around	  Eastern/Western	  constructions	  of	  womanhood.47 Jayawardena showed how patriarchal nationalism pushed women into public life 
while	  trying	  to	  preserve	  ‘traditional	  culture’,	  perpetuating	  their	  subordination.48  Chatterjee, Badran, Yuval-Davis, Anthias and	  Kandiyoti	  showed	  how	  women’s	  
privileged	  role	  as	  symbols	  of	  ‘authenticity’	  and	  the	  ‘spiritual	  quality	  of	  national	  
culture’49,	  or	  as	  ‘boundary	  markers	  of	  their	  communities’50 meant	  ‘burdens	  of	  
                                                                                                                                           
1978)	  cited	  by	  Margot	  Badran	  ‘The	  Origins	  of	  Feminism	  in	  Egypt’,	  in	  Current	  Issues	  in	  Women’s	  History, ed. Arina Angerman, Geerte Binnema, Annamieke Keunen, Vefie Poels and Jacqueline Zirkzee, (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 155-156; Badran, Feminists, Islam and Nation, Jayawardena. 46 Tohidi, p.141. 47 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, in Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, ed. Mohanty, Russo, Torres, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Uma Narayan, Dislocating 
Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third-World Feminism, (New York: Routledge), 1997); Partha Chatterjee, The Nationalist Resolution of	  the	  Women’s	  Question. 48 Jayawardena. 49 Chatterjee, p. 243. 50 Kandiyoti,	  ‘Identity and	  its	  Discontents’,	  p.45,	  48; Anthias, Yuval-Davis, Campling, pp. 85, 143, 155. 
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continuity	  were	  placed	  on	  women’51, which translated to different limits of modernity and westernisation for women compared to men.    Joan Wallach 
Scott’s	  argument	  that	  ‘old	  notions	  of	  gender	  have	  served	  to	  validate	  new	  regimes’,	  highlights	  how	  old	  definitions	  are	  recalled	  to	  express	  authenticity	  in	  modern times.52    The cases of Egypt and Iran show women were often constructed as symbols of indigenous culture to illustrate the binary of authenticity versus inauthenticity, often revolving around changing limits and definitions of westernisation.  This thesis argues that women were not passive participants in these processes and that notions of what was authentic were revised over time.  More specifically, it argues that women themselves actively contributed to, negotiated, and employed changing ideas	  of	  cultural	  authenticity,	  ‘transgression	  
of	  social	  boundaries’,	  competing	  constructs	  of	  modern	  womanhood	  and	  manhood, and what/who constituted western and non-western at different points in time, to strike various patriarchal bargains.   Their contribution was not only influenced by wider socio-political factors, but by individual experiences, through the intersectionality of their class, race, and gender, which often led to competing definitions of gender, nationalism, and national identity.  Thus, it was not purely that changing forms of patriarchy emphasised certain definitions of authenticity, but also how women interacted and negotiated bargains around these definitions of authenticity, and in response to changing social and political contexts, that decided their fate. 
                                                 51 Badran,	  ‘Competing	  Agenda:	  Feminists,	  Islam	  and	  the	  State	  in	  Nineteenth-and Twentieth 
Century	  Egypt’,	  in	  Deniz	  Kandiyoti	  (eds.)	  Women, Islam and the State, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 209. 52 Joan	  Wallach	  Scott,	  ‘Gender:	  A	  Useful	  Category	  of	  Historical	  Analysis’,	  The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 91, No. 5, December 1986. 
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 Scholars writing about the interaction of imperialism and nationalism have pointed to the importance of constructed ideas of westernisation, modernisation, feminism, and culture.  Edward Said argued that opposition and 
resistance	  to	  Imperialism	  were	  articulated	  together	  on	  ‘a	  largely	  although	  
disputed	  terrain	  provided	  by	  culture’,	  highlighting	  the	  centrality	  of	  women’s	  movements in this context.53  Leila Ahmed argued that the discourse of 
‘patriarchal	  colonialism’,	  through	  advocates	  like	  Lord	  Cromer	  in	  Egypt,	  used	  
women’s	  status	  to	  attack	  colonised societies, and by doing so tainted their movements as inauthentic or ‘westernised’	  agents	  of	  Imperialism.54  Uma Narayan and Deniz Kandiyoti pointed to how definitions of westernisation 
varied	  with	  ‘time,	  place,	  and	  community’55, and often also reflected internal struggles to do with class, religion, and ethnicity within the nation itself.56  Khater and Nelson also pointed to class as a historically developing term, rather than a static idea.57  Similarly to changing definitions of westernisation and class and their gender implications, Leila Ahmed has argued that the meaning of gender in Islam is not fixed, but historically derived.58  Abdullahi An-Na’im	  has	  pointed to how the Shari‘a itself reflects specific historical interpretations of the 
Qur’an and Sunna.59  Badran correspondingly points to the historically changing 
definitions	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘secular’	  and	  ‘religious’	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.60   
                                                 53 E. Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London: Vintage, 1994), p.24. 54 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, p.243. 55 Narayan, Dislocating Cultures, p. 28. 56 Kandiyoti,	  ‘Identity	  and	  its	  Discontents,	  p.53. 57 Khater	  and	  Nelson,	  ‘Al-Harakah Al-Nissa’iyah’. 58 Leila Ahmed,	  ‘Women and Gender in Islam, p. 236. 59 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im,	  Abdullahi,‘Human Rights in the Muslim World: Political Conditions 
and Scriptural Imperatives: A Preliminary Inquiry', Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 2,1990. 60 Badran,	  ‘Between	  Secular	  and	  Islamic	  Feminism/s,	  pp.	  6-28. 
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 These scholars are among many that argue ideological definitions of culture, modernism, secularism, westernisation, nationalism, Islam, feminism, social class, etc, are not static concepts, but changing discourses made up of conflicting and variable notions.  Since these discourses, which influence ideas of authenticity are not givens, and since the notion of gender within such discourses is not fixed, gendered notions of authenticity are similarly not givens, but evolving discourses that change over time and according to complex socio-political factors.  Arguments about whether or not feminist developments in such societies were/are authentic	  can	  only	  be	  made	  when	  notions	  of	  ‘cultural	  
authenticity’	  are	  misleadingly validated as static.   
This thesis examines how the notion of cultural authenticity changed over time to argue that feminist ideas developed intrinsically as part of the cosmopolitan processes of modernisation and nationalism in Egypt and Iran, which it mutually influenced and shaped, and that as it developed, so did the notion of feminism as a western import.  Notions of feminism and/or feminism as a western import were shaped by cultural tensions at the heart of modernisation and anti-imperialist movements and the different discourses and definitions they promoted.  These discourses not only changed in response to external socio-political factors, but were also influenced by how intra-communal factors such as gender, class, race, and ethnicity intersected with each other in different societies and groups.  These ideological struggles were indicative of political power plays between oppositional forces, both external and internal, who all used constructed ideas of authenticity, and the gender constructs they 
promoted,	  often	  framed	  within	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  ‘West	  versus	  East’,	  to	  assert	  their political power.  Once again throughout this period, women are often seen 
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seeking the role of cultural carriers and symbols of national culture, as part of changing patriarchal bargains about what was authentic and what/who constituted appropriate models of womanhood.   
 
Methodology 
In a part of the world where access to undiscovered historical records is unlikely given the political climate and the extreme difficulty that international researchers face in accessing national archives and libraries, particularly in Iran where such access is virtually impossible, a critical re-reading and re-interpretation of available sources is crucial.  Iranian writers Panah and Shahidian have argued that the lack of primary sources on women in Iran, particularly over the last 100 years, explains the ‘patchwork	  nature	  of	  Iranian	  
women’s	  history’.61  Yet, Najmabadi argues that, the problem is not a lack of sources, but the lack of any gender analysis of available sources.  She affirms that 
her	  work	  on	  the	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  the	  Daughters	  of	  Quchan’	  was	  not	  based on any new primary or historical material, but upon a new reading of the same material used by others writing about the Iranian Constitutional Revolution.62   
 This thesis uses a varied combination of primary material selected based on the analytical perspectives it uses to investigate historical developments.  By triangulating a wide variety of primary material and by applying a more critical methodology for the reading, or re-reading of such sources, original arguments, both country-specific and comparative about	  women’s	  discourses	  over	  this	  period are made.   
                                                 61 Panah, p. 8; Najmabadi, Hikayat, p. 182 62 Najmabadi, Hikayat, p. 182. 
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Literary and post-colonial	  theorist	  Edward	  Said	  argued	  that	  ‘narrative 
itself	  is	  the	  representation	  of	  power’,	  and	  that	  authors	  are	  ‘in	  the	  history	  of	  their	  societies’,	  being	  affected,	  albeit	  in	  ‘different	  measure’,	  by	  the	  social	  changes	  and	  experiences that form that history.63  Thus, a critical reading of texts, from official state documents, journal publications, to life-writing requires an analysis of what was included in that writing as well as what was excluded from it,64 to illuminate what forces were in effect at the time, and what affects they had on particular social groups and/or individuals.  Post-colonial and transnational feminist theorist, Chandra Talpede	  Mohanty	  has	  argued	  that	  	  ‘history	  and	  memory are woven through numerous genres: fictional texts, oral history, poetry, as well as testimonial narratives-not just what counts as scholarly or 
academic	  (‘real?’)	  historiography’.65 Autobiographies can thus provide alternative narratives, to help historians cover areas where there are archival 
gaps	  or	  where	  there	  has	  been	  a	  ‘re-writing	  of	  historical	  memory’	  by	  power	  systems such as a colonial state,66or patriarchal nation states.   Moreover, by highlighting that	  ‘writing	  itself	  is	  an	  activity	  which	  is	  marked	  by	  class	  and	  ethnic	  
position’67questions about which or what type of audience such texts were written for become highly relevant to any understanding of such sources.   
Discussing	  women’s	  biographical	  writing in late 19th/early 20th century 
Egypt,	  Marilyn	  Booth	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘biography	  was	  one	  means	  by	  which	  women might assert subject positions within the nationalist collectivity, writing themselves into life narratives that represented the sorts of subject positions 
                                                 63 E. Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin, 2003); Culture and Imperialism, p. 24, p. 330. 64 Ibid, p. 79. 65 Mohanty, Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, p. 36.  66 Ibid. 67 Ibid, p. 33. 
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they	  envisioned	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  daughters’.68  Linking this argument to those of Said and Mohanty, one question that arises is how does memory become a historical source that can illuminate the cultural, political, and economic processes	  that	  defined	  the	  author’s	  lifetime?	  	  Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson argue that in autobiographical	  writing,	  the	  author	  becomes	  both	  the	  ‘observing	  
subject	  and	  the	  object	  of	  investigation’, and is thus addressing an audience they 
want	  to	  convince	  of	  ‘their	  version	  of	  experience’.69  Historian, Jermey D Popkin has argued that	  ‘life	  writing	  ‘does	  not	  have	  to	  engage	  the	  moments	  of	  shared	  experience that historians identify as significant in the collective time of an era, 
nation,	  or	  culture,	  or	  present	  the	  ‘big	  picture’	  expected	  of	  a	  historian’.70  
Yet,	  autobiographical	  works	  link	  the	  ‘big	  picture’	  to	  real	  people,	  their	  lives, and the effects that historical events had on them.  Reading the text not only shows what the author wanted their particular audience to know, but also 
what	  they	  didn’t	  want	  known.	  	  	  When	  such	  writing	  is	  triangulated	  with	  other	  primary material, it allows historians to arrive at a fuller picture of the forces in effect at the time and how personal subjectivities negotiated around such forces, and what this tells us about the ‘bigger	  historical	  picture’.  In this context, Smith 
and	  Watson’s	  arguments	  on	  the	  ‘emphasis	  of	  reading’	  are	  extremely	  useful.	  	   
Rather than view it as a story to be proved or falsified, the emphasis of reading shifts from assessing and verifying knowledge to observing processes of communicative exchange and understanding.  It redefines 
the	  terms	  of	  what	  we	  call	  ‘truth’:	  autobiographical	  writing	  cannot	  be	  read	  solely as either factual truth or simple fact.71   
                                                 68 Marilyn Booth, May Her Likes be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 14/xiv. 69 Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives: Reading 
Autobiography, (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 2010), pp. 1, 7. 70 Ibid, p. 13. p. 727. 71 Ibid, p.17. 
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However, the more our critical reading of such sources improves, the more autobiographical sources can be used to demonstrate additional, or different 
‘truths’	  and	  perspectives,	  which	  when	  combined	  with	  other	  historical	  sources	  can add another layer in our understanding of the past, and its implications for the future. 
This thesis uses life-writing, and autobiographical writing in particular, to explore changing expressions of culture, cultural resistance, and patriarchal resistance, albeit for certain groups and classes of people, to shed light on the subjectivities of such complex socio-political processes.  This type of primary 
source	  provides	  a	  particular	  insight	  into	  the	  author’s	  cultural	  and	  political	  experiences, what they selected to project of those experiences at the time of writing, and thus how they wanted to be remembered for their actions, by whom, and why.  It therefore offers an alternative view of the dominant power 
players	  and	  social	  factors	  that	  shaped	  the	  author’s	  choices,	  with	  whom	  the	  author is sometimes negotiating patriarchal bargains and/or resisting and straining them through the act of writing.  For instance, it could be argued that the published tracts and autobiographical writing of pioneering female educator Nabawiya Musa constituted both acts of resistance and negotiation with male nationalists and conservative patriarchal forces, whilst the writings of Doria Shafiq and Nawal el-Saadawi constituted acts of resistance and rebellion that often transgressed existing patriarchal bargains, making clear what the limits of those bargains were at the time. 
 
 
 33 
Sources 
Primary sources used are highlighted in each chapter introduction.  Main sources are summarised below according to different analytical perspectives. 
Sources	  on	  Women’s groups	  and	  Individual	  Women’s	  perspectives 
Archive collections at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, 
Women’s	  Library	  Archives	  in	  London,	  American University in Cairo, United Kingdom National Archives, United States National Archives and The British Newspaper Archives are combined with publications, tracts, letters, poetry, and autobiographical work by ideologically diverse Iranian and Egyptian female intellectuals and activists, like Sedigheh Dowlatabadi, Bibi Khanom Astarabadi, Taj al-Saltaneh, Qurrat al-‘Ayn, Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, Afsal Vaziri, Sattareh Farmanfarmaian, Ashraf Dehgani, Ashraf Pahlavi, Shirin Ebadi, Azar Nafisi, Mahnaz Afkhami, and Zaynab Fawwaz, May Ziyadah, Malak Hifni Nasif, Nabawiyah Musa,	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi, Doria Shafiq, Inji Aflatun, Munirah Thabit, Ruz al-Yusuf, Nawal el-Saadawi, Amina al-Said,	  Bint	  al	  Shati’,	  Jehan Sadat, Zaynab al-Ghazali and Fatima Abdel Hadi.  Iranian and Egyptian women’s	  organisation 
pamphlets	  and	  statutes,	  and	  relevant	  women’s	  journals like Zaban-i-Zanan, 
L’Egyptienne, Bint al-Nil magazine are combined with newspapers sources throughout the period to get a sense of key issues at the time, and how women chose to present and negotiate them.  These are supplemented with archival and published writings, speeches, and interviews of important figures such as Mohammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Tahia Nasser, ‘Abd	  al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Farah Diba, Fatemeh Pakravan, Manouchehr Ganji, and Mehdi Rezai. These varied primary sources are used to 
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get a deeper understanding of men’s bargaining motives and to assess the growing competition and rivalry that developed between female activists over 
their	  different	  views	  on	  women’s	  rights, nationalism, female activism, and cultural authenticity. 
Sources on Broader Socio-political Movements 
The	  writings	  and	  publications	  of	  Rafi‘	  Rifa‘ah	  al-Tahtawi, Mohammad Abduh, Qasim Amin, Mansur Fahmi, Muhammad Farid Wajdi, Taha Hussein, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abdel Salam Faraj in Egypt, and Abbas Effendi, Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Nabil Zarandi, Ahmad Kasravi, Ali Shariati, Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, Ruh-Allah Khomeini, The Tudeh party of Iran, the 
Iranian	  People’s Mojahedin (Mojahedin-i-Khalgh),	  the	  People’s	  Fadayan (Fadayan-i-Khalgh), CARI (Committee Against Repression in Iran), are analyzed to get a deeper understanding of ideological debates that helped transform notions of nationalism, womanhood, and cultural authenticity. 
Sources on International Observers and Foreign Policy 
Orientatlist writing on Egypt and Iran is used to help assess how imperialist views affected notions of cultural authenticity, modern nationalism, and gender norms.  These include the writing of Sophia Poole, Ellen Chennells, Lucy Duff Gordon, Elizabeth Cooper, Thomas Russell Pasha, Lord Cromer, Valentine Chirol, Edward Granville Browne, Morgan Shuster, and George Nathaniel Curzon.   British Foreign Office documents related to the political views and activities of Egyptian women, the Wafdist Women Central Committee, Saffiya Zaghlul, Esther 
Fahmy	  Wissa,	  and	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi are used to shed light on both colonial attitudes to the movement, and the nationalist activities of women during the 
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early 20th century.  Reports of International Alliance of Women (IAW) held at the 
Women’s	  Library	  Archives	  are	  used	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  international, Egyptian, and Iranian feminists, and to assess the development and implications of constructed ‘East/West’ dichotomies at different points in time.  Reports and correspondences between the Egyptian Feminist Union, Arab Feminist Union, and the IAW are used to highlight changing Egyptian and Arab perspectives on this relationship.  British and US National Archives are used in conjunction with Egyptian and Iranian sources to gain greater insight on foreign policy over particular periods, and to assess how this affected or altered notions of authentic culture and womanhood.  These are supplemented by press publications throughout the period, held at The British Library Newspapers, International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, American University in Cairo Archives, UK National Archives, US National Archives, and various digital newspaper archives.   
 
Structure  
Chapter 1, Founding Mothers and Fathers (1800s-1900s) will show how the modernisation reforms of Mohammad Ali challenged the educational leadership of the Egyptian ulama,	  and	  motivated	  more	  extensive	  debates	  on	  the	  women’s	  
question	  than	  in	  Iran,	  where	  the	  Qajari	  state’s	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  female	  education and the persistent power of the Iranian clergy limited such discourses.  
The	  first	  section	  analyses	  Imperialism’s	  role in influencing notions of cultural authenticity and how European traveller accounts used notions of European tutelage to justify imperialist intervention in both countries.  It additionally 
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explores the way Qurrat al-‘Ayn challenged patriarchal definitions of Iranian womanhood through a rejection of orthodox Iranian Shi‘ism.  Themes of women as symbols of national purity are used to analyse how most Iranian men labelled Qurrat al-‘Ayn morally, and thus nationally, impure.  Pointing to how myths and legends are often revised to authenticate new discourses, it is argued that as definitions of Iranian womanhood changed, some Iranian feminists in the late 20th century reinterpreted Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  ‘legend’	  to define her rebellion as a pioneering form of Iranian feminism.  In the second section it is shown how male and female reformers had to navigate around the competing patriarchal forces of imperialism, the state, and the conservative religious establishment to advance their goals.  The tensions this created led to many limitations in the arguments of men like Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh in Iran, and	  Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi and Qasim Amin in Egypt.  In Iran, Bibi Khanum and Taj al-Saltaneh	  used	  different	  ‘gradual	  
change’	  approaches	  to	  barter on common ground with constitutionalist men around notions of female education as nationalist activity. In Egypt, Malak Hifni Nasif, May Ziyadah, and Nabawiya Musa struck bargains around the arguments of modernist men, while simultaneously challenging their limits on	  women’s	  reforms.   
Chapter 2, Feminism and Nationalism (1890s-1920s) looks at the 
relationship	  between	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement and early nationalist movements in these countries, namely the 1906-1911 Iranian Constitutional Revolution and 1919-1922 Egyptian Revolution/independence struggle.  It will 
show	  how	  different	  notions	  of	  women’s	  purity	  and	  modesty	  were tied to new definitions of womanhood, which intersected with nationalist discourses of authenticity.  It will show how Egyptian and Iranian women used nationalist 
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language to exercise their own agency through organisations like the Egyptian Wafdist	  Women’s	  Central	  Committee and The National Ladies Society in Iran, to negotiate bargains with nationalist men around new socio-political roles.  It will argue in contrast to Jayawardena, that women did question traditional patriarchal structures within the family, but that their bargaining strategies were shaped differently by the specific context out of which they operated.  In both countries, men appeared to encourage	  women’s participation in anti-colonial/foreign policy contexts more than their participation in domestic politics.   
Chapter 3, Changing Bargains: From Nationalism to Internationalism in 
Egypt, and Independent Activity to State feminism in Iran (1920s-1940s).  This chapter looks at Iranian	  women’s	  activism	  under Reza Shah to show that state co-optation was a form of patriarchal bargaining for some activists, who chose to exchange their gradual change approach for more revolutionary change through Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  Project.  Similarly, the EFU struck common ground with nationalist men over notions	  of	  ‘educated	  motherhood’, whilst it challenged patriarchal limits on women’s	  higher	  education	  and	  travel	  abroad. Moreover, women presented themselves as cultural ambassadors through their international feminist activities as a way of questioning patriarchal limits on their political roles.  The EFU in particular, by presenting itself as a forum for cultural exchange between	  ‘East	  and	  West’, defined itself as a national and social necessity, signalling to nationalist men that it could contribute to both foreign and domestic policy.  The EFU’s	  employment	  of	  pan-Arab discourse in the context of the Palestinian-Zionist conflict drew revised lines around the constructed opposition of ‘Eastern versus Western’ feminism.  Encouraged to 
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view the International Alliance of Women (IAW) as a colonial force in this context, the EFU moved towards a regional-Arab alliance as the better-perceived bargain at this point in time.   
Chapter 4, Feminisms, Class, and Political Diversification (1940s-1950s) will show that elite women in both countries drew class lines around their leadership	  of	  the	  women’s	  movement.	  	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening project in Iran reaffirmed	  elite	  women’s	  leadership	  of	  the	  movement	  through	  the	  
Kanoun Banovan, while his Unveiling Decree helped turn veiling into a symbol of political resistance and authenticity against the Pahlavi state.  A new generation of women from more diverse social backgrounds began to challenge elite women from political, cultural, and class perspectives.  Despite growing competition, this chapter will also show that ideologically diverse activists joined forces over common feminist and/or nationalist goals when it constituted the better-perceived bargain, such as the 1951 Egyptian	  women’s	  march	  on	  parliament	  and	  1952 suffrage petition in Iran.  However, where ideological differences or actions appeared to threaten revised patriarchal bargains, women diversified and criticised each other, as illustrated by criticism of Doria Shafiq after the 1951 ICW conference.  It is argued that the political instability, revolutionary environment, and renewed anti-colonial battles that characterised this period in both countries rendered unification over nationalism the better patriarchal bargain for most female activists at the time.   
Chapter 5, Nationalisation and Co-optation: Mohammad Reza Shah and 
Gamal Abdel Nasser (1950s-1970s) will show that in both countries Nationalisation policies promoted anti-westernisation, but that definitions of 
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anti-westernisation developed differently.  The	  CIA’s	  role	  in the overthrow of 
Mossadegh’s	  regime	  helped redefine notions of western imperialism as 
‘American’, while British and French reaction to nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
encouraged	  Nasser’s	  turn towards the Soviet Union, promoting a more socialist, Arab, and anti-capitalist model of Egyptian nationalism.  It will also show that while the Shah and Nasser granted women greater social and political rights, both leaders promoted women’s	  political	  position as secondary; the former by primarily defining them as wives and mothers, and the latter by emphasising a balance between familial and national duties in the 1956 Constitution, and 
‘different’	  political/military duties for men and women.  Some women negotiated new bargains around the different modernising impulses of the Shah and Nasser to advance their own goals.  However, these revised patriarchal bargains were not necessarily acceptable to all state feminists, as illustrated by Nezhat	  Nafisi’s	  outspoken criticism against the 1967 Family Planning Act, and Amina al-Said’s	  criticism of some Egyptian state policies.   
Chapter 6, The Political Opposition and Alternative Models of 
Womanhood (1960s-1970s) will show how certain events and policies in both countries alienated people from the state, and helped spur the opposition towards militancy and increasing violence.  These changes compounded the portrayal of state feminism as inauthentic, and encouraged some women to strike patriarchal bargains with the opposition for spaces that were otherwise being denied by the state.  Within the Iranian opposition, themes of female loyalty and sacrifice were equated with arrest and martyrdom as part of new patriarchal bargains with revolutionary groups.  It will be shown how desire for arrest and martyrdom within the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh was a manifestation of 
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these themes realised through Shariati’s	  revolutionised models of Fatima and Zaynab.  Whilst exalting notions of female sacrifice and endurance of hardship, it will be show that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood/Sisterhood promoted different models of authentic Islamic womanhood.  The case of al-Ghazali is compared to women in the Muslim Sisterhood to illustrate how al-Ghazali was able to strike exceptional patriarchal bargains with Muslim Brotherhood leaders based on modernist Islamic notions of religious equality in da’wa, as well as modern nationalist notions of educated motherhood.  However, despite initially putting forward a more independent, political definition of Islamic womanhood than Muslim Sisters like Fatima Abdel-Hadi, increasing state crackdowns on the Brotherhood and her own Muslim Ladies Group made joining and merging her activities with the Brotherhood the better bargain in her view by the 1960s.   
Chapter 7, The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and The Fall of Sadat (1970s-
1980s) shows how the state and opposition groups entered into ‘patriarchal battles’ using their different definitions of womanhood and cultural authenticity.  
In	  both	  cases,	  the	  state	  promoted	  its	  women’s	  reforms against	  the	  opposition’s	  alternative models of womanhood.  However, it will be argued that by employing a dual strategy of compromise and repression against the opposition, and compromising women’s	  reforms as part of conciliatory gestures, the Egyptian and Iranian states validated contradictory notions of womanhood, undermining their own state feminist projects.  Moreover, although veiling formed a crucial part of ‘patriarchal battles’ between the opposition and the state, the re-veiling phenomenon in Iran and Egypt formed part of very different patriarchal bargains with the opposition.  It was only in Egypt that veiling formed part of actual bargains struck between women and the Islamic opposition who wished to 
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pursue their university education, whilst projecting a revised authentic model of Egyptian womanhood.  In Iran, secular women donned the veil as a temporary bargain with the opposition, as an anti-Pahlavi symbol of revolution, and did not necessarily promote the act of veiling as authentic outside this context.  This was illustrated in March 1979, when thousands of women took to the streets to protest Khomeini’s	  enforced	  veiling	  law.	  	   
Throughout the following chapters, this thesis will explore how notions of cultural authenticity shifted as they intersected with revised definitions of womanhood and changing patriarchal bargains.  It seeks to investigate how these complex processes, which are continuously in motion, ensure the non-static nature of historical figures and events, which can be revised, re-modelled, and re-drawn upon at later times to authenticate new discourses and ideas.  New and	  revised	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  activism,	  work,	  social,	  and	  political	  rights	  will	  be assessed in line with these changes to understand better the tensions and overlapping factors at the heart of these processes, and how they affected the development of women’s	  rights	  in	  these	  countries.	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Chapter 1 
 Founding Mothers and Fathers (1800s-1900s) 
 
The development of feminist discourse in Egypt and Iran can be traced back to early modernist and anti-imperialist debates, which raised and placed the 
woman’s	  question within emergent notions of nationalism and national identity.  Nations and national identities like other constructed notions are not static, but changing1, hybrids of identity2, formed of multiple, multi-layered, often conflicting cultural, linguistic, ethnic, gender, class, religious, and political identities.3  Moreover, scholars have pointed to the role myths and historical memories play in defining the nation and national identity, and how culture or cultural rituals are used to sustain such constructions to maintain national unity.4  Late 19th and early 20th century intellectual debates in Egypt and Iran, and changes to their political and ruling structures led to socio-economic and ideological developments, which affected women of different classes in different ways.  In Egypt, the early modernising policies of Muhammad Ali coupled with Islamic modernist debates encouraged discussions about	  women’s	  rights,	  education, and public roles.  In Iran, the inter-play between religious anti-Qajar movements and cultural imperialism led to transgression of gender norms in 
some	  exceptional	  cases,	  and	  limited	  debates	  about	  women’s	  status	  prior	  to	  the	  Constitutional Revolution of 1906. 
                                                 1 Otto	  Bauer,	  ‘The	  Nation’	  in Tamar Mayer, p.1. 2 Ruth Wodak, p.11. 3 Anthony D. Smith, p.4; Tamar Mayer, pp. 4-5. 4 Anthony D. Smith, p.11; Tamar Mayer, p.9; Najmabadi, Hikayat, , pp, 2, 7.  
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This chapter is split into three sections and relies on the published and unpublished	  writing,	  memoirs,	  and	  tracts	  of	  early	  women’s	  rights	  activists,	  the	  writings of modernist thinkers, European traveller narratives, and incorporates some relevant press and newspaper sources of the period.  The first section analyzes imperialism’s	  role in influencing notions of cultural authenticity, and 
how	  this	  affected	  and	  limited	  modernist,	  nationalist,	  and	  women’s	  rights	  discourses and activists of the period.  In the first instance, building on the arguments of scholars like Edward Said5, Uma Narayan6, and Chandra Mohanty7 it is argued that European traveller accounts of Egyptian and Iranian women validated imperialist notions of cultural superiority, making imperialist interference seem more justifiable by rendering notions of European tutelage interchangeable with imperialist intervention and control.   
In the second section, the case of Qurrat al-‘Ayn and Babism in Iran is used to illustrate how imperialist interference confused and compromised the contribution of certain revolutionary figures and expressions of modernism.  This chapter argues secondly, that while Qurrat al-‘Ayn was a revolutionary figure who challenged gender relations and certain definitions of Iranian womanhood, by doing so as an explicit rejection of orthodox Shi‘a Islam, and by garnering imperialist sympathy and admiration, she became a controversial figure that her immediate successors chose to repudiate in order not to be 
similarly	  cast	  out	  as	  ‘un-Iranian’.  Moreover, her public preaching to male audiences and abandonment of her familial duties to pursue her religio-political activism, pushed patriarchal limits within Iranian society, including amongst 
                                                 5 E. Said, Orientalismm; Culture and Imperialism. 6 Narayan, Dislocating Cultures. 7 Talpade Mohanty, Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism. 
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most Babis, too far.  Consequently, to avoid the same fate, later reformers, argued for gradual change to gender roles and relations, stressing continuity and authenticity through Islamic examples.  However, it is additionally argued that as definitions of authenticity and Iranian womanhood changed over time, this allowed some Iranian feminists in the late 20th century to reinterpret Qurrat al-
‘Ayn’s	  legend and define her independent actions and religious rebellion as an early form of Iranian feminism.  This case provides a significant example of how myths and legends	  are	  revised	  and	  reinterpreted	  as	  ‘authentic	  history’	  to	  validate new nationalist and feminist discourses.  It highlights how notions of authenticity are often formed from a combination of both facts and imagined ideas, and how this selective process changes over time, so that what was once deemed inauthentic, is later argued to be authentic. 
In the second section recurrent	  themes	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  women’s	  bodies as representations of national purity, boundary markers of the ‘true’	  community,	  and women as cultural carriers8 are used to assess the way that modernists and those who opposed their ideas articulated their positions.  It is argued that in both countries male and female reformers manoeuvred around competing patriarchal forces of imperialism, the state, and the conservative religious establishment in order to advance their ideas; the terms of their bargains were influenced by tensions resulting from their multiple identities and specific situations.  It is argued that these tensions created many contradictions and limitations in the arguments of modernist men like Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh in Iran, and	  Rifa‘ah Rafi‘	  al-Tahtawi and Qasim Amin in Egypt.  Women in 
                                                 8 Peterson, p. 47; Tamar Mayer, pp. 7, 10, 18, Chatterjee; p. 243, Floya Anthias, Jo Campling, Nira Yuval-Davis, pp. 85, 143, 155; Kandiyoti, Identity and its Discontents, pp. 49, 51;Yuval Davis, Gender and Nation, (London: Sage, 1997), p. 45-46. 
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particular were engaged in a combined strategy of negotiating their demands around these competing patriarchal forces as well as the patriarchal limits of modernist men, at the same time as challenging those very limits.   
Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  choice	  to	  pursue	  revolutionary	  activism	  over	  her	  domestic duties proved too transgressive in 1850s Iran, highlighting the patriarchal	  limits	  on	  women’s	  activity	  at	  the	  time.	  	  In	  contrast,	  during	  the	  1890s,	  
Bibi	  Khanum’s	  inclusion	  of	  domestic	  subjects	  alongside	  scientific	  education	  for	  girls supported modernist arguments that female education would produce better mothers, while Taj al-Saltaneh’s	  definition	  of	  female	  education	  as	  nationalist activity in the 1900s supported ideas of the budding constitutional movement.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  Bibi	  Khanum’s	  ‘gradual	  change’	  approach	  and	  Taj	  al-
Saltaneh’s	  actions were active attempts to strike common ground with dominant and changing patriarchal discourses of the period, in order to advance their own 
women’s	  rights	  discourses	  without	  being socially outcast.  Similarly, in Egypt, Malak Hifni Nasif, May Ziyadah,	  and	  Nabawiya	  Musa’s vocal	  support	  for	  women’s	  education, overt criticism of polygamy, and gradual change approach to unveiling, mirrored the arguments of modernist men like Tahtawi and Amin.  At the same time, their calls	  for	  women’s	  own	  agency	  within	  the	  reform	  movement	  and questioning of modernist men’s motives and leadership, challenged the 
latter’s	  patriarchal limits and authority.   
Finally,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  Qajari	  state’s	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  women’s	  education and the persistent power of the Iranian clergy reduced the bargaining power of women in Iran compared to Egypt.  In contrast, the introduction of scientific education and establishment of the first girls schools by the 
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modernising Egyptian state under Mohammad Ali challenged the Egyptian ulama as educational leaders, motivating reformers to revise gender bargains and increasing women’s	  bargaining	  power	  in	  this	  context.	  	  This helps explain the 
more	  extensive	  and	  expansive	  nature	  of	  women’s	  rights	  debates	  in	  Egypt,	  compared to Iran at this stage. 
 
Section 1: Imperialist Narratives and Indigenous Realities 
This section looks at the writing and traveller diaries of European visitors to Egypt and Iran in order to explore how orientalist or imperialist views shaped notions of cultural authenticity and modernist, nationalist, and	  women’s	  rights	  discourses in these countries. Extending the arguments of scholars like Edward Said9, Uma Narayan10, and Chandra Mohanty11 it is argued that European accounts of Egyptian and Iranian women validated imperialist notions of cultural superiority, making European interference seem more justifiable by rendering notions of European tutelage interchangeable with imperialist intervention and control.   
1.1 Orientalism in Egypt 
Egypt’s	  birth	  as	  a	  modern	  state	  began	  during	  the	  early	  19th century, with the introduction of secularisation and technological advancements as part of Muhammad	  Ali’s	  modernisation program.  These included education reforms, with some small steps taken to initiate and encourage female education.  
However,	  women’s	  education	  was	  still	  largely	  limited	  to	  royal	  families	  or	  the	  
                                                 9  E. Said, Orientalism; Culture and Imperialism. 10 Narayan, Dislocating Cultures. 11 Mohanty, Third World Women. 
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elite, urban, land-owning classes, who could afford to employ private educators.  Thus, the majority of elite women, mainly belonging to the Turko-Circassian or Coptic upper classes, began following the example of royal households by employing European governesses to privately educate their daughters within their strict harems.12  Muhammad Kamal Yahya and Buthayna Sha‘ban have both pointed to the distorted views of harem life promulgated by Europeans and orientalist writers.13  Yayha argues that	  most	  European	  men	  ‘never	  heard	  the word harem without their imagination going to dancing, singing, and pools of pure water surrounded by	  virgins	  and	  girls	  swimming…even though nothing of this sort of imagined idea existed within Egyptian harems’.14  European women who visited the harems painted a far more depressing and harsh picture of harem life, but often indulged in similar simplifications and generalisations. 
Sophia Poole, sister of famous orientalist ethnographer Edward William Lane15, visited Egyptian harems between 1842 and 1846, describing strict and 
depressing	  surroundings	  and	  noting	  that	  ‘upper	  class’	  women	  were	  guarded	  
even	  more	  strictly	  than	  their	  ‘middle-class’	  counterparts.16  She wrote that the 
majority	  of	  harem	  women	  could	  neither	  read	  nor	  write:	  ‘It	  is	  very	  grievous	  that	  the women in general are	  merely	  instructed	  in	  handiwork…few	  of	  the	  ladies	  can	  
read	  and	  write	  even	  their	  own	  language.	  	  I	  know	  however,	  some	  exceptions’.17  On the other hand, she also wrote that women were not ignorant of political events.  
                                                 12 The Egyptian Gazette, 1 March 1893; The Egyptian Daily Post, 4 May 1904. 13 Sha‘ban, p. 102. 14 Kamal Yaha, p. 31.  15 Reina Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), p.18. 16 Sophia Poole, The Englishwoman in Egypt, (London: Eurospan, 2003), p. 116. 17 Ibid, p. 120. 
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I was surprised, during my second visit to the hareem of Habeeb Effendi, 
to	  find	  the	  ladies…immersed	  in	  politics,	  and	  painfully	  anxious	  on	  account	  of the difference of opinion, which has arisen between the Emperor of Russia and their cousin the Sultan.18    The harem system in Egypt was related to class status rather than religion.  Poole described the customs practiced in a Christian harem in Egypt in a letter written in 1845,19 as did Lucie Duff Gordon much later in 1902, writing that ‘the	  Copts have but one wife, but they shut her up much closer	  than	  the	  Arabs’.20  
Ellen	  Chennells,	  English	  governess	  to	  Khedive	  Ismail	  Pasha’s	  daughter	  several	  
decades	  later,	  validated	  the	  ‘strict’	  and	  ‘depressing’	  picture	  painted	  by	  other	  
European	  women	  like	  Poole	  when	  she	  wrote	  ‘There was to me inexpressible melancholy in these harems; there was a want of air and light, of recreation and 
of	  intellectual	  employment’.21   
The	  memoirs	  of	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi, although covering a later period from 1879-1924, provide a rare, indigenous account of harem life among the Turko-Circassian Egyptian	  elites.	  	  Although	  Sha‘rawi writes of the anguish and depression she felt at being denied the same level of education as her brother, her account challenges those of Chennells and Poole by highlighting the 
education	  and	  ‘intellectual	  employment’	  she	  received within the harem.  
My passion increased all the more because of the itinerant poet, Sayyida Khadija al-Maghribiyya…observing Sayyida Khadija convinced me that, with learning, women could be the equals of men if not surpass them.22  
                                                 18 Ibid, p. 126. 19 Ibid, p. 197. 20  Lady Lucie Duff Gordon, Letters	  from	  Egypt:	  Lady	  Duff	  Gordon’s	  Letters from Egypt, (London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1902), p. 30. 21 Ellen Chennells, Recollections of an Egyptian Princess by her English Governess, (London: William Blackwood, 1893), p. 125. 22 Huda Sha’rawi, Mudhakkirati, Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist (1879-1924), ed. Margot Badran, (London: Virago, 1986), p. 40-42. 
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While both Poole and Chennells pointed to several institutions set up for the education of young girls during this period, they emphasised the majority were missionary schools.   
Muhammad Ali had given orders as early as 1820 to introduce foreign languages to government schools in an effort to modernise the curriculum.  Moreover, the first medical and private schools were founded in 1828, and by 1831 the government had chosen a handful of girls to study midwifery.23 Sawsan 
Naji	  has	  argued	  that	  Egyptian	  women’s	  emergence	  into	  the	  work	  force	  was	  specifically associated with this establishment of the Sina School of Midwifery, in 
the 1830s.24  Thus, the modernisation policies of Muhammad Ali helped revise the 
terms  of  existing  patriarchal  bargains  on  women’s  roles,  particularly with regards to 
female  education  and  ‘appropriate’  forms  of  ‘women-related’  work,  like  midwifery.   In 1845, Poole visited a Coptic school that had been in operation since 1835, which had twenty-five	  pupils,	  ‘three-hundred girls have left since the year [1835], able to read and write...these girls are of different religions, like the 
boys’.25  Chennells, writing later between	  1871	  and	  1876,	  argued	  that	  ‘the Khedive, to do him justice,	  was	  anxious	  to	  raise	  the	  position	  of	  women’.26  She 
described	  a	  school	  he	  had	  set	  up,	  ‘they	  were	  children	  from	  all	  classes, but put on 
a	  perfect	  equality…and on subsequent visits I saw the girls examined in reading, writing, geography, and arithmetic.27  This was one of the first state schools for 
                                                 23 ‘Education	  in	  Egypt’,	  The Egyptian Mail, 22 February 1917.  24 Sawsan Naji, al-Marʼah	  fī	  al-mirʼah: dirasah naqdiyah lil-riwayah al-nisaʼiyah fi Misr (1888-
1985), (Cairo: al-ʻArabi lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi, 1989), p. 86.   25 Poole, p. 201. 26 Chennells, p. 6. 27 Ibid, p. 255. 
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girls, which had opened under the patronage of Khedive Ismail's third wife, Tchesme Afit Hanim in 1873.28   
Throughout her writings, Chennells stressed that such schools were initiated by the government	  and	  not	  by	  public	  demand.	  ‘The	  expense	  of	  such	  an	  establishment is of course great, and	  it	  all	  falls	  on	  his	  Highness…there is as yet no 
public	  spirit	  in	  the	  country.’29  Yet, the Egyptian modernist movement, the nahda (awakening/ renaissance), had already begun by this point, with the work and intellectual writings of pioneering	  Islamic	  reformer,	  Rifa‘ah al-Tahtawi.  The first of his books, Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Baris (A Profile/Summary of Paris), based on his experiences in Paris and education in modern sciences and enlightenment thought, was in print by the mid 1830s.30  Indeed,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  girl’s	  
school	  mentioned	  above	  coincided	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  Tahtawi’s	  book, al-
Murshid al-Amin lil-Banat wa-al-Banin in 1873 (The Honest Guide for Girls and Boys), which encouraged female education on the basis of Islamic principles.31  By the late 1890s the Abbas Primary School in Cairo had opened a	  girl’s	  section,	  and the Saniyah Teacher Training School for women was in operation.  While Tahtawi was also an employee of the state, the reality of this budding reform 
movement	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  women’s	  press	  by	  the	  1890s32 challenge European generalisations	  about	  Egyptian	  intellectual	  society,	  the	  absence	  of	  ‘public	  spirit’,	  
and	  women’s	  lives in general.  While their accounts provide valuable pictures of 
how	  Europeans	  interpreted	  women’s	  status,	  they	  also	  illustrate	  how	  such	  interpretations were very much governed and clouded by their own belief 
                                                 28 Sha’rawi, Mudhakkirati,, p. 14. 29 Chennells, pp. 255-256. 30 Rifa‘ah Rafi’al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Baris, (Bulaq: 1849). 31 Rifa‘ah Rafi’	  al-Tahtawi, al-Murshid al-Amin lil-Banat wa-al-Banin, (Cairo: Majlis al-A’la lil-Thaqafah, 2002), p. 66. 32 Baron, The Women's Awakening in Egypt, p. 16. 
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systems and prejudices.  Thus, sweeping generalisations and historical omissions point to how western women often applied a colonial or imperialist lens to the subjects they studied.  
1.2 Exoticism in Persia 
In 19th century Iran, the Qajar ruling system, based on a long-standing tribal leadership, faced increasing political and economic losses leading up to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.  The 1828 Torkamanchay Treaty signed between Russia and Iran annexed its northern ports and resulted in extensive political and commercial concessions to Russia.  Similar political and commercial treaties with other western powers negatively affected the majority of Iranian 
classes	  economically	  while	  putting	  a	  small	  minority	  into	  contact	  with	  ‘western’	  ideas.  Increasing commercial travels to Europe exposed some Iranian merchants and state officials to western life and thought, while western travellers, diplomats, and missionaries in Iran spread their ideas throughout the country.33   
In Persia and the Persian Question, British statesman George Nathaniel Curzon, who was Viceroy and Governor-General of India during the late 19th/early 20th century, provided a list of travellers to Persia, showing the increasing numbers of European visitors, envoys, and missionaries in the 19th Century.34  The writing of British female travellers to Persia during the 1890s, such as Ella Sykes, Isabella Bird, and Gertrude Bell, provide strong examples of how imperialist and colonialist narratives drove their descriptions and interpretations of the customs and lifestyles within Persian society.  All three 
                                                 33 Paidar, pp. 27, pp. 42; Camron Michael Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman, (Florida: University Press Florida, 2002), p. 17. 34 George Nathaniel Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol. 1, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1892), pp. 18-20. 
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women	  repeatedly	  expressed	  their	  disproval	  of	  Persian	  women’s	  dress	  and	  
comportment,	  viewing	  them	  as	  testament	  of	  their	  ‘frivolity’35,	  ‘inferiority’	  and	  
‘ignorance’.36  Expressing their disapproval at their use of cosmetics, Bird wrote, 
‘Persian	  ladies	  paint,	  or	  rather	  smear’37, while Bell described the practice as a 
form	  of	  ‘barbarism.’38 Scholars and theorists of orientalism and exoticism have pointed to how exotic descriptions, and the labelling of native customs as 
‘barbaric’,	  as	  seen	  in	  Bird	  and	  Bell’s	  writing,	  helped to construct the imperialist divide of the West and the Orient,	  and	  the	  narrative	  of	  ‘civilised	  versus	  uncivilised’	  to	  represent	  the	  self/other.39  The portrait drawn here of the misery 
of	  Persian	  women’s	  inferiority	  and	  seclusion was emphasised with little exception, and their personages essentialised as unhappy victims, frivolous, ignorant, and child-like,	  in	  need	  of	  guidance	  or	  ‘Christian	  disinfecting’.40   
Yet, education levels of Persian women were not consistent across the country, and harem experiences were not the same for all women.   In an attempt to continue challenging orientalist narratives, Haleh Afshar narrates the story of Sonbol, a black slave within a royal Qajar harem, who later became her nanny.  She argues that for Sonbol, the harem was a positive space compared to the 
outside	  world,	  a	  place	  where	  ‘she	  was	  special’	  and	  appreciated	  as	  a	  companion.41  
                                                 35 Isabella Bird, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan: Including a Summer in the Upper Karun Region 
and a Visit to the Nestorian Rayahs, (London: John Murray, 1891), Vol. 1: pp. 217; Vol. 2: pp.353-354. 36 Ella Sykes, Persia and its People, (New York: The Mcmillan Company, 1910), pp. 196, 199. 37 Bird, Vol.1, pp. 217. 38 Gertrude Bell, Persian Pictures, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1928), p. 80. 39 Wan Roselezam, Wan Yahya, Farah Ghaderi & Kamaruzaman Jusoff, The Exotic Portrayal of Women in Isabella Bird Bishop's Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, Iranian Studies, 45:6, 2012, pp. 779-793.  40 Sykes, p. 208; Bird, Vol. 1, pp.354; Vol. 2, pp. 53; 161, 179.  41 Haleh Afshar, Age, Gender and Slavery in and out of the Persian harem: A different story, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, Vol. 23: 5, 2000, pp. 905-916. 
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Writing	  on	  Persian	  women’s	  education,	  Sykes	  declared	  it	  was	  a	  rare	  thing	  to find a Persian woman who could read and	  write,	  there	  being	  ‘no	  such	  thing	  as	  
a	  girl’s	  school	  in	  the	  whole	  country’.42  In 1907, the pioneering female educator, Bibi Khanum Astarabadi established Dabestan Doshizghan, The School for Girls in Tehran, and advertised for pupils in the newspaper Majlis.43  Although Sykes had travelled to Iran during the 1890s, The School for Girls would have been in 
operation	  for	  three	  years	  before	  Sykes’	  book	  was	  published.	  	  Bird	  who	  had	  travelled and published her accounts by 1891, acknowledged higher levels of education amongst women in Tehran.44  The writings of Bird and Sykes exemplify the type of orientalist writing that Edward Said argued was void of any real understanding of the lives of the subjects they were writing about.45  If female education did not look like western female education, then it did not exist, or was superficial at best.   
Even	  before	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  first	  girl’s	  school,	  royal	  and	  elite	  Qajari	  women were engaged in the reading and writing of complex poetry.  Pari Shaykh al-Islami’s	  historical	  study	  on	  female	  journalism	  and	  women’s	  activism	  in	  Iran	  argued that many members of the Qajari royal family were excellent poetesses, 
pointing	  to	  the	  example	  of	  Fath	  Ali	  Shah’s	  wives	  and	  daughters.46  Most recent scholarship has argued that these female poets and their elite female patrons should be viewed	  as	  ‘evidence	  of	  a	  female-centred literary tradition, one that was 
                                                 42 Sykes, p197. 43 Afzal Vaziri, Bibi Khanum Astarabadi va Khanum Afzal Vaziri: madar va dukhtari az pishgaman-i 
maʻarif va huquq-i zanan, ed. Afsaneh Najmabadi, Narjis Mihrangiz Mallah, Muhammad Tavakkuli Tarqi, (Chicago: Nigarish va Nigarish-i Zan, 1996), p. 59; The Education of Women & The Vices of 
Men: Two Qajar Tracts, trans. Hasan Javadi and Willem Floor, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2010), p. 23.  44 Isabella Bird, Vol.1, pp.215. 45 E. Said, Orientalism, pp. 22, 55,130. 46 Shaykh al-Islami, Zan dar Iran. 
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in dialogue with (and often intersected) the dominant male tradition, 
empowering	  the	  women	  within	  it’.47  The writing of Lady Leonora Sheil, wife of Irish/British diplomat Justin Sheil, provides a more detailed account of educated elite and royal women.  Writing several decades earlier, Sheil highlighted that the harem system in Persia was not based on religion or ethnicity, and pointed to the situation of Armenian women, whose state of seclusion she described as 
‘much	  more	  severe	  than	  that	  imposed	  on	  Persian	  females’.48  Of the elite women she met, she wrote:   
I found the few Persian women I was acquainted with in general lively and clever…and	  may	  be	  said	  to	  manage	  their	  husbands’	  and	  sons’	  affairs…Women of the higher classes frequently acquire a knowledge of reading and writing, and of the choice poetical works in their native language.49  
Similarly	  to	  Bird,	  Sheil	  pointed	  to	  the	  ‘cruelty’	  and	  injustices	  of	  the	  harem,	  
writing	  that	  ‘power	  in	  the	  anderoon is	  nearly	  despotic’.50   
Both Bird and Sheil emphasised the dictatorial power of the mother-in law within the harem hierarchy.  Describing the royal harem, Sheil emphasised 
that	  it	  was	  the	  Shah’s	  mother	  who	  held	  ‘the	  chief	  place	  at	  court—the royal wives 
count	  as	  nothing’.51  She described	  the	  Shah’s	  mother	  as	  ‘handsome…very	  clever,	  
and	  as	  someone	  who	  ‘is	  supposed	  to	  take	  a	  large	  share	  in	  the	  affairs of the 
government.’52  Bird, on the other hand, drew much harsher pictures of the mother/duenna figures she met in the harems of various provincial rulers.  She gave an almost identical description of the mothers of Fath Allah Khan in the 
                                                 47 Dominic Parviz Brookshaw, Women in Praise of Women: Female Poets and Female Patrons in Qajar Iran, Iranian Studies, 46:1, 2013, pp.17-48.  48 Lady Mary Leonora Woulfe Sheil, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia, (London: John Murray, 1856), p. 235. 49 Ibid, pp. 134, 146. 50 Ibid. 147. 51 Sheil, p. 130. 52 Ibid, pp. 131. 
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Ardal Valley, and	  Aslam	  Khan	  in	  Khuzestan,	  as	  ‘tyrants’,	  who	  often	  slapped	  their	  
sons’	  young	  wives	  if	  they	  misbehaved.53  Similarly, visiting the Khan	  of	  Bijar’s	  household, Bird described his mother as a fiendish-looking middle-aged	  woman’	  who mocked those around her.54  Roselzam, Yahya, Ghaderi and Jusoff argue that 
Bird,	  unlike	  most	  male	  travel	  writers,	  blamed	  polygamy	  on	  Persian	  women’s	  
‘lack	  of	  true	  womanliness	  and	  domestic	  accomplishment’.55   However, depictions of the duenna/mother as the dictatorial ruler of harem wives, 
particularly	  Bird’s	  descriptions	  of	  her	  as	  an	  old,	  fiendish,	  shrieking	  tyrant,	  who	  
slaps	  and	  abuses	  her	  son’s	  wives,	  links	  these	  older	  Persian	  women	  with	  the	  despotic male head of the household in using the harem system to victimise 
‘innocent,	  young	  women’	  in	  need	  of	  ‘rescue’ from this older generation of 
‘backward’	  Persians.	  	   
The dissimilar descriptions of the harem duenna/mother in Bird and 
Sheil’s	  accounts,	  while	  they	  could	  point	  to	  differences	  between	  the	  writers	  personal perspectives, by comparing them to accounts of others like Sykes and Bell, highlight how customs, manners, and education levels amongst women, differed according to social-class, racial, and ethnic differences.  Fatiallah Khan was a tribal leader in the Ardal County, Aslam Khan a Zalaki tribal leader in Khuzestan, Bijar Khan a tribal leader in Kurdistan, while Sheil was describing the 
Shah’s	  royal	  harem	  in	  Tehran. Yet, the majority of traveller narratives did not stress such differences.  Rather, specific stories were used to paint general characterisations	  of	  Persian	  women,	  such	  as	  Bird’s	  visit	  to	  a	  Bakhtiari	  Khan’s	  house (an Ilkhani tribal leader), where she wrote that as soon as the topic turned 
                                                 53 Bird, Vol.1, p. 353, Vol 2., p. 62. 54 Ibid, Vol.2, p.181 55 Roselezam, Yahya, Ghaderi, Jusoff, pp. 779-793.  
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to	  politics	  and	  ‘important	  subjects’, the	  Khan’s	  ‘wives	  relapsed	  into	  complete	  
indifference,	  and	  stared	  into	  vacancy’.56  The nomadic Bakhtiari lifestyle and her 
own	  description	  of	  the	  family’s	  poverty57don’t	  appear	  to	  offer	  Bird	  any	  
explanation	  as	  to	  why	  Taimur	  Khan’s	  wives	  may	  have	  had	  different concerns to her, or different needs to urban women in the capital, who she credited with 
higher	  levels	  of	  education.	  	  Bird’s	  descriptions	  of	  Tehran	  focus	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  western commercial infiltration, modernisation of roads, and the increasing number of Europeans.58  From her accounts it does not appear that Bird ever visited the harem or andarun of the urban elites in Tehran, or even the less wealthy classes of the city.59  While this could explain the many generalisations in her writing, it is important to note that such generalisations, along with 
accusations	  of	  ‘savagery’ helped	  validate	  the	  idea	  of	  British	  women’s	  cultural	  and	  intellectual superiority, a notion all four women illustrated in their writing. 
Many	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  to	  how	  the	  ‘grand	  narratives’	  of	  European	  orientalist writing were driven by notions of imperialist cultural superiority and thus failed to correctly interpret the lives and subjects they studied.60   Joan 
DelPlato	  has	  argued	  that	  imperialist	  views	  of	  women’s	  seclusion	  in	  the harem 
provided	  ‘one	  more	  justification	  for	  meddling	  in	  Eastern	  affairs’.61  Roselezam, Yahya, Ghaderi and Jussof build on this argument to posit that portrayals of 
Persian	  women	  by	  writers	  like	  Bird	  ‘could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  lending	  implicit	  
                                                 56 Bird, Vol.2, pp.53. 57 Ibid, Vol. 2, pp. 53-54. 58 Ibid, Vol.1 187-190 59 Ibid, Vol.1, pp. 209. 60 E. Said, Orientalism, Judy	  Mabro,	  ‘Veiled	  Half-Truths:	  Western	  Travellers’	  Perceptions	  of	  Middle	  
Eastern	  Women’,	  in	  ed.	  Haideh	  Moghissi,	  Women and Islam: Critical Concepts in Sociology, (New York: Routeldge, 2005); Leila Ahmed, Western ethnocentrism and Perceptions of the Harem, 
Feminist Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1982, pp. 521-534; Carl Thompson, Travel writing: The New Critical 
Idiom, (London: Routeldge, 2011), pp.136-137. 61 Joan DelPlato, Multiple Wives, Multiple Pleasures: Representing the Harem, 1800–1875, (Massachusetts: Rosemont Publishing and Printing Corp, 2002), p. 20. 
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support to Britain’s	  colonial	  intervention	  and	  imposition	  on	  Persia’.62 In all the 
examples	  discussed	  above	  for	  Egypt	  and	  Iran,	  notions	  of	  European	  women’s	  cultural and intellectual superiority are consistently pointed to as givens, and 
used	  as	  markers	  for	  ideal	  ‘civilised’	  behaviour.	  	  Poole,	  Chennells, and Gordon pointed to the ignorance of Egyptian women and promoted the idea that any 
advance	  in	  education	  was	  purely	  the	  result	  of	  certain	  ‘western-enlightened’	  (western-educated) leaders, such as Khedieve Ismail.  While Sheil acknowledged higher levels of education amongst elite Qajari women in Iran, she joined others 
in	  painting	  the	  harem	  as	  a	  ‘cruel’,	  ‘despotic’	  space,	  ‘where	  even	  murder	  can	  be	  
committed	  without	  atonement’.63  Sykes	  and	  Bird	  described	  Persian	  women’s	  
‘savage’	  and	  ‘uncivilised’	  manners	  and	  appearance	  to	  paint	  them	  as	  ignorant	  victims of Islam, in need of saving by the Christian, or modern, West.   This chapter argues that notions of European cultural superiority encouraged the idea of western men and women as teacher-parent	  type	  figures	  who	  could	  ‘save’	  or liberate Iranian and Egyptian women from patriarchal tyrants (male and female) and their social traditions, drawing strong connections between notions of European tutelage and Imperialist intervention and control. 
Section 2: Imperialist	  Construction	  and	  Destruction	  of	  	  ‘Feminist’	  Legacies 
In this section the case of Qurrat al-‘Ayn in Iran is used to illustrate how imperialist interference and sympathy for Babism complicated her legacy.  More specifically,	  this	  section’s	  second	  argument	  is	  that	  while	  Qurrat	  al-‘Ayn challenged gender relations and certain definitions of Iranian womanhood, because she did so as she also rejected orthodox Shi‘a Islam, she became a 
                                                 62 Roselezam, Yahya, Ghaderi, Jusoff, pp.779-793.  63 Sheil, p. 147. 
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controversial figure that her contemporaries and immediate successors had to repudiate in order not to be similarly outcast as inauthentic.  Male and female Babis were targeted because of their vocal	  critique	  of	  orthodox	  Shi‘ism, the clergy, and the Qajari state.  However, Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  activities also transgressed the terms of existing patriarchal bargains in her society, which 
included	  most	  Babi	  men.	  	  Abbas	  Effendi’s	  account	  of	  the	  protestation	  of	  male	  Babis against Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  activities,	  particularly	  her	  public	  preaching,	  indicated patriarchal	  limits	  within	  the	  community	  made	  women’s	  public	  preaching, and their prioritisation of independent, religious, and/or political activism over familial duties unacceptable at the time.    
2.1  Imperialist and indigenous narratives in the case of Qurrat al-‘Ayn Within orientalist narratives certain historical figures were glorified or vilified, and facts distorted, to promote wider imperialist agendas.  This is seen with the controversial female figure of Qurrat Al-‘Ayn (Fatemeh Tahirih Zarrin Taj Baraghani), in the context of the Iranian Babi movement, the forerunner of the 
Baha’i faith, which surfaced and expanded during the mid-19th Century.  Despite her orthodox Shi‘a background and exceptional standard of religious education, Qurrat Al-‘Ayn (solace of the eye) became one of the earliest adherents of Babism 
encouraging	  the	  religion’s	  full	  break	  from	  Twelver	  Shi‘ism, casting off her veil in defiance of orthodox beliefs.64  According to Abbas Effendi, the eldest son of Baha’ullah,	  (founder	  of	  the	  Baha’i	  faith), many male Babis objected to her activities.  
Some of these even wrote to the Bab asking whether it was seemly for a woman to preach publicly to men.  In reply the Bab not only sanctioned 
                                                 64 Amin Banani, Tahirih: A Portrait in Poetry, (Los Angeles: Kalimat Press, 2004), pp. 4-7. 
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her preaching and applauded her zeal, but bestowed on her the title of Jenab-i-Tahira	  (‘her	  Excellency	  the	  Pure’).65   
The	  Bab	  never	  met	  Qurrat,	  but	  according	  to	  Nabil	  Zarandi,	  a	  Baha’i	  historian	  of	  the period, he exalted her in his writing: ‘As to those whose supreme privilege it was to be enrolled by the Bab in the Book of His Revelation as His chosen Letters 
of	  the	  Living…Tahirih	  is	  one-only	  woman’.66 In 1850, the Bab was publicly executed.  Two years later, three Babis attempted, unsuccessfully, to assassinate Nasser-al-Din Shah.  Zarandi claimed that during her lifetime Qurrat al-‘Ayn achieved a certain level of popularity amongst women in Tehran; ‘Her stay in Tihran [sic] was marked by many proofs of the warm affection and high esteem in which she was held by the leading women of	  the	  capital’.67  Yet, it is hard to 
know	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  was	  the	  case	  given	  Zarandi’s	  bias	  as	  a	  Babi	  himself,	  and	  
given	  that	  ‘the	  leading	  women	  of	  the	  capital’	  were	  women	  of	  the	  Qajar	  elite,	  who	  would have been hard pressed to show any support for an anti-establishment figure.  It is also hard to assess what sort of influence, if any, Qurrat al-‘Ayn had 
on	  women	  of	  her	  time.	  	  Turning	  to	  a	  ‘leading	  woman’	  of	  the	  late	  19th century, Taj al-Saltaneh, daughter of Nasser-al-Din Shah, it is worth noting that while her 
memoirs	  are	  full	  of	  passionate	  calls	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  women’s	  status,	  they	  make no reference to the story of Qurrat al-‘Ayn.  In fact, other than Lady Sheil, there appear to be no other female contemporaries who wrote about her.  Many Qajari male writers, like Muhammad Sipihr, wrote slanderous accounts, using her unveiling and activism to accuse her of promiscuity, prostitution, and 
                                                 65 Abbas Effendi, Abd al-baha ibn Baha Allah, A	  Traveller’s	  Narrative	  Written	  to	  Illustrate	  The	  
Episode of the Bab, ed. and trans. Edward G. Browne, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1891), p. 311. 66 Nabil Zarandi, The Dawn-Breakers (1844-1888): Nabil's Narrative of the Early Days of the Baha'i 
Revelation, trans. Shoghi Effendi, (London: Baha’i	  Public	  Trust, 1953), p. 55. 67 Ibid, pp. 457-458. 
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polyandry.68  A more positive account by the Iranian constitutionalist historian Ahmad Kasravi (published in the 1940s) labelled	  her	  ‘Shir-Zan’/lion-woman, (a term that is still used to describe extraordinarily brave nationalist or revolutionary women in Iran), yet, he too ultimately portrayed her as unstable and insane.69  The accounts of Abbas Effendi show that while the Bab himself encouraged Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  activities,	  he	  was	  the	  exception,	  as	  her	  unveiling,	  public preaching, and her choice to leave behind her family in order to do so, transgressed patriarchal limits of the time, which not only upset Qajari men like Siphir, but many male Babis as well.  
Writing within the same period, Lady Sheil referred to the Babi 
movement	  as	  a	  socialist/communist	  revolution	  ‘under	  the	  disguise	  of	  a	  new	  
revelation’, which	  could	  have	  ‘overturned	  the	  throne	  and	  Islamism	  in	  Persia’.70  In the penultimate chapter of her book she briefly mentioned Qurrat al-‘Ayn, as 
another	  Babi	  victim,	  a	  ‘prophetess’,	  and	  called	  her	  execution	  a	  ‘useless	  deed’.71  The orientalist writer, Edward Granville Browne, writing over thirty years later, 
recounted	  the	  story	  of	  ‘the beautiful Kurrat’ul-Ayn’,	  the	  innocent	  victim	  who	  was	  wrongly accused and executed,72 who he referred to as	  an	  ‘immortal	  prodigy’,	  
and	  a	  ‘miracle’.73   What is interesting is how European/orientalist depictions of Qurrat al-‘Ayn developed over the next decades from innocent victim to legendary heroine.  Lord Curzon wrote of the Babi disciple; ‘the heroism of the 
                                                 68 Muhammad Taqi Kashani Sipihr, Nasikh al-tavarikh:	  Sala’tin-I Qajar, Vol.3, p. 239, Farzaneh Milani: Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1992), p. 79.  69 Ahmad	  Kasravi	  Baha’igari,	  Shi’igari,	  Sufigari,	  1956	  (Saarbrucken: Nawid, 1989); Farideh Milani, p. 79.  70 Sheil, p. 176-177. 71 Ibid, p. 281. 72  Sir Edward Granville Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians: Impressions as to the Life, 
Character and Thought of the People of Persia Received in the Years 1887-1888, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1893), p. 101,  73 E. G Browne in Abbas Effendi, Abd al-baha ibn Baha Allah, A	  Traveller’s	  Narrative, p. 309. 
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lovely but ill-fated	  poetess	  of	  Qazvin…who,	  throwing	  off	  the	  veil,	  carried	  the	  missionary torch far and wide, is one of the most affecting episodes in modern 
history’.74  By the early 1900s, the imperialist journalist Valentine Chirol was declaring, ‘no memory is more deeply venerated or kindles greater enthusiasm than hers, and the influence which she wielded in her lifetime still inures to her 
sex’.75  Yet, what influence, if any, did Qurrat al-‘Ayn have during her lifetime, and what sort of legacy did she leave behind?   
Amin Banani writes that the majority of writing about Qurrat al-‘Ayn is 
split	  between	  portraying	  her	  either	  as	  ‘a	  saintly	  martyr’,	  or	  a	  ‘fiery	  feminist’.76  He argues that such one-dimensional illustrations distort the reality behind her motives, which are impossible to separate from her promotion of the Babi religion.77  In the	  poem	  ‘From	  those	  locks’	  she	  rejected	  the	  orthodox	  Shi‘a Islam of the Iranian ulama and	  introduced	  ideas	  of	  religious	  equality,	  ‘When	  the	  fire	  of	  your love flamed up, it burned away from	  me	  both	  heathen	  and	  Muslim…there is no difference between Kaaba and	  church.’78  Early	  Baha’i	  accounts,	  such	  as	  
Zarandi’s,	  do	  not	  portray	  her	  activities	  as	  ‘feminist’ or frame it within a struggle for gender-equality; rather they emphasise	  her	  ‘martyrdom’	  as	  a	  religious	  and	  patriotic act. 
She was thirty-six years of age when she suffered martyrdom in Tihran...May future historians perceive the full measure of her influence, and record the unique services this great woman has rendered to her land and its people.79 
                                                 74 Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol.1, p. 497. 75 Valentine Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question, or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence, (London: John Murray, 1903), p. 124. 76 Banani, p. 4. 77 Ibid, p.19. 78 Banani, pp. 114, 142. 79 Zarandi, p. 459. 
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On the other hand, depictions of Qurrat al-’Ayn as	  a	  ‘fiery	  feminist’	  are	  more	  readily found amongst European writers.  Referring	  to	  Curzon	  and	  Browne’s	  accounts, Sykes wrote in 1910,  
The	  beautiful	  poetess	  Kurrat’ul-Ayn spread her doctrines far and wide, until her tragic death at Tehran; and It seemed as if the status of women would be raised, for they were to be considered equal with men, were to throw off their veils, and polygamy and divorce were to be abolished.80  The facts about Qurrat al-‘Ayn are clouded by the many myths surrounding her story, myths that were promoted by different types of writers.   
Ronald Vroon has pointed to	  how	  Gobineau’s	  erroneous	  account	  of	  Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s execution as	  ‘burning	  at	  the	  stake’	  linked	  her death directly to the image 
of	  Joan	  of	  Arc’s	  martyrdom.81  He argues that such myths influenced writers, such as Russian playwright Velemir Chlebnikov, whose early 20th century works contributed to Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s legend, this time as both a Magdalene-like figure and a symbol of Iranian resistance against British colonialism.82  Moreover, European observers often portrayed Babism as a counter-force, or solution, to 
the	  ‘backwardness’	  of	  Islam.	   
If the Bab had escaped, in all probability, Persia would have been converted to his doctrines en bloc, and would have emerged from the petrifying influence of Islam into a liberal atmosphere where progress was possible.83  
 It is not difficult to see how notions of ‘popular liberal movements’ suppressed by the Islamic orthodoxy, or the execution of a brave and persecuted female figure, would have fit well into imperialist narratives of colonised people in need 
of	  European	  ‘saving’.   
                                                 80 Sykes, p.142. 81 Ronald Vroon, Qurrat al-‘Ayn	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  Asia	  in	  Velimir	  Chelbnikov’s	  Post-Revolutionary Oeuvre, Russian Literature, 50: 2001, pp.335-362. 82 Ibid. 83 Sykes, p. 142. 
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2.2 History or Legacy of Qurrat al-’Ayn? 
Western myths and orientalist accounts influenced Iranian thought, helping to delegitimize Qurrat al-‘Ayn as an authentic Iranian model, as Babism became associated with imperialist narratives, and thus anti-nationalist/anti-Iranian rhetoric.  In	  future	  decades,	  even	  in	  contemporary	  Iran,	  opponents	  of	  women’s	  rights would accuse feminists of being Babi in an attempt to delegitimize them.  The historical precedent for this is seen in Taj al-Saltaneh’s	  memoirs	  (1884-1914). 
As I progressed in my studies day by day, my irreligiosity grew, until I was 
a	  complete	  naturalist	  myself…As	  I	  would	  begin	  to	  talk,	  however,	  my 
mother	  would	  curse	  at	  me:	  You	  have	  turned	  Babi!’84   
Contemporary	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  Iranian	  ‘feminists’	  today	  regard	  Qurrat	  al-‘Ayn ‘as	  the	  first	  Iranian	  feminist’.85  Mahnaz Afkhami has described her as 
‘arguably	  the	  most	  interesting	  woman	  in	  Iran’s	  history’,86while Nayereh Tohidi has linked	  her	  to	  Iran’s	  contemporary	  ‘Islamic	  feminists’	  by	  counting	  her	  
amongst	  early	  ‘Muslim	  woman	  thinkers	  and	  writers’	  who	  ‘by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th 
century	  had	  ‘gradually	  begun	  framing	  their	  gender-conscious and women-
friendly	  writings	  within	  the	  Islamic	  ethics’.87  However, Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  activities	  and poetry indicated her struggle was very much against the orthodox Shi‘a establishment and the Iranian government that supported it, driven by her belief in Babism.  She was not advocating a renewed or feminist interpretation of Islamic principles, but a clear break from them, which challenges Tohidi’s	  
                                                 84 Taj Al-Saltanah, Crowning Anguish-Memoirs of a Persian Princess From the Harem to Modernity 
1884-1914, ed. Abbas Amanat, (Washington: DC: Mage, 1993), p.309. 85Lois Beck and Guity Nashat, Women in Iran: From 1800 to the Islamic Republic, (Illinois: Illinois Press, 2004), p. 15; Milani: Veils and Words, pp. 94. 86 Mahnaz Afkhami, In the Eye of the Storm: Women in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed. Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), p.191.  87 Tohidi, p.141. 
 64 
definition of her as someone framing their gender-consciousness within Islamic ethics.    
On the other hand, although Qurrat al-‘Ayn did not consciously or 
explicitly	  advocate	  women’s	  rights	  reforms,	  as	  a	  female	  religious	  reformer	  she	  nevertheless challenged patriarchal structures within both the religious establishment and Iranian society.  Men, even those within the Babi movement, were threatened by her independence and unveiling, drawing attention to how female bodies were used as boundary markers of	  purity,	  and	  the	  ‘true’	  community or nation.88 Thus, by resisting the dominant patriarchal religious discourse of the period, transgressing social boundaries by unveiling, challenging religious texts, and preaching publicly to men, Qurrat al-‘Ayn challenged many gender norms of the time.  Yet, it is crucial to highlight that she was not held up 
as	  a	  ‘feminist’	  or	  ‘Iranian’	  role	  model	  for	  most	  of	  the	  20th century, because those challenges, particularly her overt rejection of the Shi‘a clerical establishment, pushed patriarchal limits beyond levels of acceptability not only during her lifetime, but for a long period after. 
For	  nearly	  a	  century	  after	  it	  was	  founded,	  Babism/Baha’ism	  was	  viewed	  by the majority of Iranians as anti-Islamic/anti-Shi‘a, and as such was not incorporated as part of Iranian identity.89  Moreover, positive, sympathetic European accounts of Babism and Qurrat al-‘Ayn, tainted their legacy with the brush of imperialism, further delegitimizing them as authentic Iranian models.  Thus, this section argues that while Qurrat al-‘Ayn was a revolutionary woman 
                                                 88 Peterson, p.47; Tamar Mayer, pp. 7, 10, 18; Chatterjee; p. 243; Anthias, Campling, Yuval-Davis, pp. 85, 143, 155; Kandiyoti, Identity and its Discontents, pp. 49, 51; Yuval-Davis, p. 45-46. 89 Afsaneh Najmabadi (2005) cited in The	  Baha’is	  of	  Iran:	  Socio-historical Studies, ed. Dominic Parviz Brookshaw, Seena B. Fazel, (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 195.  
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who fought for certain kinds of changes to gender definitions and relations, by doing so as an explicit rejection of (orthodox Shi‘a) Islam she became a controversial figure that her immediate successors had to repudiate in order not to be similarly cast out as anti-Shi‘a/Islamic and un-Iranian.  Consequently, later modernists and reformers pressed for gradual rather than revolutionary change to gender roles and definitions, stressing continuity and authenticity through Islamic examples.  However, this chapter additionally argues, that as Iranian definitions of authenticity and womanhood changed over the next century, to incorporate more educated, independent, revolutionary characteristics, it allowed some Iranian feminists in the late 20th century to revisit Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  
‘legend’	  and	  define	  her	  independent,	  revolutionary	  act	  of	  religious	  rebellion	  as	  an example of early Iranian feminism.  This highlights how old myths, models, 
and	  legends	  were/are	  used	  to	  prove	  the	  ‘authenticity’	  of	  new feminist discourses and feminist movements.   
 
Section 2:  Modernist	  Thought	  and	  Women’s	  Rights	  discourses 
This section looks at the strategies and contents of patriarchal bargains between modernists and reformists in Egypt and Iran.  It is argued that tensions caused by the multiple identities of male and female reformers, and the need to manoeuvre around competing patriarchal forces, from imperialist influence or authority, the modernising state, to conservative religious or community leaders, created many ideological contradictions and limitations in the arguments of men like Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh	  in	  Iran	  and	  Rifa‘ah al-Tahtawi or Qasim Amin in Egypt.  
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Women faced the additional challenge of manoeuvring between all these patriarchal forces and the limits of reformist discourses.   
Thus, it is additionally argued that women were engaged in a combined strategy of negotiating their demands around the patriarchal limits of both conservative and modernist men, at the same time as challenging those limits in order to advance their goals.  In Iran, Bibi Khanum’s	  inclusion	  of	  domestic	  subjects alongside scientific education for girls, and Taj al-Saltaneh’s	  support	  for	  the budding constitutional movement were attempts to strike common ground with dominant patriarchal forces of the period.  Similarly, in Egypt, Malak Hifni Nasif, May Ziyadah,	  and	  Nabawiya	  Musa’s	  ‘gradual	  change’	  approach	  to	  women’s	  
rights	  is	  juxtapositioned	  against	  their	  calls	  for	  women’s	  own	  agency	  in	  the	  reform movement and their questioning	  of	  men’s	  motives	  and	  leadership	  of	  that	  movement.  
2.1 Iran’s	  Male	  Modernists 
Modernist thought about the status of women came about from different ideological directions in Egypt and Iran.  Unlike the Islamic modernists in Egypt, the renewalist writers Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani 
both	  argued	  for	  reforms	  and	  women’s	  emancipation	  outside	  the	  tenants	  of	  Islam,	  and in fact, as a rejection of them.  Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, a Babi, argued 
Persian	  women’s	  inferior	  status	  was the result of the Arab Islamic invasion.  He blamed polygamy, female seclusion, and veiling for preventing women from 
getting	  an	  education	  and	  participating	  in	  society,	  noting	  ‘we	  Iranians	  have	  not	  
counted	  women	  as	  people	  or	  as	  part	  of	  humanity’90.  While ‘Arabs’	  had not 
                                                 90 Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Seh Maktub/Sad Khetabeh, (Iran: Alborz-Verl, 2005), p. 132. 
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introduced the idea of female seclusion or the harem to Persia, by arguing such social practices were the result of a foreign invasion, Kermani was attempting to 
make	  an	  argument	  about	  the	  ‘authentic’	  state	  of	  Iranian	  women,	  prior	  to	  the	  Arab/Islamic invasion.  By pointing to pre-Islamic Iran, Kermani was challenging existing gender ideas by constructing the notion of Persian women as more empowered before the Arab Muslim invasion.  Akhundzadeh published 
Maktubat-i Kamal al-Dowlah (Letters of Kamal al-Dowlah) sometime in the 1860s, using the fictional correspondence between Kamal, an Indian Prince, and Jala al-Dowleh, a Persian Prince, to attack the Qajars and Islam for the corruption of society and for the situation of women.91  He criticised Islam as inherently oppressive to women, attacked polygamy, and accused the clergy of corruption and self-serving politics.92  Akhundzadeh also used his dramatic plays to challenge traditional customs and gender relationships, and to reify the binary opposition	  of	  the	  ‘scientific,	  modern’	  West	  against	  the	  ‘irrational	  Islamic’	  East.93  
In	  the	  story	  of	  ‘The	  Botanist	  Monsieur	  Jourdan	  and	  the	  Sorcerer-dervish Mast Ali 
Shah’	  he	  pointed	  to	  the	  patriarchal	  Muslim	  family	  as	  a	  chief	  source	  of	  gender	  inequality, and social ignorance.94  The Botanist represented the rational European, while Mast Ali Shah (Drunk Ali Shah) represented the ignorant, corrupt Muslim.  Akhundzadeh advocated marriage based on love and freedom of choice for both parties.   
                                                 91 Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh, Maktubat, (Maktubat-e-Kamal Al-Dowleh) (Tehran: Intisarat-i-Mard-i-Imruz, 1985). 92 Ibid, p.179. 93 Mehrdad	  Kia,	  Women,	  Islam	  and	  Modernity	  in	  Akhundzadeh’s	  Plays	  and	  Unpublished	  Writings,	  
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1998, pp.1-33. 94 Akhundzadeh, The Botanist Monsieur Jourdan (1889), The Story of the Vizier of the Khan Sarab-(1851) The Adventures of the Vizier of the Khan of Lankaran, The Story of the Bear that Caught the Robber-(1852) in Three Persian Plays trans. A Rogers, (London: Neptune Press, 1890).  
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In many of his plays, women	  were	  ‘cultural	  carriers’,	  who	  both	  maintained and suffered from upholding traditional customs and ideas.95 He also used his plays to portray Russia as the enlightened western moderniser and educator, under whose guidance, or even rule, Persian women could be liberated.  In this way, Kia convincingly argues, that Akhundzadeh used women as a debating ground for competing ideas of traditional Islam and European modernity.96  In The Story of the Attorneys at Law (1855), Akhundzadeh illustrated how existing patriarchal bargains held back social progress.  In the play, Aunt Zubayda financially attempts to blackmail her niece Sakina into a loveless marriage, even though she has come to realise her suitor was only after money, because she feels it would damage their reputation and honour.  Thus, she prefers to maintain her side of this traditional patriarchal bargain (the 
promise	  of	  her	  niece’s	  hand	  in	  marriage),	  even	  if	  it	  holds	  back	  women’s	  emancipation and hurts her own niece.  As a defender of existing cultural customs, her generation of women stood to lose the most (their reputation, 
without	  gaining	  independence),	  if	  Sakina’s	  generation	  transgressed such customs/bargains.  In this way, Akhundzadeh highlighted the possible tensions that such conflicting and complex gender bargains could create between the old 
and	  new	  generation	  of	  Persians	  facing	  ‘modernity’.	  	   
Writers like Haideh Moghissi have argued that the expressions of men like Akhundzadeh and Kermani should be viewed as feminist.97  Kia argues that Akhundzadeh’s	  views	  were	  largely	  pragmatic	  choices;	  he	  avoided	  direct	  attacks	  
                                                 95 Ibid.  96 Mehrdad Kia, Women,	  Islam	  and	  Modernity	  in	  Akhundzadeh’s	  Plays	  and	  Unpublished	  Writings. 97 Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Feminism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis, (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 127. 
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on Islam in order to avoid charges of heresy from the Iranian establishment, and venerated Russian modernisation and leadership to maintain his governmental post in the Caucasus.98   This section argues that the arguments of modernists like Kermani and Akhundzadeh were products of their time and place, resulting from complex bargains negotiated around the multiple discourses they identified with, and the realities and limits of their situations.  Akhundzadeh’s	  rejection	  of	  
Islam	  and	  the	  ulama,	  support	  for	  women’s	  rights	  and	  Iranian	  constitutionalism,	  and admiration for western modernisation, incorporated competing ideological discourses.  He primarily viewed women as domestic figures, but called for greater freedom within this context, promoting love and freedom of choice as the basis for any marriage.  However, by advocating Russian tutelage or leadership, he was consciously or subconsciously calling for the replacement of existing Persian patriarchy with Russian imperialist patriarchy.  By avoiding direct attacks on Islam in his plays and promoting the idea of Russian tutelage, Akhundzadeh was striking and maintaining necessary patriarchal bargains with both the Iranian and Russian establishments in order to advance his views. 
2.2 Iran’s	  Female	  Modernists 
Pioneering Iranian modernists during this period included a few exceptional women.  In 1894-1895 Bibi Khanum Astarabadi wrote an essay entitled Maayeb 
ol-Rejal (The Vices of Men or The Failings of Men) in response to a Qajar tract, titled Tadib ol-Nesvan (The Education of Women/ The Chastisement of Women), which had been published in Tehran by an anonymous author almost 10 years earlier.  The Education of Women, which was published around 1886/1887, 
                                                 98 Kia. 
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called	  for	  women’s	  total	  obedience	  and	  submission	  to	  their	  husbands	  as	  religious	  
duty	  and	  defined	  their	  roles	  as	  ‘extensions	  of	  their	  husbands’ pleasure in all 
respects’.99  While the pamphlet was addressed to all women, its main targets were upper-class urban women, who were more educated and displayed more independent thinking than other classes of women at the time.100  It was naturally assumed the writer was male, but his identity was never proven, with some suggesting he may have been a satirical inciter mocking early efforts to 
advocate	  women’s	  rights,	  or	  a	  genuine	  conservative	  voicing	  his	  objection	  to	  developing trends.101  Javadi argues that whatever the case, he was likely wedded to an Iranian princess and thus hid his identity in fear of her possible 
retaliation,	  but	  adds	  the	  author’s	  phraseology	  suggests	  he	  was	  Azeri-Turkish not 
Persian.	  	  Whatever	  the	  case,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  add	  that	  the	  author’s	  choice	  for	  anonymity implies that by this point such misogynistic views were likely to cause some controversy amongst the upper classes in Tehran.   Bibi Khanum’s	  essay retaliated by arguing that such derogatory tracts were engineered to 
maintain	  men’s	  superiority,	  and	  pointed	  to	  men’s	  flaws,	  which	  she	  blamed	  for	  all	  the backwardness and corruption of society.102   Astarabadi’s	  father	  was	  a	  Mazandarani chief and the commander of the Asatarabad cavalry, and her mother the teacher of Nasser al-Din	  Shah’s	  principal	  wife.	  	  She	  grew	  up	  in	  the	  royal harem and received her education there.103  Consequently, it was partly this privileged situation that provided her with the education and means to act on her reformist desires.  She called for a defence of	  women’s	  rights	  (huquq-i-
                                                 99 Astarabadi, The Education of Women & The Vices of Men, pp. 10-11.  100 Ibid, p. 9. 101 Ibid, p. 11. 102 Ibid, p.83-106, 130, 133, Afzal Vaziri, Bibi Khanum Astarabadi va Khanum Afzal Vaziri. 103 Astarabadi, The Education of Women & The Vices of Men, p.18. 
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zanan defah)	  and	  women’s	  ‘vital	  rights	  of	  livelihood’	  (huquq-i-ma’ashi	  va	  hayati-i 
nesvan).104  As mentioned earlier, Bibi Khanum set up the first girls’ school for pupils between the ages of 7 and 12 from her own home in 1907.  She and her elder daughters were part of the five female staff, along with one old male 
gapoochi (an old Qajar word for gatekeeper), who it was advertised would teach subjects ranging from reading, writing, arithmetic, law and religion to cookery, embroidery, knitting, and sewing.105  Bibi Khanum attempted to re-define existing gender norms by	  promoting	  women’s	  scientific education, whilst offering domestic subjects alongside it to illustrate that female education complemented	  family	  life	  and	  improved	  women’s	  existing	  roles	  by	  producing	  better mothers who would better educate the next generation of Iranians.   
During the same period a few elite women began to link their demands for female emancipation to nationalist progress and independence.  Taj al-Saltaneh, the daughter of Nasser al-Din	  Shah,	  argued	  that	  all	  of	  Iran’s	  moral	  backwardness and corruption could be attributed to the veiling of women and the absence of female education, and criticised	  her	  father	  and	  brother’s	  mismanagement of the country.106  Her memoirs show great admiration for 
western	  women,	  and	  a	  longing	  for	  similar	  women’s	  rights	  advancements	  in	  Persia.  She argued that unveiling, education, and increased rights would allow 
women	  to	  exercise	  their	  patriotism	  and	  contribute	  to	  their	  nation’s	  progress.107  
Taj	  linked	  notions	  of	  women’s	  rights	  progress	  with	  revolution	  and	  nationalism. 
When the day comes that I see my sex emancipated and my country on the path to progress, I will sacrifice myself in the battlefield of liberty, and 
                                                 104 Afzal Vaziri, p. 2. 105 Ibid, p. 59, Astarabadi, The Education of Women & The Vices of Men, p. 23.  106 Taj al-Saltanah, pp. 292,110, 266. 107  Ibid, pp. 284-285. 288. 
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freely shed my blood under the feet of my freedom-loving cohorts seeking their rights.108   The growth of such sentiments are seen in the lead up to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, which saw educated women from elite harems like Taj al-Saltaneh and Bibi Khanum, as well as educated women of the upper-clerical classes, like Sedigheh Dowlatabadi, participate in a nationalist revolution for the first time.  Female educators like Bibi Khanum and female nationalists like Taj al-Saltaneh were working out of an environment that was largely hostile to the idea of female education and independence.  The Qajar state was interested in the appearance of modernisation but did not initiate any educational reforms for 
women.	  	  Thus,	  women’s	  bargaining	  power	  was	  limited,	  given	  the	  asymmetric	  power of an unsupportive state and an explicitly hostile clerical establishment.  In this context, the inclusion	  of	  ‘domestic	  arts’	  in	  Bibi	  Khanum’s	  school,	  and	  Taj	  al-Saltaneh’s	  linking	  of	  her	  feminist	  views	  to	  the	  budding	  nationalist	  movement,	  can be viewed as a form of patriarchal bargaining.  That is not to say they were not genuinely nationalist, or that the inclusion of domestic subjects was done purely to appease men, but that these compromises were genuine attempts at striking a common ground with the patriarchal forces around them to advance their modernist, nationalist, and feminist positions. 
2.3 Male Voices for Reform in Egypt  
The late 19th century Islamic modernist and Egyptian nationalist movement led 
to	  intellectual	  debates	  regarding	  the	  women’s	  question,	  which	  focused	  on	  female	  education, polygamy, and veiling.  Earlier arguments made by scholars like Muhammad Kamal Yahya, Ahmad Taha Muhammad, and Soha Abdel Kader that 
                                                 108 Ibid, p. 294. 
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such debates were initiated by elite men, have more recently been challenged by others like Baron and Badran, who argued that during the same period many 
‘middle-class’	  and	  ‘upper-class’	  women	  contributed	  towards	  a	  growing	  feminist-
consciousness	  with	  their	  own	  writing,	  in	  the	  women’s	  journals	  they	  founded,	  and	  the poetry, novels, and tracts they wrote.109   
Standing at the forefront of the Islamic reform movement in Egypt was 
Rifa‘ah al-Tahtawi, who argued that Islam encouraged female education, and that society would improve once the female population was educated.  Just before his 
death	  in	  1873,	  he	  wrote	  it	  would	  ‘make	  them	  stronger…help	  them	  to	  
communicate	  better…prevent	  them	  from	  gossiping and wasting time or sitting 
around	  procrastinating’.110 He brought up Islamic examples of women during the time of the Prophet, who could read and write, such as his wives Aisha and Hafsa, and pointed to hadiths that promoted the education of women.111  His writing, particularly the references to historic Islamic female figures, drew attention to the ways in which old gender models were used and reinterpreted by reformists to validate modern behaviour as authentic and nationalist.  Marilyn Booth has argued that during this period other male writers like Ali Jalal, Habib Effendi al-Zayyat al-Dimashqi,	  and	  Shaykh	  Hamza	  Fathallah	  used	  their	  works	  to	  argue	  ‘for	  
historical	  authenticity	  of	  attitudes	  and	  practices’	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  ‘modify, but not 
                                                 109 Kamal Yahya, p. 5; Ahmad Taha Muhammad, al-Marah al-Misriyah bayna al-madi wa-al-hadir (Cairo: S.n, 1979), p.47; Soha Abdel Kader, Egyptian Women in a Changing Society, 1899-1986, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1987), p. 50; Baron, The Women's Awakening in Egypt; pp. 188-189, Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 61. 110 al-Tahtawi, al-Murshid al-Amin lil-Banat wa-al-Banin, p. 66. 111 Ibid, p. 68. 
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fundamentally alter, local patriarchal structures of family, community and 
state’.112 
The famous modernist judge Mohammad Abduh, who in 1899 was appointed Grand Mufti of Egypt, also argued for the advancement of women in his work al-Islam wa-al-mar’ah (Islam and the Woman).113  However, it was the later works of Muslim lawyer Qasim Amin, which created the greatest controversy.  Amin’s	  two	  books,	  Tahrir al-Mar’ah (the Liberation of the Woman, 1899) and Al-Mar’ah al Jadida (The New/Modern Woman, 1900), were 
unprecedented	  in	  their	  forceful	  calls	  for	  change	  to	  women’s	  status,	  attacking	  institutions like polygamy and divorce.114 He defended most of his arguments using Shari‘a principles arguing that the Islamic legal system itself had 
‘stipulated	  the	  equality	  of	  women	  and	  men	  before	  any	  other	  legal	  system’.115  He wrote that face-veiling had no basis in Islamic law, and only increased temptation and prevented women from participating in society, referring to 
polygamy	  as	  ‘nothing	  short of a legal trick to satisfy an animal-like	  desire’.116  He praised the contribution of western women towards their societies, arguing they 
had	  ‘contributed	  significantly	  to	  the foundation of civilisation’.117  He thus linked 
women’s	  progress	  to	  nationalism by justifying it as a way to advance the nation: 
                                                 112 Marilyn Booth, The long 1890s in Egypt: Colonial Quiescence Subterranean Resistance, ed. Marilyn Booth and Anthony Gorman, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 366. 113 Muhammad Abduh, Al-Islam wa-al-Marah fi Ray al-Imam Muhammad Abduh, (Cairo: al-Qahirah lil-Thaqafah al-Arabiyah, 1975). 114 Qasim Amin, The liberation of Women; The New Woman: Two Documents in The History of 
Egyptian Feminism, trans. Samiha Sidhom Peterson, (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000). 115 Qasim Amin, The Liberation of Women, p. 7. 116 Ibid, pp. 43, 40, 85. 117 Ibid, pp. 16, 73. 
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‘In order to improve the condition of the nation, it is imperative we improve the 
condition	  of	  women’.118   
His views created an intense backlash from conservatives like Muhammad Farid Wajdi who attempted to discredit	  Amin’s	  arguments	  in	  his	  book, al-Marat-Al-Muslimah (The Muslim Woman). 
The author of the New Woman states:	  ‘is	  justice	  different	  with	  regards	  to	  men and women, and are there two set of rights, one for the man, and one 
for	  the	  woman?’	  …We	  say	  that	  this	  talk	  is	  not	  beneficial…because	  the	  rules of the universe and life and humanity have proved that there is no equality except through the equivalence of strength/power.119   On the other hand, Amin’s	  supporters like	  Mansur	  Fahmi	  wrote	  in	  1913,	  ‘I	  bow	  before the memory of the Egyptian writer Qasim Amin, who gave everything to 
the	  woman’s	  cause’.120 Fahmi argued that the Egyptian woman would emancipate herself not by following the same model as western women, but 
through	  ‘her	  own	  history	  and	  genius	  of	  her	  race’.121  By	  stressing	  ‘her	  own	  
history’	  and	  ‘race’,	  Fahmi	  was	  claiming	  authenticity	  for	  a	  budding	  feminist	  movement by encouraging its links to a modern, more secular Egyptian culture 
and	  nation.	  	  While	  Amin	  accused	  Egyptian	  men	  of	  neglecting	  women’s	  ‘proper	  
education’,	  he	  did	  not	  advocate	  equal	  education	  with	  men,	  but	  defined	  this	  
‘proper	  education’	  as	  ‘the	  possibility for boys and girls to have a comparable educational experience throughout the primary stage’.122  Furthermore, while he argued female seclusion was harmful to society and had no basis in Islamic 
Shari‘a, he	  did	  not	  recommend	  an	  immediate	  end	  to	  it,	  explaining	  that	  ‘such	  a	  
                                                 118 Ibid, pp. 102, 75. 119 Muhammad Farid Wajdi, al-Mar'at al-Muslimah, 1901, pp. 116-117. 120 Mansur Fahmi, La Condition de la Femme dans l'Islam, (Paris: Editions Allia, 1990), p. 159.  121 Ibid. 122 Qasim Amin, The Liberation of Women, p. 28. 
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sudden revolution could lead to an increase in the behaviour that we consider 
corrupt.’123   
Why	  did	  Amin	  advocate	  women’s	  education	  but	  then	  limit	  it	  only	  to	  primary level?  Why argue that female seclusion was harmful to society, and then warn against an immediate end to it?  Moreover, considering that earlier reformers like Tahtawi and Abduh had already introduced ideas of female education and changes to polygamy and divorce, why did his books generate 
more	  controversy?	  	  What	  stands	  out	  in	  Amin’s	  works	  compared	  to	  earlier	  reformers is his focus on unveiling.  Writers	  like	  Kader	  label	  Amin	  ‘the first 
Egyptian	  and	  Arab	  feminist’	  by	  arguing	  that	  his	  books	  turned	  the	  debate	  about	  
the	  woman’s	  question into a full-fledged movement.124  On the other hand, Leila Ahmed argues that rather than being the father of Egyptian feminism Amin was 
actually	  a	  child	  of	  colonialism	  (‘son	  of	  Cromer’).125  Ahmed argues that Amin internalised orientalist views on Egyptian culture, and on veiling as a symbol of inferiority.  Thus, by replicating imperialist attacks on Egyptian customs 
(veiling),	  Amin’s	  calls	  for	  ‘women’s	  liberation’	  were	  actually	  calls	  to	  replace	  Islamic-Egyptian patriarchy with western/imperialist patriarchy.126 Highlighting 
that	  ‘‘woman’	  signified	  more	  than	  gender	  relations’	  in	  such	  contexts,	  and	  that	  
Amin	  ‘faced	  two	  audiences:	  a	  local,	  mostly	  male	  intelligentsia	  and	  scholar-
bureaucrats	  of	  Europe’, Marilyn Booth has recently asked ‘recognising this dual 
                                                 123 Ibid, pp. 45, 60. 124 Abdel Kader, p. 8. 125 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, pp. 155-157. 126 Ibid, p.162-166, 167. 
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(and overtly male) audience, might we recast the late 20th century debate over 
whether	  Qasim	  Amin	  was	  a	  Lord	  Cromer	  crony?’127   
This chapter contends that labels such as colonialist supporter, Islamic reformer, modernist or feminist, should not be viewed as one-dimensional or static identities outside the context of their time.  Amin was no doubt aware of the kind of conservative backlash his ideas would create.  To some extent, this could explain his suggestion of limiting female education to primary level, in the same way Tahtawi suggested, or his call for a gradual rather than an immediate end to seclusion.  These calls for gradual change could be seen as a form of patriarchal bargaining with both conservative forces exemplified by men like Wajdi and modernist reformers like Abduh and Tahtawi.  Similarly, Amin can be seen striking patriarchal bargains with imperialist forces by focusing on veiling/unveiling to	  advance	  his	  views	  on	  women’s	  liberation.	  	  	   
John	  Livingston	  has	  argued	  that	  Tahtawi’s	  dilemma as the employee of a state that was actively promoting scientific education over religious education explains the many contradictions in his views.128  Tahtawi’s	  multiple	  identities	  as	  Islamic Shaykh, reformer, and employee of a modernising Egyptian state (among other identities), meant he had to negotiate his own views in complex ways, and enter into similar patriarchal bargains with the state, colonialists, and conservative Islamists, or risk becoming obsolete as traditional religious education was replaced by modern scientific education.  Thus, this chapter argues that contradictions and limits in the works of reformers like Tahtawi, Abduh, and Amin were the result of tensions between their multiple identities, 
                                                 127 Booth, The long 1890s in Egypt, p. 391. 128 John W. Livingston, Western Science and Educational Reform in the Thought of Shaykh Rifaa al-Tahtawi, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1996, pp. 545, 547. 
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which encouraged them to strike bargains with competing patriarchal forces, namely the modernising Egyptian state, colonialist forces, and conservative religious leaders, in order to advance their own positions. 
2.4 Female Voices in Egyptian Modernist discourse 
The overlap between an Islamic modernist movement and a modernising state in Egypt helps explain	  why	  many	  calls	  for	  women’s	  rights	  came	  from	  Islamic	  scholars and leaders, whereas in Iran, much of the clergy remained staunch opponents of similar ideas.  However, how did Egyptian	  women’s	  contributions to these debates and their bargaining power differ from their contemporaries in Iran, and what factors were responsible for such differences?   Did	  women’s	  calls	  
for	  change	  mirror	  men’s	  ideas	  and	  limits	  for	  reform?	  	  Were	  men	  mirroring	  
women’s	  calls for reform?  Were they articulated in a similar language, and were bargains motivated by similar factors?   
The	  tradition	  of	  the	  women’s	  press	  in	  Egypt	  began	  in	  1892,	  when	  Hind	  
Nawfal,	  a	  Syrian	  Christian,	  founded	  the	  first	  women’s	  journal	  in	  Egypt- Al-Fatat (The Young Woman).  Her mother, Maryam al-Nahhas, had come to Egypt from Lebanon and had completed a biographical dictionary of women in 1879.129 Buthayna Sha‘ban has argued that as Egypt was relatively autonomous from Ottoman authority, unlike Syria and Lebanon, many thinkers and writers from these countries went to Cairo and Alexandria to pursue their activities alongside Egyptian writers.130 The Egyptian Aisha al-Taymurriyyah, who was raised in a 
harem,	  lamented	  and	  challenged	  women’s	  seclusion	  in	  multiple publications 
                                                 129 Baron, The Women's Awakening in Egypt, pp. 14, 16. 130 Shaʻban, p. 11. 
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between 1885-1892.131  Another pioneering female writer was the Shi‘a Lebanese Zaynab Fawwaz who published a large biographical work on Eastern and Western women in 1894 titled al-Durr almanthur fi tabaqat rabbat al-
khudur (Scattered pearls on the generations of the mistresses of seclusion).132  Throughout the book there are biographical descriptions of mythological women, biblical female characters, and notable women from all over the world, such as Balqis, Queen of Sheba, Isabella II Queen of Spain, Qurrat Al-‘Ayn, and Maryam al-Nahhas.133  She also described many Islamic heroines, such as 
Khadeeja,	  the	  Prophet’s	  first	  wife,	  his	  daughter	  Fatima,	  his	  youngest	  wife	  Aisha,	  who could read and interpret the Qur’an, and Zaynab, the granddaughter of the prophet, who Fawwaz praised as a female role model.134   Buthayana Sha‘ban credits Fawwaz with the production of the first modern Arabic novel.  She argues 
that	  contrary	  to	  existing	  historiography	  Husein	  Heykal’s	  Zeinab was not the first of such novels, as Fawwaz had already published her novels 15 years earlier in 1899.135  Underlining Marilyn Booth’s	  arguments,	  Badran	  writes	  that	  women	  like	  
Fawwaz	  and	  Taimuriyyah	  ‘stood	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  feminist	  tradition	  in	  Egypt’.136 Amal al-Subki’s	  has argued that one of the effects of Qasim	  Amin’s	  
writing	  and	  work	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  later	  women’s	  rights	  advocates	  like	  Bahithat al-Badiya (Malak Hifni Nasif) and May Ziyadah.137 However, it is also clear that by viewing earlier women like al-Taymurriyyah and Fawwaz as inspirational pioneers, and describing them as such in their written work, 
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women like May Ziyadah and Malak Hifni Nasif, who came from very different social backgrounds, were validating a	  ‘feminist’	  continuity	  between	  these earlier women and themselves, on the basis of a shared struggle for women’s	  emancipation. 
Ziyadah, a Lebanese-Palestinian Christian, was a well-known poet, writer, translator.  She wrote biographical works on Aisha al-Taymurriyah138 and Malak Hifni Nasif139, and ran one of the most famous literary salons in Cairo.  In a letter 
to	  ‘the	  young	  Egyptian	  woman’	  Ziyadah	  combined	  the	  notion	  of	  female	  activism,	  work, and nationalism by asking the Egyptian girl to choose her path in life 
between	  a	  ‘slave’	  through	  laziness	  or	  a	  ‘queen’	  through	  independent	  thought	  and	  
work;	  ‘if	  you	  live	  [like]	  a	  slave	  you	  would	  be	  a	  heavy	  burden	  on	  your	  
relations…but	  if	  you	  live	  [like]	  a	  queen	  you	  would	  be	  beloved	  and	  celebrated	  by	  
your	  family	  and	  nation’.140  In a letter to the Muslim writer Malak Hifni Nasif in 
1902,	  Ziyadah	  asked	  for	  direction	  and	  leadership	  in	  the	  woman’s	  struggle:	   
Help in the emancipation of the woman by teaching her her 
responsibilities	  and	  duties…we do not mind if you hide your delicate hands behind walls or if you hide your eastern features behind your veil, as long as we continue to hear the sound of your pen at work, so that we may know from you what the higher self is.141 The letter shows how women of different backgrounds encouraged each other in pursuing their mutual struggle for greater freedom and rights.  In 1910, Nasif published, al-Nisa’iyat (Women’s	  Affairs),	  described	  by	  Badran	  as	  a	  ‘key	  text	  in	  Egyptian feminist history’142, which looked at several issues from marriage, to polygamy, to education and work.  Nasif argued against arranged marriages 
                                                 138 May Ziyadah, Aisha Taymur: Shariat al-Talia, (Beirut: Muassasat Nawfal, 1975/1924). 139 Ziyadah, Bahithat al-Badiyah, (S.l: S.n, 1920). 140 Ziyadah, Rasa’il Mayy: Safahat wa ‘Ibarat min Adab Mayy al-Khalid, (Beirut: Dar Beirut, 1951), p. 60. 141 Ibid, p. 14. 142 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 54. 
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saying	  ‘if	  love	  is	  not	  the	  foundation	  for	  two	  people	  coming	  together,	  then	  there	  is	  no meaning	  to	  their	  union’,	  and	  wrote	  that the marriage age for girls had to be raised to at least sixteen years of age.143  She was vehemently opposed to 
polygamy	  arguing	  that	  ‘polygamy	  corrupts	  men…	  and	  corrupts	  the	  hearts	  of	  
women’144.  Her views on veiling were more ambiguous.  On the one hand she 
argued	  that	  ‘our	  religion	  does	  not	  restrict	  us	  in	  this	  matter’,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  
stated	  that	  ‘my	  opinion	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  time	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  veil,	  for	  women must first be given a true education, and taught proper behaviour…then	  leave her to	  choose	  what	  is	  most	  beneficial	  to	  her	  and	  her	  nation’.145   
Nasif’s	  writing overlapped with the arguments of earlier Islamic modernists on polygamy and female education, and incorporated Amin’s	  
‘gradual	  change’	  argument	  on	  veiling.  Yet, she was also subtly challenging the authority of such reformists, when she wrote ‘our	  religion	  does	  not	  restrict	  us	  in	  
this	  matter’,	  validating	  women	  as	  interpreters	  of	  their	  own	  religion,	  and	  
stressing	  women’s	  individual agency in the choices they made as modern women and nationalists.	  	  In	  1912,	  Nasif	  and	  Ziyadah	  challenged	  male	  reformers’	  motives	  
and	  leadership	  in	  letters	  to	  each	  other	  ‘If	  the	  man	  commanded	  us	  to	  veil,	  we	  veiled, and if he asked us to unveil, we unveiled, and if he asked us to learn, we learned, but were there always good intentions behind his demands for us?146  May	  responded,	  ‘Man	  wants	  the	  woman	  to	  feel	  his	  tyranny,	  because	  tyranny	  is	  
control…	  the	  more	  she	  rebelled,	  the	  more	  his	  authoritarianism	  increased’.147  These letters help illustrate that women like Nasif and Ziyadah were engaged in 
                                                 143 Malak Hifni Nasif, al-Nisa'iyat: Majmu‘at Maqalat Nushirat fi al-Jaridah	  fi	  Mawd‘u	  al-Mar’ah al-
Misriyah (Cairo: Multaqa al-Mar’ah wa-al-Dhakirah, 1998), pp. 57, 82. 144 Ibid, p. 78. 145 Ibid, p. 61, 64. 146 Ibid, p.  20. 147 Ibid, p.  25. 
 82 
a combined strategy of negotiating their views and desires around and between the patriarchal limits set by modernist and conservative men, at the same time as challenging and pushing those very limits.   
Another famous contemporary of the period was the Muslim female educator Nabawiyah Musa, who came from a more modest social background.  Her father, an army captain, had died on a mission when she was a child, leaving her mother to raise the family on his military pension.148  Musa entered the Saniyah Teacher’s	  Training	  school	  and	  narrated	  in	  her	  autobiography, Tarikhi bi Qalami (My History with My Pen), how she appealed to the Ministry of Education for permission to sit the state baccalaureate exam and receive equal pay to male teachers.149  The American writer Elizabeth Cooper describes the British educator, Mr Dunlope,	  as	  ‘wise’	  and	  ‘impartial’.150  Musa’s	  opposing account sheds light on how British colonial attitudes were applied differently in reality, particularly to women from more modest backgrounds like hers. 
Mr Dunlope surprised me when he came in holding my application in his 
hand...‘remove	  this	  request…unless	  you	  promise	  me	  you	  will	  be	  
successful’.	  	  I	  said:	  And	  have	  any	  of	  the	  other	  candidates	  promised	  you	  success before sitting the exam?...he said: then know that if you fail, my opinion of you will fall.  I said: I am, thank God, above the serving classes, and neither you nor any one else can make me a servant.151  She wrote of her success: 
I passed coming out forty-third among two hundred candidates.  This was 
in	  the	  year	  1907…no other Egyptian woman would pass the baccalaureate exam until 1928.  For this reason my success was big news, and 
newspapers	  carried	  titles	  such	  as	  ‘the	  first	  female	  Egyptian	  to	  pass	  the	  baccalaureate.152 
                                                 148 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, pp. 38-39. 149 Nabawiyah Musa,Tarikhi bi-Qalami, (Cairo: Multaqa al-Mar’ah	  wa-al-Dhakirah, 1999), pp. 47-48. 150 Elizabeth Cooper, The Women of Egypt, (New York: F.A. Stokes,1914), p.166. 151 Musa, Tarikhi, p. 83. 152 Ibid, p. 85. 
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   Muhammad al-Jawwadi has argued that as a pioneering female educator Musa’s	  first battle was actually against the British Colonialists, exemplified by Mr Dunlope, adding that had it not been for the solid stance of Sa‘ad Zaghlul (Minister of Education at the time),	  Musa’s	  ‘first	  revolution	  would	  have	  ended	  up	  
a	  storm	  in	  a	  teacup’.153  The case highlights the double patriarchal challenge to women like Musa, who had to manoeuvre around the patriarchal limits of the British colonialist authorities and Egyptian society at the time.  Al-Jawwadi can be seen here pointing to her fight against colonialism as a way of validating her authenticity. 
While Musa overtly championed female education she also strongly critiqued marriage,	  writing	  ‘I	  hate	  marriage	  and	  see	  it	  as	  dirt,	  and	  I	  decided	  never	  
to	  soil	  myself	  with	  this	  dirt’.154  She explained how her decision to unveil was 
partly	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  set	  an	  example	  in	  order	  to	  change	  traditions,	  ‘I	  wanted to unveil, although	  I	  did	  not	  write	  about	  it	  but	  read	  Qasim	  Amin’s	  book	  and liked it, though I believe traditions cannot be changed with words.155  This statement shows that while she defended Amin against conservatives,156like her female contemporaries she subtly challenged male reformers with the implication that debates and ideas were not enough, but had to be converted to action by women themselves.  Musa clashed with both the colonial authorities and Egyptian men of her time.  The British authorities made Musa an exception to the rule by making her the first female to receive an equal salary to male 
                                                 153 al-Jawwadi, p. 27. 154 Musa, Tarikhi, p. 87. 155 Ibid, p. 78. 156 Ibid. 
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teachers.157  Musa	  wrote	  ‘they	  called	  me	  the	  wrecker	  of	  men’s	  homes	  and	  the	  
severer	  of	  their	  livelihoods’,158and described the resentment the other male teachers and the British principal had for her. 
At that time I used to write	  for	  a	  daily	  journal	  called	  ‘The Young Woman’s	  
Egypt’…The	  other	  Arabic	  teachers	  went	  to	  the	  principal	  and	  brought	  her	  various clips from the journal and said I was criticising English politics in these articles…and	  by	  doing	  that	  they	  managed	  to	  turn	  her	  against	  me.159  The incident above highlights how her success as an educator threatened both Egyptian and British colonial patriarchy.  Musa went on to become the first 
Egyptian	  woman	  principal	  at	  a	  girls’	  school in Fayyum.160  She was made 
principal	  of	  the	  Mansurah	  teaching	  school,	  and	  in	  1924	  became	  inspector	  of	  girls’	  schools.161    
By the early 1900s women like	  Musa,	  Nasif,	  Ziyadah,	  and	  Sha‘rawi were forming and participating in female clubs, literary groups and salons, lecturing and debating feminist and nationalist ideas.162  They also began organising and attending academic lectures	  at	  the	  university.	  	  Sha‘rawi was one of the first women to organise an academic lecture series at the Egyptian university 
The talk met with such enthusiasm that I invited Mlle Clemet to return to give a whole series of lectures for women.  His highness, Prince Ahmad 
Fuad	  supported	  the	  women’s	  lectures	  and	  ordered	  a	  hall	  to	  be	  reserved	  at	  the university on Fridays. Soon Egyptian women began to speak.  The best known was Malak Hifni Nasif .163    The Egyptian Daily Post reported on some of the academic programs set up for 
women	  at	  the	  ‘Université	  Egyptienne’, which included English, French, and 
                                                 157 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 44. 158 Musa, Tarikhi, p. 93. 159 Ibid, p. 94. 160 Ibid, p. 114. 161 Ibid, p. 142. 162 Sha‘rawi,	  p.	  93-94, 98-100; Elizabeth Cooper, p.239. 163 Ibid, pp. 93-94. 
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Arabic literature, advanced mathematics, political economy and science.164  
Moreover,	  women’s	  philanthropic	  experiences	  were	  also	  pushing	  them	  into	  public paces, making them more socially and politically aware.  In 1910, The 
Egyptian Gazette reported on the activities of the Mubarat Muhammad Ali, a philanthropic organisation	  founded	  in	  1909	  by	  Sha‘rawi and other Egyptian women under the patronage of the Khedive and his family.165  Women were also receiving increasing support from male reformers.  For instance, the academic Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayed praised the example of Nasif as a pioneer and leader of Egyptian women, and corresponded with other female intellectuals such as Ziyadah.166  
 
Conclusion 
The writings of women like Fawwaz, Taymurriyah, and the editors of the 
women’s	  press in Egypt, laid	  the	  seeds	  for	  a	  budding	  women’s	  rights	  movement,	  which was fertilised by women like Nasif and Ziyadah.  While Fawwaz is counted among the first female writers to argue that gender roles were socially constructed,167 she was also engaged in proving authenticity by recalling historic female models, in a similar way to male reformers.  Finding historical precedent, and pointing to early Islamic models, was one way of negotiating authenticity with patriarchal forces.  The intellectual debates between female and male reformers in Egypt can be viewed as a trading platform where gender ideas were 
                                                 164 The Egyptian Daily Post, 6 November 1909. 165 The Egyptian Gazette, 6 April 1910. 166 Nasif, pp. 43-44, Ziyadah, Rasail Mayy, p. 32. 167 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 66. 
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exchanged; where discursive bargains were negotiated and challenged by men and women.   
The Egyptian state under Muhammad Ali began challenging definitions of 
women’s	  social roles by establishing the Sina School of Midwifery in the 1830s.  By the 1870s and 1890s the first state schools for girls were established, the Saniyah Teacher Training College was in operation, Fawwaz and al-Taymuriyah had initiated a new literary tradition,	  and	  a	  new	  women’s	  press	  was	  growing.	  	  These measures opened spaces for some classes of Egyptian women in education and journalism, as well as appropriate workspaces for some women as midwives and teachers.  By the 1900s, Malak Hifni Nasif had published al-Nisa’iyyat, May Ziyadah was writing and hosting mixed literary salons, and Nabawiya Musa was challenging colonial and Egyptian authorities in the Ministry of Education to go on to build her career in education.  Her actions, like those of her contemporaries,	  constituted	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  Egyptian	  women’s	  history.	  	  	   Unlike Egypt, the Iranian state was not challenging	  the	  clergy’s	  authority through scientific education as state policy.  The narrower debates on the 
woman’s	  question at this stage in Iran were the combined result of limited and superficial state modernisation under Qajar rule, which did not support educational reform for women, coupled with the persistent power of an explicitly hostile clerical establishment.   Thus,	  women’s	  bargaining power, and indeed the bargaining power of modernist men, was more limited in Iran compared to Egypt at this time.  As such, elite women like Bibi Khanum and Taj al-Saltaneh used their privileged positions to pursue a more subtle strategy of compromise with modernist/constitutionalist men around ideas of educated motherhood, and education as nationalist activity.  Thus, the terms and contents 
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of Iranian	  and	  Egyptian	  women’s bargains were different, and were negotiated differently as a result of their specific bargaining powers at this stage. 
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Chapter 2 
Feminism	  and	  Nationalism	  (1890’s-1920’s)  
In	  the	  first	  chapter	  it	  was	  shown	  how	  women’s	  rights	  discourses	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Iran developed as part of early modernist and nationalist debates.  This chapter looks at the relationship between early nationalist	  movements	  and	  women’s	  rights discourses in Egypt and Iran.  It relies on Foreign Office documents from the UK National Archives pertaining to the activities of Egyptian female nationalists of the period.  These are used in conjunction with the memoirs and 
writings	  of	  key	  Egyptian	  women’s	  rights	  activists.	  	  Documents	  from	  the	  Sedigheh Dowlatabadi collection held at the Archives of the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam are used along with the writings of Morgan Shuster, the writings	  of	  other	  pioneering	  Iranian	  women’s	  rights	  activists,	  constitutionalists, and foreign observers of the period.  Relevant newspaper and press sources pertaining to this period are additionally used for both country cases. Analyzing the relationship between feminism and nationalism in post-colonial societies, Mohanty, Narayan and Chatterjee have pointed to how the dichotomy of nationalism and imperialism in such societies led to a ‘cultural	  
competition’	  around	  Eastern/Western constructions of womanhood.1  In many cases, British colonial attacks centred on notions of the family, which often resulted in resistance to imperialism and modern nationalism being expressed 
                                                 1 Mohanty; Narayan; Chatterjie. 
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or articulated through the familial framework.2 In her comparative study, 
‘Feminism	  and	  Nationalism	  in	  the	  Third	  World’,	  Jayawardena	  credited	  late	  19th/early 20th century nationalism for pushing women into political life.  
However,	  she	  argued	  that	  by	  making	  the	  ‘monogamous	  bourgeois	  nuclear	  family	  the core of capitalist modernisation’,	  feminist consciousness was not able to develop far enough to question traditional patriarchal structures, and thus 
women’s	  movements	  in	  these	  countries	  ‘failed	  to	  make	  any	  impression	  on	  
women’s	  subordination	  within	  patriarchal	  structures	  of	  family	  and	  society’.3 Other scholars like Mayer and Peterson have argued that the connection between gender and sexuality makes nationalism the vehicle through which 
‘masculine	  prowess	  is	  expressed	  and	  strategically	  exercised’4,	  and	  ‘women’s	  agency in service to heterosexist nationalisms’	  pulls	  women	  towards	  ‘masculinist	  
strategies’.5  In contrast, this chapter will argue that nationalism was not purely a vehicle through which masculine prowess was expressed, but that women in Egypt and Iran used nationalist language to exercise their own agency by challenging existing patriarchal standards, negotiating new roles for themselves, and attempting to strike new patriarchal bargains with male nationalists to uphold these new roles.  In both countries men enthusiastically encouraged female participation against foreign interference and imperialism, but appeared less accommodating in allowing women the same voice when it came to domestic policies.  Women could lead and organise protests and riots against 
                                                 2 Lisa Pollard, Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonising, and Liberating 
Egypt, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Lisa Pollard, The family politics of colonizing and liberating Egypt 1805-1923, Social Politics, Vol.7, Issue 1, 2001. 3 Jayawardena, p. 24. 4 Tamar Mayer, p. 1/i. 5 Peterson. 
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foreign intervention, and voice their opposition publicly, but when it came to female suffrage or ideas of	  women’s	  progress,	  gradual	  change as opposed to revolutionary action became more acceptable terms for new patriarchal bargains.   In Egypt, nationalist men like Lutfi al-Sayyid supported modernist notions 
of	  female	  education,	  and	  bringing	  an	  end	  to	  women’s	  domestic	  seclusion.	  	  On	  the	  other hand, conservative nationalists like Mustafa Kamil objected to them as imperialist ploys designed to weaken the Egyptian nation.  Egyptian women were able to challenge patriarchal practices such as polygamy and domestic 
seclusion	  by	  contributing	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  new	  monogamous	  ‘modern	  bourgeois	  
family’,	  and	  the	  ‘educated	  mother’,	  as part of the solution for Egyptian independence against British occupation.  However, while this new family model allowed women to challenge existing patriarchal limits, it introduced new and revised patriarchal controls at the time.  Therefore, while women supported the nationalist movement, hoping to forge new spaces for themselves in the political process, they were repeatedly excluded from political decision-making processes, as the new Electoral laws restricted voting to men.  While modernist nationalists supported female education and an end to domestic seclusion, these measures were intended to produce better mothers for modern Egyptian 
children,	  and	  partners	  for	  modern	  Egyptian	  men.	  	  As	  such	  women’s	  activity	  in	  the political sphere appeared to conflict with these domestic responsibilities and with male nationalist definitions of modern Egyptian womanhood.   However, these political exclusions encouraged some female nationalists to challenge these 
limits	  on	  women’s	  political	  activity, by taking more independent action in pursuit of their nationalist and feminist goals.   
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Iranian women challenged patriarchal structures and control in a less obtrusive manner, particularly when overt activism was not possible.  At the start of the Constitutional Revolution (1906) women conducted their political activity covertly through secret societies, using these experiences to subtly challenge patriarchal limits on their public activity.  By 1910, they were able to conduct their activity more visibly, participating in mass riots, challenging men in the Majlis (Parliament/National Assembly), launching	  the	  first	  women’s	  journals, and reaching out to international feminist groups, namely the British Suffragettes.  However, women did not enjoy the same support or tolerance for their journalistic and educational activities as they did when protesting foreign or imperialist intervention during the Constitutional period.  Women operated 
girls’	  schools	  from	  their	  homes,	  against	  the	  voices	  of	  conservatives	  in	  the	  Majlis and the hostile ulama.  However, they persisted in their journalistic and educational activities, and began to win greater support and acceptance for some of their ideas.   Viewing nationalism, feminism, patriarchal bargains, and notions of womanhood as products of their time, this chapter argues in contrast to Jayawardena, that women	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Iran	  did	  in	  fact	  question	  ‘traditional	  
patriarchal	  structures’,	  particularly	  within	  the	  family,	  but	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  questions, the way they framed them, and the strategies they employed were not the same, but shaped and limited by their social backgrounds and specific historic contexts.    These challenges to existing gender definitions and patriarchal limits were repeatedly constrained by persistent notions of women as symbols of 
‘cultural	  authenticity’	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  	  Many	  writers have argued that 
women’s	  importance	  in	  nationalist	  movements	  is	  based	  on	  their	  crucial	  role	  as	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biological and symbolic reproducers of the nation.  Writers like Chatterjee, Kandiyoti, Mayer, Yuval-Davis and Anthias,	  have	  all	  stressed	  women’s	  definitions 
as	  ‘boundary	  markers	  of	  their	  communities’,	  ‘cultural	  carriers’,	  and	  
‘representatives	  of	  purity’	  in	  nationalist	  contexts,	  which	  they	  argue	  has	  compromised their development as equal citizens within modern nation-states.6 Mayer reiterates these arguments to posit that the intersection of nation, gender, 
and	  sexuality	  becomes	  a	  ‘discourse	  about	  moral	  code’,	  as	  women’s	  bodies	  and	  
‘modesty’ are used	  to	  ‘represent	  the	  ‘purity’ of	  the	  nation’,	  which	  requires	  them	  to be protected by nationalist men.7   Early Egyptian and Iranian nationalism illustrated that notions of women’s	  purity	  and	  modesty were tied to new definitions of womanhood, around which competing nationalist discourses offered conflicting definitions of authenticity to assert dominance.  However, this chapter will argue that definitions of purity and modesty were not the same in Egypt and Iran, and that such notions often manifested differently across different social groups and classes within the same country.  In	  Iran,	  the	  ‘Story	  of	  the	  Daughters of Quchan’ and the Iranian washerwoman were woven into nationalist narratives, creating a sense of national collectivity and protectiveness around themes of class and female oppression, and the loss and/or repression	  of	  ‘pure’,	  ‘modest’,	  ‘loyal’	  and	  
‘self-sacrificing’	  peasant/working	  class	  women.	  	  In	  Egypt,	  notions	  of	  modern 
Egyptian	  ‘motherhood’	  and	  the	  monogamous nuclear family were used to 
illustrate	  Egypt’s	  readiness	  for	  independence.	  	  The	  ‘House	  of	  the	  Nation’ (the residence of the Wafd leader Sa‘ad Zaghlul and his wife Saffiya Zaghlul) provided 
                                                 6 Kandiyoti, Identity and its Discontents; pp. 49, 51; Tamar Mayer, pp. 7, 10; 18, Yuval Davis, p. 45-46; Chatterjee, p. 243; Anthias, Yuval-Davis, Campling; pp. 85, 143, 155. 7 Tamar Mayer, p.9. 
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Egyptians with a symbolic and physical centre for their nationalist campaign, which along with Sa‘ad	  Zaghlul	  and	  Saffiya	  Zaghlul’s	  roles	  as	  ‘Father	  and	  Mother	  
of	  the	  nation’	  gave	  the	  nationalist	  movement	  a	  sense of unity, authenticity, and structure.  
 
Section	  1:	  Iranian	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  Women’s	  Rights	  Movement	   
Looking	  at	  women’s	  activity	  during	  the	  Constitutional	  Revolution	  this	  section	  argues, in contrast to Janet Afary8, that women did significantly challenge their 
society’s	  gender-relations’	  while	  advocating	  for	  greater	  rights,	  but	  altered	  their	  strategies to do so in less revolutionary ways at moments when more overt activism would have pushed bargains too far.  At the start of the constitutional 
period,	  Morgan	  Shuster	  referred	  to	  numerous	  secret	  women’s	  societies,	  and	  their covert activities in defence of the constitutionalist movement.  Royal women like Taj al-Saltaneh, and women from elite religious families like Sedigheh	  Dowlatabadi	  founded	  The	  Women’s	  Freedom	  Society	  in	  1906.	  	  After	  the establishment of the first and second Majlis,	  and	  the	  developing	  women’s	  
rights	  debates	  within	  them,	  these	  women’s	  activities	  became	  a	  lot	  more	  visible	  within the new National Ladies’ Society founded in 1910.  This society not only organised and participated in mass riots in 1911, challenging male Majlis members head on, but contacted British suffragettes, linking their nationalist 
activity	  to	  a	  broader/international	  women’s	  rights	  struggle.   It is important to note that the National Ladies Society was reaching out to British suffragettes at the same time clerical leaders in the Majlis were 
claiming	  women’s	  suffrage	  was	  anti-Islamic.  Women combined their 
                                                 8 Afary, p. 206. 
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revolutionary-nationalist activity against foreign intervention, with subtler forms of patriarchal resistance, through their educational, philanthropic, and journalistic activities.  Pari Shaykh al-Islami	  lists	  the	  many	  early	  women’s	  journals of the period, starting with Danesh in 1910, emphasising the role these 
pioneering	  journals	  played	  in	  initiating	  ‘bidari-i zan/zanan’	  (women’s	  awakening/renaissance).9  Bamdad similarly points to these early female journalists and educators as pioneers in the bidari-i zanan movement, describing their	  activities	  as	  ‘noorpachi’	  (illumination,	  spreading	  of	  light/enlightenment).10 However, women faced severe clerical hostility and male objection, with pioneering educators and their schools receiving regular harassment or having to hide their activities from male family members.  These examples indicate that women did challenge existing gender-relations through a combined strategy of covert and overt nationalist/public activity depending on the level of male hostility and patriarchal attitudes to those activities at the time.  Muhammad	  Panah	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘educated,	  freethinking	  women’,	  who	  
were	  mostly	  from	  the	  ‘elite	  upper	  classes’	  and	  who	  had	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  
western	  ideas	  lead	  the	  Iranian	  women’s	  movement.11  However, this section will show that while elite women like Bibi Khanum, Mohtaram Eskandari, and 
Sedigheh	  Dowlatabadi	  did	  pioneer	  women’s	  public	  activism,	  journalism, and educational activities, differences in their social and family backgrounds often influenced the various paths they took within the bidari-i zanan movement.  For 
instance,	  Mohtarama	  Eskandari’s	  Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  was	  ideologically	  
linked	  to	  her	  husband,	  Solayman	  Eskandari’s	  Socialist	  Party,	  while	  Sedigheh	  
                                                 9 al-Islami, Zan dar Iran. 10 Badr-ol-Moluk Bamdad, Zan-e-Irani az Inqilab-e-Mashrutiyat ta Inqilab-e-Sefid, (Tehran, Intesharat-e-Ibn Sina, 1968), pp. 34, 49. 11 Panah, p. 7-8. 
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Dowlatabadi’s	  activities	  lead to her estrangement from her clerical family.  As 
such	  it	  is	  additionally	  argued	  that	  women	  often	  sought	  the	  role	  of	  ‘cultural	  carriers’	  and	  protectors	  of	  the	  nation, but did so in different ways according to their different social backgrounds.  Women’s support for the ulama also varied according to their different backgrounds. The story of the Iranian washerwoman indicates the ways in which modest, working-class women were venerated as loyal, self-sacrificing nationalist models.  However, by founding their own 
women’s	  organisations and leading women in nationalist protests, educated elite 
women	  were	  positioning	  themselves	  as	  both	  protectors	  of	  Iran’s	  national	  
culture,	  and	  leaders	  of	  a	  budding	  women’s	  rights	  movement. 
1.1 The Tobacco Protests of 1890-1892 The final decades of the 19th century saw the deterioration of Qajari rule and the rise of Iranian Constitutionalism.  Western encroachment negatively affected many sectors such as the bazaaris (merchant classes), who suffered 
economically	  under	  the	  state’s	  imposition	  of	  taxation	  and	  commercial	  concessions to western countries.  This compromised donations to the clerical classes who had traditional ties with the bazaar, increasing political grievances amongst this group.12  The	  Iranian	  state’s	  legitimacy	  under	  Nasser	  al-Din Shah was continuously attacked as a result of several enormous concessions, such as 
the	  Shah’s	  1889	  concession	  to	  Baron	  Julius	  de	  Reuter	  to	  establish	  the	  ‘Imperial	  
Bank	  of	  Persia’	  as	  Iran’s	  state	  bank, allowing it to monopolise the Iranian financial sector for the next 60 years.13  E. Granville Browne wrote that the following year the Shah granted the British a tobacco concession, guaranteeing 
                                                 12  Paidar, p. 43. 13  E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), p. 31. 
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the concessionaries 75% of annual profits, with the Persians expected to cover all working expenses.14   Unlike earlier concessions, the tobacco concessions concerned a product that huge numbers of Iranians from various social backgrounds depended on: from landowners to big and small merchants, to the peasants who cultivated it.15  In the absence of an independent press, the Armenian-Iranian modernist Malkom Khan began to publish his criticisms from London, distributing a newspaper entitled Qanun in February 1890.16  According to Browne, these publications made the Persian people aware of the nature of the concessions, and as a result they began to revolt and organise boycotts in protest.17  Thus, the Tobacco Protests of 1890-1892 were a turning point in Iranian politics as they led to heavy criticism of the government by Iranian papers published abroad, and to mass protests and riots led by the Shi‘a clergy and Tehran merchants.  The American Morgan Shuster, who was appointed Treasurer-general of Persia in 1911 by the Iranian Majlis, explained that  in  December 1891  as  a  result  of  a  religious  decree   ' all  the  tobacco-­shops  closed  their  doors…and  in  a  marvellously  short  time  the  use  of  tobacco  practically  ceased.’18  The protests and boycotts eventually forced the Shah to cancel the Tobacco Concession in 1892.  Browne 
referred	  to	  the	  clergy	  as	  the	  ‘champions	  of	  popular	  causes’,	  and	  argued	  that	  it	  
was	  ‘the	  support	  and	  guidance	  of	  the	  mullahs and mujtahids, the spiritual heads 
                                                 14 Ibid, p. 33-47. 15 Hooshang Amirahmahdi, The Political Economy of Iran Under the Qajars: Society, Politics and 
Foreign Relations, 1799 to 1921, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), p. 163. 16  E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, p. 35. 17  Ibid. 18  Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York: Greenwood, 1968; 1912), p. 19. 
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of the nation, which made organised and	  effective	  protest	  possible’.19  However, 
native	  perceptions	  of	  the	  clergy’s	  behaviour were quite mixed; Iranian scholar and politician of the period, Mohammad Taqi Bahar acknowledged the contribution of some important ulama, while Iranian constitutionalist and reformer Kasravi wrote	  that	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  some	  ‘enlightened’	  mullahs like Behbahani and Tabatabai, most mullahs only hoped to promulgate the 
Shari‘a and advance their own power.20   Ricks argues that the Tobacco protests became the first of the national movements culminating in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.21  
Moaddel	  argues	  that	  the	  protests	  ‘transformed	  the	  merchant-British conflict into a confrontation between the Muslims and infidels’.22  However, the accounts given by foreign observers like Browne and Shuster, and native accounts by men like Bahar and Kasravi highlight that the struggle was not purely targeted at the 
‘British	  infidels’,	  but	  rather	  at	  the	  Iranian	  state,	  as	  an	  illegitimate and corrupt imperialist agent.  Ever since Shi‘ism was	  adopted	  as	  Iran’s official religion in the 16th century, the state was viewed by the ulama as an illegitimate entity.  The replacement of the Safavids with the Qajars aggravated the situation, as unlike their predecessors, the Qajars could not claim descent from the same line of Shi‘a Imams, and so the ulama’s alienation from the state intensified.  The relationship between the state and the ulama remained contentious, oscillating between 
                                                 19 Edward Granville Browne, A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia (London: Luzac and Co., 1909), p. 7. 20 Mohammad Taqi Bahar, Tarikh-i Mukhtasar-i Ahzab-i	  Siyāsi	  Iran (Tehran, 1944-1984), p. 2; Ahmad Kasravi, History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, trans. Evan Siegel (California: Mazda Publishers, 2006), p. 296. 21 Thomas	  Ricks,	  ‘Background	  to	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution:	  Imperialism,	  Dictatorship,	  and	  Nationalism, 1872-1979’,	  in	  Iran: Essays on a Revolution in the Making, eds. Ahmad Jabbari and Robert Olson (Kentucky: Mazda Publishers, 1981), p. 22. 22 Mansoor	  Moaddel,	  Shi’i	  Political	  Discourse	  and	  Class	  Mobilisation	  in	  the	  Tobacco	  Movement	  of	  1890-1892, Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No.3, 1992. 
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periods of temporary calm and reconciliation, such as the early 19th century, which saw Fath Ali Shah favour and expand clerical influence over the court, to periods of increased conflict and hostility under his successors Muhammad Shah and Nasir al-Din Shah.23  Algar argues that this resulted in the ulama not only 
acting	  as	  community	  leaders	  but	  as	  ‘national’	  leaders,	  against	  the	  state,	  so	  that	  
resistance	  to	  imperialism	  or	  foreign	  intervention	  was	  ‘voiced	  in	  Islamic	  rather	  
than	  in	  nationalistic	  terms’.24  Thus, from the 16th century onwards the Iranian ulama can be seen as patriarchal rivals to the state, questioning its legitimacy and competing as independent agents for economic privilege and socio-political domination.  Moreover, by the end of the 19th century the ulama’s	  gender	  definitions	  were	  beginning to conflict with those of the state.  The ulama defined gender relations and womanhood according to patriarchal interpretations of Shi‘a Islamic doctrine, which particularly influenced women of the lower working classes.  Women of the Qajari elite and extended royal classes were influenced by the patriarchal Qajari state and Qajari harem systems, where notions of female education and independent thought were becoming more commonplace than amongst the bazaari and lower working classes.  As community-‘national’	  leaders, the ulama encouraged women of the lower classes to riot as part of their Islamic duty.  As such women  observed  the  tobacco  boycotts  as  strictly  as  men  and many  even  led  the  food  riots  that  followed .25   The intersection of class, 
ideology,	  and	  gender	  in	  this	  context	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  women’s	  
                                                 23 Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period, (Berkeley: University of California , 1969), pp.103, 132. 24 Ibid, p. 24. 25 Paidar, p. 51; Hamideh Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Re-veiling, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 41. 
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participation in these protests.  The women who participated in the Tobacco Protest were of the lower bazaari and lower working classes, and thus did so as part of their religious duty as they had done before (bread riots), under the direct calls and leadership of the ulama.  Moaddel argues that during the Tobacco protests, Shi‘ism constituted a common language across class divides for confronting British domination and mobilising the masses against it.26  The participation of women as religious duty shows that Shi‘a discourse not only transcended class divides, but also gender divides within certain classes as well.    Women in this context, particularly those of the lower working classes, were validating one form of patriarchy over the other by following the leadership of the ulama against the state.  For these women, upholding their end of existing patriarchal bargains with the ulama, against the state, offered them more security than challenging such bargains.  Even women from educated religious backgrounds who challenged religious patriarchy became social outcasts and were perceived as immodest, heretics, and thus anti-nationalist/anti-Iranian, as illustrated by the case of Qurrat al-‘Ayn in chapter 1. 
1.2  Women and the Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911 Economic dependence on foreign powers continued to be the primary source of 
unrest	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  revolution.	  	  The	  Shah’s	  successor	  Mozaffar	  al-Din Shah took out several major loans from Russia and Britain to support his extravagant lifestyle, including a loan for 22 million rubles from the Russians to finance a royal tour of Europe.27  In 1905, protests erupted over the collection of Iranian tariffs to pay back this Russian loan.  The idea of constitutionalism, first 
                                                 26 Moaddel, Shi‘i Political Discourse and Class Mobilisation. 27 Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Dutton, 1996), pp. 55-150. 
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mentioned by Malkom Khan in his publication Qanun, began to gain wider acceptance across Iranian society, including amongst many clerics and merchants who believed it would increase their political and commercial powers.28  Mohammad Taqi Bahar wrote that some ulama were in agreement with the idea of constitutionalism, and that British politics at the time secretly supported it.  This, he wrote, combined with Mozaffar al-Din	  Shah’s	  political 
inadequacies,	  led	  to	  the	  minority	  class	  of	  ‘educated	  and	  open-minded’	  constitutionalists taking over in 1906.29  Kasravi described how ideas of constitutionalism varied between the ministers, courtiers, clerics and the 
bazaaris,	  concluding	  that	  the	  ‘people of Iran are afflicted with disparate beliefs.  One cannot find ten people who have chosen the same way and mode of thought 
amongst	  themselves.’30  Between the summer of 1905 and 1906 a series of public protests, particularly over the economic situation, sugar shortages, and trade concessions to Belgium, took place.31  
It	  is	  within	  this	  context,	  that	  Afsaneh	  Najmabadi’s	  study	  on	  hikayat-i-
dukhtaran-i Quchan (the story of the daughters of Quchan, which took place around 1905) provides a strong example of how women were used as symbols of cultural purity and national authenticity against the Qajari state.  During a period of severe economic difficulty, exacerbated by a severe locust attack in 1905, the imposition of heavy taxation by the governor of Khurasan, and the local governor of its main county Quchan, forced peasant families to sell their daughters to Turkomans and Armenians in order to pay their debts.  Najmabadi argues that while the selling of young girls was not extraordinary at the time, increasing 
                                                 28 Paidar, p. 52. 29 Taqi Bahar, p. 2. 30 Kasravi, History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, p. 3. 31 Paidar, p. 53 
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dissatisfaction with the state turned the story into one of national grief, creating 
‘a	  sense	  of	  national	  collectivity’.32  As Najmbadi explains, the daughters of Quchan became the daughters of the nation, the daughters of Iran, and 
representations	  of	  ‘Iranianness’.33  As such, the selling of these young virgin girls to Ashkabadi Armenians, viewed as Christian outsiders, was interpreted as an attack on Iran/Iranian	  men’s	  national	  honour and	  on	  the	  country’s	  dominant	  religion of Islam.34  Recurrent	  themes	  of	  ‘female	  purity’	  and	  ‘female	  oppression’	  in the story, which were linked to notions of male honour and unjust rule, were used to symbolise national authenticity against the autocratic Qajari state. The increasing public protests forced the Shah to approve a new constitution, based on the Belgian model, on 30 December 1906.  He died within the week and was succeeded by his son Mohammad Ali Mirza on 19 January 1907.35  Whilst	  the	  constitution	  achieved	  one	  of	  the	  revolution’s	  main	  political	  aims of limiting	  the	  monarchy’s	  power	  and	  giving	  the	  first	  Majlis (first National Assembly) power to act as representative of the Iranian nation, it did not deliver changes	  to	  women’s	  political	  rights.	  	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  Electoral	  Law	  of	  September	  
1906	  read	  ‘the	  persons	  who	  are	  entirely	  deprived	  of	  electoral	  rights	  are	  as	  follows: women,	  persons	  not	  within	  years	  of	  discretion…murderers,	  thieves,	  criminals’.36 Article 5 re-emphasised the above by positioning women at the top of the list of those ‘absolutely	  disqualified	  from	  electoral	  functions’,	  alongside	  the	  
‘criminal’	  and	  the	  ‘insane’.37  Some women wrote letters to editors of Persian 
                                                 32 Najmabadi, Hikayat, p. 4. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid, pp. 6-8. 35 ‘Death	  of	  the	  Shah’,	  The Times London,	  Issue	  38226,	  10	  January	  1907;	  ‘Coronation	  of	  the	  Shah’,	  
The Times London, Issue 38235, 21 January 1907, Times Digital Archives. 36 E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, p. 355. 37 Ibid. 
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papers asking them to explain why women had been denied political rights, challenging the Majlis to allow women a trial period to run the country.38  Moreover, the constitution continued to be undermined by new foreign concessions and agreements.  The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, followed the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1906, and partitioned Iran 
according	  to	  spheres	  of	  influence	  with	  ‘Russia	  in	  the	  north	  and	  England	  in	  the	  south-eastern corner	  of	  the	  Persian	  Empire’.39  It was known from the start of his reign that Muhammad Ali Shah was against the constitution, and on 23 June 1908, with Russian help and British silence, he bombarded the Majlis, exiling many ministers and assassinating or arresting many journalists.40  Bahar writes that the Russian and British governments reacted to these actions separately according to their interests; Russia offered loans to the Qajar government, while the British held that until the constitution was stabilised no lending to the Shah should take place.41      
Despite	  some	  women’s	  disappointments with the Majlis, they continued to support their nationalist goals; using secret societies they established to spread 
political	  messages,	  and	  taking	  part	  in	  demonstrations	  and	  protests.	  	  Women’s	  groups stepped to restore order to the Majlis, sending international telegrams calling for help.  From London, The Times published a reply by Sir Edward Grey 
to	  the	  president	  of	  ‘a	  Committee	  of	  Persian	  Women	  in	  Constantinople’	  to	  inform	  
them	  that	  Britain	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Russia	  was	  already	  taking	  steps	  ‘to	  restore 
order	  in	  Persia’.42   
                                                 38 Paidar, p. 55.  39 Shuster, p. 227. 40 Taqi Bahar, p. 3. 41  Ibid. 42 ‘The	  Persian	  Troubles’,	  The Times, Issue 38752, 15 September 1908, The Times Digital Archive. 
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Iranian writer Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, whose father was an active constitutionalist, and who herself would become a pioneering female educator, described how women offered their jewellery to raise capital in support of the movement, particularly the formation of a national bank, and told the story of a washerwoman/laundress who came to offer her one toman (a single unit of Iranian currency) of savings towards the cause.43  Kasravi, too, described the 
same	  story,	  ‘women raised the subject of selling their earrings and necklaces.  
One	  day	  a	  woman	  stood	  up…‘why does the government of Iran get loans from abroad?  Are we dead? I am a washerwoman and I give as my share one toman’.44 The story illustrates how notions of female loyalty and self-sacrifice were venerated as ideal constructs of Iranian womanhood.  In this story, a lower-class washerwoman makes the sacrifice of offering her entire savings of one toman to defend Iran against foreign domination.	  	  The	  woman’s	  social	  background	  and	  the	  amount she is offering are not irrelevant; her contribution would not have supported the formation of a national bank, but the story served to inspire people, by highlighting the loyalty of the Iranian working-class masses, particularly of vulnerable women within these lower classes, who although economically the greatest victims of foreign interference and state corruption, were still willing to defend and sacrifice themselves and their livelihoods for the Iranian nation.  These notions of womanhood would be recalled and regenerated during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, to inspire women towards more radical revolutionary activism.  
                                                 43 Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, From	  Darkness	  into	  Light:	  Women’s	  Emancipation	  in	  Iran (New York: Exposition Press, 1977), pp. 28-29. 44 Kasravi, History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, p. 210. 
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The Constitutional Revolution was unique in the unprecedented participation of educated, urban women, from upper class or elite Qajari families and leading religious families, who formed and ran their own secret societies and political anjomans (clubs/societies).  Shuster wrote that during the constitutional period it was well known that in	  Tehran	  there	  existed	  ‘dozens	  of	  more or less secret societies among the Persian women, with a central organisation by	  which	  they	  were	  controlled’.45    To this day I know neither the names nor the faces of the leaders of this group, but in a hundred different ways I learned from time to time that I was being aided and supported by the patriotic fervour of thousands of the weaker sex.46    Bamdad identified the organisation as	  the	  Women’s	  Freedom	  Society,	  formed	  in	  1906, explaining that no single men or women were allowed to attend its meetings.47  Among the most prominent ladies in the society were the pioneering 
women’s	  rights	  activists	  Sedigheh Dowlatabadi and Taj Al-Saltaneh.48 In 1910  ,The National Ladies’ Society was founded in Tehran with Sedigheh Dowlatabadi as secretary, which promoted the boycott of foreign goods and engaged in philanthropic activities to improve the situation of Iranians.49  The society expressed its opposition to foreign loans and the imposition of foreign goods by promoting the sale and use of domestic fabrics, and established an orphanage with funds it raised from a charity garden party.50  Thus, female activists were 
able	  to	  challenge	  the	  state’s	  foreign policy and engage in nationalist activity via more subtle methods, such as philanthropic activity.   
                                                 45 Morgan Shuster, p. 184-185. 46 Ibid. 47 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 30. 48 Ibid, p. 31. 49 Ibid, p. 34. 50 Ibid, p. 35. 
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Many of the pioneering members of the National Ladies Society went on 
to	  become	  leading	  women’s	  rights	  activists,	  such	  as	  Dowlatabadi	  and	  Mohtaram	  Eskandari.	  	  Dowlatabadi,	  who	  was	  a	  member	  of	  both	  the	  ‘Women’s	  Freedom	  
Society’	  and	  the	  National	  Ladies	  Society,	  was	  also	  a	  pioneering	  educator	  and	  journalist who became estranged from her family as a result of her activities.51  Born to a family of ulama in Isfahan in 1882, she was educated in both Persian and Arabic.  She went on to complete her education abroad and receive her BA from the Sorbonne University.52  In 1919 she published Zaban-i Zanan (Women’s	  Voice) periodical to express her criticisms of the veil, and advocate education for women against fierce opposition from religious circles.53 Eskandari, a Qajar Princess, was also active during the Constitutional Revolution and later founded the socialist Jamiyat-i-Nesvan-i-Vantankhah (Patriotic	  Women’s	  League)	  in	  1922.	  	  The leadership of	  the	  Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  was formed of four female members, including Mehrangiz Eskandari.54  By 1923 the League was publishing its periodical, Nesvan-i-vatankhah (Patriotic Women), and holding education classes for women.55 Female education constituted another key bargaining 
strategy	  for	  women’s	  rights	  activists,	  who	  formed	  private	  schools,	  and	  founded	  journals to assert themselves, and challenge patriarchal standards during and directly after the constitutional period.   
1.3  Education and Nationalist Protests as Patriarchal Bargains 
                                                 51 Mary	  Winsor,	  American	  Suffragist,	  23	  October	  1926,	  ‘The	  Blossoming	  of	  a	  Persian	  Feminist’,	  
Equal Rights Magazine.  52 Ibid. 53 ‘Permission	  letter	  from	  the	  Iranian	  Ministry	  of	  Culture	  to	  Dowlatabadi to publish Zaban-i 
Zanan Magazine’,	  Dowlatabadi Collection, International Institute of Social History Archives (IISHA). 54 Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani az Inqilab-e-Mashrutiyat ta Inqilab-e-Sefid, (Tehran, Intesharat-e-Ibn Sina, 1968), p. 53. 55 Ibid,p. 46, Bamdad, From Darkness Into Light, pp. 62-64. 
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Sedghi argues that Iranian women played a unique role in transforming the 
‘political	  revolution	  of	  1906	  into	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  social	  revolution’.56 Afary argues that pioneering female activists in Iran were able to advocate for 
women’s	  rights	  without	  significantly	  challenging	  their	  societies’	  gender	  relations,	  
by	  founding	  girls	  schools	  and	  women’s	  journals.57  This section argues that it was not that women	  advocated	  rights	  without	  significantly	  challenging	  their	  society’s	  gender relations, but rather that they found novel and less obtrusive ways to do so when overt activity would have been too costly a bargain at the time.  The examples in this section show that women did significantly challenge existing gender-relations through a combined strategy of covert and overt nationalist activity, depending on levels of male hostility, combined with social activism through education, journalism, and philanthropic initiatives.    Although state-sponsored compulsory education was enshrined within Article 19 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907, and reaffirmed in 1910 by the second Majlis, no state schools were officially established until after World War I.58 According to The Times, The American School in Tehran (set up by the American Presbyterian Society decades earlier) had started receiving increasing numbers of female Muslim students by the 1900s, as suspicious attitudes toward female education began to change.59   It reported in 1910 on the 
existence	  of	  more	  than	  50	  girls’	  schools	  in	  Tehran,	  declaring	  that	  female	  
education	  looked	  to	  ‘play	  an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  future	  evolution	  of	  Persia’.60  
Bamdad	  credited	  these	  changing	  attitudes	  to	  a	  ‘grassroots	  campaign	  for	  women’s	  
                                                 56 Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran, p. 43. 57 Afary, p. 206. 58 Ibid, p. 42. 59 Javadi & Floor, Astarabadi, The Education	  of	  Women	  in	  Persia’, The Times, Issue 39350, 13 August 1910, Times Digital Archives. 60 Ibid. 
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education’	  led	  by	  several	  exceptional	  Iranian	  women.61  Female activists and 
nationalists	  founded	  the	  first	  girls’	  schools	  and	  women’s	  journals	  in	  an	  attempt	  to change public attitudes and challenge patriarchal bargains.   Many of these pioneering educators came from religious backgrounds.  Tuba Azmudeh, founder of Namus School	  in	  1908,	  believed	  women’s	  education	  was enshrined in Islam and demonstrated this with the teaching of Islamic texts.62  Dorrat al-Mali Khanum founded the Dorrat-i-Madares Girls School in 1909.63  Many of these pioneering educators were married to religious men, both liberal and conservative.  Safiyeh Yazdi, founder of the Effatiyeh School for girls in 1910, and Mah-Soltan Amir-i-Sehi,	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Ladies’	  Society and founder of the Tarbiat Girls School, were both married to liberal mujtahids.64   
Safiyeh’s	  husband was one of the five high-ranking mujtahids chosen to sit in the 
Majlis to ensure legislation did not conflict with Islamic teachings.65 On the other hand, Mah-Rokh Gowarshenas, who founded the Taraqi Girls School in 1911, initially had to hide her activities from her conservative husband.66   At the same time, ideological struggles continued within the Majlis, with 
women’s	  suffrage	  resurfacing as a topic of debate by 1911.  The Times published an article in August 1911 reporting on the level of male hostility and clerical opposition towards the idea of	  women’s	  emancipation,	  particularly	  female	  suffrage.   It mentioned the exception of Vakil al-Ra’aya,	  whose	  statements	  had	  been so upsetting to the rest of the male audience, that the President of the Majlis 
                                                 61 Bamdad, From Darkness into light, p. 182. 62 Ibid, pp. 42-44 63 Ibid, p. 49. 64 Ibid, p. 44, 47-48. 65 Ibid, p.44. 66 Ibid, p. 46. 
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had asked reporters not to mention the incident in the journals of the House.67  The mujtahid in this account, and his many supporters, were	  rejecting	  women’s	  rights ideas by arguing that such reforms went against Islamic principles, while a 
few	  exceptions	  like	  Vakil	  al	  Ra’ya	  were	  contesting	  these	  interpretations. 
Hadji	  Vakil	  el	  Rooy…who	  on	  August	  3	  astonished	  the	  House	  by	  an	  impassioned defence	  of	  women’s	  rights…and	  declared	  roundly	  that	  women possessed souls and rights, and should possess votes.  The orator called upon the Ulema to support him, but support failed him.  The Mujtehid, whom he invoked by name, rose in his place, and solemnly declared that he had never in a life of misfortune had his ears assailed by 
such	  an	  impious	  utterance…and	  declared	  that	  such	  doctrine	  would	  mean	  the downfall of Islam.68    
The Times maintained that these ideas, though outrageous to many, were beginning to place doubts in the minds of some Iranians.69 
In	  spite	  of	  conservative	  and	  clerical	  opposition	  to	  women’s	  political	  rights, female activists persisted with their nationalist activity.  Morgan Shuster was employed by the second Majlis to reorganise the country’s	  finances.	  	  Worried about increasing American influence, the Russians issued an ultimatum that the Majlis either dismiss Shuster and refrain from employing more Americans, or face Russian occupation.70  In November 1911, Shuster received a threat from the Oriental	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Russian	  Legation	  claiming	  that	  ‘if	  [Russian] demands were not complied with within 48 hours, diplomatic relations 
between	  the	  two	  countries	  would	  be	  broken	  off’.71  Shuster wrote that once rumours began to circulate that the Iranian Majlis intended to yield to Russian demands, hundreds of women marched towards the Majlis.  
                                                 67 ‘Women’s	  Right	  in	  Persia:	  Appeal	  for	  the	  Suffrage	  in	  the	  Mejliss’,	  The Times, Issue 39670, 22 August 1911, The Times Digital Archive. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Paidar, p.58. 71 Shuster, p.160. 
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Out from their walled courtyards and harems marched three hundred of 
that	  weak	  sex…demanded	  of	  the	  President	  that	  he	  admit	  them all…these	  cloistered Persian mothers, wives and daughters exhibited threateningly their revolvers, tore aside their veils, and confessed their decision to kill their own husbands and sons, and leave behind their own dead bodies if the Deputies wavered in their duty to uphold the liberty and dignity of the Persian people and nation.72     Some reports claim that a group of women chose this moment to combine their pro-constitutionalist protests with demands for an end to veiling.  However, they were rejected by the majority of female constitutionalists, who referred to them 
as	  a	  ‘bunch	  of	  prostitutes’,	  maintaining	  their	  focus	  on	  nationalist	  activities.73  This indicates that the majority of educated female nationalists preferred gradual change and reform, or viewed it as a more effective bargaining strategy 
than	  revolutionary	  calls	  for	  ‘unveiling’,	  which	  they	  may	  have	  feared	  as	  too	  socially transgressive.  This explains their disassociation from the group of 
female	  ‘unveilers’	  and	  their	  branding	  of	  them	  as	  ‘prostitutes’	  to	  validate	  their	  
own	  actions	  and	  calls	  for	  nationalist	  activity,	  philanthropy,	  and	  women’s	  education, as socially moral.   Bamdad explained that the Russian ultimatum had prompted the National 
Ladies’	  Society	  to	  organise a large public meeting on 1 December 1911, outside the Baharestan palace where the Majlis was	  in	  session.	  ‘Thousands	  of	  cloaked	  
and	  veiled	  women	  appeared	  on	  the	  scene…and	  made	  fervent	  speeches	  in	  defence of the constitutional regime.74  The Times similarly	  reported,	  ‘the	  patriotic	  demonstrations continue.  A curious feature is the prominent part taken in them 
by	  women…they	  were	  particularly	  strenuous	  in	  insisting	  on	  a	  Russian	  boycott’.75  
                                                 72 Ibid, p. 188. 73 Paidar, p.59. 74 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 35. 75 ‘The	  Crisis	  in	  Persia:	  Patriotic	  Demonstrations	  by	  Women’,	  The London Times, 5 December 1911, Times Digital Archives. 
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Iranian women sent telegrams to British suffragettes asking for help during the crisis pleading, ‘the Russian Government by an ultimatum demands us to surrender to her our independence; the ears of the men of Europe are deaf to our 
cries;	  could	  you	  women	  not	  come	  to	  our	  help?’76  The	  British	  Women’s	  Social	  and	  Political Union replied,  Unhappily we cannot move British Government to give political freedom 
even	  to	  us,	  their	  own	  countrywomen…our	  hearts	  deeply	  moved	  by	  sympathy with Persian sisters and admiration for their militant patriotic deeds.77  
These	  women’s	  attempts	  to	  reach out to British suffragettes shows no clear 
dichotomy	  between	  western	  feminism	  and	  Iranian	  women’s	  activism was drawn at this stage.  Thus, they saw no contradiction in challenging British colonialism whilst reaching out to create links with British suffragettes.  Indeed, by viewing 
the	  suffragette’s	  struggle	  as	  one	  against	  the	  British	  government,	  they	  created	  a	  sense of commonality in their different movements, by viewing them both as struggles against the same opponent.   Shuster argued that without the support of Iranian women, who he wrote 
had	  become	  ‘teachers,	  newspaper	  writers,	  and	  founders	  of	  women’s	  clubs	  almost	  
overnight’,	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  ‘however	  well	  conducted	  by	  the	  Persian	  men, would have early paled into a mere disorganised	  protest’.78  While Bamdad argued that	  women’s	  rights	  had	  not	  been	  the	  key	  issue	  during	  these	  demonstrations, she nevertheless pointed to it as a significant event in Iranian 
women’s	  history,	  where	  women	  ‘gave notice of their own existence and showed 
                                                 76 ‘Appeal	  from	  the	  Women:	  Telegram	  dated	  5 December	  1911’,	  The Times, 7 December 1911, Times Digital Archives. 77 Ibid. 78 Shuster, p. 184. 
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how important their cooperation could be’.79  The 1911 Russian protest also 
points	  to	  women’s	  role	  as	  cultural	  and spiritual symbols of the nation.  In 
Shuster’s	  account,	  the	  men	  of	  the	  Majlis are described as wavering in the face of Russian threats, and thus in their responsibility to uphold the independence of the Persian nation.  Given	  the	  level	  of	  male	  hostility	  towards	  women’s	  political	  rights and emancipation, the independent actions described in this incident, highlight that many women felt it their responsibility to uphold and defend the Persian nation, not only against imperialist attacks, but against Persian men who 
they	  felt	  had	  been	  corrupted	  away	  from	  the	  ‘authentic/true’	  Persian	  nation.	  	  
Women	  in	  this	  context	  can	  be	  seen	  seeking	  the	  role	  of	  ‘cultural	  carriers’	  or	  
‘symbols	  of	  the spiritual	  nation’,80reminding men that	  the	  ‘true’	  Persian	  nation	  must remain independent, and must not yield to imperialist threats. Yet, which classes of Iranian women led this revolution, and did they all have the same roles?   Female participation during the Constitutional Revolution was very 
different	  to	  women’s	  participation	  during	  the	  Tobacco	  Concession	  as	  it	  incorporated varied classes of Iranian women, who were not all motivated by, or simply following the religious calls of the ulama.  As seen earlier, the clergy were politically divided, for and against the constitutionalists.  Paidar writes that after the civil war that followed the first Majlis, many lower class female supporters of the royalist or anti-constitutionalist clergy turned on affluent women who tended to side with the constitutionalists and their clerical supporters, hurling 
                                                 79 Bamdad, From Darkness into light, p. 39. 80 Chatterjee, p. 243.  
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abuse and insults at them in one recorded incident.81  She	  argues	  that	  ‘lower	  and	  
middle	  class	  women’s’	  support	  for	  clergy	  of	  all	  political	  affiliations	  tended	  to	  be 
more	  genuine,	  while	  ‘upper-class’	  women	  who	  concentrated	  on	  educational	  activities and wrote speeches in defence	  of	  constitutionalism	  and	  women’s	  rights, supported the clergy for tactical reasons and on multiple occasions spoke out against oppressive clerical practices towards women.82   
While	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  assess	  how	  ‘genuine’	  or	  purely	  expedient	  female	  support for the clergy was using existing sources, educated Iranian women from the elite urban classes like Taj al-Saltaneh, Muhtaram Eskandari, and women from affluent religious families like Sedigheh Dowlatabadi did act more independently of the ulama, by enacting their nationalist activity very differently to lower class women.  The story of the Iranian washerwoman indicates how lower class women were venerated as modest, loyal, and self-sacrificing nationalist models, by both upper class female nationalists and male constitutionalists like Kasravi.  However, by founding their own nationalist organisations and leading female riots and protests, women of the wealthier classes were positioning themselves as leaders of a female nationalist and social revolution.  They recommended themselves as tutors and guides to less wealthy and educated classes of Iranian women by offering them access to education through their private schools, journals, and philanthropic activities.  
 
 
                                                 81 Paidar, p. 74. 82 Ibid, p. 73. 
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Section 2: Women and the 1919 Nationalist Revolution in Egypt 
Chapter	  1	  showed	  how	  prior	  to	  the	  1919	  revolution	  intellectual	  women’s	  associations brought together women of different social and class backgrounds, 
like	  Sharawi,	  Ziyada,	  Nasif,	  and	  Musa,	  resulting	  in	  different	  women’s	  rights	  and	  nationalist discourses, and different nationalist-feminist identities.   Writers like Amal al-Subki,	  Latifa	  Muhammad	  Salim,	  Buthayna	  Sha‘ban,	  and	  Muhammad al-Jawwadi are among many scholars who link the importance of the 
1919	  Revolution	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  Egyptian	  women’s	  rights	  movement.83  This section will illustrate that while larger numbers and classes of women were galvanised towards greater political activity as a result of the 1919 revolution, they did not all have the same roles and did not all define their nationalist activity in the same way. 
As	  a	  result	  this	  section	  argues	  that	  while	  women	  of	  the	  Wafdist	  Women’s	  Central Committee (WWCC) (Lajnat al-Wafd al-Markaziyah lil-Sayyidat), many of whom hailed from elite, land-owning families, defined their nationalism through public protests, speeches, and political activity in an effort to negotiate greater political roles for themselves, women like Musa and Labiba Ahmed defined and expressed their nationalism and gender roles differently, stressing female 
education	  and	  educated	  motherhood	  above	  other	  activities.	  	  While	  Ahmed’s	  stress on educated motherhood complimented Wafdist/WWCC notions of womanhood, Ahmed emphasised her Islamic identity and the Islamic identity of this nationalist mother as a way of distinguishing herself from the WWCC and EFU.   
                                                 83 L. M. Salim, p. 45; al-Subki, pp. 15, 181-184; Shaʻban, pp. 73-75; al-Jawwadi, p. 27.  
 114 
Amal al-Subki has argued that women of the aristocratic classes, middle classes, and intellectual middle classes, participated in the political and social events, which characterised this period, pointing to the examples of Huda 
Sha’rawi,	  Labiba	  Ahmed,	  and	  Tafida	  Alim.84   Writers like Muhammad Kamal 
Yahya	  have	  argued	  that	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  woman’s question, women of the 
‘upper	  classes’	  took	  a	  different	  path	  to	  women	  of	  the	  ‘middle	  and	  lower	  middle	  
classes’.85  However, this section additionally argues that women of similar social and class backgrounds did not necessarily follow the same paths or patriarchal bargaining strategies as each other.  For instance, looking at women from the wealthier, elite, land-owning classes, Esther Fahmi Wissa remained in the 
WWCC,	  preferring	  to	  negotiate	  from	  within	  the	  Wafd’s	  patriarchal framework, 
while	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi chose	  to	  challenge	  the	  Wafd’s	  patriarchal	  limits	  through	  independent activity, founding the Egyptian Feminist Union.  Similarly, looking at women from more modest, conservative backgrounds, Labiba Ahmed affiliated herself with, and chose to work from within the Islamist movement, while, Nabawiyah Musa independently challenged patriarchal limits through her 
definition	  of	  female	  nationalism	  as	  ‘female	  education’	  and	  work,	  rather	  than	  
‘educated	  motherhood’. 
2.1 Wafdist Elites, Motherhood, and Female Nationalism 1919-1923 
Unlike	  Iran’s	  Constitutional	  Revolution,	  women’s	  roles	  in	  Egypt’s	  Nationalist	  Revolution over a decade later were far more defined and apparent.  By 1919, almost two decades of serious debate had already taken place on the subject of 
women’s	  rights.  From 1881-1882, army colonel Ahmad Urabi led the first revolt 
                                                 84 al-Subki, p. 183. 85 Kamal Yahya, p. 6.  
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articulated in Islamic language against British colonialism and the establishment of a constitutional regime.86  As a result of British policies during World War I, new economic burdens were placed on most social classes in Egypt from the peasants and urban masses, to the landed elite.  Peasants were recruited to serve as the British wartime labour corps, keeping cotton prices artificially low to cheaply supply British factories.  This angered the landed gentry and motivated elite support for the independence movement, whilst the increasing number of British bureaucrats bred even greater resentment amongst middle-class Egyptians.87  Similarly to Iran, Egyptian women of the lower classes had historically participated in riots and demonstrations.88  However,	  like	  Iran’s	  Constitutional Revolution, the 1919 Egyptian Revolution was the first time elite women of the landowning classes and educated upper middle classes were physically involved.  The revolution provided women of those wealthier upper and upper middle-classes,	  who	  had	  formed	  the	  vanguard	  of	  Egypt’s	  ‘women’s	  
awakening’	  (al-nahda al-nisa’iya), with an important outlet through which to turn their words and writing into action.   Within the various	  nationalist	  camps,	  varying	  ideas	  on	  women’s	  emancipation took form.  Liberal nationalists like Lutfi al-Sayyid endorsed 
women’s	  emancipation	  according	  to	  Qasim	  Amin’s	  model,89 supporting the idea of female education and an end to domestic seclusion, while men in the conservative camp like Mustafa Kamil, rejected them claiming they were an 
                                                 86 Thomas Mayer, The Changing Past: Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt, 1882-1983 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998), p. 11,13. 87 Ziad Fahmy, Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture (California: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 135. 88 Abdel Kader, p. 63. 89 Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid in Nasif, al-Nisa'iyat, pp. 43-44. 
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attempt to weaken the Egyptian nation.90  The Wafd (delegation) Party was formed on 13 November 1918, and with the aid of Lutfi al-Sayyid its leading delegates Sa‘ad Zaghlul, Abd al-Aziz	  Fahmi,	  and	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi	  ‘s	  husband	  Ali	  
Sha’rawi, planned and presented their request/demarche for independence to the British Government.  In 1919 these demands, along with the request to participate at a peace conference in Paris, were denied.  On the 8th of March 1919 British authorities arrested	  and	  deported	  Wafd	  leader	  Sa‘ad Zaghlul, and some of his associates to Malta.91  This proved the trigger for a nation-wide uprising that launched the revolution.  The Wafd Party, with its more liberal and reformist leanings, offered educated Egyptian women of the upper land owning and upper middle classes the opportunity for political activity.  The earlier activities of women like Sha‘rawi, who joined others like Ziyadah as founding members of the 
‘Intellectual Association of Egyptian Women’ in 1914, and initiated philanthropic activities through organisations like the Mubarrat Muhammad Ali, encouraged an extension into	  the	  political	  arena.	  	  Sha‘rawi’s	  memoirs	  illustrate	  how	  these	  earlier experiences fuelled her nationalist and feminist ideas, and how the nationalist movement drew her attention from her philanthropic, intellectual 
activities	  and	  her	  ‘private	  life’	  to	  ‘serving	  [her]	  country’.92  
Huda	  Sha‘rawi and other Wafdist women organised some of the first 
women’s	  demonstrations	  on	  the	  16th and 20th of March 1919 to protest the arrest of Wafdist leaders.  Hundreds of women charged into the streets and marched towards the foreign legations of France, Italy, and America to leave 
                                                 90 Mustafa Kamil, Rasail tarikhiyah min Mustafa Kamil il· Fuad Salim al-Hijazi, (Cairo, 1969), 
Safahat matwiyah min tarkh al-zaim Mustafa kamil : rasail jadidah li-Mustafa Kamil min 8 Yuniyu 
1895 ila 19 Fabrayir 1896, (Cairo: Dar al-Nahdat al-'Arabiyah, 1962). 91Thomas Mayer, pp. 136, 138; Donald Malcom Reid, Cairo University and the Making of Modern 
Egypt, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), P. 72. 92 Sha’rawi, Mudhakkirati, pp. 96-111. 
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written protests, carrying banners with French and Arabic protest phrases93, 
before	  marching	  on	  to	  the	  home	  of	  arrested	  leader	  Sa‘ad	  Zaghlul.94 Huda 
Sha‘rawi recalled, 
British	  troops	  surrounded	  us…We	  stood	  still	  for	  three	  hours	  while	  the	  sun	  
blazed	  down	  on	  us…I	  did	  not	  care if I suffered sunstroke-the blame would fall upon the tyrannical British authority.95    Thomas Russell Pasha, Chief of Cairo police, described the incident in a letter to his father.  I let them get a little way and then blocked them in with police supported by troops and there the dear things had to remain for an hour and a half in the hot sun with nothing to sit on except the curb stone.96    He wrote that the Egyptian conscript police were given firm warning not to use violence against the women, although ‘considerable license was given them by their officers to practice their ready peasant wit on the smart ladies who 
confronted	  them’.97 On 12 January 1920, in the presence of one thousand women, Sha‘rawi	  held	  a	  meeting	  at	  St	  Mark’s	  Cathedral	  in	  Cairo, where the 
Wafdist	  Women’s	  Central	  Committee	  (WWCC)	  was	  officially	  formed	  with	  Sha‘rawi as president.98  Wafdist men fully supported the new female faction, especially as it meant women could keep the movement alive in their absence.  Sha‘rawi	  explained	  ‘My husband kept me informed of events so that I could fill 
the	  vacuum	  if	  he	  were	  imprisoned	  or	  exiled’.99  When Wafd leaders were jailed or exiled the women took charge, organising boycotts of British goods and banks, handling finances, and maintaining communication with the British authorities 
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and Wafdist men.100  Sha‘rawi recalled how in an effort to finance a strike of government workers,  ‘women	  took	  off	  their	  jewellery and offered it to 
government	  workers	  with	  the	  plea	  ‘If	  you	  want	  money	  take	  this	  but	  do	  not	  
hinder	  our	  cause	  by	  going	  back	  to	  work	  under	  British	  threat’’.101  
 However,	  within	  the	  WWCC’s	  first	  year	  a	  crisis	  surfaced	  among	  the	  male	  and female Wafdists with regards to the Curzon Plan; a proposal for Egyptian independence was drafted by Wafd leaders in London and presented in October 1920, without any consultation with the WWCC.102  The WWCC did not sit on the matter, criticising the	  terms	  of	  the	  Curzon	  Plans	  as	  ‘inadequate’	  and	  published	  their own views in the Egyptian press, and sent forceful letters to the Wafd 
leaders;	  ‘We	  criticised the delegates from the Wafd for disregarding our rights and our very existence by neglecting to solicit our views.’103 Sha‘rawi personally wrote to Zaghlul on 12 December 1920 expressing her condemnation.  
We	  are	  surprised	  and	  shocked	  by	  the	  way	  we	  have	  been	  treated…You	  
supported	  us	  when	  we	  created	  our	  Committee…What	  makes	  us	  all	  the	  more indignant is that by disregarding us the Wafd has caused foreigners to disparage the renaissance of women.  They claim that our participation in the nationalist movement was merely a ploy to dupe civilised nations into believing in the advancement of Egypt.104    Zaghlul responded with an apology, stating that a society could not progress without the contribution of its women.105  These strong letters from the WWCC demonstrated that although female Wafdists fundamentally supported the nationalist movement and its male leaders, they did so hoping to improve their own socio-political rights.  They expected to be consulted and to be treated as 
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equal political partners as part of new public roles they were negotiating for themselves, and were not afraid to voice their criticism and challenge male leaders when they appeared to falter in supporting the new constructs female nationalists had been putting forward and hoping for. Zaghlul was arrested again by the British in 1921, and deported first to Aden, then the Seychelles, and finally Gibraltar.  Sha‘rawi wrote how the WWCC put aside their disagreement with Zaghlul and came together to protest his 
arrest	  and	  deportation	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  British	  High	  Commissioner:	  ‘You	  cannot	  silence the voice of the nation by stifling the voice of the person who speaks for the nation’.106  During this crucial time the WWCC again took control of the chaos and launched themselves into various activities to keep the movement alive.  In February 1922, Britain issued a unilateral declaration of independence, conditional upon the Four Reserve points, which limited Egyptian sovereignty by allowing for a continuous presence of British troops to protect their foreign 
interests	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  enforced	  Egypt’s	  separation	  from	  the	  Sudan.	  	  The	  Wafd	  and the WWCC both objected to the conditions.  The WWCC called a meeting on February 3rd and reiterated their objections to the terms of the Curzon Plan as inadequate in satisfying the demands of Egyptian nationalists.107  Members of the WWCC accused the government of violating the national pact, with Sha‘rawi 
declaring,	  government	  leader	  Tharwat	  Pasha	  ‘now	  boasts	  about	  the	  independence the imperialists hail as a magnanimous gift.  It is no more than a 
                                                 106 Sha‘rawi, p. 125. 107 ‘Decision	  of	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  of	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right only partially restored to its owners.  We women consider it merely a move to paralyze our national movement’.108   By July 1922, the British made another fresh round of arrests of Wafdist leaders.  The WWCC once again jumped into action.  WWCC vice president Esther Fahmi Wissa demonstrated their resolve in a letter to British official Lord Allenby. You will see how unjust and unbased the accusation that has been levelled at the members of the Delegation, who are standing up for the rights of the people.109  During the revolution, female activists held leverage as nationalists; the Wafd needed the WWCC to maintain its campaign in its absence, so apologies were made, and praises offered by male leaders in an attempt to appease its female 
members.	  	  However,	  when	  Zaghlul	  was	  finally	  released	  in	  May	  1923,	  women’s	  
services	  to	  the	  nation	  and	  the	  Wafd’s	  praises	  did	  not	  translate into improved political rights.  While the Egyptian Constitution of 1923, proclaimed all Egyptians equal before the law, an electoral law restricted voting to Egyptian men only.  The restriction was based on the reasoning that participation in political	  life	  would	  take	  away	  from	  a	  woman’s	  affairs	  in	  the	  home,	  her	  children,	  and would become a cause of conflict with her husband.110  Wafdist women were bitterly disappointed, however, their rejection as political equals, became the 
‘threat	  point’	  of	  their patriarchal bargain with nationalist men, triggering greater independent action.  
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2.2 Growing Conflict between the Wafd and the Egyptian Feminist Union On 16 March 1923, four years after the inception of the WWCC, Sha’rawi called a meeting with her fellow members to form an independent feminist organisation.  It was here that the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) was born.111  However, it would be another year before Sha‘rawi relinquished her role as president of the WWCC.  The situation came to a head over the	  question	  of	  Sudan’s	  separation	  from Egypt and the murder in Cairo of Sir Lee Stack, British Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan.  When the British gave the Egyptian government a harsh seven-point	  ultimatum,	  the	  ‘Women’s	  Boycott 
Committee’	  telegraphed	  Zaghlul	  demanding	  the	  ultimatum	  be	  rejected.112  Egypt 
and	  Sudan’s	  complete	  independence	  from	  British	  rule	  was	  listed	  as	  the	  very	  first	  
point	  on	  the	  political	  section	  of	  the	  EFU’s	  organisational program.113  As such, it was over this issue that the already shaky relationship between Zaghlul and Sha‘rawi broke down irreparably, with Sha‘rawi condemning	  Zaghlul’s	  actions,	  calling for his resignation, and resigning herself as president of the WWCC.   Since you have failed while in public office to fulfil your mandate by 
positive	  action,	  I	  ask	  you	  not	  to	  be	  an	  obstacle	  in	  your	  country’s	  struggle	  
for	  liberation…I	  ask	  you	  to	  step	  down.114   Sha‘rawi continued her nationalist and feminist activity within the framework of the EFU, arguing In moments of danger, when women emerge by their side, men utter no 
protest.	  	  Yet	  women’s	  great	  acts	  and	  endless	  sacrifices	  do	  not	  change	  
men’s	  views	  of	  women.	  	  Through	  their	  arrogance,	  men	  refuse	  to	  see	  the	  
capabilities	  of	  women…women	  rose	  up	  to	  demand	  their	  liberation…their	  
                                                 111 Sha‘rawi, p. 86 112 Ibid, p. 131. 113 Text	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leap forward was greeted with ridicule and blame, but that did not weaken their will.115  The rupture forced female activists to take sides.  The disappointment felt by some female nationalists inspired them to join Sha‘rawi in challenging 
patriarchal	  nationalist	  definitions	  of	  womanhood	  and	  women’s	  rights	  independently, through the EFU.  However, others remained in the WWCC, preferring to take a different strategy based on their own political views, which encouraged them to maintain their original patriarchal bargain with Wafdist men.  These women reconstituted themselves as al-Lajnah al-Sa’diyah Lil 
Sayyidat (Committee	  of	  Sa‘adist	  Women/Ladies),116 with women like Sharifah Riyad and Esther Fahmi Wissa emerging as new leading figures.  
Wissa’s	  Coptic-Christian background and fluency in English made her particularly suited to represent the WWCC during this period of anti-colonial resistance.  She often invited British official Lord Allenby to tea or dinner, and their letters demonstrate cordial exchanges even during strained times, with Wissa appearing to view Allenby as an exception to colonial rule.117  Wissa went on to expand her philanthropic and feminist activities beyond Cairo, to Alexandria and abroad, representing Egypt in international feminist conferences, similarly to Sha‘rawi.118  She emphasised improving conditions within the domestic sphere, education, and argued that suffrage was not the sole goal of feminism and that independence had to come first.119  However, she too eventually became disappointed with the Wafd leadership, with Prime Ministers 
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Nahhas	  and	  Sidqi’s	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  women’s	  suffrage,	  particularly	  Sidqi’s	  
attacks	  on	  gender	  mixing	  and	  women’s	  presence	  at	  universities.	  	  However,	  after	  leaving the WWCC she did not really join forces with other feminists in pursuit of 
political	  rights	  but	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  social	  welfare	  activities.	  	  Wissa’s	  political	  and feminist approach differed from Sha‘rawi’s.	  	  Their	  different	  choices	  were	  shaped by their particular situations, which affected their bargaining power within the Wafd.  Unlike Wissa, Sha‘rawi’s	  husband’s	  relationship	  with	  Sa‘ad Zaghul deteriorated in 1921.  Their disagreement made the situation awkward for Huda, who demonstrated her diplomatic skills, welcoming Zaghlul back on his return in April 1921, while remaining loyal to her husband.120  Yet, in her memoirs she described how uncomfortable the situation made her.121  As a result, when Zaghlul disappointed the WWCC, it no longer made sense for her to maintain their political relationship, particularly when her personal situation made the bargain more costly.  Thus, while the risks of bargaining with Wafdist men as head of the WWCC outweighed the potential benefits for Sha‘rawi, the opposite could be said for Wissa.  As such, Wissa preferred to maintain family loyalty and negotiate patriarchal bargains from within the Wafd, rather than join 
Sha‘rawi in attempting to change the terms of the bargain through independent activity.   
2.3 The	  Nation	  as	  ‘Family’ A crucial concept of Egyptian nationalism and modern womanhood that was nevertheless shared by the EFU and the Wafd/WWCC was the importance of 
‘family’	  and	  ‘motherhood’	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  new	  nation.	  	  Lisa	  Pollard	  has	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argued that in Egypt, as in other British	  colonies,	  the	  family	  was	  used	  as	  ‘a	  yardstick by which Egyptian backwardness (or, by contrast, progress) was 
measured’,	  and	  thus	  was	  used	  by	  Egyptian	  nationalists	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  readiness for independence.122  This was done through the construction of the bourgeois, monogamous, nuclear family, as the new Egyptian ideal.  At the head of this family the leading male and female figure of the Wafd, Sa‘ad Zaghlul and his wife Saffiya	  Zaghlul,	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  ‘father’	  and	  ‘mother’	  of	  this	  new	  Egyptian familial nation.  Pollard has highlighted that central to this political 
family	  framework	  were	  ‘good	  mothers	  of	  both	  sexes’,	  emphasising that	  ‘imagery	  of the domestic realm was not borrowed from Egyptian women by Egyptian 
men’,	  as	  masculinity	  in	  Egypt	  under	  British	  occupation	  also	  meant	  ‘displaying	  a	  
kind	  of	  maternalism’.123 Modern	  Egyptian	  ‘motherhood’	  became	  a	  crucial	  notion	  that was used to	  illustrate	  Egypt’s	  modernity	  or	  readiness	  for	  independence.	  	   Sa‘ad	  Zaghlul’s	  wife,	  Saffiya	  Fahmy,	  who	  hailed	  from	  the	  old	  Turkish	  aristocracy, played a key role in supporting and realising	  her	  husband’s	  goals	  along with other members of the WWCC.  A telegram from the Edinburgh Egyptian Society to Saffiya acknowledged her importance as a female figure and 
celebrated	  her	  nationalist	  role	  as	  ‘mother	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  people’:  ‘We greet in your noble person the heroic representative of Egyptian womanhood and the devoted mother of the Egyptian people assuring you of the full support of your 
loyal	  sons’.124  A	  note	  from	  the	  High	  Commissioner’s	  Office	  stated	  that	  Saffiya	  had	  received other similar messages from Egyptian societies in England.125  Her 
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power as a nationalist symbol was not lost on British officials who were wary of her activities.  A document from the Ministry of the Interior, dated December 1921, addressed to the Commandant of Cairo City police, specifically instructed 
that	  ‘Mme	  Zaghlul’	  be	  carefully watched.126  By continuing to hold meetings at 
her	  house	  in	  her	  husband’s	  absence	  she	  maintained	  his	  central	  position	  in	  the	  
Wafd,	  turning	  their	  home	  into	  ‘Bayt al-umma’	  (The	  House	  of	  The	  Nation),	  which	  served to reaffirm the revolution within this family framework.127   
The	  ‘House	  of	  the	  Nation’	  provided	  Egyptians	  with	  a	  symbolic	  and	  physical centre for their nationalist campaign, which along with the Zaghluls’ 
roles	  as	  ‘Mother	  and	  Father	  of	  the	  nation’	  gave	  the	  nationalist	  movement	  a	  sense	  of unity and structure.	  	  The	  support	  base	  Saffiya	  enjoyed	  as	  ‘mother	  of	  the	  
Egyptians’	  was	  evident	  during	  her	  ‘send-offs’	  to	  visit	  Zaghlul	  in	  exile,	  where	  huge	  crowds would gather to express solidarity and support.  These events were referred to in letters and telegrams between British Officials, revealing their anxiety over them, and the level of influence Saffiya enjoyed.128  This was also 
well	  highlighted	  after	  Sa‘ad	  Zaghlul’s	  death,	  in	  a	  letter	  between	  Mr	  Henderson	  and Sir Austen Chamberlain discussing the issue of his possible successors. Mme Zaghlul is showing activity, and has issued a manifesto to the 
people…The	  idea	  which	  is	  more	  widely	  held,	  of	  making	  Mme	  Zaghlul	  honorary president of the Wafd, is another proposal.129   
The	  letter	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  role	  of	  ‘motherhood’	  was	  so	  key	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
Egyptian	  nationalism	  and	  independence,	  that	  the	  Wafd’s	  male	  leaders	  considered portraying the party as	  Egypt’s	  ‘mother’	  through	  Saffiya,	  ‘mother	  of	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the	  Egyptians’,	  as	  their	  honorary	  president.	  	  While	  this	  supports	  Pollard’s	  
argument	  that	  the	  role	  of	  	  ‘mother’	  was	  sometimes	  embodied	  by	  women	  and	  
other	  times	  by	  men,	  it	  illustrates	  how	  ‘women’s	  privileged	  role	  as	  ‘spiritual	  carriers of national	  culture’	  meant	  that	  women were used by men and women to 
validate	  political	  ‘maternalism’	  during	  the	  revolution.	  	  Moreover,	  notions	  of	  
‘motherhood’	  and	  the	  new	  monogamous	  bourgeois	  family	  were	  not	  only	  gendered constructs, but influenced by class associations as well, which helps explain why women of different classes produced different nationalist and 
women’s	  rights	  discourses. 
2.4 Class	  Differences	  Within	  The	  ‘Family’	   Looking at the activities of the Wafd and the WWCC it appears that different nationalist roles were associated with different classes of Egyptians, with Wafdists viewing themselves	  as	  the	  leaders	  and	  ‘parent-figures’	  of	  other	  Egyptians.  Pollard has argued that Wafdist elites targeted the middle-classes with cultural ideas of the reformed bourgeois family, and the modern educated 
mother	  in	  order	  ‘to	  create	  a	  parental	  link’	  between	  the	  Wafd	  and	  the	  
Egyptians’.130  The Wafd party attempted to represent social diversity in Egypt by co-opting both Muslims and other religious denominations such as the Christian Copts.  However, many Wafdists came from large landowning families, including leading Coptic women, Esther Fahmi Wissa and Regina Khayatt.  Writers like Badran have argued that during	  the	  revolution	  ‘class	  differences	  between women as feminists	  and	  nationalists	  were	  of	  little	  importance’	  as	  women from various backgrounds united in a common struggle for Egyptian 
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independence.131  Sha‘rawi herself stressed that the nationalist movement was one that transcended class, age, gender, and religion, writing	  ‘even personal hardship did not prevent more acts of revolt and strikes on the part of all 
classes’.132  The British claimed our national movement was a revolt of the Muslim majority against religious minorities.  This slander aroused the anger of the Copts and other religious groups.  Egyptians showed their solidarity by meeting together in mosques, churches, and synagogues.133  Yet, while Sha‘rawi’s	  memoirs	  support	  the	  notion	  that religious differences were irrelevant for women of similar upper class, land owning, Turko-Circassian or Coptic backgrounds, her account of the 1919 March demonstrations illustrates that roles and perceptions differed according to social/class backgrounds.  The 
WWCC	  saw	  themselves	  as	  leaders	  and	  ‘mother	  figures’	  of	  other	  nationalists, particularly men and women of the lower classes.  Women like Sha‘rawi and Wissa took a leadership role over other classes of women, by organising and leading such protests, and presenting themselves as the official voice of Egyptian women.  On the 12 December 1919, these upper-class women drafted a letter 
Lord	  Milner’s	  Commission,	  on	  behalf	  of	  ‘The	  Women	  of	  Egypt’,	  declaring	  that	  if	  
Britain	  did	  not	  give	  Egypt	  its	  independence,	  they	  would	  ‘fight	  armless;	  our	  blood	  shall soak the soil of our fathers,	  and	  we	  shall	  die	  happy’.134  Yet, whilst colonial authorities did not physically target elite women, they did often target women of the lower classes; Sha‘rawi recalled how during the 1919 nationalist demonstrations ‘the	  death	  of	  Shafiqa	  bint	  Muhammad,	  the first woman killed by 
                                                 131 Badran,	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a	  British	  bullet,	  caused	  widespread	  grief…it	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  intense	  national	  
mourning’.135 Sha‘rawi and her colleagues also began compiling records of the dead and wounded, among which five	  women	  were	  listed,	  ‘Shafiqa	  bint	  Muhammad, Aisha bint Umar, Fahima Riyad, Hamida bint Khalil, and Najiyya 
Said	  Ismail’,	  all	  from	  the	  lower	  working	  classes.136 Upper	  class	  women’s	  leadership and the different treatment women received at the hands of colonial authorities point to how both British officials and Egyptians maintained some existing class distinctions throughout the revolution. Moreover, looking at the different centres and types of activity within the revolution, it becomes clear that class and gender positions affected both the roles, places, and activities male and female nationalists were associated with.  For instance, Fahmy argues that during the revolution coffee shops and bars served as revolutionary centres where impromptu speeches and nationalistic songs were delivered and illicit circulars were distributed.137  Mosques and churches played similar roles as centres of revolutionary activity, however, unlike cafes and bars, which were predominantly male spaces, they offered women, particularly those from more elite backgrounds, acceptable spaces to participate.138  Thus, class and gender rules were not fully revised during the revolution, as certain spaces remained inappropriate for certain classes of 
Egyptian	  women,	  threatening	  their	  definitions	  of	  ‘modesty’.	  	   Furthermore, women’s	  definitions	  of	  nationalism varied across different social and class backgrounds as well.  Such variations were responsible for the 
development	  and	  articulation	  of	  multiple	  and	  different	  women’s	  rights	  
                                                 135 Sha‘rawi, p. 118. 136 Ibid, p.118. 137 Ziad Fahmy, p. 145. 138 Ibid, p. 147. 
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discourses.  For instance, women from lower, more religious, class backgrounds like Labiba Ahmed, and those from less westernised, often more Arabic-speaking, middle-class backgrounds like Nabawiya Musa, defined their nationalisms differently.  While Ahmed participated in the WWCC March 1919 demonstrations, showing a convergence over nationalist goals, her social goals 
and	  women’s	  rights	  discourse	  differed	  from	  the	  WWCC	  and	  EFU,	  as	  she	  emphasised a more Islamic model, preferring to ally her activities with Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.139 Thus, while Ahmed supported Zaghlul and the Wafd, she never joined the WWCC but formed her own Islamic social 
welfare	  society	  instead,	  by	  the	  name	  of	  The	  Society	  of	  Egyptian	  Ladies’	  Awakening (Jam‘iat	  Nahdat	  al-Sayyidat al-Misriyyat), also starting a journal by the name of The	  Women’s	  Awakening (al-Nahda al Nisa’iyah).140   
Some	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  like	  Musa refused to participate in nationalist demonstrations altogether, arguing that education had a longer-term nationalist impact than public protest and agitation.  Musa, who as discussed in 
chapter	  1	  was	  raised	  by	  her	  mother	  on	  her	  late	  father’s	  military	  pension, was 
headmistress	  of	  the	  Wardiyan	  Women’s	  Teacher’s	  Training	  School	  in	  Alexandria	  at this time, and restrained the teachers and students in her school from participating in nationalist demonstrations.141  Musa’s	  book	  ‘Woman	  and	  Work’,	  
published	  in	  1920,	  defended	  women’s	  intellectual	  capabilities,	  their	  right	  to	  an	  education and a profession, reinforcing her definition of female education as the 
                                                 139 Baron, Egypt as a Woman, pp. 194, 198, 202-204. 140 Ibid, pp. 172, 190 141 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 38, 78-79. 
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highest form of nationalism.142 Ahmed, like Musa, focused	  on	  women’s	  education,	  
but	  did	  so	  along	  more	  conservative	  lines,	  arguing	  that	  a	  girl’s	  ultimate	  duty	  was	  to be a mother, raise her children better by being better educated, especially with regards to religion, and running a household effectively.143 
As	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  intellectual	  women’s	  associations	  and	  literary salons, which preceded the revolution, incorporated women of different social, class, and religious backgrounds, like Sha‘rawi, Ziyadah, Nasif and Musa. 
Consequently,	  women’s	  rights	  discourses	  incorporated	  multiple	  ideas,	  roots,	  and	  differences, developing in response to changing dominant patriarchal discourses.  Building on this, this section argues that while WWCC women organised public protests, boycotts, and riots to demonstrate their nationalism and bargain for improved political rights, educated women from non-elite, more modest middle or lower class backgrounds like Musa and Ahmed, defined and expressed their nationalism and gender-consciousness differently, stressing female education and work, and	  ‘educated	  motherhood’,	  respectively.	  	  While	  Ahmed’s	  stress	  on	  
‘educated	  motherhood’	  overlapped	  with	  Wafdist	  nationalist	  definitions,	  her	  emphasis on a central Islamic character/identity differentiated her and women like her from the WWCC and EFU.  Women like Musa and Ahmed may have felt misrepresented by the largely French-speaking, land-owning elite Wafdist women, with their increasingly Europeanised manners, developing different 
nationalist	  identities	  and	  different	  women’s	  rights	  discourses	  in response.   
 
 
                                                 142 Nabawiyah Musa	  ‘The	  Difference between Men and Women and their Capacities to Work in Woman and Work-1920’,	  in	  Margot	  Badran	  and	  Miriam	  Cooke,	  Opening the Gates: An Anthology of 
Arab Feminist Writing (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 263-269. 143 Baron, Egypt as a Woman, p. 201. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that women in Egypt and Iran linked the earlier arguments of 19th century modernists (discussed in chapter 1), with growing nationalist discourse in the 20th century to challenge patriarchal limits on 
women’s	  political	  and	  public	  activity.	  	  In	  both	  countries	  men	  supported	  female	  participation within anti-colonial contexts, but were more restrictive in allowing women political space when it came to drafting internal policies and domestic 
politics.	  	  Men’s	  support	  for	  women	  in	  anti-colonial struggles centred around notions of women as cultural carriers and symbols of national/cultural purity.  Egyptian women were able to use nationalist discourse and these ideas of educated motherhood to challenge patriarchal practices such as polygamy and domestic seclusion.  However, they faced greater challenges in negotiating political spaces	  for	  themselves	  as	  women’s	  political	  activity	  conflicted	  with	  Wafdist definitions of Egyptian womanhood as educated mothers, whose primary responsibilities were to their children and husbands. These patriarchal challenges encouraged women like Sha‘rawi and members of the EFU to take more independent action.  Iranian women were able to stress similar notions of 
modern	  motherhood	  through	  their	  growing	  women’s	  journals,	  their	  philanthropic activity, and their establishment of private girls schools to slowly challenge patriarchal limits on female education and public activity, often against serious clerical backlash.   Women of similar social backgrounds did not necessarily follow the same patriarchal bargaining strategies as each other.  As such, while women	  often	  sought	  and	  upheld	  their	  roles	  as	  ‘cultural	  carriers’	  and	  
protectors	  of	  the	  ‘spiritual	  nation’,	  they	  did	  so	  in	  different	  ways	  according	  to	  their different social backgrounds and ideological differences.   
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Chapter 3  
Changing Bargains: From Nationalism to Internationalism in Egypt, and 
Independent Activity to State feminism in Iran  (1920s-1940s)  The previous chapter showed how modern nationalism catalysed	  women’s	  rights activism, but that the unwillingness of male nationalists to incorporate women in national decision-making processes prompted some women to pursue independent, organised activity.  This chapter looks at the Egyptian Feminist 
Union	  (EFU)	  and	  women’s	  rights	  activism	  in	  Iran	  between the 1920s and 1940s and is divided into 3 sections.  It relies on documents from the personal collection of leading women in Iran and Egypt, namely Dowlatabadi and 
Sha‘rawi, held at the International Institute of Social History Archives in Amsterdam, and the American University in Cairo Archives, respectively.  These documents are used in conjunction with historical reports of the IAW 
conferences,	  held	  at	  The	  Women’s	  Library	  Archives	  in	  London,	  along	  with	  memoirs of key political actors, and feminist journal publications of the period. Following the Constitutional Revolution, women in Iran continued to focus on female education and journalism, often facing extreme opposition from religious conservatives.  They began to advocate broader equal rights as well as initiate discussions and critique of the veil through these publications.  Women in Egypt re-grouped more strongly under the banner of the EFU, and pushed on more independently with their campaigns.  In both cases the need to reach out to international feminist organisations became important.  The mid 1930s became a key period for women in both countries, with Reza Shah launching his 
Woman’s	  Awakening	  Project	  and	  his	  controversial	  veiling	  ban	  in	  1936,	  and	  the	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EFU adopting the cause of Palestinian women’s	  organisations following the 1936 Arab Revolt in Mandatory Palestine, which saw them emerge as regional feminist leaders. Writers like Eliz Sanasarian and Mansoureh Ettehadieh have argued that 
the	  rise	  of	  Reza	  Shah	  in	  1925	  spelled	  the	  end	  of	  an	  ‘independent’	  or	  
‘spontaneous’	  Iranian	  women’s	  movement,	  and	  that	  state	  co-optation of the 
movement	  meant	  that	  from	  that	  point	  onwards,	  women’s	  rights	  changes	  were	  
‘ordered	  from	  above’.1 Building	  on	  Geraldine	  Heng’s	  theory	  that	  feminism	  under	  state control adapts to persist in different or less visible ways2, this chapter argues, in contrast to Sanasarian and Ettehadieh, that co-optation was a two-way process between men and women, and thus a form of patriarchal bargaining 
where	  Iranian	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  asserted their own agency by choosing to 
adapt	  their	  ‘gradual	  change	  approach’	  for	  what	  they	  viewed	  had	  become	  the	  better patriarchal bargain; more revolutionary change as	  part	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  
Women’s	  Awakening	  Project.	    Similarly to their Iranian counterparts, the EFU stressed areas of collaboration and overlap, particularly over notions of educated motherhood, in order to co-opt the support of leading male modernists and nationalists to improve their bargaining leverage. At the same time they continued to push 
patriarchal	  limits	  on	  women’s	  education	  by	  promoting	  women’s	  higher	  education and travel abroad.   
In	  the	  second	  section	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  both	  Iranian	  and	  Egyptian	  women’s	  rights activists improved their bargaining leverage by taking part in feminist 
                                                 1 Mansoureh	  Ettehediah,	  ‘The	  Origins	  and	  Development	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Movement	  in	  Iran’,	  in	  
Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic, ed. Lois Beck and Guity Nashat (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2004), p. 95; Sanasarian, The	  Women’s	  Rights	  Movement	  in	  Iran, p 68. 2 Heng,	  ‘A	  Great	  Way	  to	  Fly, p. 30.  
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activities abroad.  By representing their countries at international feminist and 
women’s	  conferences,	  they	  expanded	  their	  network	  and	  support	  base,	  and	  demonstrated to male leaders their potential as contributors to international relations.  The EFU in particular, by presenting itself as a forum for cultural 
exchange	  between	  ‘East	  and	  West’	  and	  defining	  itself	  as	  a	  national	  and	  social	  necessity, indicated its potential as a player in both Egyptian foreign and domestic policy.  The	  final	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  looks	  at	  the	  EFU’s	  activities	  and	  changing	  strategies in response to the growing Palestinian-Zionist conflict, and the breakdown of its relationship with the IAW.  Mariscotti argues that during Palestinian-Zionist upheavals, ruling-class women diverted their attention away from internal political conflicts in Egypt and moved toward a broader alliance 
with	  women	  in	  the	  Arab	  world’.3  Badran argues that regional Arab feminism was institutionalised	  from	  ‘coalescence in solidarity around a nationalist cause, 
the	  Palestinian	  cause’,	  and	  that	  ‘Arab	  feminism	  was	  also	  partly	  born	  out	  of	  the	  
limitations	  of	  international	  feminism’.4  The	  EFU’s	  sense	  of	  unity	  with	  Palestinian	  female activists was based on a sense of shared gender and regional identity as Arab and Muslim women.  This promoted the articulation of the Palestinian 
struggle	  as	  one	  of	  ‘Islam’	  and	  ‘Arab	  nationhood’	  against	  British	  Imperialism.	  	  This	  chapter once again posits that female participation in anti-imperialist movements offered men a visible way to assert	  the	  nation’s	  cultural identity against imperialist-western domination, which explains their active support for 
the	  EFU’s	  political	  contributions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Palestinian-Zionist conflict.  
                                                 3 Cathlyn Mariscotti, Gender	  and	  Class	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  Women’s	  Movement	  1925-1939: Changing 
Perspectives (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2008), p. 80. 4 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 238. 
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The chapter argues that as Arab-nationalist sentiment rose in response to an anti-colonial, anti-Zionist resistance, a dichotomy was	  drawn	  between	  ‘Eastern	  and Western’	  feminism over changing notions of cultural authenticity and national identity, which positioned western feminism in opposition	  to	  ‘Eastern	  
feminism’.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  EFU’s	  move	  towards	  a	  regional-Arab alliance over an 
international	  or	  perceived	  ‘western’	  alliance	  became	  the	  better-perceived bargain at this point in time.   The content of these bargains	  reinforced	  women’s	  domestic	  roles	  as	  educated mothers, national mothers, and as protectors or symbols of national culture, roles women themselves sought and expanded during this political crisis to concern the wider	  Arab	  region,	  and	  ‘Arab culture’.  This chapter shows how women themselves emphasised their domestic-maternal roles as educated national mothers, their role as protectors of the spiritual nation, and their capabilities as independent political players, indicating to nationalist men they saw no contradiction in these multiple roles.    
Section 1:  Bargains of Co-optation This section argues, that both men and women used co-optation strategies in an attempt to get their goals realised.  Some writers have argued that the enforced state co-optation	  of	  the	  Iranian	  women’s	  movement	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  
‘independent	  women’s	  movement’.5  In contrast, this chapter argues that while 
women’s	  groups	  who	  did	  not	  cooperate	  with	  the	  regime	  were	  effectively	  stamped out, co-opted female rights activists chose to change their independent 
                                                 5 Ettehediah, p. 95; Sanasarian, The	  Women’s	  Rights	  Movement	  in	  Iran, p. 68.  
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gradual change approach for what they viewed as a better patriarchal bargain at that point in time; working with modernist statesmen like Reza Shah to initiate greater change and to fulfil personal/professional goals.  As such they stressed areas of overlap, such as definitions of educated motherhood.  Similarly in Egypt, the independent EFU emphasised areas of cooperation, reaffirming Wafdist definitions of modern Egyptian womanhood, as educated wives and mothers, capable of rearing a stronger generation of Egyptian nationalists, whilst 
simultaneously	  pushing	  patriarchal	  limits	  on	  women’s	  education	  by	  promoting	  
women’s	  higher	  education	  and	  travel	  abroad.	  	   
1.1 Women’s	  ‘Emancipation’	  and	  State	  Co-optation in Iran The period directly following the 1906-1911 Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the 1919-1922 Egyptian Revolution saw Iranian and Egyptian women 
pushing	  forward	  with	  independent	  feminist	  activity.	  	  Women’s	  rights	  activities	  in	  Iran at this point were taking place without governmental support, and were restricted to a narrow spectrum of educated female constitutionalists, philanthropists, journalists, and female educators who had begun schools for girls during this period.   The 1917 October Revolution in Russia promoted the rise of liberation movements in the northern provinces in Iran, and ultimately the formation of The Communist Party of Iran in 1920.  It also encouraged the 
formation	  of	  more	  Iranian	  women’s	  groups	  and	  women’s	  publications.6  By 1918, the Iranian government	  was	  starting	  to	  show	  some	  interest	  in	  women’s	  education, helping to fund the establishment of ten primary schools for girls, The 
Women’s	  Teacher	  Training	  College,	  and	  a	  Department	  of	  Public	  Instruction	  for	  
                                                 6 Farah Azari, Women of Iran: The Conflict with Fundamentalist Islam (London: Ithaca, 1983), p. 95. 
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Women.7  By 1924, the Ministry of Education was showing greater interest in 
The	  Women’s	  Teacher	  Training	  College,	  employing	  Mme	  Helene	  Hess	  as	  its	  next	  head to introduce the teaching of domestic science, child psychology, and better teaching methods.8  Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, was one of the first group of 
students	  admitted	  to	  the	  Women’s	  Teacher	  Training	  College	  in	  1918,	  and	  was	  by	  this point working there as a supervisor and translator.  She translated Mme 
Hess’s	  notes	  to	  put	  together	  the	  very	  first	  Persian	  book	  on	  domestic	  science.9  She was unable to get the book printed, however, until Reza Shah/Reza Khan Sardar-i-Sepah, who was Prime Minister and War Minister at the time, approved 
the	  book	  ‘s	  publication	  via	  the	  Army	  press	  in	  1925.10     Bamdad combined her educational work and teaching with journalism, writing articles for various periodical and liberal papers such as Iranshar, 
Ferangestan and Gole Zard.11  She argued that the publication of early female 
journals	  such	  as	  Sedigheh	  Dowlatabadi’s	  Zaban-i-Zanan,	  Mohataram	  Eskandari’s	  
Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  periodical	  Nesvan-i-Vantakhah, and Zan-i-Emruz, for which she worked as editor,12 all constituted the essential efforts of a small 
group	  of	  pioneers	  who	  ‘gradually	  prepared	  the	  future	  upsurge	  of	  Iran’s	  women-
ready	  to	  step	  forward	  and	  quickly	  occupy	  worthy	  positions	  in	  society’.13  The 
Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  had	  been	  established	  as	  an	  organisation by 1922 in 
                                                 7 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p.58. 8 Ibid, p.60. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid, Preface. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid, p. 66. 13 Ibid, p. 68. 
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Tehran and had voluntarily undertaken the teaching of hygiene, childcare and household management to women.14   Dowlatabadi similarly focused on education and journalism, slowly 
becoming	  known	  to	  international	  feminists	  abroad.	  	  In	  1919,	  Dowlatabadi’s	  magazine Zaban-i-Zanan was making strong political statements, for which she was soon attacked.  She published her opinions on the parliamentary elections, the question of the Northern oil agreement and the 1919 Anglo-Iranian 
agreement,	  which	  she	  condemned	  as	  a	  ‘sell-out’	  and	  a	  total	  compromise	  of	  the	  
country’s	  national	  and	  economic	  independence.15  In 1921, she gave a speech about the purchase of government stocks, which was incorporated into one of 
her	  magazine’s	  many	  articles,	  and	  resulted	  in	  an	  angry	  mob	  of	  men	  gathering	  in	  protest, an incident she accused the British Consular General of Isfahan of helping to organise.16   Women like Bamdad and Dowlatabadi, were following the line of earlier educators and writers like Bibi Astarabadi, defining	  ‘emancipation’	  as	  education,	  and combining strategies of compromise and resistance towards dominant patriarchal discourses	  of	  the	  period.	  	  The	  case	  of	  Bamdad’s	  book	  on	  domestic	  science shows how state co-optation was a two-way process, which incorporated mutual cooperation and compromise between female activists and state actors like Reza Shah to strike new patriarchal bargains in an effort to create mutually beneficial results.  Bamdad was able to print her book as a result of state support, which made it accessible to a wider number of Iranian women, which in turn promoted the modernisation agenda of Reza Shah.  The stress on domestic 
                                                 14 Ibid, p. 56-58. 15 ‘Speech	  Given	  by	  Dowlatabadi	  on	  the	  Purchase	  of	  Stocks	  and	  Shares	  Issued	  by	  the	  
Government’,	  1921, Dowlatabadi Collection, IISHA. 16 Ibid. 
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science and educated motherhood complemented the ideas of male modernists and leaders like Reza Shah, who supported the idea of educated women who would then biologically and culturally reproduce a new generation of modern, Iranian nationalists.  Yet, some women were simultaneously challenging patriarchal limits by raising their political voices in their educational and journalistic spaces, to test and push these patriarchal definitions in an effort to negotiate greater rights and roles for themselves. 
1.2 Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening Project Reza Shah was officially brought to power after overthrowing the Qajar dynasty 
through	  a	  coup	  d’état	  in	  1925.	  	  Ashraf	  Pahlavi	  discussed	  her	  father’s	  admiration	  for the reformist Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and explained that 
watching	  ‘a	  military	  man	  like	  himself…create	  a	  new	  nation	  out	  of	  a	  ruined	  
country’,	  inspired	  many	  of	  his	  own	  modernisation ideas.17  Reza Shah followed 
Ataturk’s	  strategy	  of	  suppressing	  independent	  social	  and	  cultural	  organisations that had survived from the earlier constitutional era.18  As a result, a new period 
of	  repression	  resulted	  in	  the	  stamping	  out	  of	  most	  independent	  women’s	  groups.  Between 1927-1929 Reza Shah launched many major legislative reforms, such as census registration, conscription, the reorganisation of the judicial system along secular lines, the beginning of the trans-Iranian railway, and the passing of the Uniform Dress law.19  Similarly to Ataturk, he put into place new policies and legal changes affecting women in an attempt to modernise them as part of his broader national modernisation campaign.   
                                                 17 Ashraf Pahlavi, Faces in a Mirror: Memoirs from Exile (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. 8, 23. 18 Stephanie Cronin, Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921-
1941 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 22. 19 Ibid, p. 161. 
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Female education was one of his main areas of focus, illustrated by the upsurge	  of	  girls’	  schools,	  and	  the	  Majlis approved laws of 1934 for the establishment of teacher training colleges.20 This allowed some women to conduct their educational and journalistic activities more freely, particularly when they complemented the policies of the regime.  Therefore, while some 
women	  like	  Bibi	  Astarabadi’s	  niece, Afzal Vaziri, struggled to print articles in newspapers of the day21, others like Fakhr Afagh Parsa, who had been a member 
of	  the	  Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  but	  whose	  magazine	  had	  been	  closed down by the Qajari government censor, was able to return from exile and to launch a new magazine, Alam-i-Nesavan (Women’s	  World) supporting similar ideas of female education and modernisation.22   Another area that saw important change was marriage law.  While Reza Shah did not abolish polygamy he did make small reforms in marriage and divorce laws; replacing religious courts with civil courts, demanding that marriage contracts be registered with the Ministry of Justice, and making it possible for women to insert extra conditions into their marriage contracts, such as the right to divorce their husbands if they were to marry another woman.23  The Iranian state under Reza Shah sought to co-opt the budding	  women’s	  rights	  
movement	  as	  the	  latter’s core education campaign complemented and reinforced 
the	  regime’s	  modernisation	  agenda	  based	  on	  Ataturk’s	  model	  in	  Turkey.	  	  However, this section argues that women equally took advantage of new opportunities to better achieve their socio-political goals.   
                                                 20 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, pp. 56-58. 21 Letters between Afzal Vaziri and Shafaq Sorkh editor, in Afzal Vaziri, p. 92. 22 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 58. 23 Sanasarian, The Women’s	  Rights	  Movement	  in	  Iran, p. 61. 
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Responding to the increasing repression, and restrictions on independent 
activity,	  they	  altered	  their	  independent,	  ‘gradual	  change’	  activism,	  for	  more	  radical change, launched and supported by the state.  For example, in 1932 the 
Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  of	  Iran	  hosted	  the	  Oriental	  Women’s	  Congress	  in	  Tehran (Second Congress of Eastern Women), chaired by Sedigheh Dowlatabadi.24  They	  reached	  out	  to	  regional	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  from	  Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and India among other nations.  Rosalie Slaughter 
Morton’s	  account	  of	  the	  Congress	  highlighted	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  eldest	  daughter, Shams Pahlavi, as president of the Congress.25  She wrote that the list 
of	  progressive	  decisions	  that	  the	  participants	  put	  together	  was	  a	  ‘testament	  to	  their vision and common	  sense’.26  Among the resolutions adopted at the Congress were the right to vote and, once qualified, be elected to office, compulsory education, equal pay for equal work, educational training for adult women, government funded kindergartens, playgrounds and educational 
cinemas…improving	  the	  morals	  of	  men…the	  outlawing	  of	  polygamy,	  the	  prohibition of alcohol and narcotics, and the organising of a feminine police force to examine public health and sanitary conditions.27  In 1935, a number of women came together under the orders of Reza Shah to form the organisation Kanoun Banovan (Ladies’ Centre).28  As a founding 
member,	  Bamdad	  recorded	  the	  occasion	  as	  a	  ‘historic	  event’,	  which	  took	  place	  at	  the Women’s	  Teacher	  Training	  College.29  She explained that the centre was 
                                                 24 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 60. 25 Rosalie Slaughter Morton,	  A	  Doctor’s	  Holiday	  in	  Iran (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1940), p. 311. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 89. 29 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 93. 
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instituted under the honorary presidency of Princess Shams Pahlavi and the patronage and supervision of the Ministry of Education. The statues and objectives of the organisation centred on	  women’s	  intellectual	  and	  domestic	  education.30 To provide adult women with mental and moral education, and with instruction in housekeeping and child rearing on a scientific basis, by 
means	  of	  lectures,	  publications,	  adult	  classes…to	  promote	  physical	  
training	  through	  appropriate	  sports…to	  create	  charitable	  institutions for the support of indigent mothers and children.31  The statues also stressed the promotion of Iranian production and use of Iranian consumer goods.32 The organisation’s emphasis on modern and domestic education complemented the efforts of earlier ‘gradual	  change’	  activists	  like	  Astarabadi, and pioneering female educators of the constitutional period who had negotiated greater educational rights on the basis of improving their mothering and teaching abilities in service to the nation.   However, Reza	  Shah’s visit to Turkey in 1934 catalysed the enforcement of more controversial laws such as the 1936 Unveiling Decree or Kashf-i-Hejab, 
part	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  state	  feminism	  project	  Nazhat-i-Banovan (Woman’s	  Awakening).  Early 19th century reformists such as Kermani had argued that the 
veil	  ‘deafened	  and	  blinded’	  Iranian	  women,33 and	  some	  discussion	  of	  women’s	  unveiling and its advantages had taken place in press articles, particularly 
women’s	  journals,	  such	  as	  Dowlatabadi’s,	  prior	  to	  Reza	  Shah’s	  accession	  to the 
throne	  in	  1925.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  Reza	  Shah’s	  ban	  on	  veiling,	  which	  caused	  the	  
greatest	  controversy	  and	  outrage	  across	  the	  majority	  of	  Iran’s	  population.	  	  
Unlike	  female	  activists’	  gradual	  change	  approach	  to	  unveiling	  (see	  chapter	  2),	  
                                                 30 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 89. 31 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 93. 32 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 89. 33 Paidar, p. 47. 
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Reza	  Shah’s	  ban	  on veiling pushed existing patriarchal bargains with conservative men too far, which resulted in an immediate religious backlash following his forced abdication.  As an executive member of the Kanoun Banovan, Bamdad stressed the organisation’s	  key	  role	  in	  both initiating and promoting abandonment of the veil.34 She explained how eight months after the organisation’s formation, a big 
education	  function	  was	  held	  in	  the	  Shah’s	  presence	  with	  the	  express	  command	  that all women teachers in the capital attend without veils.35 Bamdad recalled 
‘the	  looks	  of	  astonished	  disbelief	  on	  the	  faces	  of	  the	  men	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  the	  crowds lining the royal route when they saw some schoolmistresses walking by 
unveiled’.36 The	  Shah	  chose	  the	  graduation	  ceremony	  of	  the	  Teacher’s	  College to officially declare his unveiling policy on the 8th of January 1936, with his wife and daughter in attendance, and both completely unveiled for the first time.  Bamdad described the reaction: some of the elderly ladies among them, however, were visibly so upset by the loss of facial cover that they stood almost the whole time, looking at the wall and perspiring with embarrassment.37  
The	  Shah’s	  daughter,	  Ashraf	  Pahlavi,	  also	  gave	  an	  account of the event in her memoirs, arguing,  My father knew that he could build schools and create employment opportunities for women but he also knew that these measures would be useless unless women were pushed out of their cloistered environment.38  She wrote that the decree was another example of the paradox that was her father; that he would be willing to present his wife and daughters to the public 
                                                 34 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 94-95. 35 Ibid, p. 95. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid, p. 96. 38 Ashraf Pahlavi, p. 25. 
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unveiled, yet was unwilling to relax strict control over them at home.39  Ashraf viewed this as proof that he was willing to put his own feelings aside for the sake of modernisation.	  	  The	  contradiction	  she	  exposed	  suggests	  that	  Reza	  Shah’s	  need	  for Iran to achieve modernity, or the appearance of it, allowed him to justify 
controversial	  changes	  to	  himself,	  such	  as	  women’s	  unveiling.40 In her writing Bamdad described	  Reza	  Shah’s	  unveiling	  policy	  as	  	  ‘The	  Great	  Decree’41 and credited him with	  laying	  ‘the	  foundation	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  freedom	  in	  Iran’	  with the reforms he initiated in the 1930s.42   Bamdad and Dowlatabadi were amongst many prominent Iranian feminists who were successfully co-opted by the state, and rewarded in return.  
Dowlatabadi’s	  papers	  reaffirmed	  that	  Kanoun Banovan meetings always took 
place	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  daughters,	  and	  were	  thus	  strictly	  monitored.43 Therefore, while women like Bamdad and Dowlatabadi played key roles in the Kanoun Banovan,	  they	  were	  aware	  that	  the	  centre’s	  main	  purpose	  
was	  to	  support	  and	  reinforce	  the	  regime’s	  policies	  on	  women,	  such	  as	  the	  1936	  
Unveiling	  Decree,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  regime’s	  broader	  modernisation agenda.  However, Reza	  Shah’s	  state	  feminism	  project,	  Nazhat-i-Banovan (Woman’s	  Awakening/Movement), offered employment opportunities and education for women in exchange for the abandonment of their veils in public.44  Bamdad for instance, in 1936 became one of the first group of women admitted to Tehran 
University,	  and	  by	  1940	  was	  appointed	  principal	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Teacher	  
                                                 39 Ibid, p. 23. 40 Ibid, p. 25 41 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, 94.  42 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 55. 43 Statutes of organisation Kanoun Banovan 1935, Dowlatabadi Collection, IISHA. 44 Camron Michael Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy, and 
Popular Culture, 1865-1946 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), p. 1. 
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Training College.45  However,	  she	  also	  mentions	  the	  poetess	  Parvin	  Etesami’s	  departure from the organisation,	  but	  gives	  no	  reason	  for	  this	  other	  than	  ‘her	  
sensitive	  nature’.46  The statutes of the organisation, which were published in 
1935	  as	  ‘educational,	  cultural,	  and	  social	  work’,	  complemented the earlier campaigns of pioneering female activists and women’s	  rights	  advocates	  of	  the	  constitutional era.47   This chapter argues, that while some women like Parvin Etesami chose not to remain in the Kanoun Banovan, state co-optation	  of	  the	  Iranian	  women’s	  movement should be viewed as a form of patriarchal bargaining, and an active decision on the part of some Iranian	  women	  to	  alter	  their	  independent	  ‘gradual	  
change’	  approach	  for	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  a	  more	  effective	  strategy	  of	  working	  with	  a modernising state to initiate more revolutionary changes, for greater short term gain and professional reward.  In the next chapter, the effects of Reza 
Shah’s	  policies	  on	  different	  classes	  of	  Iranian	  women	  will	  be	  assessed	  to	  shed	  light on changing definitions of cultural authenticity amidst growing anti-westernisation sentiment. 
1.3 The	  Egyptian	  Feminist	  Union	  and	  Women’s	  Higher	  Education 
After	  Britain’s	  recognition	  of	  Egyptian	  independence	  in	  1922,	  some	  female	  nationalists and activists attempted to break away from the patriarchal limits and framework of the Wafd by leaving the WWCC to form the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923.  Describing the double standards and disappointments felt at the hands of male-nationalists, founding EFU member Ceza Nabarawi wrote in 
                                                 45 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 55 46 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 54.  47 Statutes of organisation Kanoun Banovan1935, Dowlatabadi Collection, IISHA. 
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1925: ‘’A	  Double	  Standard!’ This	  will	  always	  exist	  as	  long	  as	  men	  rule!’48  
Women’s	  rights	  activists	  were	  becoming	  increasingly aware of the limits of male nationalist definitions of modern Egyptian womanhood, particularly with regards to influence over domestic policy, and were seeking new ways to negotiate around these definitions and assert their own.   At the same time, they were careful not to alienate male nationalists, emphasising cooperation over overlapping ideas, such as notions of educated motherhood, in an attempt improve their bargaining positions by co-opting the support of male modernists and elite men.  For instance, the February 1929 issue 
of	  the	  EFU’s	  journal, L’Egyptienne, celebrated its 4th anniversary with a message 
from	  EFU	  president	  Sha‘rawi,	  reiterating	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘collaboration’	  with	  men.  The realisation	  of	  two	  of	  the	  EFU’S	  great	  vows…First	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  close collaboration between men and women by adding to our panel a 
committee	  of	  eminent	  men…Experience	  has	  shown	  that	  collaborating	  with men with regards to general questions has never prevented women from fulfilling their duties in the home, but rather helps them better understand their responsibilities as wives and mothers.49   
The	  statement	  above	  reaffirmed	  women’s	  nationalist	  roles	  in	  line	  with	  Wafdist	  constructs of womanhood and the modern nuclear family, as educated wives and mothers, capable of rearing a better, more modern, and educated generation of Egyptian nationalists.   Yet, EFU	  feminists	  also	  attempted	  to	  push	  patriarchal	  limits	  on	  women’s	  education by challenging conservative attitudes	  on	  women’s	  higher	  education,	  co-education, and veiling.  Women’s	  political	  activity	  also	  continued	  with	  protests against the repressive regime of Ismail Sidqi between 1930 and 1933.  
                                                 48 Saiza	  Nabarawi,	  ‘Double	  Standard’, written in 1925, in Opening the Gates, p. 280.  49 L’Egyptienne,	  February 1929 issue, p. 3, 19, Sha‘rawi Collection, American University of Cairo Archives (AUCA). 
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The 1923 Constitution was suspended and only reinstated in 193550 after mass demonstrations against the Sidqi regime, which Egyptians viewed as a corrupt government propped up by the British.51  Latifa Salim writes that pictures of 
women’s	  protests	  and	  their	  encounters	  with	  police	  during	  these	  demonstrations	  were released to enthuse the population.  Most of the young women were students who sent telegrams to the press announcing their protests as expressions of their nationalist feelings, and describing their treatment at the hands of police.52 In 1932, Nabarawi, editor of l’Egyptienne, wrote, Based on the atmosphere of regression that reigns within official circles we have been reading for some time in the press the most absurd articles regarding the use of the veil, the dangers of superior education and co-education…53  In the same October 1932 issue of l’Egyptienne, Nabarawi wrote an article about young female students who had studied abroad, citing the examples of future 
women’s	  rights	  activist	  Doria Shafiq, and future deputy Minister of Education Karima al-Said, to illustrate the benefits of higher education and education abroad for women.   Some of the female students sent on missions in Europe are back with a halo of successes, equipped with higher degrees and full of faith for the future.  I met two of them on the beach at Stanley Bay, Miss Doria Shafiq, who passed so brilliantly her degree of education at the Sorbonne, and Miss Karime El Said, who obtained a diploma with honours in History from the University of Westfield.54  The words of these two young women so impressed Nabarawi that she declared,  
I	  wanted	  the	  detractors	  of	  women’s	  emancipation	  to	  be	  present	  during	  this conversation, to see how higher education far from diverting a 
                                                 50 al-Subki, p. 57-58. 51 Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human rights, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2007), p. 100; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 88. 52 L.M. Salim, pp. 38- 42.  53 Nabarawi, L’Egyptienne, October 1932 issue, p. 6; Sha‘rawi Collection, AUCA. 54 Ibid. 
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woman away from her natural duties, widens the horizon of her knowledge…is this not for our beloved country the prelude of a new era?  Educators and mothers of the future, it is to our young girls/daughters that the responsibility of the mission is given to instil in our children a love of freedom, independence, which alone makes nations strong and individuals worthy of respect.55  In this passage, Nabarawi can be seen using modern notions of educated motherhood,	  and	  male	  nationalist	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  domestic	  and	  nationalist responsibilities as educators, to extend the acceptable terms of this 
patriarchal	  bargain	  to	  include	  ‘higher	  university	  education’	  and	  education	  abroad.  
Section 2:  Expanding Networks and Bargains: International Feminism This section argues that both Egyptian and Iranian women reached out to international feminists, particularly the IAW, in an effort to strengthen their own negotiating positions vis-à-vis men, by showing them that they could influence international spaces and positively contribute to foreign and domestic policies at home.  The EFU in particular, by presenting itself and its journal l’Egyptienne as a cultural exchange	  forum,	  representing	  ‘eastern’	  ideas	  and	  interests	  abroad	  while 
promoting	  the	  most	  ‘noble’	  ‘western’	  ideas at home, and defining itself as a national and social necessity, highlighted its potential as a contributor to both Egyptian foreign and domestic policy 
2.1 Egypt and The International Alliance of Women during the 1920s. From its inception, the EFU sought to expand its support network by joining the International Woman Suffrage Alliance Congress in Rome (later known as the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal citizenship, or IAW).  The 
                                                 55 Ibid. 
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Egyptian delegates listed that year were Huda Sha‘rawi, Nabawiya Musa and Ceza Nabarawi.56  Musa was selected to present the	  subject	  of	  women’s	  
emancipation	  in	  Egypt	  during	  the	  conference,	  where	  she	  declared	  	  ‘there	  exists	  no law in Egypt, either secular or religious to check the complete emancipation 
of	  the	  Egyptian	  woman’.57  She went on to discuss the effects of foreign interference in Egypt as well as the beginnings of modernisation	  under	  the	  ‘Great	  
Mohammad	  Ali’,	  highlighting	  the	  names	  of	  Egypt’s	  first	  female	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Aisha al-Taymurriyah, Zaynab Fawwaz, and the Saniyah School For Girls.  She stated that although their numbers were originally limited, pioneering women 
had	  taken	  key	  steps	  towards	  ‘emancipation’,	  and	  that	  they	  had	  taken	  part	  in	  nationalist demonstrations.58  She argued that nationalist activities went hand in hand with the need for female education and the development of a feminist press.59  Defining	  ‘education’ as the path to emancipation and greater liberation, she added, The Egyptian woman must unceasingly work in view of obtaining her 
admission	  in	  the	  superior	  schools	  of	  Egypt,	  the	  same	  as	  a	  man…If	  the	  Egyptian woman prevails in this great aim, she will be able to claim other advantages, still more precious, such as universal suffrage.60    By the time of the next IAW conference in 1926 the EFU had already launched its journal l’Egpytienne.  While the French-language publication restricted its readership in Egypt to the French-speaking classes, it facilitated networking and communicating with international feminists and activists.  The February 1926 issue of L’Egyptienne celebrated their international network and 
                                                 56 Report of the 9th IAW Congress in Rome, 1923, IAW Collection, Women’s	  Library	  Archives (WLA). 57 Ibid, p. 169. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid, p. 171. 60 Ibid, pp. 170-171. 
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the many correspondences they had received, closing with a pledge to courageously continue on the path for emancipation, and reiterating 
l’Egyptienne’s confidence in the future.61   
Sha‘rawi, Nabarawi and Fekria Hosni, the director of the Abbas School for Girls in Cairo, were the official delegates at the October 1926 conference.62  As president of	  the	  EFU	  Sha‘rawi delivered a speech in French during the proceedings, discussing their efforts and obstacles in pursuing suffrage, campaigning for changes to family law, and improving their professional rights.63  She explained that progressive changes were being made with regard to family law and marriage legislation, with the minimum marriage age being raised to 16 for women and 18 for men.64  She went on to explain that the EFU was focused on claiming child custody rights for mothers in the interest of children after a divorce, and engaged in generally improving	  women’s	  divorce	  rights	  in	  the	  country.  She ended her speech by discussing the professional gains Egyptian women were making, declaring that the Egyptian government had sent numerous female students for study overseas that very year, and that in public offices, women were receiving the same treatment as male employees.65  A similar progress report on Egypt was also given by the EFU at the 11th IAW congress in Berlin in 1929, which included eight Egyptian delegates.66  The EFU at this point proudly pointed to their expanding support base, which 
included	  many	  of	  Egypt’s	  male	  intellectual	  and	  political	  elite,	  such	  as	  Professor	  Taha Hussein of Cairo University, who in 1950 became Minister of Education, 
                                                 61 L’Egyptienne, Feb 1926 Issue, p.2, Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA. 62 List of Delegates-Report of the 10th IAW Congress in Paris, 1926, IAW Collection, WLA. 63 Ibid, Rapport de la Presidente de	  l’Union	  Feministe	  Egyptienne, p. 211. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid, pp. 211-212. 66 ‘Report	  of	  the	  11th IAW	  Congress	  in	  Berlin’,	  1929,	  IAW	  Collection,	  WLA. 
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and government ministers who covered areas from hygiene and medicine to civil law.67  At	  this	  point	  the	  EFU’s	  executive	  committee	  was	  made	  up	  of	  twenty	  
members,	  and	  its	  membership	  had	  risen	  to	  250.	  	  The	  report	  highlighted	  ‘new’	  
and	  ‘important’	  advances	  that	  had	  been	  made	  since	  1926,	  and	  that	  the	  previous	  April, a law had been promulgated wherein a man could not repudiate his wife as easily, and where women could in certain cases demand a divorce as well.68   Thus while the EFU co-operated with men at home to influence internal changes, it also attempted to increase its own international influence by 
presenting	  itself	  as	  an	  ambassador	  of	  the	  ‘orient’	  and	  a	  ‘propagandist’	  of	  western	  ideas at home.  On the fourth anniversary of l’Eyptienne,	  Sha‘rawi wrote, Founded in 1925, two years after the formation of the EFU and the official collaboration between women of the East and West, it responded to an urgent necessity,	  as	  much	  national	  as	  social…Has she not become for 
Europe	  the	  faithful	  messenger	  of	  the	  Oriental	  soul,	  and	  for	  us	  ‘Orientals’,	  the dedicated propagandist of the West’s	  most	  noble	  ideas.69  IAW reports from 1923-1929	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  EFU’s	  bargaining	  strategies,	  and	  
how	  women’s	  approach	  to	  domestic	  policy	  had	  changed	  after	  their	  separation	  
from	  the	  Wafd/WWCC.	  	  The	  EFU’s	  focus	  on	  female	  education	  explains	  their	  choice of the pioneering female educator, Nabawiya Musa, as their speaker at the 
1923	  conference.	  	  Her	  message	  of	  ‘education	  first’	  and	  equal	  educational	  
opportunities	  with	  men,	  reinforced	  the	  EFU’s	  attempts	  to	  both	  complement modernist notions of female education at the same time as challenge existing patriarchal limits or conservative	  views	  on	  Egyptian	  women’s education.  The 1926 report showed that EFU members were actively challenging and 
negotiating	  men’s	  guardianship	  of	  domestic	  policy,	  to	  push	  for	  changes in family 
                                                 67 Ibid, p. 387. 68 Ibid, pp. 388-389. 69 L’Egyptienne, February 1929 issue, p. 2, Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA. 
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law and gain government support for further education initiatives, such as study abroad.  They applied a combined strategy of challenging conservative patriarchal views and improving their bargaining position by representing the Egyptian nation at international feminist conferences, whilst co-opting the support of modernist men over complimentary notions of modern Egyptian womanhood.  The EFU thus promoted itself as a national and social necessity by presenting itself and its journal as a forum	  for	  cultural	  exchange	  between	  ‘East	  
and	  West’.	  	  By	  highlighting	  its	  ability	  to	  represent	  Egypt	  internationally,	  it	  made	  a case for itself as a contributor/player to both foreign and domestic policy at home. 
2.2 Iran and The International Alliance of Women 1926, 1929  The 1926 IAW Paris conference saw the introduction of Iranian delegates for the first time.  The Iranian entry listed the Union of Patriotic Women (Mohtaram 
Eskandari’s	  Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter),	  represented	  by	  Sedigheh	  Dowlatabadi,	  ‘the	  leading	  Iranian	  feminist	  and	  editor	  of	  
Zaban-i-Zanan women’s	  magazine’.70  Dowlatabadi’s	  leading	  position	  amongst	  
Iranian	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  and	  her	  command	  of	  the	  French	  language	  resulting from her studies at the Sorbonne in 1922, made her a strong choice for the Paris conference.71  Two	  letters	  from	  the	  Patriotic	  Women’s	  League	  requested Dowlatabadi to speak on their behalf in Paris, but to avoid bringing up any political issues.72 It appears that the strategy of Iranian women’s	  rights	  activists at the time was to expand their network and thus improve their 
                                                 70 ‘Report	  of	  the	  10th IAW	  Congress	  in	  Paris’,	  1926,	  IAW	  Collection,	  WLA; Bamdad, From Darkness 
into Light, pp. 77-80. 71 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 80. 72 ‘Two	  letters	  from	  ‘Jamiat-e-Nesvan Watankhah to	  Dowlatabadi’,	  28	  Dec	  1923	  and	  20	  Jan	  1924,	  Dowlatabadi Collection, IISHA. 
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bargaining position, but to do so subtly, without transgressing existing patriarchal boundaries set by male modernists and Reza Shah by being overtly political.  The active participation of multiple Egyptian delegates at the conference in comparison to the relatively passive and singular Iranian presence was partly the result of the patriarchal context out of which female activists were operating at home, and their different negotiating positions.   
Unlike	  their	  Egyptian	  counterparts,	  Iranian	  women’s	  activities	  were	  largely disparate and decentralised.	  	  Moreover,	  Reza	  Shah’s	  policy	  of	  suppressing	  independent activity and co-opting	  the	  women’s	  movement	  meant	  that	  women’s	  rights activists had to be careful not to act too independently and to uphold the 
patriarchal	  state’s	  definitions	  of	  female	  behaviour, which limited their political activity.  As a result, Iranian women made their presence known at international conferences without making blatant political statements. By doing so, they subtly attracted the attention of international feminists during the IAW conference, such as American suffragist Mary Winsor, who wrote an article about Dowlatabadi in the magazine Equal Rights.  Equal Rights informed its readers that the Persian government intended to make Dowlatabadi 
the	  inspector	  of	  girl’s	  schools	  in	  Tehran,	  and	  was	  at	  the	  same	  time	  paying	  for	  her	  to complete her education in France.73  Winsor expressed her satisfaction at Dowlatabadi becoming a Persian representative on their International Advisory Council and organising a Persian committee to keep international feminists informed about the progress of women in Iran.74 Dowlatabadi went on after the 
                                                 73 Mary Winsor, The Blossoming of a Persian Feminist, Equal Rights Magazine, 23 October 1926, Dowlatabadi Collection, IISHA. 74 Ibid. 
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IAW Paris conference to give	  another	  conference	  at	  ‘Le Collège Féminin in July 1927 about Franco-Persian relations and the life of women in Persia.75     The absence of an Iranian representative at the Berlin conference in 1929 was most likely linked to political developments in Iran.  As mentioned earlier, Reza Shah initiated a serious crackdown on independent groups, and socialist 
parties	  in	  particular,	  when	  he	  came	  to	  power.	  	  Eskandari’s	  Patriotic	  Women’s	  
League	  was	  associated	  with	  Iran’s	  Socialist	  Party76, which explains both its cautious political approach at the IAW in 1926, and its absence in 1929, when the crackdown was more seriously under way.  By 1931 Reza Shah had declared all leftist and	  oppositionist	  parties	  illegal,	  disbanding	  Solayman	  Eskandari’s	  
(Mohtaram	  Eskandari’s	  husband’s)	  Socialist	  Party	  and	  banning	  The	  Communist	  Party.77   
Following	  on	  from	  hosting	  the	  Oriental	  Women’s	  Congress	  in	  Tehran	  in	  1932, Iranian women participated more actively at the 1935 IAW conference.  This time the IAW congress report included information on the advances Iranian 
women	  had	  recently	  made,	  such	  as	  ‘Article	  12	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  7	  September	  1929’,	  which provided that a Persian woman who married an alien/foreigner did not 
lose	  her	  nationality	  unless	  she	  chose	  to	  acquire	  her	  husband’s	  instead’.78  
However,	  Iran’s	  presence	  at	  the	  IAW	  conferences	  remained	  inconsistent	  until	  the	  reign of Mohammad Reza Shah.  This reflected the difference in foreign policy between Reza Shah and his son.	  	  Reza	  Shah’s	  attempts	  to	  diminish	  western	  interference in Iran compared	  to	  his	  son’s	  active	  engagement	  with	  western	  
                                                 75 ‘Invitation	  from	  the	  Directors	  of	  Le	  Collège	  Féminin	  in	  Paris	  for	  Dowlatabadi	  to	  give	  a	  Speech	  on Franco-Persian Relations and the Life of Women	  in	  Persia’,	  20	  July	  1927,	  Dowlatabadi Collection, IISHA.   76 Paidar, p. 95. 77 Ibid, 101. 78 ‘Report	  of	  the	  12th IAW	  Congress	  in	  Istanbul’,	  1935,	  p.	  150,	  IAW	  Collection,	  WLA. 
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countries, helps explain the change in pattern; specifically the increased and more consistent presence of Iranian feminists at these conferences during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah compared to the period	  of	  his	  father’s	  rule,	  as	  later chapters will illustrate.  
Section 3:  Alternative Bargains: EFU, Regional Feminism, and the IAW  
It	  was	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2	  that	  men	  supported	  women’s	  contribution	  to	  foreign	  affairs, specifically in the context of anti-imperialist movements, far more than their participation in domestic affairs and policy.  As symbols of national culture 
or	  the	  ‘spiritual	  quality	  of	  national	  culture’,79 this section contends that	  women’s	  contribution to anti-imperialist movements offered men an effective way of 
asserting	  the	  nation’s	  cultural	  identity against imperialist cultural hegemony.  As a result, joining forces with other Arab feminists offered Egyptian women a better-perceived patriarchal bargain than their ongoing relationship with the IAW, which was beginning to threaten their position as a result of political developments in Palestine.  As such, this chapter argues that this caused an important change of position for the EFU, where a more defined line was drawn 
between	  ‘Eastern’	  and	  ‘Western’	  feminism	  at	  this	  point	  over	  changing	  notions	  of	  cultural authenticity and national	  identity,	  which	  positioned	  ‘Western	  feminism’	  
in	  opposition	  to	  ‘Eastern	  feminism’	  as a result of this wider anti-colonial struggle. 
3.1 The	  EFU	  and	  the	  ‘Arab	  Feminist	  Conference’	  of	  1938 The EFU also solidified its regional network during this period.  The May 1930 issue of l’Egyptienne	  included a three-page	  article	  covering	  ‘The	  Feminist	  
Congress	  in	  Beirut’. 
                                                 79 Chatterjee, p. 243. 
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A large convention was held last month in Beirut.  Uniting women from 
the	  Arab	  world…it	  allowed	  hope	  for	  greater	  united	  participation	  in	  the	  
future…Various	  important	  issues	  were	  discussed	  and	  put	  up	  to	  the	  vote	  
such	  as:	  women’s	  access	  to	  art	  schools,	  the	  abolition	  of	  licensed	  brothels…the	  question	  of	  universal	  peace	  was	  also	  raised.80  The article explained that for the first time an official government representative and the Minister of Public instruction had inaugurated the congress, with many journalists in attendance.81  It also summarised that after a welcome address from the president of the congress, women representing Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, gave speeches, receiving much applause.82  Ehsan Ahmed Al-Koussi, speaking on behalf of the EFU, declared that Egyptian women deeply appreciated and admired the success achieved by their colleagues despite the obstacles they were facing.83  Egyptian feminists took the opportunity to stress the importance of regional affiliations in fighting male prejudice towards female, and thus national progress. With the affiliation of Syria and Egypt to the International Alliance For 
Women’s	  Suffrage	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  one	  of	  the	  international	  congresses	  of this organisation	  may	  one	  day	  be	  held	  in	  an	  Eastern	  country…on	  this	  subject I will say that the admission of Syria and Lebanon at the last IAW congress in Berlin was received with sympathy by all the delegates, especially the Eastern delegates.84  The 1935 IAW conference in Istanbul saw the addition of more Arab feminists representing more nations, including a large 24-member delegation from Syria.85 
Sha‘rawi used the opportunity to send Egyptian Prime Minister Tawfiq Nasim Pasha a letter on behalf of the EFU updating him on the resolutions agreed upon 
                                                 80 L’Egyptienne,	  ‘Le	  Congres	  Féministe	  de	  Beyrouth’,	  May	  1930	  issue,	  p.	  17,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA.  81 Ibid, p. 18. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid, p. 18-19. 85 ‘Report	  of	  the	  12th IAW	  Congress	  in	  Istanbul’,	  1935,	  IAW	  Collection,	  WLA. 
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at the IAW Conference in Istanbul that April.86  Show-casing her increasing clout in the international arena, Sha‘rawi brought up the question of polygamy as well as equal political rights, writing: ‘please, allow us to draw the attention of your Excellency especially to the resolutions related to the status of polygamy and the 
political	  rights	  of	  the	  woman’.87  She framed her arguments in the context of 
foreign	  policy,	  arguing	  that	  polygamy	  spoiled	  the	  ‘moral	  reputation’	  of	  Egypt	  in	  
the	  international	  arena,	  and	  reiterated	  the	  EFU’s	  1926	  request	  for	  its	  prohibition, excluding exceptional cases such as infertility, using religious arguments.  It contradicts with the law of life and the traditions of the age, and our religion is innocent in this issue, as the Holy Koran does not permit the same, except under conditions, which are now impossible to achieve.88   On the question of	  equal	  political	  rights	  Sha‘rawi	  continued,	  ‘we	  assume	  the	  same quantity of duties and obligations assumed by men and surrender the same laws and provisions, so we must have, like men, the rights of representation and 
prosecution’.89  While earlier female and male thinkers such as Malak Hifni Nasif and Qasim Amin had challenged social and religious justification for polygamy in 
a	  similar	  way,	  Sha‘rawi added to this by challenging it on the	  grounds	  of	  Egypt’s	  
international	  relations.	  	  The	  EFU’s	  confidence was increasing partly as a result of its international activities and its expanding regional/international network, which allowed it to extend earlier discourses on polygamy and veiling, to include greater political rights and roles for women, and to do so with a more powerful voice.   However, from 1936 onwards, serious strains began to develop between the IAW and their Arab affiliates over the growing Zionist-Palestinian conflict.  
                                                 86 ‘Letter	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  Tawfiq	  Nasim	  Pasha’,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA, 1935. 87 Ibid.  88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 
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Arab protests against increasing Jewish immigration came to a head with the Arab Revolt of 1936, making the EFU and its Arab counterparts question their relationship with the IAW, as they felt the latter were taking sides and demonstrating imperialist attitudes.  Matiel Mogannam, a leader of the 
Palestinian	  woman’s	  movement,	  wrote	  that	  on	  26	  October	  1929	  the	  Arab	  
Women’s	  Congress	  of	  Palestine	  was	  held	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  with	  two	  hundred	  Muslim and Christian delegates in attendance, in order to discuss the political unrest in the country.90  These women had also started to reach out to international feminists.  In April 1935 a delegation of Palestinian women was sent to the IAW conference in Istanbul, and by June 1936 Palestinian women had 
contacted	  Sha‘rawi asking for help in their national struggle.91  In 1937 Matiel 
Moganam	  wrote	  that	  Egypt	  could	  ‘boast	  of	  many	  women	  writers	  and	  reformers	  who have won for themselves a worldwide reputation.  Even in the political field these ladies have proved to be an invaluable asset	  to	  their	  country.’92  She argued 
that	  Sha‘rawi	  had	  done	  a	  great	  deal	  for	  the	  Egyptian	  women’s	  movement,	  and	  highlighted her election as vice president to the Board of the IAW at the 12th congress in Istanbul in 1935.93   
In	  1936,	  Sha‘rawi	  received	  ‘an	  emotional letter from the Arab Ladies Committee of Jerusalem explaining the deteriorating situation of the Palestinians, and calling on Egyptian women to support them.94  Sha‘rawi presented the appeal to the EFU who welcomed it and decided to convene a meeting to discuss the issue, where the following decisions were made: 
                                                 90 Matiel E.T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem (London: Herbert Joseph, 1937), p. 70. 91 ‘Report	  of	  the	  12th IAW	  Congress	  in	  Istanbul’,	  1935,	  IAW	  Collection,	  WLA. 92 Mogannam, pp. 50-51. 93 Ibid, p. 51. 94 ‘Eastern	  Women’s	  Conference	  Summary	  Report’,	  (1930-),	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA.  
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1-A committee of assembly members would be constituted to collect donations. 2-Protests would be executed against the Balfour Declaration 3-Letters of protest would be sent to the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Colonies of Britain, and the Speaker of the House of Commons. 4-International feminists and League of Nations would be urged to support the women of Palestine in their national struggle.95  
Sha‘rawi sent a telegraph to the British Ministry of Foreign affairs and speaker of the House of Commons on 17 June 1936. The Egyptian women express their ardent emotions towards their Palestinian friends and brothers during their time of fear and severe distress as a consequence of their current situation, which has made all 
the	  children	  of	  the	  Arab	  East	  lose	  trust	  in	  the	  British	  people.’96  In early 1937 a telegraph was sent to the EFU from the Acre Ladies Committee, Oh neighbours of the sacred land, have you not heard the news of the catastrophe that has befallen our land; this catastrophe will remove a 
nation	  from	  existence…Oh Allah make Egypt get up from its long slumber to see the catastrophe.97   
Sha‘rawi’s	  response	  reiterated	  a	  sense	  of	  unity	  over	  the	  struggle,	  ‘we are with 
you…we	  hope Britain will give up this policy which will put it in a position of enmity with Muslims and Islam’.98 These correspondences illustrated how	  the	  EFU’s	  sense	  of	  unity	  with	  Palestinian female activists was not only based on a sense of shared gender and national identity as Arab women, but also the sense of common Muslim identities.  This helped articulate the Palestinian struggle as one of Islam and Arab nationhood against British imperialism, with Sha‘rawi sending telegraphs to British officials, such Ambassador of Egypt Sir Miles Lampson, on behalf of 
                                                 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid,	  Letter	  to	  British	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  17	  June	  1936,	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  ‘Eastern	  Women’s	  
Conference’	  Papers,	  	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUC Archives.  97 ‘Telegraph	  to	  Sha‘rawi from Anissa al-Khadraa,	  President	  of	  the	  Acre	  Ladies	  Committee’,	  1937,	  
Sha‘rawi	  Collection, AUCA  98 ‘Telegraph	  to	  the	  Acre	  Ladies	  Committee	  from	  Sha‘rawi	  and	  EFU’,	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  Collection,	  AUCA.  
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Palestinian and Arab women.99  The increasing tension with British officials and Europeans over the question of Palestine made interaction with the IAW increasingly difficult, especially as Arab feminists continued to encourage the EFU president to speak on their behalf.   
The	  EFU’s	  increasing	  influence	  as	  the	  representative	  voice	  of	  Arab,	  and	  specifically Palestinian, women over the political crisis allowed it to assert itself in Egypt more strongly.  On 14 July 1937,	  Sha‘rawi sent the two telegraphs with a letter to Mustafa Al Nahas Pasha, Head of the Egyptian Government, requesting him to take a position on the issue. As Egypt can never be less than the other Arab nations in its feeling towards its neighbours, indeed when it is considered the leader of Arab 
countries…will	  you	  keep	  silent	  and	  neutral	  towards	  this	  flagrant	  act	  which hurts four hundred thousand Muslims in Palestine?100     
Sha‘rawi also sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs Wasif Ghali Pasha a letter congratulating him on his defence of Palestine at the League of Nations, and received in response a letter from him expressing his deep gratitude and respect.101  The EFU thus used its growing political voice to both challenge male 
leaders’	  response	  to	  the	  crisis and cooperate with them to defend Palestinian interests. 
By	  July	  1937	  Sha‘rawi had received even more letters from Arab feminist organisations asking her to defend the Palestinian issue in their name before 
international	  audiences.	  	  She	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  host	  an	  ‘Eastern	  Women’s	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  Al	  Nahas	  Pasha	  from	  Sha‘rawi’,	  1937,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA.  101 ‘Letter	  to	  and	  from	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Wasif	  Ghali	  Pasha’,	  (undated),	  Sha‘rawi Collection, AUCA.  
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Conference for the Defence of	  Palestine’	  at	  the	  EFU	  headquarters	  in	  Cairo	  in	  October 1938.    We have decided to hold an Arab Feminist Conference to consider the 
painful	  situation	  which	  Palestine	  is	  suffering…in	  the	  name	  of	  humanity	  and justice, we urge all feminist societies and other societies to support 
us…and sending representatives to participate with us in this conference which we have decided to hold in Cairo from 15 October 1938.102  The EFU explained that the goal of the conference was to explore the crucial issue of the Palestinian problem, specifically the Balfour Declaration, which the document stated was	  ‘a	  breaking	  of	  the	  British	  promise	  made	  to	  the	  Arabs	  to	  
protect	  its	  lands,	  by	  promising	  the	  Jews	  a	  national	  homeland	  in	  Palestine’.103   The document went on to explain the position of Arab woman on the issue.  She thus began to act and participate with her men-folk in order to 
protect	  her	  homeland	  and	  the	  future	  of	  her	  children…and	  as	  a	  consequence women in different Arab countries formed secondary committees to defend the Palestinians, who stand in the face of the injustice created by the British and the Jews.104     The stress on women as protectors, mothers, and nurturers of the nation shows how women often sought or reinforced these roles themselves, particularly during times of crisis, to demonstrate national strength and cultural unity.  The EFU also used the conference to promote themselves with international press coverage, which included a Time Magazine article printed on the 18th of October 
1938,	  ‘describing	  how	  far	  Eastern	  women	  have	  come	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  political	  intelligence and social liberation’.105  Sha‘rawi also sent telegrams to Mr. Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, encouraging Britain to change its position, and support the Arabs, and sent copies of this telegraph to the British 
                                                 102 ‘Appeal	  written	  by	  Sha‘rawi	  and	  EFU	  Calling	  on	  Women	  to	  Attend	  First	  Eastern	  (Arab)	  Feminist Conference’,	  4	  September	  1938, Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA. 103 ‘Eastern	  Women’s	  Conference	  Summary	  Report’,	  1938, Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 
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Embassy in Cairo.106  Although a letter of response was sent back by the Eastern Secretary Mr. W.A. Smart, it did not engage in discussing, or even acknowledging the Palestinian situation.107   
Sha‘rawi took the opportunity of the Eastern Conference to position and present the EFU as leaders of a broader regional/Arab	  women’s	  movement.	  	  On	  
12	  October	  1938,	  Sha‘rawi circulated the following message to members of the EFU and other female activists, in anticipation of the arrival of the conference participants. They departed from their countries, left their children, husbands and 
work,	  and	  bore	  the	  hardship	  of	  travel…to	  participate	  with	  their	  Egyptian	  
sisters	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Women’s	  Conference	  to	  be	  held	  at	  the	  house	  of	  the	  Egyptian Feminist Union in Cairo, on the 15th of October to discuss the 
issue	  of	  Palestine…I	  hope that each Egyptian woman, who hears our call to attend the conference, considers such a call as an invitation for her.108    
The	  circular	  reaffirmed	  women’s	  roles as wives and mothers, and the sacrifices they had made leaving their households as part of their nationalist/regional duty towards Palestine as Arabs, Muslims, and women.  The circular emphasised 
women’s	  domestic	  roles,	  their	  role	  as	  protectors of the cultural/spiritual nation, and their capabilities as active political players, indicating to nationalist men they saw no contradiction in these multiple roles.     
3.2 Bargains of Authenticity: The Breakdown of EFU-IAW Ties Rising tensions over British/European attitudes towards the question of 
Palestine	  catalysed	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  EFU’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  IAW.	  	  The	  attitude of the IAW regarding the Arab Revolt of 1936 and the intensifying conflict highlighted, in the view of Arab female activists, an unjust intolerance 
                                                 106 ‘Telegram	  sent	  to	  Mr	  Chamberlain,	  the	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  Sha‘rawi’,	  1938,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection, AUCA.  107 ‘Letter	  sent	  by	  Eastern	  Secretary	  Mr	  W.A.	  Smart	  to	  Sha‘rawi’,	  30	  September	  1938,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection, AUCA.  108 ‘EFU	  circular’, 12	  October	  1938,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA.  
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and double	  standard	  in	  upholding	  its	  ‘democratic	  principles’ when it came to its 
‘Eastern	  sisters’.	  	  IAW	  leaders	  came	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  extensions of their imperialist governments in the context of the Palestinian-Zionist struggle, which 
made	  the	  EFU’s	  on-going relationship with them a growing threat-point to patriarchal bargains with nationalist men and notions of cultural authenticity.   In January 1939, the EFU had drafted a fiery letter addressed to The World Association of National Newspapers in Copenhagen, appealing on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine to all newspapers, periodicals, news agencies and organisations.  They used religious references to frame the struggle as one of 
‘Judaism’	  against	  ‘Christendom	  and	  Islam’.109 Some still hoped the EFU would be able to enlist the support of the IAW on the basis of the 16-year relationship it had built with the organisation.	  	  The	  Arab	  Women’s	  Union	  of Haifa sent a 
message	  to	  Sha‘rawi in February 1939, informing her about the deaths of women and children in their town, and asking her to enlist the help of IAW president Margaret Corbett Ashby and British women on their behalf.110  Yet no resolutions over the issue could be agreed upon at the conference, and the presence of the 
Jewish	  Women’s	  Equal	  Rights	  Association	  from	  Palestine	  only	  served	  to	  exacerbate tensions.111   Sha‘rawi responded by threatening to leave the IAW, which resulted in IAW president, Margery Corbett Ashby, sending her a letter on 8 July 1939, the first day of the 13th IAW Congress, pleading with her not to abandon the organisation and their long-standing friendship.  
                                                 109 ‘Letter	  Drafted	  by	  the	  EFU	  Addressed	  to	  the	  World	  Association	  of	  Newspapers	  in	  Copenhagen’,	  pp. 1-2,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA.  110 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 231. 111 Ibid, p. 235. 
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We plead with great emotion that you do not take such a fast decision.  We have too many common memories; we have worked together for too many years, to resign ourselves to such a cruel departure.112  Ashby sent another conciliatory letter on the final day of the congress. All our colleagues of the Board are aware of your letter and feel deep sympathy.  They feel in complete agreement with you in their desire to maintain the bonds of sisterhood that unite us if not our political differences…in doing so, you will help the women of the East and the West despite the many difficulties in understanding each other better.113    
The	  EFU’s	  breakdown	  with the IAW encouraged the need for stronger regional alliances and helped catalyse the unification of Arab women groups under the banner of the Arab Feminist Union (AFU) in 1944.   The idea of political and cultural unification around the notion of a common Arab identity grew stronger	  in	  response	  to	  perceived	  ‘colonialist-
Zionist’ threats.  The heightening of Arab-nationalist sentiment, in the context of an anti-colonial and anti-Zionist struggle,	  altered	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  EFU’s	  patriarchal bargains, directing	  them	  and	  other	  Arab	  women’s	  groups	  towards consolidation of a regional Arab feminism.  The EFU with its two decades of experience played a leading role in establishing a pan-Arab federation, with 
Sha‘rawi and fellow EFU members Hawa Idris and Amina al-Said visiting 
women’s	  groups	  in	  Syria,	  Lebanon,	  Palestine	  and	  Transjordan	  in	  order	  to	  test	  the	  idea in the summer of 1944.114  The tour led to the organisation of an Arab Feminist Congress in Cairo in December 1944, with open support from the state, in an attempt to shape a new pan-Arab Feminist institution and to reiterate their commitment to the Palestinian cause.   
                                                 112 ‘Letter	  from	  Margret Corbett Ashby to Sha‘rawi	  and	  EFU’,	  8	  July	  1939,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA.  113 ‘Letter	  from	  Margret	  Corbett	  Ashby	  to	  Sha‘rawi and EFU’,	  15	  July	  1939,	  Sha‘rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA.  114 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, pp. 238, 239, 245. 
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The Egyptian government was said to have donated one thousand pounds towards the conference and Education Minister Mohammad Haykal gave the introductory speech.115  While	  Sha‘rawi spoke of equal social and political rights, 
which	  included	  the	  demand	  for	  women’s	  suffrage,	  reform	  of	  personal	  status	  laws	  through modern interpretations of the Shari‘a,	  women’s	  right	  to	  work	  and	  equal	  pay, Haykal glorified their special cultural and maternal roles.116 It was decided that an Arab Feminist Union (AFU) would be formed with its headquarters in Cairo, under the administrative	  leadership	  of	  the	  EFU.	  	  Sha‘rawi was nominated as president, and Amina al-Said as secretary	  and	  editor	  of	  the	  AFU’s	  journal	  al-
Marah al-Arabiya (The Arab Woman).117  Men’s	  support	  for	  the	  conference	  
illustrated	  their	  promotion	  of	  women’s	  participation in foreign policy against western imperialism, which highlighted women as symbols of a wider Arab national culture. IAW conferences were largely interrupted over World War II; however, by the summer of 1946 it had resumed its next congress at Interlaken.  Sha‘rawi led a delegation composed of four women to the Interlaken Congress: Ceza Nabarawi, Asmat Assem, Munirah Harb and Mme Maha, and was herself still listed as a vice president of the IAW Board.118  1946 was also the year that Margaret Corbett Ashby resigned as IAW president.119  The congress report highlighted a speech by Ashby, expressing on behalf of herself and the IAW, her 
horror	  ‘at	  the	  atrocities	  perpetrated	  against	  the	  Jewish	  people	  by	  the	  Hitler	  
regime’	  and	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Jewish	  
                                                 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid pp. 240-243. 117 Ibid, p. 244. 118 ‘List	  of	  Board	  Members	  and	  Delegates- Report of the 14th IAW	  Congress	  in	  Interlaken’,	  1946,	  IAW Collection, WLA. 119 Ibid, p. 12. 
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refugees were still being detained.120 She subsequently demanded that the UN take necessary steps to secure the liberation of these refugees.121   The Arab delegations did not directly confront the Palestinian situation at this conference, but they highlighted their unified commitment towards defending the political rights of their fellow Arabs in general.  The 1946 congress booklet included progress reports from the Egyptian and Lebanese delegations, both of which took the opportunity to highlight the establishment of the AFU.  The EFU reported that at the Egyptian University the number of female students had increased from 373 in 1939 to 637 by 1946, and that women had begun to gain access to more significant state and academic posts, although their right to suffrage had still not been granted.122  However, it stressed the alliance of Arab women from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and Egypt under one unified bloc, as its greatest victory throughout the past seven years of WWII.123  The Lebanese Arab Women Federation reiterated the same feelings in their report stating	  that	  after	  the	  Arab	  Women’s	  Congress	  in	  Dec	  1944	  in	  Cairo,	  the	  decision had been made 
To	  unite	  in	  one	  big	  federation,	  namely,	  the	  ‘pan-Arab	  Women	  Federation’	  
with	  headquarters	  in	  Cairo,	  and	  Mrs	  Sharaoui	  as	  president…Our	  aim	  in	  taking this step was to unify our efforts in the social and political fields and to work hand in hand with the Arab League in safeguarding the political rights and interests of the Arab world in general.124   The Congress thus reiterated cooperation with regional male nationalists in both reinforcing a new unified Arab identity, and pursuing greater rights for women on the basis of their shared cultural/national identities. 
                                                 120 Ibid, pp. 13, 19-20. 121 Ibid, p. 120. 122 Ibid, pp. 51-52. 123 Ibid, p. 53. 124 Ibid, p. 62. 
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The Interlaken	  congress	  was	  to	  be	  Sha‘rawi’s	  last	  IAW	  Congress,	  as	  she	  passed away the following year.  Following her death, her daughter Bathna became president, but Nabarawi, as vice president of the EFU, became its new active leader.125    IAW congress reports in the years that followed showed Arab feminists continuing to attend as separate national delegations rather than under the banner of the unified AFU.  However, a more defined line had been drawn between western and Middle Eastern feminism, around the Palestinian-Zionist conflict, which complicated various women’s	  	  discourses in Egypt going forward.  The next chapter will look	  at	  how	  women’s	  different	  national identities were compounded by their different political leanings, which lead to greater 
diversification	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  women’s	  rights	  movement	  in	  the	  decades	  that	  followed.  
Conclusion In chapter 2 it was shown how women challenged patriarchal limits on education and domestic seclusion by emphasising	  nationalist	  ideas	  of	  ‘educated	  
motherhood’,	  but	  struggled	  to	  shift	  limits	  on	  women’s	  political	  behaviour.  This chapter has shown that Iranian and Egyptian	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  attempted	  to strike common ground with male leaders whilst simultaneously increasing their bargaining leverage as political players by organising, leading, and 
participating	  in	  regional	  and	  international	  women’s	  conferences.  With Reza 
Shah’s	  rise	  to	  power,	  some	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  like	  Bamdad	  and	  Dowlatabadi chose	  to	  accept	  the	  state’s	  revolutionary	  approach	  over	  their	  
independent	  ‘gradual	  change’	  approach.	  	  State	  co-optation	  of	  the	  women’s	  
                                                 125 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 248. 
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movement and state support for	  women’s	  reforms	  in Iran contributed to a 
decrease	  in	  women’s	  international	  activity once the Kanoun Banovan was established.  The opposite was seen in Egypt; the EFU attempted to demonstrate its value as a forum for cultural exchange by expanding its international network and positioning itself as a regional, Arab, feminist leader, as a way of increasing its bargaining leverage against the unsupportive and repressive government of Ismail Sidqi.    Women’s	  roles	  as	  symbols	  of	  national/cultural	  authenticity,	  particularly	  within anti-colonial contexts and times of political crisis, was used to explain 
men’s active	  support	  for	  the	  EFU’s	  political	  activity during the Palestinian-Zionist conflict.  Their	  leadership	  of	  regional	  women’s	  groups	  helped	  draw	  an	  oppositional line between western and Middle-Eastern feminism over political differences and changing notions of cultural and national authenticity.  Women thus defined themselves as educated mothers of the nation, protectors of the Egyptian and wider Arab nation, highlighting their abilities as regional and international political players in order to signal to Egyptian and Arab nationalists they saw no contradiction in these multiple roles.  While women still struggled to win equal political rights at home, these experiences helped them mobilise and develop their organisational and negotiation skills, domestically, regionally, and internationally. 
 169 
New Chapter 4: 
Feminisms, Class and Political Diversification (1940s-1950s)  In the previous chapter, the	  EFU’s	  response	  to	  the	  Palestinian-Zionist conflict illustrated how politicised notions of cultural authenticity prompted a breakdown with the IAW and a move towards regional alliances.  This chapter focuses on developments over the next decade, assessing the ideological 
diversification	  of	  the	  women’s	  movement	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  	  It	  illustrates the growing competition amongst	  female	  activists	  over	  leadership	  of	  the	  women’s	  movement in their countries, and how this led to competing patriarchal bargains.   This chapter relies on the memoirs and tracts of female activists and important actors in Iran and Egypt, including leading members of the Kanoun 
Banovan and Saffiyeh Firuz in Iran, and Doria Shafiq, Ceza Nabarawi, Inji Aflatun, Zaynab al-Ghazali, and the recently published autobiography of Fatima Abdel-Hadi in Egypt, press and newspaper sources from the period, and documents 
from	  the	  IAW	  collection	  held	  at	  the	  Women’s	  Library	  Archives.	  	  It	  also	  refers	  to	  journal publications and un-published material from the Doria Shafiq and Huda 
Sha‘rawi Collections at the American University in Cairo Archives, and state documents from the British and US National Archives.  The chapter is divided into 2 sections, with the main arguments for each country case highlighted in 
section	  introductions.	  	  Section	  1	  looks	  at	  class	  limitations	  of	  the	  women’s	  movement in Iran and Egypt.  Section 2 focuses	  on	  how	  women’s	  rights	  discourses diversified, influenced by and contributing to the growth of oppositional political movements, which promoted competition and rivalry between female activists. 
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The first comparative chapter argument is that elite Iranian and Egyptian 
women	  drew	  class	  and	  ideological	  lines	  around	  their	  leadership	  of	  the	  women’s	  movement, encouraging a new generation of women to challenge their leadership from political, cultural, and class perspectives.  In Iran, patriarchal 
bargaining	  between	  Iranian	  women’s	  rights	  advocates	  and	  the	  state	  was	  based	  on the needs of only certain classes of Iranian women, namely the more educated, elite, westernised classes.  As such, it is argued that Reza	  Shah’s	  
Women’s Awakening project encouraged the notion of women’s	  rights	  activism	  as a western class privilege, reinforcing class-based patriarchy and hierarchy of elite, urban women, over lower Bazaari, working class, and provincial Iranian women.  It is argued further that by enforcing unveiling as state policy, Reza Shah turned veiling into a political act of defiance against the Pahlavi state, its westernisation policies, and its bourgeois, westernised followers, by opening the act of unveiling up to allegations of inauthenticity.  In the Egyptian case, women like Labiba Ahmed and Zaynab al-Ghazali disassociated themselves from the EFU as a result of its perceived western and secular character.  Moreover, it is argued that women like Ruz al-Yusuf and Munira Thabit challenged the elitist feminism of the early EFU by launching their own journals and promoting journalism as a professional vocation for women from more modest middle, or working class backgrounds.   The second section will show how ideologically diverse women put 
forward	  different	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  roles;	  early	  Islamist	  women	  
like	  Labiba	  Ahmad	  defined	  women’s	  public	  activity	  as	  education	  and	  social	  work,	  while Islamist Zaynab al-Ghazali participated in political and nationalist demonstrations, and	  women	  like	  Fatma	  Ni’mat	  Rashid,	  Ceza	  Nabarawi,	  Inji	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Aflatun, and	  Doria	  Shafiq	  campaigned	  for	  women’s	  right	  to	  political	  suffrage	  and	  political representation.  The second comparative chapter argument is that ideologically disparate women were willing to join forces over common nationalist and feminist goals, when it constituted the better bargain at the time, specifically when female suffrage, political representation for women, and a common anti-colonial stance, provided strong areas of overlap within their 
different	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  nationalism.  As such, diverse female activists were able to unify during the 1951 suffrage march in Egypt, the 1951 battles in the Canal Zone, and the 1952 suffrage petition in Iran.  However, they were equally willing to attack each other if their actions appeared to threaten existing patriarchal and nationalist bargains, as illustrated by the female 
backlash	  to	  Shafiq’s actions at the ICW conference in April 1951.   
Moreover,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  limits	  on	  women’s	  nationalist	  and	  feminist	  activity were negotiated and defined by women themselves, often around actions that proved too independent, or socially and politically transgressive at the time.  For instance, the backlash from leading Egyptian female activists over Doria 
Shafiq’s	  1951 ICW activity and her 1954 hunger strike demonstrated that support for Shafiq became too risky a bargain for most women, creating a greater consensus that her activities went to far, transgressing limits upheld by 
most	  female	  nationalists	  on	  women’s	  political	  activity.  As such, it was not so 
much	  that	  women	  in	  Egypt	  unified	  more	  easily	  over	  ‘nationalist’	  issues	  than	  over	  
their	  own	  ‘political	  rights’,	  as	  argued by writers like Margot Badran,1 but that the majority of activists viewed female suffrage as contingent on Egyptian political sovereignty and	  so	  did	  not	  support	  Shafiq’s	  actions.  Women, therefore, united 
                                                 1 Badran, Feminists, Islam and Nation, p. 217 
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temporarily over	  both	  nationalist	  and	  women’s	  rights	  goals	  where	  their	  definitions overlapped with each other and their ideological differences did not threaten revised or potential patriarchal bargains.  The political instability, revolutionary environment, and renewed anti-colonial battles that characterised this period in both countries rendered unification over nationalism the better patriarchal bargain for most female activists at the time.    
Section 1:  Class Limits of Iranian State Feminism and The EFU In the previous chapter it was shown how many pioneering female activists like Sedigheh Dowlatabadi and Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad worked with the state-supported Kanoun Banovan to	  promote	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  reforms.  Writers like Paidar and Sanasarian have argued	  that	  Reza	  Shah’s	  
‘Women’s	  Awakening	  Project’	  was	  essentially	  a	  window-dressing policy or 
‘opportunity	  for	  the	  Pahlavi	  state	  to	  build	  its	  power	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  true	  social	  progress by co-opting	  the	  independent	  women’s	  movement	  and	  confirming	  the	  patriarchal	  consensus’.2 Ettehadieh similarly argues that the major obstacle to 
the	  development	  of	  the	  women’s	  movement	  was	  that	  the	  woman’s	  question	  was	  politicised and subsumed as government policy.3   Amin argues that the 
guardians	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Awakening project emphasised motherhood and 
women’s	  domestic	  roles,	  thus	  making	  the	  modern	  Iranian	  woman	  at	  once	  
‘capable	  of	  many	  things	  and	  yet	  restricted	  to	  one	  societal	  role’.4  
In	  contrast,	  this	  section	  shows	  that	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  project did not purely	  impose	  the	  patriarchal	  state’s	  modernisation	  ideas	  on	  
                                                 2 Sanasarian, The	  Women’s	  Rights	  Movement	  in	  Iran,	  p. 68, Paidar, pp. 111-112, 116, Camron Michael Amin, p. 4. 3 Ettehediah,	  ‘The	  Origins	  and	  Development	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Movement	  in Iran’,	  p.	  101. 4 Camron Michael Amin, pp. 202-204. 
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Iranian women, but incorporated and adopted many of the campaign issues of 
women’s	  rights	  activists	  of	  the	  time,	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  hailed	  from	  the	  educated, wealthier, upper-urban classes.  Thus, it is argued that by focusing on education, unveiling,	  teaching,	  and	  ‘educated	  motherhood’,	  the state emphasised the campaign issues put forward by these women themselves, which laid emphasis on women’s	  domestic	  roles.	  	  However,	  the	  state	  also	  reinforced class-based patriarchy by promoting elite	  women’s	  superiority	  over	  lower	  class	  
women,	  through	  the	  former’s	  association	  with,	  and	  management	  of,	  the	  state’s	  
Women’s	  Awakening	  projects.	  	  As	  such, it is additionally argued that the	  state’s	  Unveiling Decree helped draw class lines around the practice of veiling, linking unveiling to notions of a new bourgeois, westernised class of inauthentic Iranians.  This in turn helped turn veiling or re-veiling into a political act of rebellion against the Pahlavi state and its westernising reforms, as the final chapter of this thesis will demonstrate. Looking at class-based feminism in Egypt, Cathlyn Mariscotti argues that lower-class women both consented to and challenged the constructs of elite 
women,	  by	  being	  the	  ‘first	  generation	  of	  Egyptian	  women’	  to	  engage	  in	  journalism as a profession rather than as ‘an	  extension’	  of	  their	  philanthropic	  activity.5  In contrast this section argues that the work of pioneering journalists and activists from more modest, middle class backgrounds in the late 19th century and early 20th century, like Malak Hifni Nasif and Nabawiya Musa, created the space for women like Thabit to pursue writing and journalism as a career.  More specifically, this section argues that appreciating the greater bargaining power of the EFU, women like Thabit and al-Yusuf chose to 
                                                 5 Mariscotti, pp.93-94. 
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strategically align with them in order to promote their own activism.  These bargains constituted a type of patriarchal-class bargaining, which while maintaining elite definitions of Egyptian womanhood, and the patriarchal limits associated with those constructs, still allowed the lower classes to challenge class-based	  definitions	  and	  limitations	  of	  ‘feminism’	  and	  ‘female	  political 
activism’	  through	  their	  own	  work.	  	   
1.1 The	  legacy	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  Project	   
In	  the	  last	  chapter	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  Reza	  Shah	  and	  the	  Iranian	  women’s	  movement mutually co-opted each other to initiate and reinforce the reforms of the state’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  program.	  	  Nevertheless	  the	  degree	  of	  acceptance	  for state reforms, particularly the controversial Unveiling Decree of 1936, was mixed and influenced by class differences.  Mahnaz Afkhami, secretary general of the Women’s	  Organisation of Iran in 1970, argued that the 1936 policy of 
unveiling,	  although	  resented	  by	  ‘traditional’	  Iranians	  was	  ‘nevertheless	  the	  single	  
most	  important	  step	  toward	  ending	  the	  segregation	  of	  women	  in	  society’.6  She wrote that it gave many educated women the confidence to remain unveiled 
even	  after	  Reza	  Shah’s	  forced	  abdication	  in	  1941.7  However, the return to veiling, and backlash over the issue from more religious and conservative sectors 
of	  Iranian	  society	  following	  the	  Shah’s	  abdication,	  indicated	  that	  this had not 
been	  the	  case	  for	  all	  Iranian	  women.	  	  According	  to	  Bamdad,	  the	  ‘upper	  classes’	  and younger population had generally welcomed the law, while the majority 
‘suffered’	  not	  knowing	  what	  to	  wear	  or	  how	  to	  act,	  and	  many	  even	  secluded	  
                                                 6 Mahnaz	  Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organisation	  Of	  Iran:	  Evolutionary	  Politics	  and	  Revolutionary	  
Change’,	  in	  Lois	  Beck	  and	  Guity	  Nashat	  (eds),	  Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2004), p. 112. 7 Ibid. 
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themselves in their homes.8  Bamdad wrote that women found their new 
predicament	  ‘strange’	  and	  ‘startling’,	  and	  that	  the	  situation	  reached	  ‘such	  a	  pitch	  that unveilers would set out with veils till they got to the upper part of the city, and then put them on again when they	  went	  home’.9 Sattareh Farmanfarmaian, founder of the first school of social work in Tehran in the late 1950s, recalled 
how	  following	  Reza	  Shah’s	  abdication,	  women	  ‘who	  had	  felt	  humiliated	  by	  the	  dress code put on black chadors and flaunted them in the streets, revelling in the 
freedom	  to	  wear	  what	  they	  wished	  once	  he	  was	  gone’.10  
However,	  the	  ‘Unveiling	  Decree’	  had	  not	  been	  a	  total	  imposition	  by	  the	  
state,	  nor	  a	  simple	  imitation	  of	  Ataturk’s	  westernisation programs.  The decree formed part of negotiations and bargains struck with pioneering Iranian 
women’s	  rights	  activists	  from	  educated,	  wealthy,	  urban	  class	  backgrounds,	  including women from wealthy religious circles, many of whom had already begun challenging seclusion and veiling through their own activism, like 
Dowlatabadi.	  	  Thus,	  the	  state	  and	  some	  early	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  shared	  ‘un-
veiling’	  as	  a	  common	  goal,	  although	  their	  motives	  for	  such	  goals	  were	  not	  always	  
the	  same	  in	  that	  women’s	  arguments	  for	  unveiling	  were	  based	  on	  fighting	  seclusion and the	  ignorance	  associated	  with	  it,	  while	  the	  modernising	  state’s	  aim	  
was	  to	  enforce	  the	  image	  of	  ‘modern	  women’	  based	  on	  Ataturk’s	  westernisation	  model.   Moreover, while the reactions to and the effects	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  reforms	  differed across social and class backgrounds, differences existed within similar social groups, and often depended on individual family attitudes to state reforms.  
                                                 8 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 98-100.  9 Ibid, pp. 95-96. 10 Sattareh Farmanfarmaian, Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey from her Father's Harem 
through the Islamic Revolution (London: Bantam press, 1992), p. 12. 
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For instance, the Iranian State also encouraged Girl Scout programs and offered a new martial image of modern Iranian womanhood through its celebration of female pilots.11  While	  many	  Iranians,	  including	  the	  parents	  of	  women’s	  rights	  activist Saffiyeh Firuz did not approve of such programs, Farmanfarmaian 
recalled	  scouting	  as	  a	  positive	  experience;	  part	  of	  ‘an	  encouraging	  and liberal 
atmosphere’	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  Women’s	  Awakening	  project.12  State policy was not necessarily taken advantage of by all elite or educated upper-class urban women, as many like Farmanfarmaian still had to negotiate around patriarchal limits within	  the	  family,	  which	  often	  obstructed	  the	  application	  of	  the	  state’s	  
policies.	  	  Farmanfarmaian	  wrote	  that	  her	  father’s	  response	  to	  sending	  her	  abroad for study was that, ‘it	  would	  be	  a	  waste	  of	  money…a	  woman	  will	  be	  
nothing’.13  She wrote that this made her want to sink through the floor with 
shame.	  ‘That	  he	  would	  refuse	  because	  he	  thought	  me	  stupid	  and	  not	  worth	  
spending	  money	  on	  was	  something	  I	  had	  never	  imagined	  for	  an	  instant.’14   Similarly Reza Shah, despite his reforms on female education, placed limits on	  women’s	  education,	  particularly	  when	  it	  came	  to	  his	  own	  daughters.	  	  Ashraf Pahlavi recounted that after visiting her brother while he was at Le Rosey in Switzerland, she sent her father a telegram asking if she might study in a European school too.  Reza	  Shah’s	  answer	  was	  a	  ‘short,	  harsh	  cable:	  “stop	  this	  
nonsense	  and	  come	  home	  at	  once”’.15  She	  wrote	  it	  was	  then	  that	  she	  realised	  ‘no	  matter how much education my father might allow at home, I would always be 
                                                 11 Camron Michael Amin, pp. 200-201. 12 Ibid; Farmanfarmaian, p.95. 13 Farmanfarmaian, p. 90. 14 Ibid. 15 Ashraf Pahalavi, p. 23. 
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denied	  the	  opportunities	  he	  gave	  my	  brothers’.16  Thus, educated women from land-owning, royal, or elite households like Farmnanfarmaian and Ashraf Pahlavi 
were	  not	  only	  constrained	  by	  the	  limits	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  modernisation	  definitions,	  but also patriarchal resistance to such definitions within their familial frameworks.  Referring to his policy of unveiling Pahlavi wrote, Here again was an example of the paradox that was my father.  Though I never felt he was willing to relax his strict control over us at home, he did make the historic decision to present the Queen, my sister Shams, and me unveiled.17    Farmanfarmaian would question the	  intention	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  reforms much later, writing: As he did not give women the right to vote, run for political office, divorce their husbands, have custody of their own children, or even get a passport 
without	  their	  husband’s	  permission…these	  improvements,	  while	  significant, were less meaningful…Reza	  Shah	  was	  anxious	  to	  emancipate	  women—or rather, to create the appearance of emancipation.18  She added that his ideas went only as far as thinking women capable of learning to be good wives and mothers, like most of his contemporaries.19 Yet, this was 
also	  an	  idea	  shared	  by	  many	  pioneering	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  and	  educators	  
like	  Astarabadi	  and	  Bamdad.	  	  Reza	  Shah’s	  policies, while they were modelled on 
Ataturk’s	  reform	  ideas, were also influenced by the demands made by some leading women at that time, as illustrated in chapter 2, which looked at female activism in the aftermath of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution.  The reforms were intended to appeal to and co-opt pioneers like Dowlatabadi and Bamdad, 
who	  preceded	  Farmanfarmaian’s	  generation, and for whom education, veiling, 
                                                 16 Ibid. 17 Ashraf Pahalavi, p. 24. 18 Farmanfarmaian, p. 95. 19 Ibid, pp. 83-95. 
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teaching,	  and	  ‘educated	  motherhood’	  had	  been	  the	  greater	  focus	  rather	  than	  political enfranchisement,  Feminists who chose to work within the limits set for them by the government, managed to achieve some of their original goals such as greater educational opportunities for women, and for some of them, abandonment of the veil, making it appear at least on the surface, that the Pahlavi regime was a 
supporter	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  	  However,	  although	  Reza	  Shah	  admired	  and	  desired	  modernisation for Iran, his approach to it was largely superficial in that it was more about material change than intellectual and grassroots change.  No serious 
education	  campaign	  was	  launched	  to	  help	  promote	  the	  state’s	  controversial	  reforms, and so ultimately the lack of an education campaign to support the 
Women’s	  Awakening campaign, particularly its Unveiling Decree, limited its affects to a minority of women from the educated, wealthier, upper-classes.  This helped draw class lines around veiling, linking unveiling to notions of a new westernised, bourgeoisie and opening up the opportunity for the reforms and those who supported them to be challenged using the language of cultural 
authenticity.	  	  Reza	  Shah’s	  state	  reforms,	  by	  targeting	  women	  of	  the	  wealthier,	  educated, urban classes, helped reinforce this class-based patriarchy, by 
maintaining	  elite	  women’s	  power	  over	  lower	  class women, through their 
relationship	  with	  the	  state’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  project. Moreover, by enforcing unveiling as state policy, Reza Shah helped politicise the veil, resulting in re-veiling and conservative backlashes after his abdication in 1941.  Ayatollah	  Khomeini’s	  1943	  publication,	  Kashf al-Asrar (The Revelation of Secrets), which he wrote following the abdication of Reza Shah, 
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ridiculed the Unveiling Decree and European dress code, and equated them with notions of immorality and national decay.  We have nothing to say to those whose powers of perception are so limited that they regard the wearing of European hats, the cast-offs of the 
wild	  beasts	  of	  Europe,	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  national	  progress…with	  a	  European	  hat	  on your head, you would parade around the streets enjoying the naked 
girls,	  taking	  pride	  in	  this	  ‘achievement’.20  
He	  equated	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  project	  with	  female	  prostitution. They regard the civilisation and advancement of the country as dependent upon women going naked in the streets, or to quote their own idiotic words, turning half the population into workers by unveiling them (we know only too well what kind of work is involved here).21  As such, this section argues that by enforcing unveiling as an expression of modern Iranian nationalism, Reza Shah inadvertently compromised its perception as an independent, authentic Iranian act.  As such, the ban on veiling, or Unveiling Decree helped turn veiling into a political act of defiance against the western Pahlavi state and its elitist, upper-class followers, promoting a religious backlash following his abdication.  Towards the end of the century the veil would once again be used as a political symbol in the lead up to the 1979 Revolution, as the final chapter of this thesis will illustrate.  Moreover, many women of 
Farmanfarmaian’s	  generation	  came	  to	  view	  Pahlavi	  women’s	  reforms	  as	  state	  grants, and organisations like the Kanoun Banovan and	  the	  later	  Women’s	  Organisation of Iran as state instruments, as later chapters will also demonstrate. 
1.2 Class	  limitation	  of	  the	  EFU’s	  Definitions	  of	  Egyptian	  Feminism. 
The	  EFU’s	  international	  activities	  during	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s,	  particularly	  its	  role within the IAW, and its regular references to western ideas and western feminism in its journals, tied it more directly to Western/European feminist 
                                                 20 Ruhollah Khomeini, Extract from Kasjf al-Asrar (1943) in Islam and Revolution: Writings and 
Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 172.  21 Ibid, p. 171. 
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organisations.  Moreover its French-language journal L’Egyptienne22 restricted 
the	  EFU’s	  reach	  and	  appeal	  to	  wealthier,	  elite,	  French-speaking women until its Arabic-language paper, al-Misriya, was launched in 1937.  The elite background of key EFU figures affected female activists from the lower-middle and working classes, such as Ruz al-Yusuf and Munira Thabit.   Al-Yusuf had started her professional career as an actress, but quit the acting stage in 1925 to start a weekly magazine named after herself.23  Thabit had written for many national journals such as al-Ahram and al-Balagh before starting her own daily and weekly journals in 1925, arguing that she was one of the first in her social class to demand women be granted the right to vote and be elected.24  Thabit mentioned attending international conferences on journalism and wrote of her 
‘reputation’	  as	  the	  greatest	  female	  journalist	  of	  the	  period.25    When al-Yusuf began her weekly journal publication Ruz al-Yusuf in 1926, she	  reached	  out	  to	  both	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi and Saffiya Zaghlul for help.  However, she only	  received	  a	  response	  from	  Sha‘rawi. When the magazine was an artistic publication, I sent messages to the Mother of	  the	  Egyptians	  and	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi asking them for support, and Mother of the Egyptians did not reply and this disregard hurt me deeply.  When the magazine became political, Mother of the Egyptians seized the opportunity to write to me on some of the political issues encouraging and congratulating me.  But I too	  committed	  myself	  to	  silence…and the 
opposite	  was	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi, who quickly replied to me and did not falter in encouraging and supporting me.26   Offended by the experience, al-Yusuf wrote how her theatrical background made it very difficult	  for	  people	  to	  take	  her	  journal	  seriously	  as	  ‘it	  was	  still	  strange	  for	  
                                                 22 L’Egyptienne,	  February	  1926	  Issue,	  Huda	  Sha’rawi	  Collection,	  AUCA. 23 Cathlyn Mariscotti, p.95. 24 Munirah Thabit, Thawrah fi al-Burj al-‘Ali:	  Mudhakkirati	  fi	  ‘Ishrin	  ‘Aman	  Marakat	  Huquq	  al-
Mar’ah	  al-Siyasiyah (Egypt: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1946) pp. 113-114. 25 Ibid. 26 Ruz al-Yusuf, Dhikrayat, vol. II ‘Ayam	  al-Sahafa’	  (Cairo:	  Mu’assasat	  Ruz	  al-Yusuf, 2010), p. 107. 
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a	  political	  magazine	  to	  carry	  the	  name	  of	  a	  woman…and	  an	  artist/actress’.27  Yet, her memoirs show that she understood the need to build some sort of tie with male and female Wafdists, as well as other elite women in order to access their power networks to legitimise her own work and efforts.  Similarly, when Thabit 
first	  voiced	  her	  views	  on	  women’s	  political	  equality the EFU argued her demands were premature, and patronised her as	  ‘an	  amusing	  infant’.28  It was only after she received a degree in French law in 1933 that the EFU reached out, inviting her to travel to Copenhagen with them for the 1939 conference of the International Alliance of Women (IAW).29   Mariscotti argues that by seeking the acceptance of the elites, lower-class women attempted to consent to their construct of woman, but also put forward their own, as their magazines ‘were not an extension of their philanthropic activity as was the case with ruling-women’.30 In contrast, this chapter argues 
that	  the	  EFU’s	  journals	  were	  not	  mere	  extensions	  of	  their	  political	  and	  social	  work, but a powerful tool they used to support their agendas because of the precedent set by early pioneering female writers and journalists like Nawful, Fawwaz, and Taymurriyah.  Moreover, the writing and work of activists from more modest, middle class backgrounds like Musa paved the way for women like Thabit to pursue university degrees and careers as professional writers and journalists.  As such, this chapter argues that appreciating the greater bargaining power of the EFU and elite feminists, women like Thabit and al-Yusuf cooperated with them in an effort to legitimise and gain support for their own activism.  These bargains between women of different classes constituted a different type 
                                                 27 Ibid. 28 Baron, Egypt as a Woman, p. 179. 29 Thabit, p. 66. 30 Mariscotti, p. 94. 
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of patriarchal bargaining, which maintained the social hierarchy of wealthier upper class women, whilst still allowing the latter to challenge those constructs and class limitations by putting forward their own definitions of womanhood 
and	  women’s	  roles	  through	  their	  own	  work/journalism.  Furthermore, class differences with the EFU did not prevent women like Thabit and al-Yusuf from competing with each other for leadership as journalists. The competition between Thabit and al-Yusuf during the mid 1920s resulted in hostile statements 
over	  things	  like	  who	  best	  deserved	  the	  title	  of	  ‘the	  first	  Egyptian	  woman	  
journalist’.31   
1.3  Perceptions	  of	  westernisation	  and	  Islamist	  women’s	  discourses	   The perceived western character	  of	  leading	  women’s	  groups	  like	  the	  WWCC	  and	  the EFU influenced early divergences between female activists, encouraging women like Labiba Ahmad and Zainab al-Ghazali to initiate their own groups and Islamic women’s	  discourses.  Ahmed, who had been an active during the 1919-1922 independence struggle, became	  very	  active	  in	  the	  women’s	  wing	  of	  the	  Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin).  The wing was focused on social work projects, like health clinics, orphanages, and schools for children built on the principles of the Brotherhood.32  To do this, a special program was launched 
in	  1935,	  with	  the	  first	  women’s	  committee	  formed	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Ismailia	  and	  a	  second in Cairo under the same name, until 50 committees or so were in operation by 1948.33  
                                                 31 al-Yusuf, p. 104. 32 al-Subki, p. 117-118. 33 Ibid, p. 118. 
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Fatima Abdel-Hadi, who joined the Muslim Sisterhood in 1942, claimed 
that	  although	  a	  women’s	  group	  had	  existed	  earlier	  under	  Labiba	  Ahmed,	  it	  had	  not officially been	  a	  ‘direct	  follower’	  of	  the	  Brotherhood	  organisation, but had worked in close cooperation with it.34  The statement was made to emphasise Abdel-Hadi	  as	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  Sisterhood	  when	  it	  became	  ‘a	  direct	  and	  
official	  follower	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  with	  ‘Mahmood	  al-Jawhari acting as the official responsible, who communicated and mediated on their behalf directly with Hassan al-Banna’.35  Abdel-Hadi emphasised similar social work activities after 1942, the expansion of their educational activities, which saw them relocate their headquarters (only after the proposal was given to Mahmood al-Jawhari to present to al-Banna	  for	  approval)	  where	  they	  established	  the	  ‘The	  Islamic	  
Education	  House	  for	  Girls’,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  care	  for	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  orphans.36  She added that the Muslim Sisterhood would travel to expand its 
da’wa (prosyletising) operations by establishing committees in different parts of the country, including Port Said, Asyut, and Mina.37  She explained that their programs were pre-organised by the Ikhwan leaders before they travelled, and that every two sisters would travel with a mahram (Islamic permitted male relative).38   While women focused on social, educational, and religious activities, the political side was reserved only for men.  Al-Subki argues that these decisions were made on the premise that women were intended for the home, and that if they were to leave it should only be for education, religious/preaching and to 
                                                 34 Fatima Abdel-Hadi,	  Rihlati	  ma‘a	  al-Ikwhat al-Muslimat, (Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, 2011), p. 22.  35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid, p. 27. 38 Ibid. 
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attract a greater number of women to the cause.39 The case of Labiba Ahmed and the writings of Fatima Abdel-Hadi on the Muslim Sisterhood, therefore, point to large divergences amongst female nationalists and activists over definitions of 
women’s	  rights	  and	  roles.	  	  Ahmed,	  Abdel-Hadi and the Muslim sisterhood defined their womanhood on the basis of their domestic and maternal responsibilities and their public roles as social work, educational, and da’wa.  
Their	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  rights	  did	  not	  include	  the	  vote,	  political	  representation,	  or	  political	  participation,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Ikhwan’s	  limitations	  on	  
women’s	  roles.	  	   Zaynab al-Ghazali’s	  experiences	  were	  rather	  different.	  	  After	  joining	  the	  EFU, al-Ghazali left the organisation to form her own Muslim Ladies Group/Society in 1936/1937, during a period of growing conservative attitudes 
amongst	  Egypt’s	  lower	  middle	  classes.  Although many university faculties had opened their doors to women during the 1930s, towards the end of the decade socially conservative attitudes were growing amongst these classes, attacking co-education and calling for gender segregation.40  The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood was growing amongst this particular segment of the population, and according to al-Ghazali, she was called to meet with their leader Hassan al-Banna at the Ikhwan’s	  headquarters.	  	  Al-Ghazali wrote that although al-Banna asked her to merge her society with the Muslim Sisterhood, her group decided to remain independent at the time, preferring close cooperation with the Muslim Sisterhood instead.41 
                                                 39 al-Subki, p. 119 40 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nationa, p. 163. 41 Zaynab al-Ghazali, Return of the Pharaoh: Memoir in Nasir’s	  Prison,	  trans. Mokrane Guezzou, (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2006), p. 25. 
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Abdel-Hadi also recounted how al-Banna would encourage them to attend al-Ghazali’s	  lectures,	  to	  get	  to	  know	  the	  Muslim	  Ladies	  Group	  and	  invite	  them	  to	  the Sisterhood, but added that Amina al-Jawhari and herself used to stand outside the lecture spaces, as there were often men present at many of al-
Ghazali’s	  lectures.42  She also recalled asking al-Banna	  ‘why	  there	  was	  a	  split	  in	  
the	  Da’wa	  movement…why	  doesn’t	  sister	  Zaynab	  al-Ghazali	  join	  us?’	  to	  which	  al-Banna is said to have replied: Truly sister Fatima, we offered, and offered her leadership of the Sisterhood, but she stipulated that we call them the Muslim Ladies Group, but we said we are the Muslim Brotherhood, and the group will remain as 
it	  is	  and	  there	  will	  be	  a	  women’s	  wing	  and	  you	  will	  lead	  it,	  but	  she	  refused.  The quote, and the way that Abdel-Hadi recalls the story is interesting, especially her choice of	  wording	  of	  a	  ‘split’	  in	  the	  da’wa movement, indicating she may have viewed al-Ghazali more as a divisive figure than a cooperative or conformist one.  Al-Ghazali	  later	  took	  an	  active	  part	  in	  the	  EFU’s	  Arab	  women’s	  congress, presenting a more political role for herself and her organisation than the women she cooperated with in the Muslim Sisterhood.   Although al-Ghazali would formally join the Brotherhood/Sisterhood much later, the choice of the Muslim Ladies Group to remain independent indicated that not all Islamist women at the 
time	  were	  happy	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  definitions	  and	  control	  of	  their	  social and religious activity.  
This	  section	  has	  shown	  that	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  feminism/women’s	  rights and westernisation in both Egypt and Iran were largely associated with elite, upper class women.  In the Iranian case, the state itself upheld this 
generalised	  notion,	  and	  reinforced	  it	  through	  its	  Women’s	  Awakening	  program.	  	  
                                                 42 Abdel Hadi, p. 29. 
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In	  Egypt,	  the	  EFU’s	  leadership	  and French-language magazine, coupled with its attitude towards women like Thabit and al-Yusuf, encouraged an exclusionary, elite, model of Egyptian feminism, which by the 1930s was being questioned and challenged by women of different social backgrounds.  Its perceived western and secular character encouraged female nationalists and activists like Labiba Ahmed and Zaynab al-Ghazali to establish their own groups in line with their different ideological/religious views.  Hostile competition between Egyptian and Iranian feminists intensified in the 1940s and 1950s over political divergences and competing definitions of womanhood, female nationalism, and different notions of cultural authenticity associated with these definitions.    
Section 2: Political	  Diversification	  of	  Women’s	  Rights	  Discourses	   
Writers	  like	  Bahar	  and	  Sanasarian	  have	  argued	  that	  although	  Iranian	  women’s	  groups increased during this period, they did so largely as affiliates of male-led political associations, who controlled and limited their activity.43  Sanasarian has further argued that female members gave priority to their male colleagues and attacked each other according to party lines.  Amin similarly posits that affiliation to male-led	  political	  parties	  compromised	  women’s rights gains, as the 
fall	  of	  political	  parties	  resulted	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  their	  women’s	  factions.44 Comparatively, Nelson and Badran have argued that Egyptian feminists and 
women’s	  rights	  groups	  struggled	  to	  unify	  over	  common	  goals,	  and	  that	  when	  
                                                 43 Sima	  Bahar,	  ‘A	  Historical	  Background	  to	  the	  Women’s	  Movement	  in	  Iran’	  in	  Women of Iran: The 
Conflict with Fundamentalist Islam, ed. Farah Azari, (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), 181; Eliz Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, p. 71. 44 Camron Michael Amin, p. 238. 
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they did, it was	  generally	  over	  ‘nationalist	  struggles’	  rather	  than	  their	  ‘own	  
political	  rights’.45   This section argues that any	  unity	  between	  women’s	  groups	  was	  an	  active	  choice taken based on what constituted the better bargain for their groups or individual goals.  Given	  that	  what	  constituted	  the	  ‘better	  bargain’	  changed	  over	  time and according to the political context, female activists oscillated between moments of convergence and divergence.  Thus, in contrast to writers like Bahar and Sanasarian, it is additionally	  argued	  that	  women’s	  political	  attacks	  on	  each	  
other	  were	  not	  necessarily	  motivated	  by	  giving	  ‘priority	  to	  their	  male	  
colleagues’46,	  but	  rather	  that	  women	  competed	  for	  leadership	  of	  the	  women’s	  rights movement, criticising each other according to their political affiliations to validate their various ideological positions. In Iran, the abdication of Reza Shah, 
and	  the	  clerical	  backlash	  that	  ensued	  over	  his	  Women’s	  Awakening	  policies,	  made state-feminism the weaker bargain at that point in time.  As such, some women like Saffiyah Firuz founded their own organisations, but also looked for 
opportunities	  to	  unify	  with	  other	  women’s	  groups	  to	  improve	  their	  power	  
position,	  which	  saw	  several	  leading	  women’s	  groups	  ‘federate	  under	  a	  coordinating committee in 1943’.47 Others, like Mariam Firouz, viewed cooptation and affiliation with dominant opposition parties as the better bargain.  Moreover, in contrast to the arguments of Amin, this section shows that the fall 
of	  political	  groups	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  their	  women’s	  factions did not necessarily spell the end of the activism of its female members, but resulted in new strategic approaches.  For instance, after the Tudeh Party was banned in 1949, its female 
                                                 45 Cynthia Nelson, Doria Shafik Egyptian Feminist, A Woman Apart (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), p. 176; Badran, Feminists, Islam and Nation, p.217. 46 Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, p. 71. 47 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 106-107. 
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faction continued its activities underground and was renamed the ‘Democratic	  
Organisation	  of	  Women’.48  
Moreover,	  limits	  on	  women’s	  activity	  were	  negotiated	  and	  defined	  by	  women themselves, often around actions	  that	  proved	  too	  ‘radical’	  or	  transgressive.  By campaigning for suffrage in 1951 while Egypt was embroiled in another anti-colonial battle, many of Doria Shafiq’s	  peers	  felt	  she	  had pushed 
existing	  limits	  on	  women’s	  political	  activity	  too	  far.	  	  The	  mixed	  and	  critical	  reaction from other leading female activists demonstrated that support for Shafiq became too risky a bargain for most women at the time, and thus promoted rivalry between them over definitions and limits of nationalist and feminist activity.  Thus, it was not so much that women in Egypt unified more 
easily	  over	  ‘nationalist’	  issues	  than	  over	  their	  own	  ‘political	  rights’49, but that at the time the majority of activists viewed Egyptian independence as a priority and 
necessary	  step	  in	  achieving	  greater	  women’s	  rights,	  because	  of	  the	  political	  instability of the period.   
2.1 The Growth of Oppositional Politics and Female Factions in Iran 
The	  last	  years	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  reign,	  1939-1941, saw worsening economic, political and social conditions, with social unrest and bread riots breaking out in Tehran in 1940 and 1941.50  Britain	  was	  worried	  about	  Nazi	  Germany’s	  high 
import	  trade	  with	  Iran	  and	  the	  large	  number	  of	  German	  technicians	  or	  ‘agents’	  in	  the country.  Consequently, although Iran had formally declared its neutrality in World War II, on 25 August 1941, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran from the 
                                                 48 Sima Bahar, p. 180.  49 Nelson, Doria Shafik Egyptian Feminist, p.176; Badran, Feminists, Islam and Nation, p.217. 50 Mohammad Gholi Majd, Great Britain & Reza Shah: The Plunder of Iran, 1921-1941 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), pp. 365, 367. 
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west and the north.51    Reza Shah was forced to abdicate and leave Iran in order to ensure that his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, succeeded the throne.52  On 29 January 1942 a Tripartite Alliance was signed between Iran, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, with the US becoming a formal signatory to the Tripartite Treaty by the end of the year.53  All these changes occurred without the involvement of the Iranian military, or the support of the Iranian people.54 Following the abdication and exile of Reza Shah in 1941, a short period of relative democracy ensued, characterised by parliamentary politics and the 
flourishing	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  women’s	  groups,	  which	  helped	  offset	  the	  religious backlash that followed his abdication.55  Allied support for oppositional parties with shared interests,56 and the replacement of Reza Shah by his young, politically inexperienced son created a political vacuum.  This led to the strengthening of leftist and nationalist movements, optimised by the rise of the communist Tudeh Party, which was formed by a group of young Marxists in Tehran following the Anglo-Soviet invasion.57  Although the British and Americans withdrew from Iran at the conclusion of the war, Soviet forces only withdrew under US pressure in March 1946.58 However, Manouchehr Ganji, former Iranian Minister of Education between 1976-1978, explained that the end of Soviet military presence in Iran did not spell the end of its political presence.  
                                                 51 Ibid, p. 377. 52 Ibid, pp. 376, 380-381 53 Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p.191. 54 T. Ricks, p. 33. 55 Paidar, p. 120; Guity Nashat, Women and Revolution in Iran (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 28-29. 56 Paidar, p. 120 57 Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  ‘Communism	  and	  Communalism in Iran: The Tudah and the Firqah-I 
Dimmukrat’,	  International Journal of Middle East Studies I, 1970, p. 291; Nikki R. Keddie, Modern 
Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: : Yale University Press, 2003), p. 119. 58 Manouchehr Ganji, Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of 
Resistance (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), p. 16. 
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By 1946 the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, and the Turkish Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan centred in Tabriz, were announced.  At the same time the Tudeh Party in Tehran was organising large urban demonstrations demanding workers rights.59   
Women’s	  organisations	  also	  flourished	  following	  the	  abdication of Reza Shah.  However,	  amongst	  leftist	  groups,	  the	  Tudeh	  party’s	  Tashkilat-e-Zanan Iran (The Organisation of Iranian Women) was the most successful, attracting larger numbers of female students, teachers, and educated women.60 Established in 1943, its program was aimed at political, social and economic liberation of women.61  A US Central Intelligence Agency report on the Tudeh party reported 
that	  the	  women’s	  faction	  was	  not	  ‘particularly	  conspicuous	  for	  its	  activity’,	  but	  
that	  it	  had	  ‘agitated	  for	  political	  rights	  and	  economic	  freedom	  for	  women’.62 One 
of	  the	  founding	  members	  of	  the	  Tudeh’s	  women’s	  faction	  was	  Maryam	  Firouz.	  	  Born into an aristocratic family, Firouz was educated at a French Lycee, (Ecole 
Jean	  d’Arc),	  joining	  the	  Tudeh	  Party	  in	  the	  early	  1940s.  She went on to become a 
member	  of	  the	  party’s	  central	  committee	  in	  1945	  and	  was	  later	  dubbed	  ‘The	  Red	  
Princess’.63   Other women persisted with independent social and political activity, 
such	  as	  Princess	  Saffiyeh	  Firuz,	  founder	  of	  The	  Women’s	  Party (Hezb-i Zanan) in 1942, later known as the Council of Women in Iran.64 Bamdad wrote that Firuz, who had travelled across Europe, Asia and Africa, and spoke many languages, 
                                                 59 Thomas Ricks, pp. 36-37. 60 Nashat, Women and Revolution in Iran, p. 29. 61 US Central Intelligence Agency Confidential Report,	  ‘The	  Tudeh	  Party:	  Vehicle	  of	  Communism	  in Iran’,	  18	  July	  1949,	  ORE23-49, United States National Archives (USNA). 62 Ibid. 63 Haleh	  Afshar,	  ‘Maryam Firouz, Iranian Feminist: She was a Key Member of the Communist 
Tudeh	  Party	  and	  Went	  to	  Jail’, The Guardian, 31 March 2008. 64 Adelaide	  Kerr,	  AP	  News	  Features	  Writer,	  ‘Princess	  Assists	  Iran	  Women	  to	  Seek	  the	  Vote’,	  Cairns 
Post, 2 March 1946; Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 108. 
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had always been a very active social worker.65 However, by the 1940s she had become more politically active, leading a	  march	  for	  women’s	  suffrage	  on	  the	  Iranian Parliament.66 In her interview with Cairns Post in 1946, Firuz explained that her Women’s	  Party relied on many committees to conduct social work alongside its suffrage campaign.  This included a committee of health, which conducted a clinic and dispensed treatment, medicines, and clothing to people in need, a committee for education which held adult classes to teach women to read and write, and a committee of arts and crafts which taught women sewing among other skills.67  She explained that the organisation’s	  original	  membership	  of 200 had more than doubled by 1946 and that it had no official president, but was governed instead by a committee of 19 women elected once a year, of which Firuz was one such member.68   Firuz	  illustrated	  how	  women’s	  rights	  advocates	  in Iran were increasingly focusing on suffrage and equal employment as part of their campaigns:  In a country where women were freed of the veil only ten years ago it is natural that many men should oppose giving women the vote…it	  is	  only	  a	  matter of time until Persian women will manifest faculties and practical 
capacity	  in	  carrying	  on	  the	  work,	  which	  is	  still	  largely	  done	  by	  men…To	  that end I am travelling in America in order to meet and know American women and to study the methods, which they employ in organisation.69 
Firuz’s	  statements	  illustrated the importance she placed on building 
international	  alliances	  and	  support	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  Iranian	  women’s	  influence abroad, and as a consequence their political influence back home, particularly over controversial issues such as the vote.  As such, during her visit to the US she attended and held conferences with leading American Suffragettes, 
                                                 65 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 77. 66 ‘Iranian	  Princess,	  Early	  Fighter	  For	  Women’s	  Rights	  Dies’,  Associated Press, 22 March, 1990. 67 Adelaide Kerr, Cairns Post, 2 March 1946. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 
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and represented Iran throughout this	  period	  at	  various	  international	  women’s	  events.70  During this period, state co-opted feminists such as Dowlatabdi and members of the Kanoun Banovan remained largely pro-establishment.  
Dowlatabadi’s	  Zaban-i-Zanan magazine, which had started off voicing 
controversial	  political	  ideas,	  was	  by	  the	  1940s	  focusing	  on	  domestic	  science,	  ‘a	  
mother’s	  role	  in	  her	  children’s	  education’,	  housekeeping,	  and	  the	  lifestyle	  of	  
European	  women,	  in	  line	  with	  Reza	  Shah’s	  model	  for	  women.71  Moreover, women like Dr Qudsiyah Hijazi and Shams al-Molouk Javahir Kalam, who was a member of the Kanoun Banovan executive committee, wrote positive articles and 
books	  on	  women’s	  rights	  in	  Islam,	  showing	  a	  desire	  among	  women	  and	  state	  feminists to use religious justification as a way of proving the authenticity of their campaigns and striking bargains with Iranian religious leaders at the time.72  Moreover, while the Kanoun Banovan praised the Pahlavis, the relatively 
free	  period	  also	  encouraged	  them	  to	  gently	  push	  Pahlavi	  limits	  on	  women’s	  roles,	  in response to changing political forces.   For instance, in 1942, Bamdad	  founded	  the	  Iranian	  Women’s	  League	  	  (Jamiyat-i-Zanan-i-Iran), and	  described	  how	  women’s	  groups	  increasingly	  felt	  the need to unify their efforts because of the conservative backlash that had followed the abdication of Reza Shah.73 
After	  September	  1941,	  when	  the	  women’s	  movement	  unexpectedly	  lost	  the support of the great	  royal	  patron…reactionary	  elements	  on	  every	  side	  
seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  start	  agitating	  and	  causing	  trouble…Women’s	  associations saw the need to join forces in a combined stand against their 
                                                 70 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 78. 71 Zaban-i-Zanan Magazine, August 1944, issue no.4, July 1945; issue no.1, March 1945, Dowlatabadi Collection, IISHA. 72 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, pp. 81, 84.  73 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 106. 
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opponents and in 1943 agreed to federate under a coordinating 
committee’.74    
She	  described	  how	  Firuz’s	  Council	  of	  Iranian	  Women	  came	  together	  with	  her	  organisation	  and	  another	  leading	  women’s	  organisation of the period. The Council worked in conjunction with two other bodies, which had been set up for the same purpose,	  namely	  the	  Women’s	  League	  (which	  in	  
1956	  became	  the	  Women’s	  League	  of	  Supporters	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Human Rights) and the New Path Society (organised by Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi).75  However, Firuz became disillusioned by the experience of trying to form a single 
independent	  women’s	  organisation,	  complaining	  that	  ‘nobody	  stays	  to	  work	  with	  
another	  person’,	  and	  that	  only	  a	  year	  after	  the	  Women’s	  Party’s	  first	  meeting	  in	  1944, many of the original participants had split off to form as many as 35 new societies.76 Sanasarian argues that female members of political parties gave priority to their male colleagues and went beyond this to attack each other according to party lines.  She writes that the	  Women’s	  Party/Hezb-i Zanan, which included ex-members of Kanoun Banovan, accused the latter of preventing 
women’s	  progress	  during	  the	  dictatorship	  of	  Reza	  Shah,	  with	  Kanoun Banovan 
retorting	  that	  the	  Women’s	  Party	  was	  no	  more	  than	  a	  tool	  of	  party	  politics.77   Firuz and her organisation were increasingly representing Iranian women at international feminist conferences abroad.  Thus, the competition between 
Kanoun Banovan and Hezb-i- Zanan rather than illustrate affiliation and prioritisation of male-led parties and politics78, illustrated that women competed 
                                                 74 Ibid, pp. 106-107. 75 Ibid, p. 108. 76 Reminiscences of Saffiyeh Firuz, in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the Foundation for Iranian Studies, in Camron Michael Amin, p. 238. 77 Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, p. 73. 78 Sima Bahar, p. 181; Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, p. 71; Camron Michael Amin, p. 238. 
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for leadership	  of	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement,	  and	  criticised each other according to their political views. 
By	  February	  1944,	  the	  Tudeh	  party	  was	  officially	  calling	  for	  women’s	  
political	  enfranchisement	  with	  its	  women’s	  committee	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  campaign.  However, by endorsing Soviet oil Concessions as part of a resolution to the 1946 Azerbaijan crisis, the Tudeh ended up on the wrong side of Iranian politics.79  On 4 February 1949, the first failed assassination attempt was made against the Shah during his visit to Tehran University.  Ashraf Pahlavi wrote that the police uncovered evidence that the shooter had been a member of the Communist Tudeh party.80  The Tudeh Party was officially blamed and the group banned in 1949.81  Writers like Bahar and Sanasarian have argued that although 
women’s	  groups	  increased	  during	  this	  period,	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  did	  so	  largely	  as	  affiliates of male-led political associations limited their activity.82  Specifically, Bahar argues that men in the central committee of the Tudeh Party controlled 
the	  activities	  of	  their	  ‘middle-class’	  female	  members,	  while	  Amin	  argues	  that	  the	  
fall	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Qavam’s	  Democrat	  Party	  resulted	  in	  the	  dissolution	  of	  
Mehrangiz	  Dowlatshahi’s	  New	  Path	  Society	  similarly	  to	  the	  Tudeh	  Party	  and	  its	  
Women’s	  Committee	  under	  Maryam	  Firouz.83   
Yet,	  women’s	  rights	  campaigns	  did	  not	  end	  with	  the	  fall	  of	  these	  parties,	  nor did the activities of the women who formed their female membership.  For instance, after the Tudeh was officially banned in 1949, it continued its activities underground, organising the members of both its main party and female faction 
                                                 79 Camron Michael Amin, pp. 225-226. 80 Ashraf Pahlavi, pp. 112-113. 81 Hammed Shahidian, Women in Iran: Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), p. 127. 82 Sima Bahar, p. 181; Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, p. 71. 83 Sima Bahar, p. 180; Camron Michael Amin, p. 226. 
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under a different name, ‘Democratic	  Organisation	  of	  Women’.84  After	  Qavam’s	  
death	  Mehrangiz	  Dowlatshahi	  continued	  to	  work	  with	  various	  women’s	  organisations from	  1956	  onwards,	  attending	  many	  international	  women’s	  conferences, until she was appointed deputy director of the International Council of Women (ICW).85 In the 1960s she joined the Iran-i- Novin Party (New Iran Party),86 founded by then Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansur.  Saffiyeh Firuz similarly persisted with her domestic and international activities;	  Firuz’s	  organisation	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Council	  of	  Iran’	  representing	  Iran	  at	  the	  1949	  IAW	  congress.87  Moreover, pioneering lawyer Mehrangiz Manuchehriyan, who graduated from Tehran University in 1949, challenged patriarchal limits with the publication of her thesis in the same year, entitled ‘Integad-i Gavanin-i Assasi va 
Madani va Kayfari-yi-Iran az Nazareh Huquq-i-Zanan’	  (Criticism	  of	  Iran’s	  
Constitutional,	  Civil,	  and	  Criminal	  laws	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  Women’s	  Rights).	  	  Khorasani and Ardalan argue that Manuchehriyan had great difficulty getting her thesis published,	  as	  it	  was	  considered	  ‘very	  radical	  on	  family	  law’	  for the time.88 She approached small printing and publishing offices, but many refused to print parts that were ‘mukhalefeh	  mazhab’ (against religion).89 She was eventually able to print a few copies, transfer them into storage, before distributing them personally to the professors of law and literature at Tehran University and to 
                                                 84 Sima Bahar, p. 180.  85 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 80. 86 Ibid. 87 Report of 15th IAW Congress in Amsterdam, 18-24 July 1949, p. 65, IAW Collection, WLA. 88 Nushin Ahmadi Khorasani, Parvin Ardalan, Sinatur:	  Fa‘aliyat’ha-yi Mehrangiz Manuchehriyan 
bar Bastar-i-Mubarazat-i-Huquq-i-Zanan dar Iran, (Tehran: Nashr-I Tawsiah, 2003), p. 237. 89 Ibid, pp. 237-238. 
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various places, including Khorasan, Qom, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.90  Khorasani and Ardalan argue that Manuchehriyan’s book	  was	  a	  ‘bomb	  that	  shook	  
everyone’,	  however,	  it	  would eventually be republished in 1963 by Ettehadieh 
Zanan-i-Hugugdan-i-Iran91 (Women’s	  Union	  of	  Female	  Lawyers	  in	  Iran,	  of	  which	  Maunchehrian was a founding member), as some women continued to challenge existing patriarchal limits on their political and legal rights. Therefore, this section contrastingly argues that the fall or outlawing of 
political	  groups	  did	  not	  necessarily	  spell	  the	  ‘fall’	  or	  ‘end’	  of	  the	  activism	  of	  its	  female members, but instead lead to re-organisation, new strategic approaches, and new	  patriarchal	  bargains.	  	  Women’s	  strategies	  and	  approaches	  changed,	  particularly their short-term goals, in an effort to maintain the struggle in novel and less obvious ways.92 While political parties like the Tudeh and Democrat Party looked to bolster their influence with female support, their campaigns were primarily designed to co-opt	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement,	  by	  incorporating their ongoing campaign issues, such as the vote.  Women willingly joined such groups because of ideological beliefs, as well as pragmatic choices to strike better bargains in response to the changing political context in Iran.  The forced abdication of Reza Shah compromised the political bargaining power of state feminists and the Kanoun Banonvan.  The immediate conservative and 
clerical	  backlash	  over	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  policies,	  and	  increasing	  anti-Pahlavi sentiment, made state-feminism the weaker bargain at this point in time.  As such, some women chose to pursue independent activity in pursuit of 
women’s	  rights,	  while	  for	  others	  affiliation	  to	  dominant	  oppositional	  parties	  and	  
                                                 90 Ibid, p. 239. 91 Ibid, pp. 239, 242. 92 Heng,	  ‘A	  Great Way to Fly’, p. 30. 
 197 
mutual cooperation appeared to offer greater leverage and reward.  However, as the political climate changed with the rise and fall of Mohammad Mossadegh, women had to once again alter their strategies to maintain their ongoing struggles.   
2.2 Mossadegh’s	  Nationalisation	  of	  Iranian	  Oil	  and	  Women’s	  Suffrage In 1949, Iranian constitutionalist and lawyer, Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, who had participated in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, formed the National Front of Iran from a coalition of the middle class and Bazaar merchants, together with a group of social-democratic and liberal politicians.93  In October of that year Mossadegh and his supporters argued the results of the 16th Majlis elections had been tampered with.  Mossadegh’s	  nephew	  Farhad	  Diba	  explained	  that	  the	  main issue at these elections had been the question of oil and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) agreement.94  Diba recalled that when it came to this 
particular	  issue,	  ‘Mossadegh	  enjoyed	  almost	  universal	  support,	  from	  religious	  
reactionaries,	  to	  the	  far	  right,	  to	  the	  Tudeh	  Members	  of	  the	  far	  left’.95  However, 
the	  Tudeh’s	  communist	  ideology	  meant	  that	  any	  support	  for	  the	  National	  Front	  was withdrawn whenever Russia attacked Mossadegh.96  Mossadegh officially 
came	  to	  power	  in	  April	  1951,	  cancelling	  the	  AIOC’s	  oil	  concession	  less	  than	  a	  month later.  Britain and the United Sates called for a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil in response, with Britain lodging complaints to the United Nations Security Council	  that	  Iran’s	  actions	  were	  endangering	  world-peace.97  A telegram 
                                                 93 Farhad Diba, Mossadegh: A Political Biography (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1986), p. 96. 94 Ibid, p. 95. 95 Ibid, pp. 96, 111. 96 Farhad Diba, pp. 99-100. 97 Report Submitted By Prime Minister Mossadegh to the Majlis Upon his Return from the United States of America and Egypt, 25 November 1951, p.1, FO371/98609, UKNA; Keddie, Modern Iran, pp. 126-127. 
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from Tehran to the British Foreign Office reported that although the loss of oil revenue and standstill with Britain and the US was putting Iran under serious economic strain, Mossadegh was limited by the defiant nationalist stance he had taken.98  Musaddiq [sic] has unleashed forces of which he is no longer the master....today he finds himself face to face with the Communists who are trying to eliminate him completely from the West.99  Eisenhower’s	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  viewed	  Mossadegh’s	  takeover as a looming loss of Middle Eastern oil to nationalist-communist forces.100  As early as February 1952, British reports were underlining the notion 
that	  ‘Musaddiq	  [sic] will not fall unless he is pushed’,	  but	  that	  the	  Shah	  was too undecided and weak to do the job.101 Thus, the US conspired with Britain to overthrow Mossadegh and reinstate Mohammad Reza Shah through a coup 
d’état	  operation	  code-named Ajax in 1953.102  Diba writes that most women supported oil nationalisation and 
Mossadegh’s	  leadership	  between	  1951-1953.103  However, in 1950 the Tudeh 
Party	  Women’s	  Organisation supported the Russians in their Peace Movement, rather than focusing on oil nationalisation.104  Bahar argues this action was mobilised	  by	  the	  Tudeh’s	  male-leadership,	  however,	  the	  Tudeh	  women’s	  contribution to the 1952 suffrage petition, suggests that women acted more 
                                                 98 Telegram no.189-George Middleton to the Foreign office, 23 February 1952, p.3; Supplementary Note, 25 February 1952, FO371/98707, UKNA. 99 Telegram no. 252-From Berne to Foreign Office, 3 November 1952, FO371/98610, UKNA. 100 Records	  of	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  ‘Probable	  Soviet	  Bloc	  Courses	  of	  Action	  Through	  Mid-1953’,	  11	  December	  1952,	  pp.	  4,	  6,	  511,	  NIE64,	  USNA.  101 Secret Document-Internal Situation and an Oil Settlement, 16 July 1952, FO371/98707, British National Archives; George Middleton To the Foreign office, Telegram no.189, 23 February 1952, p.3; Additional note 25 February 1952, FO371/98707, UKNA. 102 Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company 2007), p. 511. 103 Farhad Diba, p. 115. 104 Sima Bahar, p. 181. 
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independently, choosing which actions would better serve their interests at that point in time.  In 1952 a petition was organised	  with	  various	  other	  women’s	  
groups,	  including	  the	  Tudeh’s	  women’s	  affiliation,	  demanding	  suffrage	  from	  the	  new government.105 Although the women were able to collect 10,000 signatures, the petition ultimately failed as Mossadegh withdrew the bill under pressure from leading clerics.106  Mossadegh prioritised nationalisation above everything 
else,	  which	  placed	  the	  question	  of	  women’s	  political	  rights	  on	  the	  backburner.107   While the clergy objected	  to	  women’s	  suffrage	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  would	  detract from their domestic duties at home, Mossadegh avoided controversial issues that may have created more instability during such a politically volatile period.  This pushed female suffrage outside the limits of acceptable patriarchal bargains at the time. This section argues that independent feminists and those belonging to oppositional parties like the Tudeh, continuously assessed and re-assessed which actions constituted the better bargain for their goals at different points in 
time.	  	  This	  explains	  moments	  of	  support	  for	  the	  calls	  of	  their	  parties’	  male-
leadership,	  and	  moments	  when	  they	  preferred	  to	  unify	  with	  the	  wider	  women’s	  rights movement over common goals, such as the vote.  The political instability that characterised	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  Mossadegh	  ultimately	  obstructed	  women’s	  rights campaigns, however, the return of a more dictatorial Mohammad Reza Shah created new obstacles for independent female activism.  
 
 
                                                 105 Guity Nashat, Women and Revolution in Iran (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 29. 106 Ibid; Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, p. 75. 107 Dr Mohammad Musaddiq,	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  Memoirs, ed. Homa Katouzian, trans. SH Amin and H Katouzian (London: JEBHE National Movement of Iran, 1988). 
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2.3 Minority Parties and Different	  Egyptian	  ‘Feminisms’ In Egypt, the political spectrum had started broadening shortly after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1922.  Minority parties formed out of 
the	  Wafd’s	  ranks	  during	  the	  period	  of	  Zaghlul’s	  leadership	  and	  his	  successor	  Mustafa el-Nahhas: the Liberal Constitutionalist party was founded in 1922, the 
Sa‘adist	  party	  in	  1938,	  and	  the	  Independent	  Wafdist	  Bloc	  in	  1942.	  108 Young Egypt was founded in 1933 by two young law graduates and modelled on fascist youth movements in Europe, attracting many students.  By the 1940s the Muslim Brotherhood had expanded their network and operations, founding clinics and schools and recruiting in the military and police.109  By the late 1940s, three generations were competing for power within the Wafd party, from the first generation Wafdists who had been active with Zaghlul, and their second-generation heirs, to the young professional and student generation of Wafdists who wanted more radical changes.110   After Sha’rawi’s	  death	  in	  1947,	  Egyptian	  feminists	  lost	  their	  position	  as	  leaders of the AFU, whose headquarters moved to Beirut when the Lebanese Ibtihaj Qaddurah assumed the presidency.  It only reverted back to Cairo in 1966 when Suhair Al-Qalamawi became its next president in 1966.111  Nabarawi continued to represent the EFU internationally, being elected vice president and member of the IAW executive board at their 15th congress in Amsterdam.112 It was also during this period that several of the EFU protégées began branching off to form their own groups, appealing to wider classes of Egyptian women.   
                                                 108 Joel S. Gordon, Nasser’s	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  Movement:	  Egypt’s	  Free	  Officers	  and	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  Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 18. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid, pp. 23-24. 111 Report of 15th IAW Congress, 18-24 July 1949, pp. 28, IAW Collection, WLA. 112 Report of 15th IAW Congress in Amsterdam, 18-24 July 1949, p. 5, IAW Collection, WLA. 
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Among these was Fatma Ni’mat Rashid, a former EFU member who formed the political party Hizb al-Nisa’i al-Misri (The Egyptian	  Women’s	  Party), in the early 1940s.113  The statutes of the party was formed of 4 key points, the first three being 1. Woman’s	  equality	  with men, and her moral, intellectual, and social advancement, 2. The party seeks all legitimate means to gain Egyptian women’s	  full	  national, political, and social rights, which include the vote and parliamentary representation so she may enjoy her rights as an Egyptian national. 3. Closer ties between women in Egypt and Eastern countries.114  The fourth point called for ‘the	  acceptance	  of	  women	  in	  all	  professions	  in	  the	  country (provided she had the necessary qualifications), equal rights as workers, participation in unions, and	  child	  care	  for	  working	  mothers’.115 Rashid’s	  emphasis on greater unity between Egyptian and Eastern/Middle Eastern 
women	  mirrored	  the	  EFU’s	  shift	  over	  the	  late	  1930s/early	  1940s	  from	  western/international to regional and Arab alliances (discussed in chapter 3), 
however,	  by	  stressing	  ‘eastern’ unity Rashid was also differentiating her party away from	  the	  EFU’s	  legacy	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  ‘collaboration	  between	  women	  of	  the	  
East	  and	  West’.116 
Rashid’s	  party	  was	  subjected	  to	  criticism	  from	  the	  EFU	  who	  accused	  it	  of	  creating divisions amongst the ranks of	  the	  women’s	  movement.117  Rashid 
argued	  the	  EFU’s	  activity	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  languish,	  focusing	  more	  on	  charitable and social work, and that she could not be accused of creating divisions as she had never been an official member of the EFU, but had 
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cooperated with them generally through her journalism.118  The case highlights the growing competition and rivalry between women over leadership of the 
women’s	  movement,	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  new and different definitions of 
women’s	  rights	  as	  more	  ‘Eastern’	  and political, through groups like Rashid’s	  
Women’s	  Party. Another example was Doria Shafiq, who with Sha‘rawi’s	  support	  went	  to	  
the	  Sorbonne	  to	  earn	  a	  doctorate,	  and	  contributed	  articles	  to	  the	  EFU’s	  French	  journal.119 In the December 1929 issue of L’Egyptienne, Shafiq wrote an article titled L’enfant	  du	  Nil, which included a tribute to her mentor and supporter 
Sha‘rawi.120  In 1945, Shafiq founded her own magazine, Majallat Bint al-Nil (Daughter of the Nile Magazine).  She also launched a magazine for children called Katkut (Chick) from 1946 to 1948.121    In 1948 Shafiq launched her own organisation, Ittihad Bint al-Nil (Daughter of the Nile Union) focusing on female 
literacy	  and	  women’s	  political	  rights,	  with	  branches	  in	  a	  number	  of	  provincial	  
cities’.122  The main	  points	  of	  her	  organisation’s program, issued in 1949, were 
declared	  as	  ‘raising	  the	  intellectual,	  social, and cultural level of the Egyptian 
family,	  gaining	  women’s	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  to	  national/political	  representation	  in	  order to defend her rights, and to fight for reforms in divorce and marriage 
laws’.123   
According	  to	  Nelson,	  Shafiq’s	  choice	  of	  title	  ‘Daughter	  of	  the	  Nile’	  was	  an	  
attempt	  to	  appeal	  to	  ‘middle	  class	  women’	  and	  break	  away	  from	  any	  association	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  AUCA.  121 Bint al Nil Magazine, 1949-1953, Doria Shafik Collection, ACUA; Badran and Cooke, Opening 
the Gates, p. 352. 122 Doria	  Shafiq,	  ‘Islam	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Rights	  of	  Woman’,	  in	  Badran	  and	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the Gates, p. 352. 123 Program of Ittihad Bint al-Nil, 1949, in al-Subki, pp. 122-123. 
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with the Turko-Circassian elite.124 Yet, early issues of her magazine, with their focus on nutrition, domestic science, and the latest Parisian Fashions, would 
have	  appealed	  particularly	  to	  women	  from	  the	  wealthier,	  educated,	  ‘westernised’	  classes.125  What is more clear is the way different women like Shafiq and Rashid were attempting to differentiate themselves from the EFU, redefining their 
feminism	  or	  struggle	  as	  more	  ‘Eastern’,	  ‘middle	  class’,	  and	  with female suffrage and political representation becoming a more central component of potential bargains with the state and nationalist men. 
This	  period	  also	  gave	  rise	  to	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  from	  the	  political	  left, such as Inji Aflatun and Latifa Zayyat.  Born in 1924 to an aristocratic family in Cairo, and educated at the French Lycee, Aflatun joined the Communist group 
Al –Sharara (Iskra) in 1942.126 In 1945 she went to Paris as a member of the Egyptian delegation to the World Congress of Women on behalf of the Democratic Federation Of Women.  In the same year she helped establish the University and Institutes Youth League (Rabitat Fatayat al-gami’a	  a	  wal-ma’ahid	  
al’misriya), which Latifa Zayyat, a student leader, also joined.127 Aflatun took a strong stance on education, but according to al-Jawwadi refrained from travelling abroad for further studies as she felt it would take away from her leftist activity.128  Zayyat, a native of Damietta, who had received her BA in 1946 from Cairo University, was elected general secretary of the Committee Of Students and 
                                                 124 Cynthia Nelson,	  ‘On	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  Shafik’,	  in Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron, Women in 
Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender, (New Haven: Indiana University Press, 2004, 1992) pp. 319, 322 125 Bint al Nil Magazine, Doria Shafiq Collection, 1949-1953, AUCA. 126 Inji	  Aflatun,	  ‘We	  Egyptian	  Women’,	  in	  Badran	  and	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  Opening the Gates, p. 343. 127 Margot Badran, Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences (Oxford: One world Publications, 2009, p. 30. 128 al-Jawwadi, p. 26. 
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Workers.  She went on to get her PhD in Arabic literature in 1957.  Reflecting on 
the	  political	  activism	  of	  her	  youth,	  she	  wrote	  ‘from	  my	  youth	  I	  have	  been	  preoccupied with national	  liberation…I	  have	  suffered	  all	  kinds	  of	  moral	  oppression that befall persons who are female.  Sometimes I confronted 
oppression.	  	  Sometimes	  I	  did	  not’.129 The statement illustrates how female activists had to choose certain battles and strategies over others in response to particular political situations.   For instance, in 1946 the Egyptian government under the Premiership of Ismail Sidqi Pasha launched a crackdown on leftist groups in an effort to curb communist activity; Aflatun recalled how the government closed down all 
‘progressive	  and	  Leftist	  organisations’	  including	  her	  own	  Youth	  League,	  while	  allowing other organisations like the EFU and Shafiq’s	  Bint al-Nil Union to continue operating.130  In an effort to maintain her activism despite the crackdown,	  Aflatun	  attempted	  to	  join	  Shafiq’s	  Bint al-Nil Union, only to find that they would not tolerate her communist background and views.131 Aflatun went on with other leftists to become a member of the National Executive Of Workers And Students, and the National	  Women’s	  Committee	  (Jamiyat Al-Nisai’yya al 
Wataniya al Mu’aqata).  In 1948 she wrote Thamanun Maliyun Maana (Eighty Million Women With Us) in condemnation of imperialism, and in 1949 she published Nahnu al-Nisa al-Misriyyat (We Egyptian Women), which looked at both national and female oppression.132  She	  dedicated	  it	  to	  ‘the	  women	  of	  Egypt’	  
                                                 129 Latifa al-Zayyat,	  ‘Testimonial	  of	  a	  Creative	  Woman-1996’,	  in	  Badran and Cooke, Opening the 
Gates, pp. 411-412. 130 Nelson,	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  with	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  and	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  21	  November	  1986)	  in	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Feminist, pp. 154-155. 131 Ibid. 132 Inji	  Aflatun,	  ‘We	  Egyptian	  Women	  (1949)’	  in	  Badran	  and	  Cooke,	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and	  ‘to	  the	  true	  militants	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  feminist	  cause,	  not	  the	  amateurs	  and	  sycophants giving themselves airs and looking for personal profit, or those crawling	  far	  behind’.133  The statement highlighted growing rivalry between 
female	  activists	  for	  leadership	  of	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement	  through	  the	  validation of their competing positions and ideas.	  	  The	  account	  of	  Aflatun’s	  attempt to join Bint al-Nil demonstrated that	  women’s	  different	  political	  identities shaped their different women’s	  rights	  approaches and alliances 
In	  1948	  Prime	  Minister	  Nuqraishi’s	  government	  began	  arresting	  people from across the political spectrum who were deemed to be extremists, including suspected members of leftist and communist groups such as Zayyat, who was arrested in 1949.134  Manoeuvring around increasing state repression, leftist women had to find novel and less visible or obvious ways of maintaining their activity.  As such many joined a local non-political committee known as Harakat 
Ansar al-Salaam (Movement of the Friends of Peace), whose general aim was to work for world peace and expel colonialism from Egypt.  Aflatun joined the movement in 1950, and later joined the youth group of the EFU, Lajnat Al 
Shabbaat, founded by Nabarawi in the same year to attract a new generation of young female activists to the fold.135  Where gender issues overlapped, women joined forces at certain moments when unification offered greater bargaining leverage and potential reward than independent or disparate activity.  For example, on 19 February 1951 Shafiq led a mass rally and stormed the Egyptian parliament laying out her 
demands	  for	  women’s	  rights: 
                                                 133 Ibid, p. 345. 134 Latifa al-Zayyat,	  ‘Testimonial	  of	  a	  Creative	  Woman-1996’,	  in	  Opening the Gates, pp. 411-412. 135 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 248. 
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Firstly, the immediate action on equalising the law so that the Egyptian women can achieve all her political rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.  Secondly, immediate action to pass the necessary legislation 
for	  the	  protection	  of	  mothers	  and	  wives…especially	  those	  related	  to	  easy	  divorce and polygamy.  Thirdly, full equality between men and women with regards to freedom of employment and responsibilities, especially with regards to equal pay.136  With 1,500 women by their sides, Nabarawi and Shafiq forced their way through the parliament gates, orchestrating demonstrations, until the Egyptian 
government	  promised	  to	  give	  the	  petition	  for	  women’s	  rights	  serious	  consideration.137  Only three of the women entered parliament to speak with the Head of the House. Ceza Nabarawi, Zeinab Labib and myself…I	  asked	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Senate…and	  told	  him:	  I	  am	  speaking	  to	  you	  from	  your	  office…where	  1000 women marched on the parliament and are refusing to leave without a categorical promise that explicitly recognises their political and voting rights like all other citizens.138  The government ultimately went back on its promise to approve the petition for 
women’s	  rights.  Despite the outcome, Shafiq argued that by uniting politically diverse female activists, the event had nevertheless been a victory. The first positive action participated by all the bodies, which represent 
Egypt’s	  women	  with	  all	  their	  different	  inclinations	  and	  opinions.	  	  And	  the	  
next	  day,	  Egypt’s	  newspapers,	  indeed	  the	  world’s	  newspapers,	  were	  telling the whole story.139  However, immediately following	  the	  event,	  Shafiq’s	  political	  choices	  began	  to	  increasingly alienate her from her contemporaries.   Upon her return from a Congress of the ICW in Athens, Nabarawi and Aflatun launched a barrage of attacks in the press criticising Shafiq for voting for a resolution that approved the maintenance of British troops on the Suez Canal 
                                                 136 Doria Shafiq, Rihlati Hawla al-‘Alam (My Trip Around The World) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Sharqiyya, 1955), pp. 204-205. 137Ibid, pp. 201-208. 138 Shafiq, Rihlati, p. 207. 139 Ibid, p 208. 
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under the pretext of defence.  Shafiq responded that she simply supported a motion that upheld the right of every country to have its own system of defence.140  The	  reaction	  of	  Shafiq’s	  contemporaries	  indicated	  she	  had	  crossed	  a	  
line	  on	  existing	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  nationalist activity upheld by women like 
Nabarawi	  and	  Aflatun.	  	  For	  Nabarawi	  and	  Aflatun,	  women’s	  political	  activity	  did	  not include any action that could	  ‘serve	  the	  colonial	  oppressor’,	  as	  explicitly	  stated in the statutes of their organisation al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah	  lil-Muqawama 
al-Sha’abiyah.141  In fact, the organisation, whose membership incorporated ideologically disparate women like Zaynab al-Ghazali alongside Nabarawi, Zayyat, and Aflatun,142 was	  centred	  on	  fighting	  colonialism	  and	  unifying	  women’s	  nationalist efforts.  It declared the Egyptian woman could not give up on her national duty and had to stand side by side with her nationalist male colleagues, 
‘as	  a	  fighter,	  a	  martyr,	  willing to sacrifice her	  life,	  children,	  family	  and	  wealth’.143 The statutes of the organisation, with their focus on fighting colonial intervention, and their definition of women as self-sacrificing martyrs in the anti-
colonial	  struggle,	  explain	  how	  Shafiq’s	  actions	  at	  the	  ICW	  went	  too	  far in the eyes of her contemporaries, opening her up to attacks of inauthenticty and anti-nationalism.    In the fall of 1951 Mustafa al-Nahhas unilaterally abrogated the 1936 treaty, and fighting broke out in the Canal Zone between Egyptian guerrilla 
squads	  and	  the	  British	  army.	  	  Many	  of	  Egypt’s	  leading	  women’s	  rights	  and	  political activists joined together to provide a joint nationalist force when the 
                                                 140 Nelson, Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist, p. 174. 141 Statutes of al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah	  lil-muqawama al-Sha’abiyah, 14 November 1951, Appendix 4, in al-Subki, p. 208. 142 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, p. 248; Nelson, Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist, p. 176. 143 Statutes of al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah	  lil-muqawama al-Sha’abiyah, 14 November 1951, Appendix 4, in al-Subki, p. 208. 
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violence erupted.  Shafiq was among those	  who	  called	  for	  women’s	  participation	  in the struggle. 
We	  call	  for	  fair	  equality,	  based	  on	  equality	  in	  all	  duties	  as	  well…so	  why	  do	  we not also contribute towards the defence of our land and nation?  What prevents us for composing phalanges to rise to their national duty in the guerrilla war that is raging in the Suez Canal Zone?144    
Bint al-Nil Union organised a pioneering female military unit from 200 volunteers to fight alongside the men, train field nurses,	  and	  show	  ‘ that the honour of struggle and the pride of martyrdom were not things unique to men.145 Shafiq’s	  message	  was	  that	  by	  sharing	  equal	  duties,	  even	  in	  armed	  struggle, the Egyptian woman proved herself worthy of political and parliamentary equality.   
Al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah	  also jumped into action, lead by Nabarawi.  The organisation’s	  ‘execution	  strategy’	  emphasised	  ‘unification	  and	  the	  joining	  
together	  of	  all	  women’s	  groups’,	  	  ‘unification	  with	  their	  Sudanese	  sisters,	  women	  
across	  the	  world,	  especially	  women	  in	  the	  Middle	  East’	  to	  rally	  greater numbers of women to the cause, as well as the training of women in nursing, in order to provide medical care and assistance for those fighting.146  In November 1951, Shafiq and members of Bint al-Nil Union joined tens of thousands of Egyptians, marching alongside feminist rivals Nabarawi and Aflatun, and other members of 
al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah, protesting against British attacks in the Canal Zone.147   Nelson argues that this was to be the last time feminist organisations in Egypt would rise above their differences to join forces in the fight toward a 
                                                 144 Shafiq, Rihlati, p. 217. 145 Ibid, p. 218. 146 Statutes of al-Lajna, an-Nissa’iyah	  lil-muqawama al-Sha’abiyah, 14 November 1951, Appendix 4, in al-Subki, p. 209. 147 Shafiq, Rihlati, pp. 221-223. 
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common goal.148  Badran	  argues	  that	  while	  women	  ‘could	  form	  a	  broad	  coalition	  in nationalist struggles against colonialism and internal suppression of 
democracy’,	  they	  were	  ‘unable	  to	  achieve	  the	  same	  unity in a struggle for their 
own	  political	  rights’, as class and associational allegiances made it difficult for 
female	  leaders	  to	  unite,	  pointing	  to	  the	  failed	  unification	  of	  Shafiq’s	  Bint al-Nil 
and	  Fatma	  Rashid’s	  party	  in	  1949	  as	  an	  example.149 
This	  section	  argues	  that	  women	  were	  not	  just	  ‘rising	  above	  their	  
differences’	  to	  fight	  anti-colonial, nationalist battles, but making a strategic choice to join forces over common nationalist goals to improve their political leverage.  Moreover, while ideologically disparate feminists were willing to unify at certain points in time, when it provided the better trade-off for the achievement of common nationalist and/or feminists goals, they were equally willing to confront and attack the actions that appeared to threaten existing patriarchal bargains, as illustrated by the reaction to Shafiq’	  actions	  at	  the	  ICW	  conference.  Leading and diverse female activists like Nabarawi, al-Ghazali, and Aflatun were able to come together and form al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah lil-
muqawama al-Sha’abiyah	  on the basis of their common emphasis on the nationalist struggle as an anti-colonial. Moreover, many women viewed national independence and sovereignty as necessary to the achievement of greater rights.  
2.5 The	  Free	  Officer’s	  Coup	  of	  1952,	  and	  Shafiq’s	  1954	  Hunger	  Strike The violence in the Canal Zone was compounded by additional national problems, from rampant corruption and political fragmentation, to ineffective economic and foreign policies.  The situation intensified on 25 January 1952, 
                                                 148 Nelson, Doria Shafik, p. 176. 149 Badran, Feminists, Islam and Nation, p. 217. 
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when Egyptian police in Ismailia resisted British demands to surrender, and riots 
broke	  out	  the	  following	  day	  on	  what	  became	  known	  as	  ‘Black	  Saturday’.150  To understand how the Free Officers capitalised on the political climate it is important to remember that at this point neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor the Socialists were organised enough to take advantage of the political unrest or secure leadership.151  The Free Officers, who took power on 23 July 1952, were a politically diverse group led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.  The movement had formed out of the military, and represented various opposition trends in Egypt such as 
the	  Communists,	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  and	  Wafdists’.152  The Free Officers maintained independence from other political forces in order to minimise divisions over conflicting political loyalties, but ultimately carried out the coup with the help of other groups, from members of the Muslim Brotherhood to members of the communist Democratic Movement for National Liberation (al-
Harakah al-Dimuqratiyah lil-Tahrir al-Watani).153  By 3 am on 23 July 1952 the officers had secured Cairo and sent Muhammad Naguib to headquarters, and by 7 am the same morning, Anwar Sadat gave their first broadcast to the nation.154 Having initially chosen Ali Maher as Prime Minister, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was set up to help govern after the revolution with Naguib as chairman and Nasser as vice-chairman.155 Mohammad Naguib recalled how quickly numerous parties began propping up, Within a month no fewer than twenty-two parties, new and old, had duly 
registered	  with	  the	  Minister	  of	  Interior…There	  were	  five	  Moslem	  parties,	  
                                                 150 Joel S. Gordon, pp. 26-27. 151 Ibid, pp. 29-30. 152 Selma	  Botman,	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  Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, July 1986, p. 350. 153 Joel S. Gordon, pp. 47, 53. 154 Ibid, p.52. 155 Botman, p. 354. 
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including the Muslim Brothers, three feminist parties, including the 
Daughters	  of	  the	  Nile…156  Within this encouraging political atmosphere Shafiq decided to found a monthly political supplement to her Bint Al Nil journal, titled Bint al-Nil al-Siyassiya (Political Daughter of the Nile), which illustrated the radicalisation of her feminist views from earlier issues of the magazine, with greater focus on suffrage 
and	  women’s	  political	  enfranchisement.157 Moreover, Shafiq responded to both 
secular	  and	  religious	  opposition	  to	  women’s	  ‘constitutional	  rights’,	  particularly	  an article published by the Grand Mufti, Shaykh Hasanain Muhammad Makhluf, in Akhir Lahza,	  which	  stated	  that	  ‘Islam…forbids	  the	  participation	  of	  Egyptian	  
women	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  public	  life’.158  Shafiq responded to the declarations using her knowledge of Shari‘a to challenge their interpretations and argue they were 
not	  ‘in keeping with the generous tenets of Islam regarding women’.159  She followed this with a second article in al-Misri,	  on	  14	  May	  1952	  entitled	  ‘Whom	  shall we follow, the present Mufti or the previous Mutfi?, where she advocated following the earlier Mufti who had declared ‘Islam	  looks	  at	  the	  woman	  as	  it	  looks at the man with respect to humanity, rights,	  and	  personality’.160  While Shafiq	  was	  calling	  for	  women’s	  right to political participation and the vote, and reporting on women at the United Nations in the February 1953 
                                                 156 Mohammad Naguib, Egypt’s	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issue of her magazine,161 the Free Officers were clamping down on all dissidents, particularly members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Next to the Wafd, the most powerful political organisation in Egypt before the Revolution	  was	  the	  Moslem	  Brotherhood…in	  the	  end	  we	  had	  to	  arrest	  a lot of their leaders in order to purge the Rally of their subversive influence.162  On 18 June 1953, Naguib became President and Prime Minister of the new Egyptian Republic, with Gamal Abdel Nasser as his Vice-Prime Minister.163     Yet the Muslim Brotherhood was not the only threat to the early regime; the Free Officers also suffered from divisions within the RCC, which were largely based on conflicts between Naguib and Nasser.  A telegram to the British Foreign Office highlighted the suppression of the Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood, and the continuance of the Revolutionary Tribunal, as the two key points over which Naguib and the RCC had fallen out.164  The conflict peaked on 24 Feb 1954, when Naguib openly criticised the regime for its repressive measures after Nasser outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, and subsequently announced his resignation.165  Nasser was proclaimed Chairman of the Council and Prime Minister, while the Presidency of the Republic remained vacant.166  The British Foreign Office received reports from Reuters on 27 February 1954 that forty cavalry officers, led by Khalid Muhi-al-Din, had revolted against the new regime 
of	  Colonel	  Abdel	  Nasser	  and	  were	  calling	  for	  Naguib’s	  return	  to	  power.167  Naguib was reinstated as president on 8 March 1954, however, it would only take 
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Nasser another month to isolate Naguib, weakening his leadership, and strengthening his own.168 
Many	  Egyptian	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  believed	  that	  the	  coup	  heralded	  a	  new era of freedom for the country.169  Despite the unrest, volatility, and political ambiguity of the transitional period, or perhaps deliberately because of it, Shafiq decided to stage a hunger strike to protest against women’s	  continued	  state	  of	  political inequality.  Talhami argues Shafiq’s	  timing	  had	  been	  promising	  since	  the	  Free Officers had only just annulled the 1923 constitution and appointed a legislative commission to write a new document.170   In her memoirs she explained her decision. So nothing remained to be done, but a hunger strike…and	  so	  I	  saw	  in	  a	  
moment	  of	  emotion	  that	  I	  must	  start	  this	  strike	  myself…and	  right	  away!...I	  did not want my strike to become propaganda for Bint al-Nil Union at a 
time	  when	  I	  was	  presenting	  my	  sacrifice	  on	  behalf	  of	  Egypt’s	  women	  and	  their cause collectively.171  Shafiq chose 12 March 1954 as the day of her strike, though almost no one knew of her plans.  With the aid of the Bint al-Nil Union secretary she had written statements that were to be distributed to the newspapers and news agencies at the same moment she would begin her hunger strike.172  She travelled to the 
Press	  Syndicate	  and	  asked	  the	  couriers	  to	  let	  her	  into	  the	  Chief’s	  office, where 
she	  called	  him	  to	  announce	  her	  ‘hunger strike until Egyptian women demand their rights, or I until am martyred on this path’.173   
                                                 168 Sir Ralph Stevenson-Telegram no. 62, 11 March 1954; Confidential Report-African Department of Foreign Office, 11 March 1954, FO371/108315, UKNA;	  Selma	  Botman,	  ‘Egyptian	  
Communists	  and	  the	  Free	  Officers’,	  p.	  363. 169 Nelson, Doria Shafik, p. 185. 170 Ghada Hashem Talhami, The Mobilization of Muslim Women in Egypt (Gainesville: University Press Florida, 1996), p. 18. 171 Shafiq, Rihlati, pp. 204-205, 256. 172 Ibid, p. 257. 173 Ibid. 
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She wrote that eight other colleagues joined her in the sit-in including leading Egyptian journalist Munirah Thabit.174  Shafiq recalled that on the second day of the strike, the former Prime Minister Ali Maher visited her, and asked her 
to	  stop,	  ‘I	  told	  him…what	  we	  want	  this	  time	  is	  not	  a	  promise	  of	  action,	  but	  action	  indeed’.175 And finally on the 8th day of our strike, our efforts succeeded in 
championing	  the	  issue	  of	  women’s	  rights	  in	  this	  historic	  promise	  sent	  to	  
us	  by	  the	  officials	  that	  Egypt’s new Constitution will deliver full and uncompromised political rights for women.176   Shafiq claimed the strike received a lot of international support from feminist organisations and prominent individuals in Europe, the United States, Africa, the wider Arab world and the UN.177  She wrote that the event succeeded in garnering public	  opinion	  and	  support	  for	  the	  issue	  of	  women’s	  rights more so than any other time, arguing that it attracted the support of leading thinkers and writers like Dr Mohammad Hussein Haykal.178  Yet, there were reactions on both ends of the scale; religious opposition 
was	  high,	  and	  in	  fact	  many	  women’s	  groups	  criticised the hunger strike as useless,	  with	  women	  like	  Fatma	  Ni‘mat Rashid and Samia Tewfik, vice president of the League of Arab and Eastern Women, attacking Shafiq	  for	  putting	  women’s	  rights above the interests of the country.179 Egyptian critics challenged this supposed victory, arguing that the whole thing had been nothing more than a publicity stunt that had resulted in no real gains for women.180 Within a week of the strike ending, martial law had been renewed, accompanied by the dissolution 
                                                 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid, p. 257. 176 Ibid, p. 259. 177 Ibid, pp. 262-263. 178 Ibid, p. 258. 179 Nelson, Doria Shafik, p. 200. 180 Ibid, p. 206. 
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of all political parties, renewed censorship and a postponement of elections until 
the	  end	  of	  the	  ‘transitional	  period’	  in	  January	  1956.181   Whether Shafiq’s	  hunger	  strike	  was	  a	  refusal	  to	  put	  feminist	  goals	  aside	  at	  a time of instability, or a deliberate decision to take advantage of the instability, is hard to confirm.  What is more evident was the growing hostility towards 
Shafiq’s	  choices	  from	  other	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  like	  Rashid	  and	  Tewfiq.  
Thus,	  limitations	  on	  women’s	  independent political activity were being negotiated and placed by women and men around controversial examples like Shafiq.  Women like Shafiq were challenging existing bargains and acceptable 
limits	  on	  women’s	  political	  behaviour.	  	  By	  campaigning	  for	  suffrage	  at	  a	  time when Egypt saw itself in another anti-colonial battle against British forces, Shafiq 
appeared	  to	  be	  placing	  ‘women’s	  rights’	  above	  the	  ‘nation’s	  rights’.	  	  As previous 
chapters	  argued,	  men	  encouraged	  women’s	  activism	  in	  anti-colonial contexts as a way of asserting	  ‘national	  culture’	  against	  Western	  intervention;	  in	  other	  words female participation in anti-colonial struggles was a well-established part of patriarchal bargains with nationalist men. Their action in this context proved their nationalism, their patriotism, and their authenticity.  Shafiq’s	  actions	  on	  the	  
other	  hand	  were	  causing	  her	  to	  transgress	  acceptable	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  nationalist behaviour, allowing others to brand her as unpatriotic, and thus inauthentic.  The negative reaction to Shafiq’s	  actions	  at	  the	  ICW	  conference	  in	  1951 had already signalled she was crossing a line.  Challenging patriarchal limits on female suffrage during an anti-colonial struggle over the Canal Zone, pushed limits too far, and became a far riskier bargain than most female activists were willing to take. 
                                                 181 Ibid, p. 207. 
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Conclusion   In chapter 3 it was shown that Iranian	  and	  Egyptian	  women’s	  rights	  activists encouraged a cultural exchange between ‘Eastern	  and	  Western’	  feminists.  This chapter has shown how the perceived western character of these movements, 
led	  to	  divergences	  in	  women’s	  discourses,	  particularly	  for	  Islamist	  women	  like	  Labiba Ahmad and al-Ghazali in Egypt.  In	  Iran,	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  project encouraged the notion of women’s	  rights as class privilege, and reinforced elite, urban women’s	  leadership of the movement.  Furthermore, Reza 
Shah’s	  Unveiling Decree opened the act of unveiling up to allegations of inauthenticity.  In Egypt, women like Ruz al-Yusuf and Munira Thabit challenged 
the	  EFU’s	  elitist	  constructs by defining their activism as journalism and promoting it as a female profession. 
It	  was	  also	  shown	  that	  although	  the	  women’s	  movement	  diversified and became competitive, women were able to join forces when overlapping ideas on female suffrage, women’s	  political	  representation, and anti-colonialism, provided what was perceived as the better bargain at the time.   In Iran, some state feminists were able to join in the growing campaign for female suffrage, as independent feminists and sympathetic political parties like the Tudeh and 
Qavam’s	  Democratic	  Party	  offered	  them	  greater	  leverage	  in	  challenging	  the	  
state’s	  limitations	  on	  their	  political	  activity.	  	  Similarly	  in	  Egypt	  Islamist	  women	  like al-Ghazali and leftist women like Nabarawi and Aflatun were able to come together in 1951 over their common definitions of nationalism. The backlash	  over	  Doria	  Shafiq’s	  1954 hunger strike demonstrated that the majority of female activists viewed female suffrage as contingent on Egyptian 
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political sovereignty and thus condemned Shafiq’s	  actions	  as	  anti-nationalist.  The political instability, revolutionary environment, and renewed anti-colonial battles encouraged women to view unification over nationalist activity as the priority and the better patriarchal bargain at this point in time.  Once again, during periods of national crisis women often sought the role of cultural carriers.  This was seen during the 1951 Canal Battles, where women’s	  roles as protectors of national and cultural authenticity were once again revised to see members of the al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah, define themselves as martyrs, fighters, nurses, willing 
to	  sacrifice	  their	  ‘life,	  children,	  family	  and	  wealth’	  for	  the	  nation.182    
                                                 182 Statutes of al-Lajna, al-Nissa’iyah	  lil-muqawama al-Sha’abiyah,	  in al-Subki, p. 208. 
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Chapter 5 
Nationalisation and Cooptation: Mohammad Reza Shah and Gamal Abdel 
Nasser (1950s-1970s) This chapter looks at the effect of Mossadegh’s and	  Nasser’s	  nationalisation	  policies on their respective populations and how they affected notions of nationalism and cultural authenticity.  It additionally looks at the Shah and 
Nasser’s	  approaches to	  the	  Iranian	  and	  Egyptian	  women’s	  rights	  movements,	  respectively, and assesses the effects of their policies on female activists and definitions of womanhood.  The chapter relies on Foreign Office documents from the British National Archives on Mossadgeh, the Egyptian Free Officers and Nasser, as well as press interviews, and memoirs of Mossadegh, Ashraf Pahlavi, Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad, Mahnaz Afkhami, Azar Nafisi, Shirin Ebadi, Mohammad Reza Shah, Mohammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Doria Shafiq, Inji Aflatun, Zaynab al-Ghazali and other key players and observers of the period.   This chapter is divided into 3 sections.  The first section argues that Nationalisation policies in both countries promoted anti-westernisation feelings, but that definitions of westernisation and anti-westernisation developed differently in Egypt and Iran in response to their particular political contexts and foreign policies.  The	  overthrow	  of	  Mossadegh’s	  regime	  and	  reinstatement	  of	  Mohammad Reza Shah through American intervention extended or redefined 
notions	  of	  westernisation	  as	  ‘American’,	  and	  thus	  authenticity	  as	  anti-American and anti-Pahlavi.  Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Suez Crisis that followed strengthened notions of authenticity around anti-western-European culture and politics, as Nasser increasingly aligned himself with the 
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Soviet Union, putting forward a more socialist, pan-Arab, and anti-capitalist model of Egyptian nationalism. 
Sections	  2	  and	  3	  look	  at	  women’s	  rights	  and	  state	  feminism	  under	  the	  Shah and Nasser.  The sub-arguments, which are summarised at the start of each section, are used to make 3 overall comparative arguments.  The first 
comparative	  argument	  is	  that	  while	  the	  Shah	  and	  Nasser’s	  different	  motives	  in	  granting women greater political and social rights resulted in different definitions of modern womanhood, they both ultimately promoted women’s	  political activity as secondary to that of men.  Wanting to be viewed as a modern emancipator of women, the Shah granted women suffrage and greater professional rights, but primarily defined them as wives and mothers, extending 
women’s ‘natural’ maternal skills to the welfare of the wider nation by promoting social work as a	  woman’s civic	  duty.	  	  Nasser	  stressed	  women’s	  duties	  
in	  ‘work,	  the	  factory,	  technical	  education’, and as teachers of the next generation, in accordance with socialist constructs of womanhood, yet similarly limited their political and military activity, emphasising	  ‘different’	  duties	  for	  men	  and	  women	  in this regard.  The second argument is that while the Shah and Nasser sought to co-opt 
and	  control	  women’s	  organisations,	  female	  activists	  adapted	  around	  this	  reconfigured patriarchal context to put forward their own initiatives in line with 
the	  regime’s	  goals.	  	  In	  Iran,	  women	  struck	  new	  bargains	  around	  the	  Shah’s	  desire	  to appear modern and enlightened by enlisting the support of Ashraf Pahlavi to 
consolidate	  the	  High	  Council	  of	  Women’s	  Organisations	  of	  Iran,	  gaining	  the	  vote	  and the right to be elected to parliament.  Reorganised as the Women’s	  Organisation of Iran (WOI), state feminists continued to challenge limits on 
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women’s	  rights	  against	  growing	  opposition	  to	  Pahlavi	  reforms	  promoted	  by	  works like Jalal Al-i-Ahmed’s	  ‘Gharbzadeghi,	  applying a dual strategy of reassuring conservative leaders whilst campaigning for controversial initiatives like the 1967 Family Planning Act.  In Egypt, women like al-Said and al-Shati’, who engaged in very different	  women’s	  discourses, were able to capitalise on areas of overlap with the regime to promote their own notions of womanhood.  Al-Said’s stress on equal education opportunities directly complemented 
Nasser’s	  reforms,	  while	  al-Shati’’s description of ideal Muslim women as politically supportive, rather than independent, and as maternal nurturers, 
coincided	  with	  Nasser’s	  own	  definitions of the Egyptian family in the 1956 Constitution. Finally, while the majority of state feminists at the time chose a balancing strategy of tactically campaigning for reforms whilst simultaneously reassuring 
conservative	  leaders,	  Nezhat	  Nafisi’s	  outspoken	  criticism against the 1967 Family Planning Act, and Amina al-Said’s	  exceptional	  criticism	  of	  some	  state	  policies, show that the same patriarchal bargaining strategy was not necessarily acceptable to all state feminists at all the times.  It is argued, thirdly, that this type of limited or exceptional criticism was tolerated where it did not break, or push too far patriarchal bargains made with the regime over notions of acceptable female behaviour.  As such, women who transgressed bargains made with the state, by openly	  questioning	  the	  state’s	  legitimacy,	  such	  as	  Shafiq	  and	  al-Ghazali in Egypt, or members of the revolutionary opposition in Iran, were summarily outlawed and suppressed.   
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Section 1: Nationalisation and Changing Notions of Authenticity The nationalisation of the Suez Canal cemented Nasser as a nationalist icon within Egyptian-Arab history in the same way that nationalisation of Iranian oil cemented Mossadegh as one within Iranian history.  Both leaders were seen as defenders of their country against foreign, specifically western, interference.  This section argues that these nationalisation policies altered existing definitions of westernisation, nationalism and what constituted authentic behaviour in their countries, but did so in different ways in response to their particular socio-political contexts and foreign policies. The short-lived	  nature	  of	  Mossadegh’s	  oil	  nationalisation as a result of American intervention saw lines of authenticity re-drawn against new definitions of westernisation as ‘American’,	  and	  thus	  
authenticity	  as	  ‘un-American’.	  	  Egyptian	  Nationalisation	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  reinforced anti-British and anti-French feeling, defining what was inauthentic around western-European culture and politics, as Nasser increasingly aligned himself with the Soviet Union against notions of western bourgeois capitalism.  Egyptian nationalism thus had to take on a more, socialist, Arab and anti-
capitalist	  character	  as	  part	  of	  Nasser’s	  pan-Arabism/Arab socialism.    
1.1  Effects of the 1953 Coup on the Iranian Population 
While	  Mossadegh’s	  regime	  had	  been	  short-lived, his policy of oil nationalisation 
turned	  him	  into	  a	  champion	  of	  Iranian	  independence.	  	  His	  defence	  of	  Iran’s	  
political	  and	  economic	  sovereignty	  against	  Britain’s	  complaints	  at	  the	  United Nations in 1951 turned him into a nationalist hero.1  Farmanfarmaian recalled 
                                                 1 ‘Report	  Submitted	  By	  Prime	  Minister	  Mossadegh	  to	  the	  Majlis Upon his Return from the United 
States	  of	  America	  and	  Egypt’,	  25	  November	  1951,	  p.1,	  FO371/98609, UKNA. 
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how	  Mossadegh	  ‘had	  shown	  the	  world	  that	  a	  small,	  much-bullied people could 
stand	  up	  for	  their	  rights	  to	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  nations	  on	  earth’.2  Mossadegh’s	  anti-imperialist stance inspired many in the region.  Stopping in Egypt on his way back from the UN in 1951, he reported, ‘not	  a	  moment	  passed	  without	  the	  people and government of Egypt extending their special kindness and applause 
to	  us’.3 Nobel Prize winning lawyer and pioneering female judge, Shirin Ebadi 
argued	  that	  nationalisation	  of	  Iran’s	  oil	  industry	  turned	  Mossadegh	  into	  a	  
‘Gandhi-like	  figure’,	  as	  a	  definitive	  defender	  against	  Western/British imperialism.4  The famous writer Azar Nafisi described the effect of these events in her memoirs. 
His	  aborted	  premiership	  came	  to	  embody	  Iran’s	  as-yet-unrealised democratic aspirations.  He carried with him the corrosive charm of unfulfilled dreams.5  While the 1953 coup	  d’état	  could	  not	  have	  succeeded	  without	  internal	  disaffection, it would not have occurred without foreign aid.6  The covert roles of 
Britain	  and	  the	  US	  in	  overthrowing	  Mossadegh’s	  democratically	  elected	  regime	  exacerbated anti-western feelings.    Although the US had initially been viewed as the better foreign power 
compared	  to	  Britain,	  the	  CIA’s	  operation	  Ajax	  fundamentally	  altered	  Iranian	  perceptions.7  Sattareh Farmanfarmaian summarised these feelings in her memoirs.    
                                                 2 Farmanfarmaian, p. 176. 3 ‘Report	  Submitted	  By	  Prime	  Minister	  Mossadegh	  to	  the	  Majlis’,	  25	  November	  1951’,	  p.	  6,	  UKNA. 4 Shirin Ebadi, Iran Awakening,	  From	  Prison	  to	  Peace	  Prize:	  One	  Woman’s	  Struggle	  at	  the	  
Crossroads of History (London: Random House, 2006), p.4. 5 Azar Nafisi, Things	  I’ve	  Been	  Silent	  About:	  Memories	  of	  a	  Prodigal	  Daughter (London: Windmill books Random House, 2010), p.99. 6 Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 130. 7 Ibid, p. 131. 
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As always, there had been Iranians willing to sell out their country, and as always the British had arranged for the sale.  But this time, the United 
States	  had	  been	  the	  paymaster…the	  way	  we	  felt	  about	  the	  US	  would	  never	  be the same again.8  Popular belief that US/British involvement had been fundamental to the coup’s	  success and to the restoration of the Pahlavi throne solidified the image of the 
Shah	  as	  a	  ‘US	  puppet’.9  Ebadi described the disdain felt over the reinstatement of Mohammad Reza Shah. The venal young shah was restored to power, famously thanking Kermit 
Roosevelt:	  ‘I	  owe	  my	  throne	  to	  God,	  my	  people,	  my	  army,	  and	  to	  you’.	  	  It	  was a profoundly humiliating moment for Iranians, who watched the US intervene in their politics as if their country were some annexed backwater.10  
The	  Shah’s	  policy	  reforms	  over	  the next two decades depended on western, specifically US, aid.  He looked to the West for inspiration and relied heavily on American assistance and advice to affect his modernisation plans. The US increased its investments in Iran becoming a 40% shareholder in the oil consortium of 1954 (shared with BP, Royal Dutch Shell and Compagnie 
Francaises	  de	  Petroles),	  and	  Iran’s	  main	  military	  supplier	  and	  advisor.11  The Shah made clear his preference for the US over other	  ‘western	  friends’,	  declaring,	  
‘the United States understands us better for the simple reason that it has so many interests here’.12  Moreover the regime became increasingly repressive.  
The	  Shah’s	  sister	  Ashraf	  wrote	  that	  following	  Mossadegh’s	  overthrow,	  Iran’s	  government became ‘more	  and	  more	  the	  Shah’s	  government’.13   
                                                 8 Farmanfarmaian, p. 201. 9 Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 5. 10 Ebadi, p. 5. 11 Keddie, Modern Iran, pp. 132, 136-137. 12 Oriana Fallaci, Interview with History, trans. John Shepley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), p. 280. 13 Ashraf Pahlavi, p. 150. 
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Between 1953 and 1958, the regime arrested over 3,000 party members, with party leaders, militant activists, and military members severely punished, tortured and executed.14  Between 1955 and 1963 the Shah purified the army, purging 300 to 400 officers who were Tudeh sympathisers and created SAVAK to gather intelligence and suppress any dissent or anti-regime activity.15 Referring 
to	  SAVAK	  as	  the	  ‘bête	  noire’	  of	  her	  brother’s	  regime,	  Ashraf	  argued	  ‘it	  was	  not	  his	  wish to create, as some have said, a kind of GULAG atmosphere or a security force of yes-men’.16  Farmanfarmaian described the extent of censorship, and 
control	  under	  the	  ‘renewed’	  Shah,	  and	  the	  fear	  the	  name	  SAVAK	  conjured	  up. Worst of all, a dreaded new secret police called SAVAK, said to have been trained by the CIA and the Israeli MOSSAD, watched the trade unions to prevent strikes and imprisoned left-wing activists.17  
SAVAK’s	  reputation	  as	  the	  Shah’s	  brutal,	  western-trained, secret police force substantiated the idea that the Pahlavi government primarily served the interests of its western, particularly American, patrons and was thus illegitimate. The regime not only relied on repression tactics to silence the opposition, but also used cooptation methods, using incentives such as governmental employment,	  a	  method	  that	  was	  also	  applied	  to	  the	  women’s	  movement.	  	  Farmanfarmaian recalled	  how	  the	  Shah	  ‘took	  pains	  to	  stay	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  
the	  clergy’	  and	  allowed	  his	  old	  opponents,	  even	  Mossadegh	  followers,	  into	  his	  fold as long as they did not criticise him.18  The Shah was attempting to negotiate greater support for himself as	  Iran’s	  leader,	  by	  co-opting the clergy and members of the opposition.  Throughout his writings, and even in a later interview with 
                                                 14 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (New Jersey, 1982), pp. 325-326.  15 Stempel, p. 5. 16 Ashraf Pahlavi, pp. 150-151. 17 Farmanfarmaian, p. 207. 18 Ibid, pp. 207-208. 
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Orianna Fallaci in 1973, the Shah referred to religious visions he had as a child, as divine affirmation of his leadership, arguing he had been chosen by God to accomplish a mission.19  Such declarations can be viewed as attempts by the Shah to prove his authenticity as an Iranian leader, by trying in vain to paint 
himself	  as	  a	  ‘chosen’	  religious	  figure,	  tapping	  into	  notions of the return of the 
Mahdi/12th Imam.  However, western, specifically US, involvement in the ousting 
of	  Iran’s	  democratically	  elected	  leader,	  Mohammad	  Mossadegh, had already 
compromised	  the	  Shah’s	  authenticity	  as	  an	  Iranian	  leader.	  	  The	  image	  of	  the	  Shah	  
as	  a	  Western	  or	  ‘American	  puppet’	  was	  aggravated	  further	  by	  his	  heavy	  reliance	  on American assistance and advice to affect his modernisation plans.   
1.2  Nasser and Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Unlike the 1953 Iranian coup, the 1952 Free Officers Coup enjoyed a lot of popular support, and was viewed by the majority as a genuine nationalist revolution against internal corruption, political division, and Western 
intervention.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  within	  a	  week	  of	  Shafiq’s	  1954 hunger strike, Nasser was staging strikes and demonstrations under the auspices of The Liberation Rally on 25, 26, 27 March 1954 in support of his leadership.20  On 29 March 1954 the RCC announced the postponement of elections until Jan 1956, Naguib was ousted from the government, and all demonstrations by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd Party, and the Communists were put down.21  
                                                 19 Oriana Fallaci, p. 268. 20 Selma	  Botman,	  ‘Egyptian	  Communists	  and	  the	  Free	  Officers’,	  p.	  363. 21 ‘Sir	  R.	  Stevenson	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  Telegram	  no.	  449’,	  30	  March	  1954,	  FO371/108327,	  UKNA. 
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In September 1954 Nasser published his pamphlet the Philosophy of the 
Revolution.22  He described Egyptian society as being in a process of evolution, striving to catch up to other nations, and presented himself as the leader who could provide the necessary solutions.23  The manifesto identified three spheres 
or	  circles	  of	  influence.	  	  Defining	  the	  Arab	  circle	  as	  the	  ‘first	  circle’	  and	  the	  most	  important, Nasser argued that the Arab states shared historical and spiritual features.24  Furthermore,	  he	  argued	  that	  Palestine’s	  fate	  could	  befall	  any	  of	  the	  other Arab states if the forces of imperialism were not defeated.25  Following the Arab circle, Nasser described two more circles, the Islamic and the African, 
highlighting	  the	  ‘tremendous	  possibilities,	  which	  we	  might	  realise	  through	  the	  cooperation of all these	  Muslims’.26  The British Foreign Office named Mohammad Hussein Heykal as the main author of the pamphlet, but argued it 
showed	  that	  Nasser	  envisaged	  Egypt	  ‘playing	  an	  important	  role	  as	  a	  member	  of	  an Arab-Islamic-African	  bloc’,	  and	  that	  Egypt’s	  recent initiatives	  ‘in	  the	  Arab	  and	  
Islamic	  world’	  confirmed	  that	  he	  intended	  to	  pursue	  this	  ideal.27  Besides making 
a	  case	  for	  Nasser’s	  ideological	  leadership,	  the	  manifesto	  was	  attempting	  to	  redefine Egyptian nationalism and authenticity by incorporating wider cultural links with the three highlighted spheres.  A definition was being put forward of Egypt as a political and cultural leader of pan-Arab nationalism, which would then contribute and potentially lead a wider pan-Islamic nation, or union of nations. 
                                                 22 Gamal Abdul Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, introduction Dorothy Thompson (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955), p. 32. 23 Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, pp. 87-88. 24 Ibid, p. 89. 25 Ibid, p. 98. 26 Ibid, p. 113. 27 ‘Confidential	  Report	  on	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Revolution’,	  14	  September	  1954, FO371/108317, UKNA. 
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On 26 October 1954, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was delivering a public speech, firing eight shots at him from point blank range.28   The timing of the attack, coming within a month of Nasser publishing Philosophy of the Revolution, was an advantageous 
concurrence;	  Nasser’s	  popularity	  soared	  and	  the	  incident	  provoked	  the	  regime	  to	  ruthlessly suppress its rivals.29  Hundreds were targeted, with many members of the Muslim Brotherhood arrested and several executed.30  In January 1956 Nasser created a constitutional committee, and was declared President with an overwhelming vote in his favour.31   Returning from a tour of Cairo in May 1953, US Secretary of State, John 
Foster	  Dulles,	  publicly	  endorsed	  Nasser’s	  demand	  for the complete withdrawal of British forces from Egypt, convinced that the move would result in Egypt joining the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO).32  In July 1954, as a result of increasing US pressure, Winston Churchill agreed to evacuate all British troops from Egypt, but Nasser did not join MEDO.33  Tensions continued to mount, especially after Nasser refused to join the Baghdad pact of 1955, which was similarly being promoted across the Middle East by Anthony Eden as prevention against Russian-Communist incursions.34  Instead, on 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal.35  Britain accused Nasser of committing an aggression against the Suez Canal Company; ‘that is surely aggression, in the 
                                                 28 Joel S. Gordon, p. 179. 29 Ibid, pp. 175-176, 179. 30 Nelson, Doria Shafik, p. 216. 31 Joel S. Gordon, p. 189. 32 Oren, p. 512. 33 Ibid, p. 513. 34 Nelson, Doria Shafik, p. 226. 35 Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952-1967: From 
the Egyptian Revolution to the Six-Day War (London: Frank Class, 2003), p. 46. 
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most naked form, in the political sense of the word.36  British frustrations grew in 
response	  to	  the	  US’s	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  their	  position.37  By September, the 
British	  government	  was	  declaring	  ‘if	  Colonel	  Nasser’s	  illegal	  act	  is	  not	  resisted	  by	  those who stand for international order then international disorder will 
prevail’.38 At this point the British had already joined forces with the French in a clandestine plot to arm Israel for an attack against Egypt.39  As soon as Israel attacked on 29 October 1956, President Eisenhower and Dulles argued that unless the US helped halt the attack, Egypt and other newly independent countries would turn to the Soviet Union.40  Under the threat of economic sanctions, both Britain	  and	  France	  obeyed	  Eisenhower’s	  orders	  and	  withdrew	  their forces by 22 December.  Sadat argued that the Suez War helped solidify the legend of Nasser; ‘Egypt, a small country, was at last capable of speaking loud and clear in defiance of the biggest power	  on	  earth…From	  that	  moment	  on,	  Nasser turned into an Egyptian mythical hero’.41 The Suez Crisis turned Nasser into a an icon of anti-imperialism and of Arab nationalism, encouraging a union between Syria and Egypt, which resulted in the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958.42   Thus, nationalisation of the Suez Canal and nationalisation of Iranian oil were viewed by their populations as major victories in their anti-imperialist/anti-colonial struggles.  Both events led to an increase in anti-
                                                 36 Note Accusing Colonel Nasser of Having Taken Aggressive Action Against the Suez Canal Company, 28 August 1956, FO371/119124, UKNA. 37 Telegram no. 3996: Suez, 3 September 1956, FO371/119124, UKNA. 38 Extract from Speech to be Delivered by the Secretary of State at Durham Castle on 22 September 1956, FO371/119143, UKNA. 39 Oren, p. 515. 40 Mcnamara, pp. 56-57. 41 Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of identity, (London: Collins, 1978), p. 143. 42 McNamara, p. 116. 
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western feeling, however, definitions of westernisation developed differently in Egypt and Iran in response to their particular political contexts and foreign 
policies.	  	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  1953	  coup promoted anti-American feeling, re-drawing new definitions of westernisation as more American, and thus authenticity as un-American,	  as	  the	  Shah’s	  dependency	  on	  the	  US	  increased.	  	  The	  
Shah’s	  modernisation	  reforms	  were	  thus	  tainted	  as	  inauthentic	  western	  imitations, as were the Iranians who promoted them, as later chapters will illustrate.  In Egypt, the Suez War reinforced anti-British and anti-French feeling, as Nasser increasingly aligned himself with the Soviet Union against notions of western bourgeois capitalism.  Egyptian nationalism took on more socialist, Arab, and anti-western	  capitalist	  definitions	  as	  part	  of	  Nasser’s	  pan-Arab/Arab socialist ideology.  These changing definitions affected notions of womanhood 
and	  women’s	  roles	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  Egyptian state, opposition movements, and independent activists, as the next sections will demonstrate.  
Section 2:  Mohammad Reza Shah and State Feminism in Iran. 
This	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  Shah’s	  definition	  of	  womanhood	  and	  his	  1963	  White	  Revolution, a six-point	  reformist	  program,	  which	  included	  women’s suffrage among other domestic reforms.  Bahar	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Shah’s	  main	  aim	  in	  granting women the vote was to win over the middle-class women of the intelligentsia.43  Paidar	  underlined	  that	  the	  prerequisite	  for	  women’s	  rights	  was	  
the	  Shah’s	  control	  over	  the	  women’s	  movement,	  as	  he,	  like	  his	  father	  before	  him,	  
saw	  himself	  as	  the	  father	  of	  the	  nation	  who	  had	  to	  have	  control	  over	  the	  nation’s	  women.  Reiterating Najmabadi’s	  argument,	  Paidar	  added that while the 
                                                 43 Sima Bahar, p. 182. 
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Women’s	  Organisation	  of	  Iran	  developed	  a	  ‘separate	  identity	  to	  the	  state’	  and	  
was	  not	  a	  ‘mere	  puppet	  of	  the	  Shah’,	  its activities were subjected to ‘directives 
from	  above’.44   This section makes 3 main arguments.  It is argued firstly that	  the	  Shah’s	  
definitions	  of	  women’s	  emancipation	  transferred notions of women’s domestic and maternal skills to the welfare of the nation through social work.  By defining 
women’s	  primary	  responsibilities	  as	  familial,	  through	  their	  duties as wives and mothers, the Shah underlined their political position as secondary.  Furthermore works like Jalal Al-i-Ahmed’s	  Gharbzadeghi (westoxification), which denounced 
Pahlavi	  policies	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  women’s	  roles	  as	  ‘preservers	  of	  tradition’,45 
encouraged	  many	  Iranians	  to	  view	  the	  Shah’s	  1963	  White	  Revolution	  reforms, such as female	  suffrage,	  women’s	  election	  to	  parliament,	  and	  WOI	  state-feminists as inauthentic extensions of the ‘westoxified’ regime.   However, this section argues secondly that although the WOI was subjected to ‘directives	  from	  above’, WOI activists adapted around this changing patriarchal context to put forward their own initiatives in line with state goals.  Specifically, it is argued that women	  struck	  new	  bargains	  with	  the	  Shah’s	  government around his desire to appear modern and enlightened by enlisting 
the	  support	  and	  leadership	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  sister	  in	  consolidating the High Council 
of	  Women’s	  Organisations	  of	  Iran,	  which	  saw	  them	  achieve	  the vote and be elected to Parliament for the first time in 1963.  Similarly,	  despite	  the	  state’s	  patriarchal constraints and increasing ideological and religious opposition to the White Revolution reforms, the WOI continued to subtly challenge limits on 
                                                 44 Paidar, p. 150. 45 Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague from the West, trans. R. Campbell (Berkley: Mizan Press, 1984), pp. 70-71. 
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women’s	  political	  and	  social	  rights	  by	  reassuring	  conservative	  leaders	  whilst	  putting forward progressive initiatives like the 1967 Family Planning Act.   
Furthermore,	  Nezhat	  Nafisi’s	  outspoken	  criticism	  against	  the	  1967 Act shows that the same patriarchal bargains were not necessarily acceptable to all state feminists.  However, it is argued that the majority of WOI women (like 
Bamdad)	  preferred	  to	  negotiate	  around	  such	  contradictions,	  viewing	  the	  WOI’s	  strategy of reassuring men whilst pushing for more changes, the better bargain at the time.  
2.1 The	  Shah,	  Women,	  and	  the	  Women’s	  Rights	  Movement. Throughout his reign, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi cultivated a reputation for 
himself	  as	  a	  champion	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  In	  Mission for My Country, published in 1961, the Shah	  highlighted	  Iran’s	  advances	  under	  Pahlavi	  rule,	  arguing	  that	  the	  
most	  impressive	  were	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  women’s	  rights.46  Yet	  the	  Shah’s	  views	  on	  women and feminism were not always as enlightened as they appeared, as they were based on his desire to project a modern image to the international community.  He also wrote that while	  he	  ‘personally	  objected	  to	  the	  veil	  on	  
aesthetic	  as	  well	  as	  other	  grounds’,	  he	  chose	  to	  overlook	  his	  father’s	  anti-veiling 
policy,	  preferring	  ‘to	  see	  a	  natural	  evolution,	  rather	  than	  to	  force	  the	  pace’,	  but	  
added	  that	  he	  hoped	  ‘the	  veil	  as	  well	  as	  other	  characterless	  female	  clothing	  
would	  pass	  out	  of	  favour’,	  emphasising	  women’s	  ‘unique	  feminine	  loveliness’	  and	  physical differences with men.47  Referring	  to	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement, he 
argued	  that	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  that	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘emancipation’	  and	  
                                                 46 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1961), p. 227. 47 Ibid, pp. 232, 235. 
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‘equality’	  had	  been	  used	  ‘much	  too	  loosely	  and	  in	  ways	  that	  damaged	  women’s	  
own	  cause.’48  He	  argued	  that	  some	  ‘misguided	  women’	  viewed	  emancipation	  ‘as	  a sort of license to gratify	  their	  own	  whims	  and	  selfish	  desires,	  writing	  ‘the	  blunt	  truth is that each new right exercised by woman imposes upon her new 
responsibilities’.49    To hear some so-called feminists talk, you would think it meant freedom not to marry, freedom not to have children, freedom not to devote 
themselves	  to	  their	  children’s	  welfare	  if	  they	  have	  any,	  freedom	  not	  to	  shoulder any civic responsibilities.50   
He	  thus	  defined	  women’s	  civic	  responsibilities	  as	  their	  familial	  and	  biological	  
‘duties’	  to	  the	  nation	  as	  wives, mothers, biological and cultural reproducers and nurturers.  The Shah argued that throughout history women had shown themselves to be unequal to men in ability, and that he had consequently never allowed a woman to influence him at any time in his life. 
Women	  are	  important	  in	  a	  man’s	  life	  only	  if	  they’re	  beautiful	  and	  
charming	  and	  keep	  their	  femininity…this	  business	  of	  feminism,	  for	  instance.  What do these feminists want?  What do you want?  You say 
equality.	  	  Oh!	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  seem	  rude,	  but…you’re equal in the eyes of the law but not excuse my saying so, in ability.51  
So	  whilst	  he	  stressed	  modern	  Iranian	  labour	  law	  provided	  ‘equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  
work’	  regardless	  of	  sex,	  and	  that	  more	  government	  positions	  were	  now	  open	  to	  women on an ‘equal	  basis’, he	  ultimately	  emphasised	  women’s	  main	  civic	  roles	  as wives and mothers, primarily defining them as supporters and nurturers of the nation through their support and nurturing of the family.52  
The	  educated	  Persian	  woman	  of	  today…must	  be	  a	  good	  wife…as	  her	  husband’s	  intellectual	  companion.	  	  Her	  next	  major	  task	  is	  the	  proper	  
training	  of	  her	  children…finally	  she	  must	  contribute	  to	  the	  modernisation	  
                                                 48 Ibid. 49 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, p. 237. 50 Ibid, p. 235. 51 Fallaci, pp. 271-272. 52 Ibid, p. 236. 
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of her country by taking part in welfare and other civic functions; she must forget prestige and social position.53  Viewing social services as an extension of women’s	  maternal and nurturing roles in the family, he encouraged and defined this line of work as nationalist activity for women.   Farmanfarmaian recollected that in the fall of 1958 the Shah had become curious about her School for Social Work, asking if her activities were really 
necessary	  when	  his	  own	  family	  oversaw	  a	  ‘great	  deal	  of	  social	  service’	  already.54  
Farmanfarmaian	  explained	  her	  institution’s	  purpose	  was	  specifically	  to	  train	  personnel in social services, and informed him that the current orphanages and institutions were far from satisfactory.55 
All	  at	  once	  the	  Shah	  jumped	  up	  impatiently…went	  to	  his	  telephone…he	  ordered the listener on the other end to see that in the future, the Tehran School Of Social Work would receive 20,000 rials a month (about 300 
dollars)…I	  could	  hardly	  wait	  to	  begin	  saying	  smoothly	  to	  reluctant	  donors	  
at	  dinner	  parties	  ‘The	  Shah	  himself	  is	  already	  supporting	  our	  work’.56  Farmanfarmian explained that she could not have taken social work to Iran without the support of the regime, as there were no private foundations to get financial aid from, and fundamentally no undertaking could succeed without the 
regime’s	  support.57  The	  Shah’s	  writings	  indicate	  that	  he	  viewed	  himself	  as	  the	  nation itself, its rescuer, declaring that he had almost single-handedly	  ‘saved	  the	  
country’. I mean, it’s not fair for me to take all the credit for myself for the great 
things	  that	  I’ve	  done	  for	  Iran.	  	  Mind	  you	  I	  could.	  	  But	  I	  don’t	  want	  to,	  because I know that there was someone else behind me.  It was God.58   
                                                 53 Ibid. 54 Farmanfarmaian, p. 245. 55 Ibid, pp. 245-246. 56 Ibid, p. 247. 57 Ibid, p. 208. 58 Fallaci, p. 268. 
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His	  statements	  and	  actions	  indicated	  that	  he	  believed	  Iran’s	  ‘modern’	  image	  
would	  be	  portrayed	  through	  his	  own	  image	  as	  a	  ‘modern’	  and	  enlightened liberator.   Early in 1961 the Shah declared that he would like to see Iranian women 
enjoy	  the	  same	  basic	  rights	  as	  men,	  but	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  women’s	  suffrage	  
should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  absence	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  arguing	  ‘the	  women	  of	  Switzerland still do not vote, but that is scarcely a sign that they have no	  rights’.59  Such comparisons demonstrated that despite statements to the contrary, the Shah held Western Europe and the US as his ideal modernisation models.   This desire often led to exaggerated statements about the modernisation, or rather westernisation of gender-relations in Iran.  For example when discussing female education in 1961 he wrote  
There	  are	  now	  some	  2,000	  girls	  studying	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Tehran…all	  of our universities are co-educational and there you increasingly see our young men and women associating with easy informality.60    Yet, Shirin Ebadi described her experience at law school three years later, 
pointing	  out	  that	  gender	  segregation	  or	  ‘traditional	  formalities’	  were	  still	  upheld	  by students themselves.   The students at Tehran University came from middle or working-class 
backgrounds	  and	  didn’t	  view	  their	  social	  lives	  as	  a	  realm	  for	  
experimentation…in	  class	  women	  still	  occupied	  the	  front	  rows,	  and	  men	  the back.61    Thus, a substantial gap existed between the state/Shah’s	  definition of gender-relations, and what gender-relations looked like on the ground amongst the majority of the population.  
                                                 59 Ibid, p. 235. 60 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Mission For My country, p. 234. 61 Ebadi, p.19. 
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 Conflating the nation with the monarchy,	  the	  Shah	  equated	  the	  nation’s	  progress with the projection of his own international image as a progressive modernising monarch.  Consequently, he attempted to bring all progressive 
movements,	  like	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement,	  into	  the	  regime’s	  fold,	  co-opting independent activity so that he could present progressive reforms as benevolent state grants.  The	  Shah’s	  definition	  of	  women’s	  emancipation	  made	  no	  room	  for	  personal or professional ambition, encouraging women to	  extend	  their	  ‘natural’	  domestic skills to the welfare of the wider national community.  By underlining a 
woman’s	  primary	  responsibility as familial, the Shah underlined her political position as secondary to that of her men folk.  However, women attempted to 
strike	  bargains	  with	  the	  Shah’s	  government	  around	  his	  desire	  to	  appear	  modern	  and enlightened, whilst simultaneously challenging his patriarchal limitations 
and	  definitions	  of	  feminism	  and	  women’s	  emancipation,	  as	  the	  next	  sections	  will	  show. 
2.2 Ashraf	  Pahlavi	  and	  The	  High	  Council	  of	  Women’s	  Organisation Badr ol-Molouk Bamdad, Saffiyeh Firuz and Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi were among those women’s	  rights	  activists,	  who	  despite	  earlier	  setbacks	  during	  the	  Mossadegh era, attempted to capitalise on the regime change, by enlisting the 
help	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  sister, Ashraf.  Bamdad recalled the re-establishment of 
Dowlatshahi’s	  organisation,	  Rah-e-Now (The New Path) society, in 1955, which set up a welfare centre in south Tehran, providing literacy classes and teaching domestic science and childcare.62  She writes that in 1956 a manifesto was published by a federative body composed of the Council of Women of Iran, the 
Women’s	  League	  of	  Supporters	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  the	  Women’s	  
                                                 62 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, pp. 109-110. 
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Relief	  Committee	  of	  Tehran,	  the	  New	  Path	  Society,	  the	  Women’s	  Teachers’	  Association, and the Women Medical Practitioners Centre, reinstating their 
commitment	  to	  ‘winning	  equality	  of	  women’s	  rights	  with	  men’.63   However, Mahnaz Afkhami, who would become secretary	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Organisation of Iran (WOI), explained that women struggled to unite and coordinate their efforts, and that that after several failed attempts to unify various organisations	  like	  the	  New	  Path	  Society	  and	  the	  Women’s	  League	  of	  
Supporters	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  women	  went	  to	  Ashraf	  Pahlavi,	  ‘a	  
powerful	  personality	  in	  her	  own	  right’,	  to	  ask	  her	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  movement.64  She wrote that in response, the princess commissioned A 50-member organising committee to prepare the articles of association 
for	  a	  new	  federal	  body	  called	  the	  High	  Council	  of	  Women’s	  Organisations	  of Iran.  The High Council came into being formally in 1959 with a 
membership	  of	  17	  organisations…It	  concentrated	  its	  efforts	  largely	  on	  gaining the franchise.65 
 However, Ashraf Pahlavi gave a different account of these events, arguing that at 
the	  time	  she	  began	  her	  work	  for	  women’s	  rights,	  Iran	  had	  but	  ‘a	  few	  scattered 
women’s	  organisations	  working	  at	  random,	  without	  any	  long-range goals or 
purpose’,	  and	  that	  she	  had	  been	  the	  person	  to	  initiate	  contact	  with	  these	  groups,	  
meeting	  with	  their	  representatives	  to	  ‘create	  a	  framework	  for	  our	  women’s	  
movement’.66  Her portrayal of herself as	  ‘initiator’	  and	  leader	  of	  the	  movement	  is not surprising when put into the context of her inflated sense of self-importance and domineering character, which were partly fuelled by her political experiences up to that point.   
                                                 63 Ibid, p. 107 64 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organisation	  of	  Iran’,	  pp.	  112-113. 65 Ibid, p. 113. 66 Ashraf Pahalavi, p. 154. 
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By this stage, Ashraf Pahlavi had already developed a controversial 
reputation	  as	  a	  covert	  political	  force	  behind	  her	  father	  and	  brother’s	  regimes.	  	  Mossadegh himself argued she had conspired with the Americans to mastermind the 1953 Coup, pointing to an article in the French newspaper Le Figaro on 20 September 1955, that he argued proved the true identity of those who were behind his overthrow.67  On 11 August 1953, Alan Dulles (Director of CIA) held a secret meeting at the foot of the Swiss Alps with two very important persons.  One was Roy 
Henderson,	  American	  ambassador	  to	  Iran…the	  other	  VIP	  was	  the	  Shah’s	  twin sister, Princess Ashraf.68  Ashraf Pahlavi recounted the role she played in assisting the Americans and 
British	  in	  ‘aiding’	  her	  brother	  against	  Mossadegh’s regime.69  According to her, while in France, she secretly met two men who turned out to be the personal representatives of John Foster Dulles and Winston Churchill.70  She explained that her role was to deliver a message to the Shah, and that she was given an Air France flight number to Iran and instructed to be at Orly Airport just before flight time.71  When Mossadegh became aware of her presence in Iran she was 
ordered	  to	  leave	  within	  24	  hours.	  	  In	  that	  time	  she	  was	  able	  to	  pass	  the	  ‘secret	  
letter’,	  whose contents	  ‘she	  still	  cannot	  reveal’,	  to	  her	  brother	  via	  Queen	  Soraya.72   
The	  pride	  expressed	  over	  this	  ‘contribution’	  not	  only	  illustrates	  an	  imperious and dismissive attitude towards popular Iranian feeling at the time, but an uncompromising ambition in maintaining her familial dynasty.  This is 
                                                 67 Dr Mohammad Musaddiq,	  Musaddiq’s	  Memoirs, ed. Homa Katouzian, trans. SH Amin and H Katouzian (London: JEBHE National Movement of Iran, 1988), pp. 282-283. 68 Ibid. 69 Ashraf Pahalavi, p. 134. 70 Ibid, p. 135. 71 Ibid, p. 136. 72 Ibid, pp.138, 140. 
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interesting when put in the context of her later role as a feminist leader.  Her references to covert meetings with international leaders show that she saw herself as a serious political player.  One such example was her secret meetings with Joseph Stalin in 1946, to convince him to end Russian support for the Azerbaijan Republic.73  She	  admitted	  ‘this	  involvement	  of	  mine	  in	  politics	  generated a well-oiled rumour machine...soon European newspapers christened 
me	  ‘The	  Power	  Behind	  the	  Throne’	  and	  ‘The	  Black	  Panther	  of	  Iran’’.74  She 
blamed	  the	  rumours	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  politics	  was	  ‘an	  exclusively	  male	  domain’	  in	  Iran.75 Denied an official political role, she negotiated around these constraints to dictate a realm she was authorised	  to,	  ‘women’s	  rights’.	  	  Her	  actions	  can	  be	  seen	  as an attempt to challenge male domination of politics and patriarchal limits on 
women’s	  political	  activity	  through	  her	  leadership	  and	  work	  with	  the	  High	  
Council	  of	  Women’s	  Organisations	  (later	  the	  WOI).  
2.3 The Discourse of Westoxification  
While	  the	  Shah	  was	  writing	  about	  Iran’s	  modernisation	  advances	  in	  his	  1961	  memoirs, his regime was engaged in brutal suppression of oppositional protests characterised by the riots of Tehran University students in January 1962, and the arrest of oppositional National Front leaders in December 1962.76 1962 was also the year that Jalal Al-i-Ahmad’s	  infamous	  book	  Gharbzadeghi was first secretly published. During the 1960s Al-i-Ahmad became an intellectual leader for a new generation of Iranian thinkers.77   Gharbzadeghi (‘Occidentosis’,	  ‘Westoxification’,	  
or	  ‘West-struckness’)	  highlighted	  a	  major	  concern	  among	  many	  Iranians	  who	  
                                                 73 Ibid, p. 86. 74 Ibid, p. 76. 75 Ibid. 76 Keddie, Modern Iran, pp. 143, 145. 77 Ibid, p. 189.
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were struggling with notions of authenticity and national identity in reaction to Pahlavi modernisation reforms and the westernisation of Iranian society.  Prior to the rise of Mossadegh, Al-i-Ahmad had been a member of the Communist Tudeh Party, but left the party along with a group of activists led by Khalil Mailiki, after the Tudeh insisted on defending	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  refusal	  to	  prevent an autonomous and largely communist Azerbaijan from being toppled by the Iranian government.78  He became politically active again when the departed group formed an alliance with Hizb-i-Zahmat-Kashan (Toiler’s party) to support Mossadegh and his oil nationalisation campaign in the Majlis.79 In his famous work, Al-i-Ahmad	  wrote	  ‘I	  speak	  of	  ‘occidentosis’	  as	  of	  
tuberculosis’.80  This	  ‘disease	  from	  the	  West’,	  he	  argued,	  had	  led	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  
true	  Iranian	  ‘culture’, and authenticity, compromising Iranian identity.  Al-i-Ahmad explained that Iran had resorted to Gharbzadeh (westoxified) actions, which he defined as the blind imitation of western models of modernity, culture, industrialisation, education, economics, social behaviour, turning it into a 
political	  and	  economic	  ‘pawn’	  of	  the	  West.	  He	  defined	  the	  occident	  as	  Europe,	  
Soviet	  Russia,	  and	  North	  America,	  and	  the	  ‘occidentotic’	  as	  one	  without	  belief,	  character or authenticity, without direction or aim, who was neither religious nor irreligious.81   He described him as schooled, literate, perhaps educated, but 
effeminate,	  always	  ‘sprucing	  himself	  up’,	  obsessed	  with	  European	  fashion	  and	  Western industrial goods.82  He declared that the various European style schools 
in	  Iran	  showed	  no	  trace	  of	  tradition,	  ‘no	  relation	  between	  yesterday	  and	  
                                                 78 Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, p. 11. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid, p. 27. 81 Ibid, pp. 94-95. 82 Ibid, pp. 95-96. 
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tomorrow,	  between	  home	  and	  school,	  between	  East	  and	  West’	  and	  thus	  churned	  out deficient individuals.83  Moreover,	  he	  accused	  ‘westoxification’ of increasing fanaticism in religious quarters,	  writing	  ‘the	  clergy	  have	  drawn	  into	  their	  
cocoons	  of	  fanaticism	  and	  paralysis	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  West’s	  onslaught’.84 Al-i-Ahmad’s	  critique	  challenged	  Pahlavi	  gender	  definitions	  and	  women’s	  
reforms.	  	  In	  his	  chapter	  entitled	  ‘war	  of	  contradictions’	  he	  wrote	  ‘we	  now	  resemble an alien people, with unfamiliar customs, a culture with no roots in our 
land	  and	  no	  chance	  of	  blossoming	  here’.	  	  He	  defined	  the	  5th contradiction of 
occidentosis as	  the	  ‘emancipation	  of	  women’:	  	   We believe women cannot be judges, cannot serve as witnesses, and as for voting or serving in the Majlis, the whole idea is idiotic, since even men 
have	  no	  such	  right,	  really…Divorce,	  too,	  is	  the	  male	  prerogative…so	  we	  really have given women only the right to parade themselves in public.85    
The	  statement	  highlighted	  Pahlavi	  reforms	  such	  as	  Reza	  Shah’s	  unveiling policy 
as	  superficial	  ‘westoxified’ notions that had not translated into any serious changes for women in terms of greater social or political rights. Unless the work of men and women and their services to society are equally valued and paid, unless alongside men, women assume responsibility for administering a sector of society (other than the home, a private function shared between men and women) unless material and spiritual equality is established between the sexes, we will have succeeded only in swelling an army of consumers of powder and lipstick-
the	  products	  of	  the	  West’s	  industries-another form of occidentosis.  I am 
speaking	  here	  of	  the	  cities,	  of	  the	  nation’s	  leadership,	  from which women are excluded.86  In this passage, he challenged the	  Shah’s	  primary	  definition	  of	  women’s	  responsibility as domestic and put forward a more political definition of women’s	  roles, arguing familial responsibilities should be shared between men 
                                                 83 Ibid, p. 113. 84 Ibid, p. 117. 85 Ibid, pp.70-71. 86 Ibid. 
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and women, and that women should be responsible for other sectors of society alongside men, including national leadership. We have drawn women, the preservers of tradition, family, and future generations into vacuity, into the street. We have forced them into ostentation and frivolity, every day to freshen up and try on a new style and wander around..87  By emphasising	  women’s	  roles	  as	  ‘preservers	  of	  tradition’ his portrayal of Pahlavi womanhood as ‘westoxified’ and thus inauthentic, represented a wider attack on Iranian culture and nationhood as defined by the Shah.  In other words, his reinterpretation and application of the age-old constructed ‘East-West’ dichotomy	  to	  the	  Pahlavi	  state,	  placed	  its	  women’s	  reforms	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  
this	  ‘divide’,	  and	  encouraged	  the	  assessment	  of	  female	  behaviour and sartorial practices as a way of testing/proving cultural authenticity.   
2.4 The	  Shah’s	  1963	  White Revolution and Female Suffrage 
The	  Shah’s	  1963	  White	  Revolution	  was	  largely	  responsible	  for	  his	  international	  
image	  as	  a	  champion	  of	  women’s	  emancipation.	  	  The	  White	  Revolution	  was	  a	  six-
point	  reformist	  program,	  which	  included	  women’s	  suffrage	  alongside	  land	  reform, sale of government owned factories to finance land reform, nationalisation of forests, a national literacy corps, and a plan to give workers a share of industrial profits.88  While the White Revolution confronted the issue of 
women’s	  political	  rights	  and	  led to the appointment of women to parliament, it nevertheless upheld many contradictions and hypocritical double standards, which some women chose to confront.   
Referring	  to	  the	  suffrage	  reform	  the	  Shah	  argued,	  ‘How	  could	  we	  claim	  to	  be progressive and liberal and at the same time imprison half our society in such 
                                                 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid, p. 145. 
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a	  situation?’89  Yet, Bamdad explained that while the White Revolution did contain a six-point program, the right to vote on the referendum was not initially 
extended	  to	  women	  and	  was	  defined	  ‘in	  accordance with the existing electoral 
laws;	  ‘i.e.	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  would	  be	  reserved	  for	  men	  and	  denied	  to	  the	  other	  
half	  of	  the	  nation’.90  Bamdad wrote that	  women’s	  associations	  were	  ‘deeply	  angered when they learned in this all-important referendum the old notion that 
only	  men	  inherit	  human	  rights	  would	  still	  prevail’,	  and	  so	  on	  the	  anniversary	  of	  
Reza	  Shah’s	  Unveiling	  Decree,	  on	  7	  January	  1963,	  they	  published	  a	  cancellation	  notice of their annual celebration in protest.91  The	  Council	  of	  Iranian	  Women’s	  Organisations met instead to demand the right to vote and protest in front of the Iranian Majlis/senate ‘mahrum-mandan-i-zanan az huquq-i-haq makhsusan 
khoddari-i-dolat  az  entekhabat’  (the  ongoing  deprivation  of  women’s  legitimate 
rights,  especially  the  government’s  refusal  of  their  electoral  rights).92  This spontaneous and earnest upsurge definitely expedited the enactment of legislation to grant Iranian women full civic and political rights as part of the Charter of the White Revolution of the Shah and People.93  
Thus,	  according	  to	  Bamdad’s	  account,	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  challenged the patriarchal limits of the White Revolution from the outset.   Bamadad’s	  choice	  of	  wording	  illustrates that the earlier suffrage petitions of 1943 and 1952 had helped solidify the idea of female suffrage as a critical and legitimate component of patriarchal bargains going forward for activists like Bamdad, Firuz, and Dowlatshahi.  Moreover, lawyer Mehrangiz Manuchehriyan founded Ettehad-i Zanan-i Huquqdan-i Iran (The Union of Iranian Women 
                                                 89 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, The White Revolution (Tehran: Imperial Pahlavi Library, 1967), p. 92. 90 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 116. 91 Ibid, p. 117. 92 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, pp. 107, 108. 93 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 118. 
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Lawyers) in 1961, which republished her thesis ‘Integad-i Gavanin-i Assasi va 
Madani va Kayfari-yi-Iran az Nazareh Huquq-i-Zanan’ (Criticism	  of	  Iran’s	  Constitutional, Civil,	  and	  Criminal	  laws	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  Women’s	  Rights)	  in 1963 through one of its constituents, the volunteer Organisation for the Protection of the Family.94  Women’s bargaining leverage on suffrage being stronger at this point given the Shah’s	  desire to present himself as an advanced or modern emancipator, these	  women’s	  rights	  activists used the opportunity to 
extend	  the	  regime’s	  initial	  reforms,	  introducing	  and	  striking	  new	  patriarchal	  
bargains	  with	  the	  state	  over	  this	  specific	  issue.	  	  The	  Shah’s	  reflection on these 
reforms	  years	  later,	  ‘thanks	  to	  the	  reforms,	  Iran	  was	  earning	  her	  place	  alongside	  
the	  most	  advanced	  states’,	  demonstrated these motives in granting women suffrage.95   By the summer of 1963, fundamentalist clerics were rallying the masses, 
and	  charging	  the	  regime	  with	  attacking	  Islam	  and	  people’s	  freedoms.96  At the centre of clerical opposition to the	  1963	  reforms,	  particularly	  women’s	  suffrage, was Ruhollah Khomeini.  In March 1963 paratroopers and SAVAK attacked the 
Faiziyeh religious school in Qom, where Khomeini preached, and a number of students were killed.97  On 3 June 1963, on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, Khomeini gave a scathing anti-Shah sermon, drawing parallels 
between	  him	  and	  the	  ‘inhumane’	  Ummayad	  leader	  Yazid	  ibn	  Mu’awiya,	  who	  
                                                 94 Khorasani, Ardalan, Sinatur, p. 242. 95 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The	  Shah’s	  Story, trans. Teresa Waugh (London: Michael Joseph, 1980), p. 112. 96 Stempel, p. 6.  97 Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 147 
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waged	  war	  on	  the	  prophet’s	  grandson	  Hussein,	  and	  ‘defenceless	  women	  and	  
innocent	  children’.98  What business did it have with the madrasa or with its students, like the eighteen year-old sayyid who was killed?…they are fundamentally opposed to Islam itself and the existence of the religious class.99   He argued the attack on Faiziyeh had been an Israeli plan and accused the Shah of being an Israeli puppet100 Denouncing the Shah as an imperialist puppet of Israel and America, he labelled the White Revolution a deliberate ‘deception’ of the Iranian people’.101  Farmanfarmaian recalled how Khomeini’s	  speech,	  and	  his	  threats against the regime led to his immediate arrest.102 News of his arrest saw traditional processions of mourning blow up into anti-regime demonstrations, spreading to other major cities.103   Prime Minister Assadollah Alam used severe military force to crush the uprising.104  It took several days to end the uprising, with a death toll numbering in the hundreds, although figures would swell into the thousands in the propaganda build-up to the 1979 Revolution.105  Farmanfarmaian’s	  school	  substantiated the raised death toll, authenticating the claims of over a thousand 
families,	  ‘the	  number	  would	  have	  been	  twice	  that,	  had	  victims’ relatives not been 
afraid	  their	  names	  would	  end	  up	  in	  SAVAK	  files’.106  Farmanfarmaian wrote that 
                                                 98 Ruhollah	  Khomeini,	  ‘The	  Afternoon	  of	  ‘Ashura’	  speech,	  delivered	  on	  3	  June	  1963	  at	  Fayziya	  Madrasa in Qum, in Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkley: Mizan Press, 1981), pp. 177-180. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Farmanfarmaian, p. 252 103 Stempel, p. 6.  104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Farmanfarmaian, pp. 252-254. 
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realising the riots had been a political disaster, the cabinet and Prime Minister Alam attempted to compensate the victims by contacting her school for help.107   Not believing that Iranian soldiers would shoot at them, the protesters kept marching.  The army, under orders to shoot to kill, mowed them down.  The riots that followed in the capital and in other cities for the next 3 days were the worst of modern times...the central city was a battle zone.108  
The	  regime’s	  attack	  on	  its own people gave greater credibility to notions of the state as an inauthentic, as a western/American/Israeli agent, thus strengthening the arguments of oppositional thinkers like Al-i-Ahmed and Islamist clerics like Khomeini. 
2.5 The WOI and The 1967 Family Protection Act  
Despite	  the	  conservative	  backlash	  to	  the	  Shah’s	  White	  Revolution	  reforms,	  some	  
female	  activists	  manoeuvred	  their	  activity	  around	  the	  state’s	  goals	  in	  order	  to	  
garner	  more	  support	  for	  their	  initiatives.	  	  Bamdad	  argued	  that	  Iran’s	  women’s	  movement owed much to the support of Ashraf Pahlavi, who, she wrote, 
immediately	  called	  on	  women’s	  associations	  to	  organise	  anti-illiteracy classes 
throughout	  the	  country	  in	  line	  with	  her	  brother’s	  White	  Revolution	  literacy	  campaign.109  Discussing the changes that came into place when Ashraf first 
became	  ‘honorary president’	  of	  the	  17	  pre-existing	  women’s	  organisations	  in	  1959, she recalled, In the following years the scale of activity grew so much that a new and expanded organisation was founded on 20 August 1966 by HH Princess Ashraf.110 
According	  to	  Afkhami	  when	  the	  Women’s	  Organisation	  of	  Iran	  (WOI)	  was	  formally created in November 1966, a 5,000-member assembly of women 
                                                 107 Ibid, p. 253. 108 Ibid, p.252 109 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, pp. 121-122. 110 Ibid, p. 112. 
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representatives from all regions of the country was elected, and 55 existing 
women’s	  associations affiliated themselves to the newly created body.111  She added that thanks to the White Revolution a new attitude of positive caution 
began	  operating	  with	  regards	  to	  women’s	  rights,	  which	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  women to communicate their demands.112  As	  benefactors	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  regime,	  it is not surprising that the writings of both Bamdad, president of the Civil Rights Committee of the High Council of Iranian Women, and Mahnaz Afkhami, secretary general of the WOI between 1970-1978, painted a positive picture of 
Ashraf	  Pahlavi’s	  leadership	  and	  experiences	  with	  the	  WOI.	  	  However,	  there	  were	  
a	  few	  women	  within	  the	  state	  system	  who	  directly	  challenged	  the	  regime’s	  policies from both political and feminist perspectives.   Writer Azar Nafisi’s	  mother,	  Nezhat Nafisi, was one of the first women along with Mehrangiz Manuchehriyan to enter the Senate (or upper-house of the 
Majlis in 1963 as part of the White Revolution reforms.113 In 1964 when the government brought the controversial Capitulation Law to Parliament, which gave diplomatic immunity to American military personal and placed them beyond the jurisdiction of Iranian civil and criminal courts, Nezhat Nafisi was one of the few who refused to support the bill.114  While	  Nezhat	  Nafisi’s	  rejection	  of the Capitulation Law gained her respect from many people, her decision to 
oppose	  the	  Family	  Protection	  Law	  of	  1967	  confused	  many,	  and	  ‘scandalised	  
those	  who	  were	  pushing	  for	  women’s	  rights’.115 Ashraf Pahlavi described the 
‘uphill	  fight’	  and	  ‘hundreds	  of	  hours’	  of	  labouring behind the passage of the 
                                                 111 Mahnaz	  Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organization	  Of	  Iran,	  p.	  114. 112 Ibid. 113 Azar Nafisi, p. 149. 114 Ibid, p. 153. 115 Ibid. 
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Family	  Protection	  Act,	  which	  she	  described	  as	  one	  of	  the	  WOI’s	  proudest	  achievements.116   Senator Manuchehriyan first drafted and submitted a new Family Protection Act, inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on October 24 1966, carrying the signatures of 15 other senators.117  Although Manuchehriyan’s	  campaign	  was	  not	  officially	  tied	  to	  the	  WOI’s	  activities,	  their	  campaigns were not unlinked.118 The Novin Party, of which Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi was a member, similarly announced the opening of an Iranian Women’s	  seminar	  to	  discuss	  various	  women’s	  rights	  issues,	  particularly	  the	  question of Family Law.  Only four out of the 14 speakers however were female, including Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi and future Minister of Education Dr Farokhro Parsa.  Khorasani and Ardalan argue that these proceedings encouraged competition between the various parties and groups involved in the drafting and submission of these family laws, encouraging women to work in parallel with each other rather than unifying their efforts to gain greater support.119  Ashraf Pahlavi explained that in order to get male support, especially from the religious sector, women of the WOI had to make many compromises and be careful how they presented things, reassuring men at the same time as pushing for more changes. We enlisted the cooperation of various ministers…and we sought the 
endorsement	  of	  Iran’s	  more	  progressive	  mullahs,	  to	  whom	  we	  always	  
prefaced	  our	  appeals	  with	  such	  remarks	  as;	  “Well,	  of	  course	  we	  understand 
that	  a	  woman’s	  primary	  responsibility	  is	  to	  her	  husband	  and	  her	  children,	  
but…”120   
                                                 116 Ashraf Pahalavi, pp. 155-156. 117 Khorasani, Ardalan, Sinatur, pp.265-266. 118 Ibid, p. 266. 119 Ibid. 120 Ashraf Pahalavi, 156. 
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The Act was passed in 1967, and again in stronger form in 1975, with Ashraf Pahlavi arguing it	  gave	  Iranian	  women	  ‘the	  most	  sweeping	  civil	  rights	  in	  the	  Islamic Middle East’,	  as	  it	  recognised	  a	  wife	  as	  an	  equal	  partner	  in	  marriage	  and	  divorce, seriously limited polygamy by applying strict conditions to it, including 
a	  first	  wife’s	  consent,	  and	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  divorce	  granted	  her	  child	  custody	  and	  established a process through which she could collect alimony and child support.121   
However,	  Nezhat	  Nafisi’s	  opposition	  to	  the	  original	  Act	  in	  1967	  was	  based	  on her view that it was hypocritical to pass a law claiming to protect women when they still required the notarised permission of their husbands to leave the country.122  Azar Nafisi wrote that she disagreed with her mother about the Family Protection Law, and felt she was too inflexible in not accepting the compromise the Act proposed.123  Yet, state feminists like Bamdad also wrote that the Family Protection Law did not touch on many areas where reform was desperately needed, and that the areas it did touch upon where often difficult to implement due to a lack of educational	  and	  ‘moral’	  advancement.124  
Nafisi’s	  outspoken criticism showed that the same patriarchal bargain was not necessarily acceptable to all state feminists at all times, and that some were willing to speak out, while others like Bamdad chose to accept the compromise and persist around the contradictions and constraints applying the 
WOI’s	  strategy	  of	  reassuring	  men	  whilst	  pushing	  for	  more	  changes.	  	  However,	  despite some positive gains for women, growing opposition to the White Revolution and works like Al-e-Ahmed’s	  ‘Gharbzadeghi’ demeaned the efforts 
                                                 121 Ashraf Pahalavi, p. 155. 122 Azar Nafisi, p. 153. 123 Ibid. 124 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 125. 
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and authenticity of the WOI by portraying it as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  inauthentic,	  ‘westoxified’	  regime.	  	  In	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  1979	  Revolution, 
‘patriarchal battles’ between the state and the opposition would see alternative models of modern Iranian womanhood compete for authenticity as the next chapter will show.   
Section 3:  Egyptian	  feminism	  and	  Women’s	  Rights	  under	  Nasser 
Unlike	  the	  Shah,	  Nasser’s motives in granting women the vote was not inspired by a desire to present himself as a modern emancipator by western standards, but instead by his definition and promotion of a new pan-Arab socialist ideology.   
Soha	  Abdel	  Kader	  argues	  that	  Nasser’s	  socialist	  ideology	  incorporated	  a	  commitment to gender-equality, which led to Egyptian women being granted the vote and right to run for political office in 1956.125 Nelson and Talhami have argued that Nasser granted women the vote in an attempt to win the support of women from different classes and co-opt	  the	  women’s	  movement,126 and to help 
him	  develop	  a	  new	  female	  leadership	  more	  compatible	  with	  the	  regime’s	  socialist outlook.127  State feminism, Hatem argues, thus contributed to the 
political	  legitimacy	  of	  Nasser’s	  regime	  and	  its	  progressive	  credentials.128  This section argues that while Nasser’s	  socialist	  leanings	  meant	  a	  commitment to gender-equality,	  he	  still	  defined	  ‘different’	  duties	  for	  men	  and	  women.  He emphasised	  women’s	  duties	  in	  ‘work,	  the	  factory,	  technical	  
education	  and	  military	  training’	  in	  accordance	  with	  socialist	  constructs	  of 
                                                 125 Abdel Kader, p. 116. 126 Nelson, Doria Shafik, p. 227. 127 Ghada Talhami, p. 19. 128 Mervat	  F.	  Hatem,	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  and	  Political	  Liberation	  in	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  and	  the	  Demise	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Feminism’,	  International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, May 1992, p. 231. 
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womanhood, defining their nationalist roles as teachers and nurturers of the next generation.  Yet he also defined the family, particularly	  women’s	  special	  role	  within the family, as the basis of society, limiting women’s	  political and military activity, as his speech in November 1959 showed.   Building on Nelson and Talhami, this section argues secondly that Nasser not only wished to co-opt women of different classes but of different ideological groups as well.  Thus, rather than seeking to co-opt	  the	  ‘women’s	  movement’,	  it	  is	  argued that Nasser sought to co-opt and reward women who complemented his own views, whether they were feminists or Islamist women, with or without 
direct	  ties	  to	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement.	  	  As such women like al-Said and al-Shati’ were both useful to the state, even though they promoted very different 
women’s	  discourses.  Al-Said’s	  stress	  on	  equal	  education opportunities directly complemented	  Nasser’s	  reforms,	  while	  al-Shati’s	  description	  of	  ideal	  Muslim	  women as politically supportive, rather than politically independent, and as 
maternal	  nurturers,	  coincided	  with	  Nasser’s	  own	  ideas. 
Nasser’s	  political	  legitimacy did not go unchallenged by both women opposed to his regime, and very occasionally, by those co-opted or working with the regime.  For instance, al-Said chose certain moments to critique the regime 
on	  issues	  like	  Personal	  Status	  Law	  and	  women’s	  new	  economic	  burdens.	  	  
However,	  Doria	  Shafiq’s	  one-woman assault on the regime, coming at a volatile 
period	  of	  Nasser’s	  leadership, transgressed both existing state	  limits	  on	  women’s	  political activity,	  and	  limits	  of	  women’s	  nationalist behaviour upheld by other female activists, resulting in a double blow of state suppression, and being 
outcast	  by	  the	  wider	  women’s	  movement.	  	  Al-Ghazali, on the other hand, 
challenged	  patriarchal	  control	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  ‘apostate’,	  whilst	  choosing to 
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cooperate and negotiate around the patriarchal limits of the Islamist movement in pursuit of their common goal of an Islamic state.  It is argued thirdly, that Nasser tolerated criticism from state-supported feminist al-Said because it did not break bargains made with the regime over common goals, but excluded, outlawed and suppressed women like Shafiq and al-Ghazali, irrespective of their different socio-political affiliations, because their actions transgressed state 
limits	  on	  women’s	  political	  behaviour.  
3.1  Nasser’s	  Arab	  Socialist	  Woman Like the Shah, Nasser understood that women had to join the public and professional spheres if the country was to compete with other modern nations.  From the start he had been careful to reassure people that his brand of socialism was a balanced one, reiterating to Esther Fahmi Wissa upon ascending the 
presidency	  that	  the	  regime’s	  trend	  of	  thought	  was	  ‘oriented	  towards a balanced Socialism, not the type of Socialism that you were afraid of.  I think that such a 
program	  will	  lessen	  the	  possibility	  of	  political	  extremism’.129  He explained his brand of socialism in a speech he gave in 1965 at the Training Camp of The Arab Socialist Union Youth Leaders at Helwan. Our Socialism emanates from our own conditions.  Socialism means the 
elimination	  of	  man’s	  exploitation	  by	  his	  fellow men…	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  
means	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  prosperous	  society	  by	  any	  means…this,	  simply,	  is	  socialism. 130   Article 2 of the 1956 Constitution guaranteed voting for men and women over the age of 18, while article 61 defined women’s ‘contribution	  to	  public	  life	  as	  a	  
                                                 129 Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser,	  ‘Translation	  of	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  to	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  Fahmy	  Wissa,	  5	  August	  
1956’,	  in	  Hanna	  Fahmy	  Wissa,	  Assiout: the Saga of an Egyptian Family, (Lewes: The Book Guild 1994), p. 414. 130 Gamal Abdel Nasser, ‘Address	  by	  President	  Nasser	  at	  Helwan,	  18	  November	  1965’,	  (Cairo:	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national	  duty’.131 Nasser’s	  commitment	  to	  gender	  equality	  was	  underlined	  in	  the	  
regime’s	  1962	  Charter,	  which	  declared	  that	  women	  were	  equal	  to	  men,	  and	  guaranteed equal opportunities, including free university education and guaranteed jobs for all graduates.132  However,	  while	  Nasser’s	  socialist	  leanings	  meant a commitment to gender-equality,	  he	  still	  referred	  to	  ‘different’	  duties	  for	  men and women.  Article 5 of the 1956 Constitution defined the family as the 
‘basis	  of	  society,	  founded	  on	  religion,	  morality,	  and	  nationalism’	  while	  article	  19 
stated	  the	  state	  would	  ‘facilitate	  the	  successful	  reconciling/balancing	  of	  women’s	  
work	  in	  society	  with	  her	  duties	  in	  the	  family’.133 Nasser argued that the Arab woman influenced society whether she wanted to or not—‘and	  her	  influence	  is	  great, whether at home, where she influences the family, or at school—she 
influences	  every	  stage	  of	  society’.134  Extending	  women’s	  nurturing	  role	  in	  the	  family to the wider nation, he defined women’s	  public roles through professional teaching.	  	  ‘Being	  teachers	  you	  have	  the	  responsibility	  in	  building	  this	  society.	  	  
Being	  teachers	  you	  have	  the	  responsibility	  of	  bringing	  up	  the	  new	  generation’.135   
While	  Nasser	  stressed	  women’s	  nationalist	  roles	  as	  teachers	  and	  nurturers of the next generation, both in the home and at school, he also underlined their industrial employment and economic contributions to 
production	  according	  to	  more	  socialist	  ideas.	  	  	  In	  an	  address	  at	  the	  Women’s	  
Teacher’s	  Military	  Training	  Camp	  in	  Alexandria in 1959, Nasser declared: 
                                                 131 Ahmad Taha Muhammad, al-Marah al-Misriyah Bayna al-Madi wa-al-Hadir (S.l: Mutbi  ‘a  Dar  
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  29. 133 Taha Muhammad, p.  71. 134 Gamal Abdel Nasser,	  ‘Arab	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  at	  the	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Now that the revolution has declared equality in rights and responsibilities, and now that the Arab girl can walk side by side with the Arab boy in constructing the country, whether in work, in the factory, in technical education or in military training, the Arab girl must believe and feel that she has a great role to play in the construction of this country.136    
His	  speech	  underlined	  women’s	  duties	  in	  ‘work,	  the	  factory,	  technical	  education	  
and	  military	  training’	  in	  accordance with socialist constructs of womanhood.  
However,	  there	  were	  limits	  to	  his	  definition	  of	  women’s	  political	  and	  military	  contributions.   Asked why Arab women were not recruited into the Army when they had stood side by side with men in the political, economic and social 
spheres	  since	  their	  ‘emancipation’,	  Nasser	  responded,	  ‘the	  answer	  to	  this	  question is very simple.  We still have plenty of men, and women have more 
duties	  ahead	  of	  them	  and	  different	  duties.’137   
Nasser’s	  wife,	  Tahia,	  did	  not	  partake	  in any political or feminist activity, and was generally kept uninformed of political decisions and events.138  Tahia 
Nasser’s	  memoirs	  show	  that	  her	  husband	  viewed	  her	  political	  role	  as	  a	  secondary and supportive one, her primary role being in the family sphere, and did not encourage her to take a more politically active, or public role.  Al-Jawwadi has argued that by virtue of their social, educational, and class 
upbringing,	  Nasser	  and	  most	  of	  his	  colleagues	  held	  more	  ‘conservative’	  views	  on	  
women’s	  activity, particularly in their own homes, and as such while the regime initiated many positive reforms for women, there were still powerful obstacles 
hindering	  women’s	  social	  and	  political	  participation.139 As the next sections will illustrate, Nasser only tolerated and promoted women’s	  discourses	  and	  activities	  where they complemented or strengthened his own political position, ruthlessly 
                                                 136 p. 370. 137 Nasser,	  ‘Address	  by	  President	  Nasser	  at	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  18	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  1965’,	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suppressing	  any	  form	  of	  women’s	  activity	  that appeared to be doing the opposite.    
3.2 Co-optation	  and	  Suppression	  of	  Egypt’s	  Female Activists Similarly to the Shah, Nasser cracked down on all forms of opposition and independent activity, which included political parties,	  the	  press,	  and	  women’s	  organisations.140   Nasser explained such measures partly through the definition of his brand of socialism, which he argued meant that political freedom would not be possible until all social exploitation had been removed, and that any domination by the state in the meantime was done to prevent exploitation.141 
At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  Nasser’s	  regime	  granted	  women	  the	  right	  to	  vote,	  it	  
also	  began	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  all	  independent	  women’s	  rights	  groups.	  	  The	  state	  attempted to co-opt	  feminist	  organisations	  like	  Shafiq’s	  Bint Al Nil Union, hoping to centralise their activities through the Ministry of Social Affairs.142  Shafiq 
objected	  to	  Nasser’s	  concessions	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  as	  women	  were	  required	  to	  apply in order to vote, they would have to demonstrate their literacy, a condition which was not required of men.143  As a sign of protest, Bint al Nil Union members refused to register, and in response the government prevented them from submitting their candidacy for election to parliament.144  Shafiq’s	  reaction	  isolated her from mainstream political views, and made many of her colleagues 
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begin to view her as dangerously inflexible.145 However, she continued to 
critique	  Nasser’s	  repressive	  leadership	  in	  Bint al Nil editorials arguing, During national crises, we found the Egyptian woman always ready to 
answer	  the	  nation’s	  call,	  fully aware that her civil and constitutional rights could not exist except in an independent and liberal homeland.146    Leftist women such as Aflatun, Nabarawi, and Islamist activists such as Zainab Al-Ghazali, while representing very different models to Shafiq were similarly worrisome to the state as a result of their independent activities, which crossed 
state	  limits	  on	  women’s	  socio-political activity.  In 1958, the Ministry of Interior 
banned	  Aflatun’s	  leftist	  organisation	  for	  ‘reasons	  associated	  with	  the country’s	  
security’.147  Aflatun described these events, writing that that the government 
was	  suffering	  from	  a	  dangerous	  disease’,	  which	  was	  ‘a	  loss	  of	  faith	  in	  the	  people	  and a constant fear of any independent organisations	  or	  unions.’148  She explained that in 1959 her house was searched and telephone lines cut, during what she described was a period of severe repression against leftist groups and communist groups in particular that lasted until 1964.149  She wrote that by 1959 the government was no longer showing any difference in the treatment and repression of men and women from the Egyptian left.150  Nabarawi was expelled from the EFU in 1959 under government pressure as a result of being labelled a communist.151  The EFU itself was also dismantled in the same year, and was only allowed to function as a social welfare society 
                                                 145 Ibid. 146 Doria	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under	  the	  title	  ‘The	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi	  Association’.152  New organisations were blocked, such as Ittihad al-Nisa’i al-Qawmi (The National Feminist Union), which was shut down in 1959,153 the same year Aflatun was sent to prison as part of 
Nasser’s	  round	  up	  of	  communists.154  The	  Muslim	  Sisterhood’s	  primary set-up as a social welfare service prevented it from initially being seen as a political threat.155  Nasser wished to co-opt all independent activism and control feminist activity, which meant that female activists who could not be co-opted, whether secular feminists or female Islamists, were excluded or repressed.  Moreover, 
women	  who	  directly	  confronted	  the	  regime’s	  limits	  paid	  the	  ultimate	  price	  with their freedom, as the cases of Shafiq and al-Ghazali illustrate. 
3.3  Rewards and Limits of Patriarchal Bargains with the Egyptian State  There were feminists who were willing to compromise with Nasser, and some whose brand of feminism or constructs of womanhood complemented his ideas.  These women were rewarded by the Egyptian State, while others continued to be suppressed.  Amina Al-Said, a	  protégé	  of	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi, promoted a brand of feminism that largely complemented	  the	  regime’s	  definitions	  of	  womanhood,	  in	  that it emphasised equal education and employment for women, which coincided 
with	  the	  state’s	  own	  gender-reform agenda.156  Al-Said published her own magazine, Hawa (Eve), which started overshadowing Shafiq’s	  Bint Al Nil by the mid-1950s.157  What made her more of an exception was that she used her writing to criticise	  some	  of	  the	  regime’s	  policies	  and	  decisions	  on	  Personal	  Status	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Law, women’s	  economic	  burdens,	  and	  Nasser’s decision to replace Huda 
Sha‘rawi’s	  house	  with	  a	  hotel.158  Moreover, she was regularly rewarded, becoming a member of the Board of the Press Syndicate in 1965, its vice president in1968,159 and receiving the First State Recognition Award from Nasser in 1963.160  It was also during this period, that women began to enter the domain of religious scholarship.161 Aisha Abd al-Rahman, also known by her pen name Bint al-Shati’, became one such example, but stood out because the Nasserite regime 
viewed	  her	  particular	  brand	  of	  religious	  scholarship	  ‘as	  moderate	  enough	  to	  be	  
useful’.162  It exalted and decorated her in an attempt to counterbalance the effects of its repressive measures against Islamists and feminists.  A professor of Islamic thought at Cairo University, her written works, Sukayna, Bint Al-Hussain (Sukayna, daughter of Hussain), Gabilat Bani Hashim/Zeinab Bint al Zahra 
Batalat Karbalah (Bani Hashim Tribe/Zeinab daughter of al-Zahra [Fatima], heroine of the battle of Karbala), and Banat al Nabi (The	  Prophet’s	  Daughters),	  all venerated female relatives of the Prophet as ideal models for Egyptian and Muslim women.  Al-Shati’ celebrated	  Fatima’s	  maternal	  and	  nurturing	  qualities,	  when she reinforced her descriptive title, ‘her	  father’s	  mother’,	  in	  her	  writings.163  This description of womanhood complemented	  Nasser’s	  own	  definitions	  of	  
women	  as	  mothers	  and	  nurturers.	  	  Her	  description	  of	  Zaynab	  (the	  prophet’s	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granddaughter) at the Battle of Karbala also reinforced the notion of women as nurturers, protectors and political supporters.164   Zaynab who was not absent for a moment throughout the whole tragic 
scene…The	  heroine	  of	  Karbala,	  who	  heard	  the	  first	  call,	  and	  was	  by	  her	  
brother’s	  side	  as	  he	  slept	  and	  watched	  over	  him	  awake…and	  she was by the side of the sick, nursing them, and the dying consoling them, and the martyrs crying for them.165  Al-Shati’ thus celebrated Zaynab as a heroine, but in a politically passive, and supportive role, as loyal protector, nurse/nurturer, sister, and follower.  This relatively passive political description was another aspect that overlapped with 
Nasser’s	  political views on women, especially when put into context with his suppression of independent feminism. Moreover, al-Shati’s	  religious	  
qualifications	  and	  background	  complemented	  the	  1956	  Constitution’s	  emphasis on religion and morality, alongside nationalism, as the backbone or foundation of the Egyptian family. On the other hand, some women chose to confront Nasser head on, transgressing the limits of existing patriarchal bargains with the state.  On 6 February 1957, Shafiq staged a second hunger strike following her first in 1951, 
this	  time	  in	  the	  name	  of	  ‘human	  freedom’	  rather	  than	  ‘suffrage’,	  specifically	  in	  
‘protest	  of	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  of	  Egyptian	  land,	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  dictatorship	  
that	  is	  leading	  Egypt	  into	  bankruptcy	  and	  chaos’.166  She claimed she chose the Indian Embassy for her strike on the basis of its neutrality, so that she would not be accused of favouring one camp over the other, and because she saw it as a 
country	  of	  passive	  resistance	  and	  the	  homeland	  of	  Gandhi,	  her	  ‘Master’.	  	  She	  released declarations to Nasser and the United Nations calling for the 
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withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian lands, a just solution to the problem 
of	  Arab	  refugees,	  and	  demanding	  an	  end	  to	  Nasser’s	  dictatorship.167  Nelson argues that Shafiq’s	  strike	  was	  deliberately	  thought out to make use of the historical moment.168  Yet, a large number of female activists and feminists denounced her actions as self-serving, especially because of its timing.   Aflatun and Nabarawi drafted a petition bearing signatures of numerous 
women’s	  organisations	  and	  individuals	  condemning	  Shafiq’s	  actions	  as	  self-serving and counter-revolutionary.  
Egyptian	  women	  condemned	  Doria	  Shafiq’s	  ‘Declaration	  of	  Strike’…and	  
we	  collected	  a	  large	  number	  of	  signatures	  from	  women’s	  organisations	  and independent individuals…and	  our	  assessment	  was	  that	  Doria	  Shafiq’s	  
motives	  at	  this	  particular	  time	  was	  based	  on	  her	  view	  that	  Nasser’s	  
regime	  was	  about	  to	  collapse…and	  that	  she	  would	  come	  out	  a	  heroine.169  
Nabarawi	  and	  Aflatun’s	  communist	  leanings	  would	  have	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  
perceive	  Shafiq’s	  actions	  in	  a	  positive	  light,	  given	  Shafiq’s	  attitude	  towards	  communism and socialism in general.  In one of the final issues of Bint al Nil magazine Shafiq chose to warn against the dangers of communism and socialist 
regimes,	  calling	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  not	  to	  accept	  or	  be	  ‘deceived	  by	  it’.170 While there were some women like Amina al-Said who refused to sign the petition, most female activists viewed Shafiq as the representation	  of	  the	  ‘western-
bourgeois’	  woman	  they	  opposed.171  Now viewed by the majority as unpatriotic and contentious, her comrades at Bint al Nil Union forced her resignation, with Nasser placing her under house arrest and ordering her name banned from 
                                                 167 Nelson, Doria Shafik, p. 238. 168 Ibid, p. 240. 169 Inji Aflatun, Mudhakkirat, p. 172. 170 Doria Shafik,	  ‘Al	  Sharq	  wa’l	  Shuyu’ia’, Bint Al Nil Magazine, April 1957, AUCA. 171 Nelson, Doria Shafik Egyptian Feminist, p. 248. 
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public print.172  Within a few months her magazine was destroyed and she became a social recluse until her death in September 1975.173    Nelson	  argues	  that	  Shafiq’s	  last	  strike	  was	  a	  political	  rather	  than	  feminist	  stance.  However, this dismisses the possibility	  that	  like	  other	  feminists,	  Shafiq’s	  politics and her feminism were not separate elements but interconnected aspects of complex nationalist identities.  By protesting against civic loss of freedom, Shafiq was also taking a feminist stance, protesting against the end of independent activism, which included feminist activism.  Moreover, the petition against Shafiq can be seen as an amplification of the earlier backlash she received in 1951.  Her vote in favour of an ICW resolution, which approved the maintenance of British troops on the Suez Canal, earned her serious attacks in the press from the likes of Nabarawi and Aflatun.  The reaction in 1951 indicated Shafiq was dangerously close to crossing a political limit around definitions of authentic, nationalist behaviour that was respected by the majority of female 
nationalists	  at	  the	  time.	  	  This	  section	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  Shafiq’s	  one-woman strike against the state at a time of nationalist instability that proved the more serious transgression against existing boundaries on female political behaviour as defined by both the patriarchal state, and the majority of female activists and nationalists at the time.  The result was that she was not only attacked and suppressed by the state, but outcast by the wider nationalist	  and	  women’s	  right	  movement. Similarly, while al-Shati’ was	  applauded	  and	  awarded	  by	  Nasser’s	  regime,	  the Islamist Zainab al-Ghazali was tracked, repressed, arrested in 1965, tortured, 
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and	  only	  released	  after	  Nasser’s	  death.174  While the Muslim Sisterhood under Labiba Ahmad had primarily portrayed itself as a social welfare organisation,175 al-Ghazali became a very different Islamic model.176  Al-Ghazali’s	  activism	  was 
more	  independent	  and	  political	  from	  the	  start.	  	  She	  challenged	  the	  state’s	  patriarchal control from the basis of its Islamic illegitimacy.  Al-Ghazali described the incessant attempts made by Nasser’s	  regime to have her register with its unions and institutions.177  She recounted how in 1964, while receiving treatment in hospital, she received a card showing her organisation The Muslim Ladies Group as registered with the state-sponsored Arab Socialist Union, and her membership for the year paid for,	  ‘thereafter invitations from the Socialist Union to attend its meetings began pouring though my letterbox.  I ignored them’.178 She wrote that she soon received a second call from the Arab Socialist Union, requesting her organisation take banners to the airport and welcome the President home.  When she did not comply, she received another warning call, and a week later was handed a letter containing a Ministerial Decree informing 
her	  of	  the	  Government’s	  decision	  to ban her organisation.179 The Muslim Ladies Group/Centre released	  a	  statement,	  asserting	  ‘We refuse to accept the ban order on the Muslim Women Centre.  The President who publicly preaches secularism has no right to rule over us.180 Al-Ghazali was arrested the following year; her failure to comply with	  Nasser’s	  requests,	  her	  da’wa activities, and calls for an Islamic state, directly challenging and undermining his leadership. 
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 Thus, the model of womanhood put forward by al-Ghazali promoted the direct confrontation of state patriarchy and control as religious duty, because the secular state was viewed as an apostate entity, but approached patriarchal control within the Islamist movement differently.  In the next chapter, it will be shown how al-Ghazali manoeuvred around the limits of the Muslim Brotherhood, and how her shared leadership of the da’wa movement offered a different model of Islamic womanhood than those put forward by women like Labiba Ahmad and Fatima Abdel-Hadi.    
Conclusion As the previous chapters showed, notions of westernisation were in a constant state of change and revision, so that by the 1950s/1960s in Iran, America was being viewed as the new imperialist power and ‘westoxification’ discourses were replacing the modernisation discourses of the constitutional period.  Similarly in Egypt, Nasser’s	  emphasis	  on	  Arab socialism, anti-capitalism, and closer ties with the Soviet Union against Western Europe and the US, shifted notions of authenticity away from previous economic and social/cultural models promoted by the Wafd Party and its leadership. The 1952 Iranian suffrage petitions and the 1951 Egyptian suffrage marches discussed in chapter 4 illustrated that many female activists were prioritising	  women’s	  suffrage	  as	  part	  of their campaigns.  This indicated to political leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi that in order to co-opt female activists, they would need to make the vote a central part of revised patriarchal bargains between women and the state.  However, their different motives in granting women the vote resulted in different definitions of 
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womanhood, which still promoted the notion of women’s	  political	  position as secondary to that of men.   By exalting women’s	  primary	  duties	  as	  educated wives and mothers, and extending this to define social work as their ultimate civic duty, the Shah underlined women’s political position as secondary.  However, the High Council 
of	  Women’s	  Organisations of Iran challenged these limitations against growing religious and intellectual opposition to Pahlavi reforms, through a dual strategy of reassuring conservative leaders whilst campaigning for initiatives like the 1967 Family Planning Act.  Nasser tolerated the kind of female activism, which promoted his own vision for Egypt as an Arab socialist state.  Ideologically diverse women like al-Said, and al-Shati’ were promoted by the regime because their goals and definitions overlapped with definitions of the educated woman worker and the Egyptian family as defined in the 1956 Constitution. It was shown that both the Iranian and Egyptian states tolerated challenges to their policies in some instances were they did not overly-strain state bargains on women’s	  socio-political behaviour.  As such, Nafisi’s	  outspoken	  criticism against the WOI 1967 Family Protection Act, and al-Said’s	  exceptional	  critique of Nasserite policies, indicated that the same patriarchal bargain was not necessarily acceptable to all state feminists at all times.  On the other hand, women who	  attacked	  the	  state’s	  legitimacy,	  such	  as	  Shafiq	  and	  al-Ghazali in Egypt, transgressing the limits of existing patriarchal/state bargains, were outlawed and suppressed.   
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Chapter 6 
The Political Opposition and Alternative Models of Womanhood  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  Shah	  and	  Nasser’s	  definitions	  of	  modern	  
womanhood	  were	  assessed	  in	  line	  with	  their	  state	  policies	  on	  women’s	  rights.	  	  In	  both cases it was shown that many female activists chose to compromise with the state around complementary goals.  However, growing opposition to both regimes, and changing notions of westernisation tainted these efforts as inauthentic.  This chapter looks at certain events and policies in both countries that helped radicalise the opposition towards more militant activity and increased the appeal of alternative gender constructs and definitions.  It relies on British Foreign Office documents on key events and leaders of the period, ideological writings and speeches of key thinkers such as Shariati, Khomeini, Al-Banna and Qutb, as well as autobiographical writings of female Islamists and members of the Muslim Sisterhood, Zaynab al-Ghazali and Fatma Abdel-Hadi.  It additionally relies on publications of the Iranian Tudeh Party, Iranian Mojahedin-i-Khalgh, Fadayan-i-Khalgh, memoirs of Iranian guerrilla fighter, Ashraf Dehgani, and the prison memoirs of Cynthia Bower Dwyer.     In section 1 it is shown that the 1967 Coronation ceremony and 1971 Persepolis celebrations in Iran, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and 1971 
Egyptian	  foreign	  policy	  shift	  under	  Sadat,	  encouraged	  notions	  of	  the	  state’s	  illegitimacy, inspiring the opposition in both countries towards militancy and violence.   It is argued that reinterpretation	  of	  women’s	  roles	  within such opposition groups helped co-opt a new generation of women looking for authentic models to identify with.  Sections 2 and 3 argue that this co-optation 
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was a two-way process, as radicalisation of the opposition, coupled with persistent de-legitimisation of state feminism compounded	  women’s	  socio-political frustrations encouraging them to strike patriarchal bargains with the opposition in order to negotiate greater spaces for themselves, that were otherwise being denied them by the state.  Some women were thus able to challenge state definitions on their activity through the realisation of alternative models of womanhood promoted by the opposition.  For instance, as militant activists they challenged the state’s	  models	  of	  women	  as	  secondary	  military/revolutionary figures and state limits on independent female activity by participating in guerrilla activity in Iran, or physical jihad in Egypt.   Within the Iranian opposition, definitions of female loyalty and sacrifice were redefined as women were increasingly drawn towards arrest and martyrdom as part of new patriarchal bargains with revolutionary groups.  The writing of leftist militant Ashraf Dehgani indicated that the adoption of these characteristics did not necessarily translate to a sense of revolutionary inferiority amongst Fadayan-i-Khalgh women as argued by Sanasarian.1  It is 
argued	  that	  Ali	  Shariati’s	  emphasis	  on	  self-sacrifice, loyalty, and endurance of hardship, linked together the models of Fatima and Zaynab despite their different revolutionary roles.  Moreover, it is argued that the desire for arrest and martyrdom within the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh was a manifestation of these 
feminine	  ideals	  realised	  through	  Shariati’s	  more revolutionary models of Fatima and Zaynab, which contrasted markedly with other interpretations of these figures by Islamist writers like Bint al Shati’ in Egypt. 
                                                 1 Sanasarian,	  ‘An	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  of	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  and	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While the Muslim Brotherhood and Sisterhood in Egypt promoted personal sacrifice and endurance of hardship in pursuit of an Islamic state, they promoted very different models of authentic Islamic womanhood than groups like the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh.  Moreover, the figure of al-Ghazali stands out within the Egyptian Islamist movement as more independent and politically active than her counterparts in the Muslim Sisterhood.  It is argued that al-Ghazali was able to negotiate greater social and political space for herself by striking exceptional patriarchal bargains with Muslim Brotherhood leaders, based on modernist Islamic notions of religious equality between men and women in da’wa, as well as modern nationalist notions of educated motherhood.  As an Islamist she challenged the state’s	  patriarchal control on the basis of its Islamic illegitimacy.  By maintaining her organisational independence until the state began to increase its suppression of the Brotherhood and the Muslim Ladies Group, she initially put forward a more independent and political definition of Islamic womanhood than women like Fatma Abdel-Hadi or Amal al-Ashmawi of the Muslim Sisterhood.  As a pioneering da’iya and leader of the independent Muslim Ladies Group, she was able to challenge Islamist limits on gender mixing by giving lectures to mixed audiences, and receiving male students and religious colleagues at her home.   However, by the 1950s and 60s, she was encouraged to accept patriarchal constraints set by the Brotherhood as increasing repression against the organisation and her own Muslim Ladies Group, made unification with the Brotherhood over their common goal of an Islamic state the better bargain at that point in time.  As such, she chose to abide by requests from the 
Brotherhood’s	  male	  leadership to stop writing articles criticising Brotherhood 
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members who accepted government posts, and was no longer able to attend any international or	  women’s conferences without their permission, as she had done in the late 1930s (see chapters 3).  However, al-Ghazali attempted to portray herself as equal or superior to male brotherhood members in jihad fi sabil Allah (struggle in the way of Allah) by describing a greater endurance of torture, the occurrence of prophetic visions during her incarceration, and through the act of writing her prison memoirs.   
Section 1: ‘Radicalisation’ of the Opposition  
By	  the	  late	  1960s	  many	  opposition	  groups	  in	  Iran	  and	  Egypt	  blamed	  the	  state’s	  westernisation policies for corrupting morality in their societies, and helping western powers politically and economically dominate them.  This section looks at events between 1967 and 1971 in Iran and Egypt, which helped radicalise the opposition towards militancy and violence.  It argues that the 1967 coronation and 1971 Persepolis celebrations turned many people against the Iranian regime as such events were viewed by the majority of the population as culturally 
inauthentic	  and	  proof	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  ‘limited	  judgement’.	  	  Such	  unpopular	  state	  policies coupled with increasing political suppression encouraged the advent of guerrilla activity within the Iranian revolutionary movement.  Similarly,	  Egypt’s	  defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli	  war	  weakened	  ‘Nasserism’	  and	  Nasser’s	  pan-Arabism as authentic nationalist ideologies,	  while	  Sadat’s	  new	  foreign	  policy	  weakened his legitimacy, opening up greater political space upon which the Islamic opposition capitalised.    Reinterpretation	  of	  women’s	  roles	  by	  the	  Islamist opposition in Egypt, and the revolutionary movement in Iran, helped 
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increase the appeal of these definitions to women looking for authentic models with which to challenge	  the	  state’s	  authenticity. 
1.1 The 1967 Regency and Coronation of Queen Farah  Opponents of the Shah and intellectual works like Al-i-Ahmad’s	  ‘Gharbzadeghi’	  
pointed	  to	  the	  regime’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  US	  and	  reverence	  for	  Western modernisation to delegitimize state reforms as inauthentic.  Fatemeh Pakravan, wife of General Hassan Pakravan, diplomat and minister of the Pahlavi regime, wrote of the 1963 religious riots against	  the	  Shah’s	  White	  Revolution,	  ‘It	  was	  not	  
the	  revolution,	  but	  the	  beginning	  of	  it’.2  Khomeini argued the October 1964 Capitulation Bill, granting American military personnel and advisers diplomatic immunity, had turned Iran into its colony. What is this Majlis doing?  This illegal, illicit Majlis…this	  government	  has	  committed treason against this country.  O God, this government has committed treason against the Qur’an.3  By describing the Majlis as a	  tool	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  government, Khomeini portrayed all those working with or for the government as traitors of the Iranian nation.  He called on all Majlis deputies, government employees, politicians, and military personnel to resign to prove their authenticity and nationalism.4  He argued that 
if	  religious	  leaders	  had	  influence,	  they	  would	  never	  allow	  Iran	  to	  be	  ‘the	  slaves	  of	  Britain one day, and	  America	  the	  next’,	  challenging	  the	  opposition	  by	  asking,	  ‘Are	  we to keep silent while they are selling us?5 Khomeini’s	  scathing	  condemnation	  
                                                 2 Fatemeh Pakravan, Khatirat-i Fatimah Pakravan , ed. Habib Ladjevardi (Massachusetts: Harvard University, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Iranian Oral History Project, 1998), p. 32. 3 Imam	  Ruhullah	  Khomeini,	  ‘Granting	  Capitulatory	  Rights	  to	  the	  U.S’,	  Speech	  given	  in	  Qum	  on	  November 4, 1964, in Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and 
Fundamentalist Thought, ed. M. Moaddel and K. Talattof, (New York: St	  Martin’s	  Press,	  2000),	  pp.	  333, 334, 336, 338. 4 Ibid, p.337. 5 Ibid, pp. 334, 336. 
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of the October 1964 Bill saw him exiled to Turkey.6  However, he continued to preach and teach from Iraq after 1965, and many of his messages were brought into Iran.7   
The	  Shah’s	  ostentatious	  actions,	  exemplified	  by	  the	  pomp	  and	  pageantry	  of the 1967 Coronation Ceremony, became another source of frustration for many Iranians, opening the regime up to attacks and ridicule by the opposition.  The regency and coronation of Empress Farah on 26 October 1967 reinforced 
the	  Shah’s	  international	  image	  as	  women’s	  rights	  champion,8 with Bamdad 
calling	  it	  a	  ‘great	  victory	  for	  the	  Iranian	  woman’.9 However, the double standard of this appointment was made clear in his interview with Oriana Fallaci in which the Shah argued that	  women	  had	  produced	  ‘nothing	  great,	  nothing!’	  and	  demanded of his interviewer, ‘tell	  me	  how	  many	  women	  capable	  of	  governing	  
have	  you	  met’.  Fallaci highlighted the contradiction between his views and his actions by asking why he had appointed Empress Farah regent. Yes, if my son, should become king before the required age, Queen Farah 
Diba	  would	  become	  regent.	  	  But	  there’d	  also	  be	  a	  council	  with	  which	  she’d	  have to consult.  I on the other hand, have no obligation to consult with 
anyone,	  and	  I	  don’t	  consult	  with	  anyone.	  	  See	  the	  difference?10  Mahnaz Afkhami admitted ‘the	  shah	  himself	  was	  not	  a	  supporter	  of	  feminism’,	  however, the WOI secretary explained that he understood that development was impossible without the integration of women and a change in their status.11  Thus, as argued in previous chapters, most women’s	  reforms,	  from	  suffrage	  to	  literacy campaigns, to changes in Family Law, were the result of a combination of 
                                                 6 Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 148. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, p. 125. 9 Bamdad, Zan-i-Irani, p. 27. 10 Fallaci, p. 272. 11 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organisation	  Of	  Iran’,	  p.	  127. 
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two	  factors:	  the	  Shah’s desire to appear modern and modernise Iran according to Western standards, coupled with the efforts of some activists to take advantage of these desires through their work with the WOI.   
Bamdad	  wrote	  that	  the	  Women’s	  Literacy Corps established in 1968 in accordance with the White Revolution, enabled women to join men in national 
service,	  which	  encouraged	  ‘better	  understanding’	  between	  the	  sexes	  and	  between different classes and segments of the population.12   The well-educated girls serving in it enter easily into contact and understanding with women living in isolated villages or urban slums who have had no chance to get any schooling and are quite ignorant of family management and hygiene.13  However, it was precisely this	  kind	  of	  ‘mixing’	  that	  the	  religious	  right	  pointed	  to	  as evidence of moral and social corruption.  During his speech on the 1964 Capitulation Bill, Khomeini	  challenged	  the	  regime’s	  White	  Revolution and its 
gender	  policies,	  declaring	  ‘I	  don’t	  know	  where this White revolution is that they 
are	  making	  so	  much	  fuss	  about’.14 If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit	  people’s	  innocent daughters to be under young men in school; they will not permit 
women	  to	  teach	  at	  boys’	  schools	  and	  men	  to	  teach	  at	  girls’	  schools,	  with	  all the resulting corruption.15  Yet, the regime continued to encourage more women to enter previously male-dominated professions.  Bamdad recalled how in 1968 Dr Farakhro Parsa became the first female Minister of Education, and how more women began to enter the legal profession.16  This path was extended by the 1970s to allow 
                                                 12 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p.125. 13 Ibid, p. 126. 14 Khomeini,	  ‘Granting	  Capitulatory	  Rights	  to	  the	  U.S’,	  p.	  336 15 Ibid, p.335. 16 Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, p. 127. 
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women to become judges, as the case of Shirin Ebadi illustrated.17 However, as opposition to the Pahlavi regime intensified in response to more brutal crackdowns, and the Shah persisted with unpopular state policies and ceremonial displays, more educated women, including those employed or supported by the state, like Ebadi, began to turn against the regime.   
1.2 The Shah and the 1971 Persepolis Celebrations 
The	  Shah’s	  extravagant	  spending	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  source	  of	  frustration	  for	  many, particularly when contrasted with the poverty of most Iranians.18  The situation culminated over the decadent celebrations of the 2500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy.  In her memoirs, Farah Diba described her pride at hosting the celebrations on the ancient grounds of Persepolis in October 1971.19  Almost two thousand guests made up of international monarchs and royals, global Heads of State, and diplomats were received in Iran.20   The festivities began with a	  ceremony	  at	  the	  tomb	  of	  Cyrus…	  For the citizens of this country, it was very impressive for it recalled the policies of the greatest of our Kings...Many hundreds of soldiers had grown beards and long hair to resemble faces in our bas-reliefs.21  Yet, public perceptions of the same event contrasted	  starkly	  with	  Diba’s	  views.	  	   
Shirin	  Ebadi	  and	  Azar	  Nafisi’s	  recollections of the event critiqued and ridiculed the very same details the Empress proudly described.  Nafisi watched the lavish celebrations on American television,	  recalling	  ‘the Shah, in an address to Cyrus the great Achaemenid king, that became a joke among Iranians, 
                                                 17 Ebadi, p. 23. 18 Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 167. 19 Farah, Shahbanou of Iran, My Thousand and One Days: An Autobiography, trans. Felice Harcourt (London: W.H. Allen 1978), p. 87. 20 Ibid, p. 89. 21 Ibid, pp. 88, 92-93. 
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declaimed,	  ‘Cyrus, sleep well, for we are awake!’’22 Shirin Ebadi described how ordinary Iranians perceived the event. The Shah displayed his vast ego and limited judgment before a rapt 
nation…most	  noticed	  that	  the	  Shah	  had	  spent	  300	  million dollars on makeshift silk tents with marble bathrooms, and on food and wine for 25,000 people, flown in from Paris. The sight I could not forget was that of the Imperial Guard, dressed in costumes of the ancient soldiers of the Achaemenid Empire, their beards grown long and curled elaborately.23  The Shah and the Empress were not unaware of domestic and international criticism over such events.  Farah Diba wrote that Denmark had put pressure on their King and Queen not to attend the ceremony, but explained,	  ‘they	  came nonetheless, out of friendship.’24 Yet, Pakravan argued that organising an event using millions of dollars when people were living in squalor in South Tehran only increased resentment towards the royal family.25  Pakravan described how their popularity dwindled, as people accused them and blamed the Empress for organising	  ‘all	  these	  big	  festivals,	  all	  these	  big	  events,	  that	  in	  the	  end,	  drove	  
people	  mad…the	  coronation…the	  Persepolis’.26  Yet, the Shah, encouraged by his own delusions of grandeur and desire to present Iran as a future superpower,27 persisted nevertheless with such ostentatious displays.  The Shah’s	  increasingly oppressive measures against the opposition had promoted the idea of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare by the late 1960s/early 1970s.  The use of violence was not new to leftist opposition groups; the Tudeh had a few hundred militants in its ranks, many of which had 
                                                 22 Nafisi, p. 201. 23 Ebadi, p. 23. 24 Farah, Shahbanou, p. 90, 95. 25 Pakravan, pp. 59, 120-121. 26 Ibid, p. 94. 27 Fallaci, p. 281. 
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already infiltrated the officers corps.28  Ruh-Allah Abbasi, a Tudeh military officer, explained that dissident members of the military had come together as early as 1944 to form a complex military wing, with a particular five-level formation.29 However, the situation peaked in the 1970s, and of the many underground militant groups, the Fadayan-i-Khalgh and Mojahedin-i-Khalgh began attracting increasing numbers of women.  The Persepolis celebrations allowed opposition leaders like Bizhan Jazani, a leader of the Fadayan Guerrillas, 
to	  mock	  the	  celebrations	  as	  ‘a	  fairground	  for	  pseudo-politicians’,	  arguing	  that 
‘the	  ‘celebrations’ became more like military and police expeditions.  Hence the regime was forced to admit the reality of guerrilla presence all over the 
country’.30   The religious opposition also used the event to attack the Shah, with Ebadi recalling Khomeini’s	  severe condemnation from Najaf.31 Thus, Iranians as ideologically diverse as intellectuals Nafisi and Ebadi, leftist guerrilla leader Jazani, and fundamentalist cleric Khomeini, rejected such events as ridiculous, inauthentic displays, contesting the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Iranian	  state	  as	  the	  ‘true’	  representative of the Iranian nation/people.  Consequently, the 1971 Persepolis celebrations, like the 1967 Coronation ceremony, only served to further aggravate the opposition and alienate the population.  This combined with the 
Shah’s	  brutal	  suppression	  of	  the	  political	  opposition	  radicalised	  the	  anti-Pahlavi movement towards militancy and violence, and encouraged women to turn to 
                                                 28 Farhang	  Jahanpour,	  ‘Iran:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Tudeh	  Party’,	  World Today, 1 April 1984, p. 153. 29 Ruh Allah Abbasi, Khatirat-i yak Afsar-i Tudahi 1330-1335 (Memories of a Communist Officer 1951-1956) (Montreal: Intisharat-i Farhang, 1989), pp. 123, 380. 30 Bizhan Jazani, Armed Struggle in Iran: The Road to Mobilization of the Masses, trans. Iran Committee (London: Iran Committee, 1976), pp. 109-110. 31 Ebadi, p. 24. 
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alternative models of womanhood promoted by these revolutionary groups, as section 2 will illustrate.  
1.3 The Defeat of Nasser and Arab-Nationalism in the 1967 Six-Day War Political events in Egypt similarly catalysed radicalisation of the opposition, resulting in violent and extremist offshoots developing within the Islamist 
movement.	  	  Egypt’s	  dramatic	  defeat during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War challenged 
the	  validity	  of	  Nasser’s	  pan-Arab	  nationalism.	  	  Nasser’s	  popularity	  had	  already	  
begun	  deteriorating	  in	  the	  region	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Syria’s	  secession	  from	  the	  United	  Arab Republic (UAR)	  in	  1961,	  and	  Nasser’s	  subsequent	  failure	  in	  the	  Yemen	  campaign.32  The Egyptian state was in no position to go to war with some of its best troops still deployed in Yemen.33  A diplomatic report to the British Prime Minister in June 1967 made reference to a conversation between Nasser and Field-Marshal Montgomery where Nasser was advised that despite having acquired the latest Russian equipment, if Egypt were to go to war with Israel, it would lose.34   
Yet,	  Nasser’s	  reduced	  popularity,	  and	  his	  self-declared commitment to the 
wider	  region	  as	  ‘champion	  of	  Arab	  nationalism’	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  cause,	  ultimately shaped his actions in the context of bubbling Arab-Israeli tensions.  Moreover, his brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood had resulted in increasing	  attacks	  against	  him	  as	  a	  ‘non-Muslim’,	  and	  thus	  illegitimate	  leader.	  	  Zaynab al-Ghazali	  argued	  even	  ‘al-Azhar’	  was	  a	  tool	  of	  the	  ‘hypocritical	  
                                                 32 ‘The	  Outlook	  for	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic	  During	  the	  Next	  Two	  Years-Report by the Cabinet 
Joint	  Intelligence	  Committee’,	  January	  1966, CAB163/71, UKNA. 33 Hisham	  Sharabi,	  ‘Prelude	  to	  War:	  The	  Crisis	  of	  May-June	  1967’,	  in	  The June 1967 War: 
Miscalculation or Conspiracy?,	  ed.	  Elias	  Sam’o	  (Illinois: Medina University Press International, 
1971),	  p.	  6;	  Sam’o,	  ‘The	  June	  1967	  War:	  Miscalculation	  or	  Conspiracy?’,	  p.	  157. 34 ‘Report	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  on	  Field	  Marshal	  Montgomery’s	  Meeting	  with	  Nasser	  12	  May	  1967’,	  9 June 1967.PREM13/1826, UKNA. 
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government’,	  declaring	  from	  prison	  ’the	  government	  is	  opposed	  to	  Islam.	  	  You	  are in collusion with evil forces. You import your ideologies from either West or 
East’.35 In early May 1967, there were several indications, which led many to believe Israel was preparing to strike Syria.   The two most important elements that led to war were the removal of UNEF forces deployed in the Sinai after the Suez war, and the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel.36    A British diplomatic 
report	  admitted	  that	  these	  actions	  and	  Nasser’s	  ‘handling	  of	  affairs	  prior	  to	  the	  
outbreak	  of	  war’	  in	  1967	  raised	  his	  popularity	  to	  new	  heights.37   
Israel’s	  attack	  on	  5	  June	  1967	  was	  shatteringly	  fast;	  the	  battle	  was	  over	  in	  the first 3-hour	  aerial	  attack	  on	  the	  UAR’s	  air force, and Israel’s	  advances	  in	  the	  next six days saw them gain more and more Arab territory before the United Nations helped conclude a cease-fire.38 The defeat dealt Egypt an enormous political, economic, and psychological blow.  Sadat argued	  Egypt’s	  defeat in 1967 
destroyed	  Nasser,	  ‘those who knew Nasser realised that he did not die on September 28, 1970, but on June 5, 1967, exactly one hour after the war broke out’.39 
Nasser	  announced	  his	  ‘complete	  and	  final	  resignation’	  on	  a	  televised	  broadcast in the aftermath of the war.40  While Jehan Sadat described ‘chanting	  
crowds’	  and	  the	  screams	  of  ‘Nasser!	  Only	  Nasser!’41, for many other Egyptians the war delegitimized Arab-Nationalism as a valid political ideology, by showing 
                                                 35 al-Gahzali, Ayyam min Hayati, pp. 21, 27 36 Sam’o, The June 1967 War: Miscalculation or Conspiracy?, p. 148. 37 ‘Research	  Department	  Memorandum:	  President	  Nasser’s	  Standing	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  since	  
June	  1967’,	  23	  September	  1969, FCO51/97, UKNA. 38 Kamel S. Abu-Jaber,	  ‘United	  States	  Policy	  toward	  the	  June	  Conflict’,	  in	  The Arab-Israeli 
Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 160. 39 Sadat, In Search of Identity, (London: Collins, 1978), pp. 179-180. 40 Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser,	  ‘Speech	  on	  June	  9,	  1967’, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2P6NUNfENE.  41 Jehan Sadat, A Woman of Egypt (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc, 1987), p. 228. 
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that the Arabs had failed to formulate a unified political or military strategy.42  A 
British	  report	  on	  Nasser’s	  regional	  standing	  in	  1969	  highlighted	  the	  disillusionment felt by most Arabs and explained Nasser no longer commanded 
the	  respect	  he	  once	  did;	  ‘he	  is	  no	  longer	  pre-eminent’.43  Zaynab al-Ghazali 
recalled	  the	  defeat	  while	  in	  prison,	  writing	  ‘super	  powers	  helped	  the	  Jews	  
become	  so	  powerful	  and	  that	  is	  why	  they	  have	  usurped	  Arab	  lands…Islam,	  fraternity, self-respect	  and	  modesty	  all	  virtues	  are	  being	  stamped	  out’.44  Thus, 
Egypt’s	  losses	  in	  1967	  challenged	  ‘Nasserism’	  and	  pan-Arabism as authentic nationalist ideologies, opening up an ideological space upon which the Islamic opposition could capitalise.   
1.4 Sadat	  and	  ‘The	  Year	  of	  Decision’	  in	  1970 In his memoirs, Sadat explained that	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Nasser’s	  death	  in	  1970,	  
Egypt’s	  foreign	  policy	  was	  in	  a	  weak	  state,	  ‘I	  found	  that	  we	  had	  no	  
relations…with	  any	  country,	  except	  the	  Soviet	  Union’.45  One of the first countries Sadat approached to normalise relations with was Iran, writing that it was the beginning of a solid friendship with the Shah.46 In many ways Sadat wanted to 
break	  away	  from	  Nasser’s	  legacy,	  with	  regards	  to	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  the	  Arab-Israeli conflict in particular.  In 1971 Sadat declared that he would be prepared to recognise Israel and live in peace with it.47  A British despatch report in 1971 explained that under President Nasser state influence had spread throughout the economy with damaging results, and that now Sadat was modifying this strategy, 
                                                 42 Sharabi,	  ‘Prelude	  to	  War:	  The	  Crisis	  of	  May-June	  1967’,	  pp.	  13-14. 43 ‘Research	  Department	  Memorandum:	  President	  Nasser’s	  Standing	  in	  the	  Arab	  World	  since	  
June	  1967’,	  23	  September	  1969, FCO51/97, UKNA. 44 al-Gahzali, Ayyam min Hayati, p. 156. 45 Anwar Sadat, In search of Identity, pp. 210-211. 46 Anwar Sadat, Those I Have Known (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), p. 24. 47 Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), p. 18. 
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encouraging the private sector to grow, welcoming foreign projects, and new World Bank Loans to restore economic confidence.48  However, it also pointed out that serious foreign investment was unlikely while the threat of war with Israel remained.49 Following the Arab Defeat in 1967 Nasser was able to quickly rebuild and reconstruct the Egyptian Army with the aid of the Soviet Union.  By 1968 Egypt was conducting limited operations against Israel along the Suez Canal, culminating in the War of Attrition by 1969.50  In an interview with the New York 
Times, Sadat declared 1971 the	  ‘Year	  of	  Decision’.51  However,	  as	  the	  state	  of	  ‘no	  
peace,	  no	  war’	  continued,	  his	  position	  weakened,	  and	  Egyptians	  mocked	  him	  for	  his failure to deliver.52   While the state under Nasser had defined authenticity as anti-western and anti-capitalist, the state under Sadat attempted to revise these definitions in its domestic and foreign policy.  For instance, despite establishing the Confederation of Arab Republics in 1971 with the Presidents of Syria and Libya,53Sadat declared he was adopting a policy of détente between the US and the USSR, re-opened the Suez Canal, began renewing ties with western countries, particularly the US, and appeared willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel.54    The weakening of	  Nasser’s	  pan-Arab	  socialism	  and	  Sadat’s	  new	  foreign	  policy approach helped further polarise the Islamists against the Egyptian state 
                                                 48 ‘President	  Sadat’s	  New	  Economic	  Policy,	  Cairo	  Dispatch’,	  26	  November	  1971, FCO 93/661, UKNA. 49 Ibid. 50 Herzog, pp. 13-15. 51 Sadat,	  ‘Interview given by President Anwar El Sadat to the New York Times,	  December	  1971’,	  in	  
Speeches by President Anwar El Sadat: April-December 1971 (Cairo: Ministry of Information, State Information Service, 1974), p. 530. 52 Herzog, p. 23. 53 Sadat, Statement to the Nation: Proclaiming the Draft Agreement of the Confederation of Arab Republics, Cairo, April 17, 1971, in Speeches by President Anwar El Sadat,  54 Sadat,	  Raphael	  Israeli,	  ‘The	  1974	  October	  Paper’,	  in	  The Public Diary of President Sadat, Part II and Part II, Part III ed. Raphael Israeli (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1978), I, p.2, III, p. 898. 
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as an illegitimate representative of the people.  Sadat’s	  willingness to negotiate peace with Israel became a serious point of contention for the Islamic opposition, as demonstrated by Abdul Rahman Abu al-Khayr, a member of Shukri Mustafa’s	  Takfir wal Hijra (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood).  Al-Khayr used 
Qur’anic passages	  to	  warn	  his	  readers	  against	  the	  untrustworthiness	  of	  ‘the	  
Jews/Jewish	  tribes’,	  linking	  these passages directly to Egyptian press reports on 
the	  ‘great	  meeting’	  between	  Sadat	  and	  US	  President Ford in 1976, as a way of condemning the Middle-East peace talks as un-Islamic.55  He pointed to press articles in 1976 to show that that names like Ahl al-Kaf (a story in the Qur’an of men who slept in a cave for over 300 years) and Takfir wal Hijra (excommunication and exile), were names journalists had chosen to describe them, acknowledging only the existence of the wider collective Jama‘at	  al-Muslimin.56 In the following section interpretations of womanhood/women’s	  roles by Islamist ideologues in Egypt and Iran will be assessed in line with 
women’s	  activity	  against the state in these countries.  
Section 2:  Redefinitions of Womanhood by the Iranian Opposition Amongst the varied ideologues of the Iranian revolution, the writings of Ali Shariati proved the most influential on young Iranians in the lead up to the 1979 Revolution.  Unlike modern ideologues like Al-i-Ahmed who denounced the Pahlavi model of womanhood but fell short of describing a strong alternative, Shariati offered a revised and revolutionary interpretation of Shi‘a role models 
for	  ‘modern’	  women	  who	  he	  argued	  had	  lost	  their	  identity.     In contrast to 
                                                 55 Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, Dhikrayati ma‘a Jama‘at al-Muslimin, al-Takfīr	  wa-al-Hijrah (Kuwait: Dar al-Buhuth al-Ilmiyah, 1980), pp. 28-29 56 Ibid, pp.28-29, 124 
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writers like Erika Friedl57 and Marcia Hermansen58 this section argues that Ali 
Sharati’s	  models	  of	  Iranian	  womanhood	  complemented rather than contradicted each other, as they tied together the different revolutionary roles of Fatima and Zaynab through common ideal characteristics of self-sacrifice, loyalty, modesty, piety and endurance against hardship.  In the context of revolution, the characteristics of Zaynab as a loyal, self-sacrificing revolutionary fighter did not contradict Fatima as a loyal and self-sacrificing mother, producer, and educator of such revolutionary fighters.  Moreover, the characteristics of loyalty and self-sacrifice were emphasised amongst female members of secular leftist and guerrilla groups like the Fadayan.  This section argues, in contrast to Sanasarian,59 that the writings of Ashraf Dehgani indicated not all Fadayan women necessarily viewed themselves as inferior to their male comrades intellectually or in terms of revolutionary 
‘ability’	  and	  that	  desire	  for	  arrest	  and	  martyrdom	  amongst	  Mojahedin women was a manifestation of the ideals of self-sacrifice and unwavering loyalty emphasised through Shariati’s	  models	  of	  Fatima	  and	  Zaynab.	  	   Shariati attempted to co-opt those women who had been shaped by the 
changes	  set	  in	  motion	  by	  the	  earlier	  women’s	  movement	  and	  the	  state’s	  reforms,	  
but	  who	  were	  also	  frustrated	  by	  the	  double	  standards	  of	  the	  state	  on	  women’s	  rights, and by a loss of cultural ‘authenticity’.  Given men like Ayatollah Khomeini, condemned co-education and gender-mixing, the voice of the religious left, represented by Shariati and the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh, offered educated 
                                                 57 Erika	  Friedl,	  ‘Ideal	  womanhood	  in	  post-revolutionary	  Iran’	  in	  Mixed	  Blessings:	  Gender	  and	  Religious Fundamentalism Cross Culturally, ed. Judy Brink and Joan P Mencher, (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp.149-151 58 Marcia	  K.	  Hermansen,	  ‘Fatimeh	  as	  a	  Role	  Model	  in	  the	  Works	  of	  Ali	  Shariati’,	  in	  Women and 
Revolution in Iran, ed. Guity Nashat (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 93. 59 Sanasarian,	  ‘An	  Analysis	  of	  Fida’i	  and	  Mujahidin	  Positions’,	  pp. 99-101. 
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women from more religious backgrounds a different bargain through the remodelling of Zaynab and Fatima, that challenged religious	  limits	  on	  women’s	  behaviour set by both the Iranian clerical establishment and the Pahlavi state. 
2.1 Ideologues	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution:	  Shariati	  and	  ‘Fatima	  is	  Fatima’ Although Khomeini ultimately emerged as leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the ideas and writings of sociologist and political activist Ali Shariati were in fact more widely circulated and better known, particularly among the younger 
intelligentsia.	  	  Shariati’s	  father	  argued	  that	  ‘the	  greatest	  service	  that	  Ali	  did	  was	  that he made the religion of Islam relevant to the class of the enlightened and 
educated’.60  Shariati	  had	  been	  active	  in	  Mossadegh’s	  National	  Front,	  until	  the	  religious faction of the National Front separated.  In 1957 at the age of 23 he was arrested and tortured for his activism.61  Shariati attempted to combine Shi‘ism with socialist and Marxist ideas.  While completing his PhD in Paris, he wrote 
letters	  to	  Franz	  Fanon,	  arguing	  that	  ‘Third	  World’	  countries could not fight imperialism without first restoring their cultural identity by finding and reviving 
their	  ‘religious	  roots’.62   
At	  the	  heart	  of	  Shariati’s	  ideas	  were	  two	  interlinked	  revolutions:	  a	  nationalist revolution to eradicate western domination, and a social revolution to eradicate capitalism and class exploitation.63  His rejection of westernisation or 
‘blind	  imitation	  of	  the	  West’	  was central to both these revolutions64 and was a view shared by very different oppositional figures, from Ayatollah Khomeini, to 
                                                 60 Laleh	  Bakhtiar,	  ‘Who	  was	  Ali	  Shariati?’	  in	  Shariati on Shariati and the Muslim Woman, ed. Laleh Bakhtiar  (University of Michigan: ABC International Group, 1996), p. 32. 61 Ibid, p. 13. 62 Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  ‘Ali	  Shari‘ati:	  Ideologue	  of	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution,	  MERIP Reports, No. 102, Islam and Politics, January 1982. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 
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the intellectual writer Jalal Al-i-Ahmad.  Shariati argued that Islam supported the 
‘equity’	  rather	  than	  ‘equality’	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  ‘by	  assigning	  to	  both	  their	  
natural	  places	  within	  society.’65  While other revolutionary ideologues like Al-i-Ahmad had denounced the westernised Pahlavi construct of womanhood, it was Ali Shariati who attempted to define a revolutionary Islamic alternative of 
‘modern’	  Iranian	  womanhood.	  	  He	  presented	  these	  alternatives	  during	  his	  
lecture	  ‘Fatima	  is	  Fatima’	  at	  the	  Husayniyah	  Irshad	  centre	  in	  Tehran,	  founded	  in	  1967 by a group of Muslim thinkers and ulama.66  
He	  attempted	  to	  reform	  and	  redefine	  women’s	  roles	  and	  ‘natural	  places’	  
through	  the	  models	  of	  the	  prophet’s	  daughter	  and	  granddaughter,	  Fatima	  and	  Zaynab, to encompass greater relevance to the specific context of his time.  He argued Iranian women were divided into three categories. 
Women	  who	  have	  remained	  in	  the	  ‘traditional	  mould’	  do	  not	  face	  the	  
problem	  of	  identity	  while	  women	  who	  have	  accepted	  the	  ‘new imported 
mould’	  have	  adopted	  a	  foreign	  identity.	  	  But	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  these	  two	  
types	  of	  ‘moulded	  women’	  there	  are	  those	  who	  can	  neither	  accept	  their	  hereditary, traditional forms, nor surrender to this imposed new form. What should they do?67  The statement	  ruled	  out	  both	  ‘traditional’	  and	  ‘westernised’	  women	  as	  
inauthentic	  models,	  by	  arguing	  the	  former	  ‘remained’	  in	  the	  past,	  while	  the	  latter	  
had	  adopted	  an	  alien	  cultural	  identity.	  	  Shariati	  continued,	  ‘they	  want	  to	  decide	  for themselves, they want to develop	  for	  themselves…they	  need	  a	  model’,	  then	  
declared	  ‘Fatima,	  through	  her	  own ‘being’ answers	  these	  questions.’68  He presented Fatima	  and	  Zaynab	  as	  authentic	  solutions	  to	  the	  ‘problem	  of	  identity’69 
                                                 65 Shariati,	  ‘Fatima	  is	  Fatima’,	  in	  Shariati on Shariati, p. 7. 66 Ibid,, p. xxviii. 67 Ibid, p. 79. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 
 282 
facing this group of Iranian women who wished to modernise without surrendering their true cultural identity. While his choice of Fatima and Zaynab as role models was not novel, his critique of earlier interpretations of their roles, and by extension Iranian 
women’s	  roles,	  was.70  Unlike Islamic scholars like Bint al-Shati’, Shariati denounced their image as	  sad	  mourners,	  and	  condemned	  Iranian	  women’s	  
‘traditional’	  association	  with	  mourning	  rituals	  like	  Rowzeh.71  Shariati celebrated 
Fatima’s	  definition	  as	  a selfless, sacrificial mother, wife, and daughter.  He equated	  her	  marriage	  to	  Ali,	  the	  prophet’s	  cousin,	  with	  her	  commitment	  to	  the	  wider community, arguing she showed the highest example of companionship by 
‘bearing	  his	  hardships’.	  	  He	  venerated	  her	  role	  as	  mother	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  figures of Hassan, Husain, and Zaynab, and underlined similarly to al-Shati’ how the Prophet	  would	  affectionately	  call	  her	  ‘her	  father’s	  mother’	  in	  appreciation	  of	  her caring and supportive character.72  He	  emphasised	  Fatima’s	  social	  commitment through her unshakable patience in the hard days of economic blockade.73  Thus,	  Fatima’s	  maternal	  role,	  patience,	  endurance	  of	  hardship,	  quiet	  strength, piety, and self-sacrifice were highlighted as ideal female qualities.    
When	  it	  came	  to	  Fatima’s	  daughter	  Zaynab,	  Shariati	  criticised	  people’s	  
understanding	  of	  her	  as	  a	  passive,	  sad	  figure;	  ‘they	  only	  knew	  Zaynab	  from	  the	  
moment	  when	  she	  left	  the	  tents	  to	  go	  to	  gather	  the	  bodies	  of	  the	  martyrs’,	  and	  
                                                 70 Yudian	  Wahyudi,	  ‘Ali	  Shari’ati	  and	  Bint	  Al-Shati	  on	  Free	  Will:	  A	  Comparison’,	  Journal of Islamic 
Studies, Vol.9, No.1, 1998, pp. 42, 45. 71 Bint al-Shati’, Banat al-Nabi (Cairo: Kitab al-Hilal, 1956), p. 223, Shariati,	  ‘Fatima	  is	  Fatima’, p. 89, Yudian Wahyudi, ‘Ali	  Shari’ati	  and	  Bint	  Al-Sahti’. 72 Shariati,	  ‘Fatima	  is	  Fatima’,	  p.	  72. 73 Ibid, pp. 71-72. 
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defined her instead as an active, tough, socially responsible, and politically independent revolutionary.74 When Zaynab saw that the revolution had begun, she left her family, her 
husband	  and	  her	  children,	  and	  joined	  the	  revolution…she	  did	  so	  because	  of her own responsibility and commitment to her society, her religion and 
to	  God…It	  was	  Zaynab…who stood against and confronted the ruling oppressive power and who destroyed all resistance.75     While Shariati did not explicitly encourage women to participate in violence, writing	  ‘she	  expressed	  with	  words	  the	  truth	  that	  Husain	  expressed	  with	  blood’,	  he nevertheless defined Zaynab as an active revolutionary.76  He credited her 
with	  ‘spreading	  the	  seeds	  of	  revolution	  in	  any	  land	  that	  she	  entered’,	  fighting	  
oppression	  and	  ‘spreading	  the	  thoughts	  and	  ideas	  of	  Husain’s	  school	  of	  
revolution	  and	  martyrdom’.77  Shariati	  therefore	  elevated	  Zaynab’s	  role	  within	  the history of Shi‘ism by emphasising it was Zaynab who spread the message of Husain’s	  martyrdom	  against	  Ummayad	  Caliph,	  Yazid	  I.  The Islamic opposition drew parallels between the Battle of Karbala and a modern revolution against the state; the narrative of Husain’s	  martyrdom	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  an	  inauthentic	  
ruler	  was	  used	  to	  justify	  revolutionary	  activism	  against	  the	  Shah’s	  regime	  as the modern representation of Yazid I.  Some	  writers	  like	  Hermansen	  and	  Friedl	  have	  argued	  that	  Shariati’s	  models of Fatima and Zaynab are limited by contradictions, incompatibilities, and offer no clear plan of action for women.78 Comparing Fatima’s	  qualities of  
‘modesty,	  self-effacement	  and	  obedience’	  to	  those	  of	  Zaynab	  as	  a	  ‘brave	  revolutionary fighter’, Friedl argues	  that	  Zaynab	  did	  not	  perform	  as	  a	  ‘mother’,	  
                                                 74 Ibid, p. 89. 75 Ibid, p. 71. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Friedl, pp.149-151, Hermansen, p. 93. 
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but	  as	  a	  ‘sister	  and	  aunt’,	  and	  thus	  falls	  short	  as	  an	  ideal	  given	  ‘unmarried,	  
childless,	  adult	  women’	  were/are	  viewed	  as	  anomalies.	  	  In her view	  Zaynab’s	  
model	  can	  only	  be	  realised	  while	  ‘woman	  is	  in	  transitionary stage between 
childhood	  and	  marriage,’	  meaning	  	  ‘the	  two	  ideals	  of	  Fatima	  and	  Zaynab can only be realised in sequence: first Zaynab,	  then	  Fatima’.79 Thus, Friedl concludes, the characteristics required to follow the models of Fatima and Zaynab are 
‘psychologically	  incompatible’,	  as	  they	  would	  require	  a	  transformation	  from	  ‘a	  politically astute, assertive, aggressive, combat-oriented, physically active young 
woman’	  into	  ‘an	  obedient,	  quiet,	  caring,	  housebound	  homemaker’	  after	  marriage.80   In contrast, this section argues that the themes of self-sacrifice, piety, strength, patience and endurance against hardship, are common threads in 
Shariati’s	  models	  of	  Fatima	  and	  Zaynab,	  which	  tie	  them	  together	  whilst	  allowing	  for diverse interpretations of these characteristics to suit different women in different socio-political contexts.  In other words, Zaynab and Fatima are different manifestations of the same notion of womanhood in response to the changing needs of their society.  Thus, in the context of a revolutionary movement against the Pahlavi establishment, the characteristics of Zaynab as an active and independent fighter against a tyrannical establishment, did not 
contradict	  Fatima’s	  characteristics	  as	  mother/teacher/producer of such revolutionary warriors/martyrs to fight against the state.  Indeed, Shariati 
argued	  ‘the	  present	  day	  woman	  must	  know	  Fatima	  was	  a	  woman	  who	  was	  a	  warrior during her childhood, a woman who showed patience and tolerance in 
                                                 79 Friedl, pp. 149, 151. 80 Ibid, p.151. 
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the hard days of the economic blockade, a woman who endured three years of 
imprisonment…and	  finally	  she	  was	  the	  nourisher and trainer of Hassan, Husain 
and	  Zaynab’.81  
Shariati	  was	  careful	  to	  stress	  Zaynab’s	  independent	  choice	  and	  agency	  as	  a revolutionary. It was not for the sake of her brother Husain, who was the leader of this revolution, that she joined it.  Even after the martyrdom of Husain and his 
companions…she	  shouted	  out	  against	  tyranny	  in	  any	  land.82    
More	  significantly,	  Shariati	  continued,	  ‘a	  woman	  of	  any	  age	  and	  any	  century	  can	  
emulate	  this	  model’.83   Thus, Shariati put forward an ideal model of womanhood that combined 
Fatima	  and	  Zaynab’s	  characteristics	  rather	  than	  offering	  two	  contradictory	  
models	  or	  two	  models	  in	  sequence.	  	  He	  stressed	  Fatima’s	  role	  in	  ‘producing’	  Zaynab and thus defined Zaynab as being part of Fatima;  Her part in training Zaynab was even more important that Husain…Fatima	  trained	  Zaynab	  inside	  her	  home	  and	  in	  her	  lap.	  	  The	  role	  of Zaynab in the revolution of Karbala and its continuation and progress, 
resulted	  from	  Fatima’s	  teachings and from the high spirit of Zaynab.84  Thus, some women during the revolution interpreted their roles as sharing in violence and martyrdom based on being equal revolutionaries, while others viewed themselves as producers/nurturers of revolutionaries and martyrs depending on their particular situations.  In the following section the realisation of these models will be assessed within the guerrilla groups of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, particularly the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh. 
2.2  The Fadayan-i-Khalgh and the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh 
                                                 81 Shariati,	  ‘Fatima	  is	  Fatima’,	  p.	  72. 82 Ibid, p. 71. 83 Ibid, p.71. 84 Ibid, p.72. 
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The Fadayan-i-Khalgh officially came into existence in 1971, adopting a policy of 
armed	  struggle,	  ‘largely	  modelled	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  armed	  struggle	  in	  Latin	  
America’.85   Bizhan Jazani, a founding member of the organisation, explained that the goal of the Fadayan was to weaken the regime through small-targeted attacks, as no means of political expression was possible, and to damage its domestic and international image.86  The guerrillas executed members of the 
Shah’s	  regime	  and	  opposition	  members	  that	  were	  deemed	  traitors,	  such	  as	  Abbas Shariari of the Tudeh Party.  In the very first year of their operations, they suffered serious losses with 13 of their members summarily executed.87  The 
regime’s	  backlash	  was	  not	  only	  reserved	  for	  male	  members;	  female	  members	  were also subjected to detention and torture.   
Like	  most	  leftist	  organisations,	  the	  Fadayan	  viewed	  women’s	  oppression	  in class terms, arguing that once a truly socialist	  system	  was	  in	  place,	  women’s	  rights issues would automatically be resolved.88  However, Sanasarian writes that many of the Fadayan women she interviewed admitted to feeling inferior to their male counterparts in terms of knowledge and ability, and argued that the organisation reinforced these insecurities by projecting a cultural stereotype of women as second-class	  citizens	  ‘under	  the	  guise	  of	  leftist	  rhetoric’.89  On the other hand, Cynthia Brown Dwyer, imprisoned at Evin in 1980, wrote of the Fadayan women	  she	  met	  there,	  that	  they	  would	  ‘read,	  study	  and	  argue	  politics	  
                                                 85 The	  Organisation	  of	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  People’s	  Fedaian	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Principled Unity (London: International KAR, 1982), pp. 1-2. 86 Bizhan Jazani, Armed Struggle in Iran: The Road To Mobilization of The Masses, trans. Iran Committee (London: Iran Committee, 1976), pp. 111-112. 87 Ibid, p. 93. 88 Sanasarian,	  ‘An	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  of	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  and	  Mujahidin	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  p.	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into	  the	  night’	  and	  appeared	  to	  view	  their	  imprisonment	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  distinction,	  which would be of use to them within the party once they were released.90   The imprisonment and torture of Ashraf Dehgani supports this view, as she became an iconic figure of resistance within the Fadayan.  Both Dehgani and her brother Behrouz were arrested in 1971, and tortured by the regime.  While her brother died in captivity, she escaped and went on to write her memoirs.  
She	  left	  a	  message	  at	  the	  end	  of	  her	  memoirs,	  to	  the	  Shah	  and	  the	  ‘enemy	  at	  
large’,	  renewing	  her	  commitment	  to	  continue	  her	  struggle	  to	  the	  death. This time I shall fight against you with a deeper sense of revenge—revenge for my martyred comrades; revenge for the blood of the 
people…there	  is	  no	  honour	  greater	  than	  dying	  for	  people’s	  freedom…I	  have taken up arms and will fight for the annihilation of the regime that protects you, and will spend the last drop of my blood for the liberation of our people.91    
Dehgani’s	  writings	  illustrate	  that	  like	  many	  female	  leftists	  she	  accepted	  ‘equality	  
of	  the	  sexes’,92 but identified primarily with a political movement aimed at eradicating class oppression through a socialist revolution.  This in itself does not prove she viewed herself as inferior or secondary to male Fadayan members, 
and	  if	  anything,	  her	  writings	  challenge	  Sanasarian’s	  claim	  of	  intellectual	  or	  revolutionary inferiority.  Dehgani wrote unapologetically of her views, with no reference to male leaders of her organisation, giving detailed descriptions of the 
tortures	  she	  was	  subjected	  to.	  	  	  Moreover,	  her	  threats	  against	  the	  regime	  ‘I	  shall	  
fight	  against	  you’,	  ‘I	  have	  taken	  up	  arms	  and	  will	  fight	  for	  the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  
regime’,	  were	  all	  written in the first person, highlighting a strong sense of self 
                                                 90 Cynthia	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  in	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and agency that indicated not	  all	  Fadayan	  women	  viewed	  themselves	  as	  ‘inferior’	  in revolutionary ability to their male comrades.     The Mojahedin-i-Khalgh was another guerrilla organisation with a fast-growing female following, which by 1981 numbered around 20,000.93  Like the Fadayan, the Mojahedin were born after the 1963 uprising and radicalised towards armed struggle.94  While most of the Fadayan originated from the Tudeh and Marxists in the National Front, the Mojahedin were religiously oriented.95  
The	  group	  became	  popular	  among	  the	  working	  classes	  and	  more	  ‘progressive	  
bazaaris’.96  They argued Shi‘ism would inspire the masses to join the revolution, 
and	  followed	  many	  of	  Shariati’s	  ideas	  and revolutionary messages.97  Sanasarian argues that considering the dedication with which Shariati attempted to confront 
the	  woman’s	  question,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  find	  that	  the	  Mojahedin	  were	  more	  committed and consistent in addressing the issue of women’s	  rights	  than	  other	  groups, including the secular Fadayan-i-Khalgh.98  The organisation argued that confining women to the family sphere was a form of enslavement to the husband, and that the capitalist system prevented women from entering society by exploiting them further in the marketplace.99   The statements of the executed Mojahid, Mehdi Rezai, claimed that the group received some of their arms from the Palestinian al-Fattah organisation.100  
Their	  activities	  were	  similarly	  focused	  on	  killing	  members	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  regime	  
                                                 93 Cynthia	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and attacking small institutional targets.101  However, unlike the Fadayan, the Mojahedin guerrilla attacks were often justified and moralised in Islamic terms.  Indeed, Mehdi Rezai referred to Ali, the first Shi‘a Imam,	  as	  the	  group’s	  leader,	  
and	  declared	  their	  objective	  as	  a	  response	  to	  ‘the	  divine	  call	  and the oppressed 
people’s	  cries’,	  making	  references	  to	  Qur’anic verses.102  In 1972 they blew up the offices of a weekly magazine Een Hafteh, on the basis that it was printing 
‘pornographic	  pictures,	  thereby	  pursuing	  the	  vicious	  colonialist	  objective	  of	  corrupting	  the	  youth’	  in	  line	  with	  Shariati’s	  emphasis	  on	  ‘western	  corruption’	  and female piety and modesty.103   
Kazem	  Radjavi,	  Iran’s	  first	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN	  following	  the	  1979	  Revolution and brother of Massoud Radjavi, secretary-general of the Mojahedin, explained the importance of jihad and martyrdom within the organisation. 
The	  Mojahed…must	  work	  simultaneously	  at	  his	  own	  emancipation	  through an internal jihad and an external one at every instant.  This double jihad has a common goal: emancipation on both an individual and 
social	  level…Martyrdom	  is	  viewed as proof of a just battle.104    The concept of jihad and martyrdom were thus incorporated as revolutionary and nationalist milestones in pursuit of social and political justice.   
Sansarian’s	  interviews	  with	  female	  members	  of	  the	  Mojahedin	  led	  her	  to	  
conclude	  that	  glorification	  of	  martyrdom	  very	  much	  affected	  the	  Mojahedin’s	  
female	  members,	  who	  generally	  exhibited	  ‘a	  burning	  desire	  for	  death’.105   Dwyer was struck by the strong-mindedness and self-discipline of young Mojahedin women, who she wrote were amongst the most stimulating and admirable 
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women at Evin prison.106  She described how one of them, 15 year old Azam, would wake early to begin her prayers and daily fast during the month of 
Ramadan,	  writing,	  ‘Though	  only	  a	  teenager	  Azam	  seemed	  as	  mature	  both	  
physically	  and	  emotionally	  as	  a	  woman	  twice	  her	  age’.107  She recalled finding her studying for her high school maths exams after getting x-rays as a result of prison beatings, and how sometimes Azam would put aside her Qur’an or maths and lead everyone in singing Mojahed marching songs.108  Dwyer reaffirmed that women welcomed arrests, as time served would raise them in the eyes of their comrades when they went home.109   Shariati’s	  models	  of	  Zaynab	  and	  Fatima	  stressed	  loyalty,	  suffering,	  and	  
sacrifice	  through	  Zaynab’s	  active	  physical	  rebellion,	  and	  Fatima’s	  rearing	  of	  
revolutionary	  martyrs.	  	  Shariati’s	  ultimate	  female	  role	  model	  was	  Fatima,	  known	  
as	  ‘mother	  of	  her	  father’,	  mother of the martyrs Husain and Hassan and Zaynab.110  He venerated her maternal qualities, and her endless suffering, and her willingness to sacrifice her own family for the cause of revolutionary justice.  
Zaynab’s	  strength	  too	  was	  defined	  through	  her	  sacrifices	  as	  the	  surviving	  heroine of Karbala and the loyal messenger of revolution against tyranny.  The Mojahedin exalted Mehdi Rezai’s	  mother as a symbol of maternal resistance, declaring her message to her son during his arrest and torture ’’Never put your guns down’ would	  ‘echo in the ears of the Iranian people’s	  children	  forever’.111  Her four children, including a daughter, all died for the cause, and when this 
outcome	  is	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  Fatima’s	  fate,	  the	  mother	  of	  martyrs	  Hassan	  and	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Husain and the revolutionary Zaynab, Mother Rezai can be seen fulfilling the role model of Fatima, and her daughter fulfilling the role of Zaynab.   
This	  section	  argues	  that	  this	  ‘desire	  for	  death’,	  and	  the	  incredible	  resolve	  under arrest and torture were manifestations of the feminine ideals of self-sacrifice and unwavering loyalty emphasised by the opposition, and realised 
through	  Shariati’s	  models	  of	  Fatima	  and	  Zaynab.	  	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  
Shariati’s	  focus	  on	  women	  who	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  either	  the	  ‘traditional	  mould’	  or	  
the	  ‘new	  imported	  mould’	  was	  an	  attempt to co-opt women who were influenced 
by	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  earlier	  women’s	  movement	  and	  Pahlavi	  state	  policies,	  who	  wanted greater political and social space, but who were also politically and culturally conflicted, and thus drawn to the authenticity arguments of the revolutionary opposition.  In turn, some women looking for alternative models, or frustrated with state limits on their political activity, were able to negotiate greater political/revolutionary space for themselves within the secular and religious left by striking patriarchal bargains with opposition leaders centred on the models and limits outlined by these groups.  
Section 3: Women and Radicalisation of the Islamist Movement in Egypt This section looks at changing definitions of authenticity, nationalism, and 
women’s	  behaviour	  within	  the Islamist movement by focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood and the alternative models of womanhood promoted by female Islamist Zaynab al-Ghazali.	  	  This	  section	  argues	  that	  rejecting	  Nasser’s	  pan-Arabism the Islamist movement redefined nationalism through the notion of a global Islamic community or ummah.  This altered notions of authenticity and 
what/who	  constituted	  the	  ‘infidel’	  or	  ‘external	  enemy’,	  and	  therefore,	  against	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whom violent jihad could be sanctioned.  Ideologues like Qutb and women like al-Ghazali attacked the Islamic authenticity of the state, arguing it was in a state of jahiliyah, rendering it a legitimate target for militant Jihadi groups.  As an Islamist, al-Ghazali thus challenged the state’s	  patriarchal control on the basis of its illegitimacy/jahiliya.   By keeping her organisation separate from the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ghazali initially put forward a more independent and political definition of Islamic womanhood than her affiliates in the Muslim Sisterhood.   The emphasis 
on	  women’s	  ‘spiritual/religious	  equality’	  by	  late	  19th century Islamic modernists like Rashid Ridha and Mohammad Abduh112 created the space for women to join the da’wa movement.  This section argues that al-Ghazali was able to negotiate a greater socio-political role for herself within the movement by striking exceptional bargains with leaders like al-Banna and key ideologues like Qutb around notions of equality in da’wa, as well as nationalist notions	  of	  ‘educated	  motherhood’,	  which	  saw	  her	  challenge	  patriarchal	  limits	  on	  gender-mixing by lecturing and teaching mixed audiences.   On the other hand, as state repression against the Islamists increased, merging her activities and accepting the patriarchal limits of the Brotherhood’s male leaders offered al-Ghazali the better bargain at that point in time in pursuit of her goals of an Islamic society/state.   Nevertheless, she continued to present herself as an equal and/or superior guide to male brotherhood members by describing her greater endurance of prison torture, and the prophetic visions she received.  Her prison memoirs can be viewed as form of patriarchal bargaining intended to assert herself within the Islamist movement.  While her writing indicated she viewed herself as an 
                                                 112 Saba	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exception, and while her actions may have been based on temporary bargains with Brotherhood leaders, her descriptions of her activities in her memoirs nevertheless provide a different and more politicised model of Islamist womanhood.   
3.1  Ideologues of the Islamist movement in Egypt In Egypt, as in Iran, certain events helped radicalise ideas and attitudes within the opposition movement.   The Islamic opposition had always centred its attacks of inauthenticity on the constructed dichotomy of	  ‘East	  and	  West’,	  however, who or what constituted the west, infidel, or enemy changed over the 20th century.  During the nationalist revolution the west had been epitomised by the ideas and actions of British imperialism.  Inauthenticity was therefore defined through an external enemy represented by a foreign nation, intruder, and coloniser.  From the late 1940s/early 1950s definitions of the west had broadened as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict to include Israel, and its American backers, alongside western European countries.  However, revised interpretations of Islamic modernist thought and writings on jihad by men like al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb were used to extend these definitions to the Arab region, and the Egyptian nation itself. The writings of both al-Banna and Qutb, argued that only freedom from western clutches and the implementation of an Islamic state would cure society of all its ills.  Referring to the effects of westernisation, Muslim Brotherhood founder, al-Banna had argued in 1949, A disease afflicting these Eastern nations assumes a variety of aspects and has many symptoms.  It has done harm to every expression of their 
lives…while	  through	  imitation	  of	  the	  West,	  the	  viper’s	  venoms	  creeps	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insidiously into their affairs, poisoning their blood and sullying the purity of their well being.113   Al-Banna argued that imitation of the west had corrupted society and 
government,	  and	  emphasised	  that	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  call	  was	  a	  global	  one.114  Yet, he also emphasised Arab unity and culture in this context,	  arguing	  ‘Islam	  
cannot	  progress,	  without	  the	  unity	  and	  progress	  of	  the	  Arabs’.115  However, as 
Nasser’s	  suppression	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  intensified,	  and	  following	  the	  defeat of pan-Arab projects and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Brotherhood leaders stressed Islamic unity across a wider/global Islamic umma.  This was not so much a contradiction	  or	  rejection	  of	  the	  ‘Arab	  unity’	  al-Banna had underlined, as a rejection of Nasser’s	  model of pan-Arab nationalism.  Rather, the Islamist movement put forward a new definition of authentic Egyptian nationalism that challenged secular politics and Nasser’s	  pan-Arab model in favour of political Islam and Muslim unity.  This altered notions of authenticity and what/who constituted the infidel or enemy, and thus against whom violent jihad could be sanctioned.  Al-Banna’s	  tracts	  emphasised	  that	  that	  the Brotherhood detested 
‘fanaticism	  of	  outlook’,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  convert	  men	  by	  ‘the	  gentle	  methods	  
of	  forbearance	  and	  affection’.116  However, while he denounced fanaticism and defined non-physical jihad,	  the	  ‘struggle’	  against	  oneself,	  as	  more	  fundamental, his writings nevertheless provided justification for war and physical jihad’.117  
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 295 
Moreover,	  he	  defined	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  reform	  as	  a	  ‘practical	  struggle’,	  where	  
‘principles	  shall	  be	  enforced’.118  Thus, more extreme elements of the Islamist movement could interpret these statements to justify violence against the 
‘enemies	  of	  Islam’,	  be	  they	  external	  or	  within	  the	  nation	  itself. Following al-
Banna’s	  assassination,	  the	  extended	  arrests	  and	  torture	  of	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  members inspired many Islamists to take	  on	  more	  militant	  views.	  	  Qutb’s	  writings, particularly works like Milestones, called for perpetual physical jihad and inspired Islamists towards more violent action.   For Qutb the separation of religion and politics in the west was akin to jahiliyah, a degraded state attributed to pre-Islamic Arabia and ignorance of God.119 Qutb argued that anyone living outside the system of Islam was effectively living in jahiliyah,	  writing	  ‘the	  whole	  
world	  is	  steeped	  in	  jahiliyyah…a	  rebellion	  against	  God’s	  sovereignty	  on	  earth’.120  Qutb sanctioned the use of offensive jihad to eliminate jahiliyah, which meant women were also subject to jihad.121  Qutb argued Dar ul-Islam (the house/abode of Islam) had no national or regional borders, redefining Dar ul-harb (the house of war) to include any so-called Muslim states that promoted 
jahiliya;	  ‘Indeed,	  people	  are	  not	  Muslims,	  as	  they	  proclaim	  to	  be,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  live the life of jahiliyyah’.122  Islamists like Mohammad Abdel Salam Faraj were able to expand and 
apply	  Qutb’s	  ideas	  to	  define	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  as	  being	  in	  a	  state	  of	  jahiliyah, and thus justify violent jihad against this ‘so-called Muslim’	  nation,	  by	  attacking the authenticity of its Islamic character.  In Al-Farida Al-Gha’ibah (The Neglected 
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Duty), Faraj argued violent jihad was an obligation for every Muslim against even Muslim rulers who did not implement Shari‘a.123 Similarly to Qutb, he refuted those who defined jihad as defensive, and declared	  ‘it	  is	  obligatory	  for	  the	  Muslims to raise their swords under the very eyes of the Leaders who hide the 
Truth’,	  which	  for	  Faraj	  included	  any	  Muslim	  rulers	  who	  did	  not	  implement	  an	  Islamic state.124  It was through such rationalisation that his al-Jihad group planned and justified the assassination of Sadat in 1981, as an inauthentic Muslim leader promoting jahiliyah.   
2.2  The Muslim Brotherhood/Sisterhood and Zaynab al-Ghazali 
The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood’s	  original	  mission	  as	  defined	  by	  al-Banna was Islamic revival and the establishment of an Islamic state.125  These views were carried and supported by the Muslim Sisterhood under Labiba Ahmad, and later by Zaynab al-Ghazali.  Al-Ghazali’s	  complex	  legacy	  as	  a	  pioneering	  da’iya	  has resulted in conflicting views about her contribution to gender discourse in Egypt.  Some writers like Leila Ahmed have argued that despite the inconsistencies 
between	  her	  actions	  and	  statements,	  she	  demonstrated	  ‘a	  determination	  to	  find	  
feminism	  within	  Islam’.126  Miriam Cooke has similarly	  labelled	  her	  an	  ‘Islamic	  
feminist’,	  based	  on	  her	  subversion	  of	  conventional	  definitions	  of	  Muslim	  
women’s	  domestic	  roles,	  her	  visible	  political	  and	  religious	  leadership,	  and	  her	  autobiographical writings, which set a precedent for Islamist women going forward.127  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Marilyn	  Booth	  asks	  ‘	  in describing her own acts 
                                                 123 Mohammad	  Abdel	  Salam	  Faraj,	  ‘Al-Farida Al-Gha’ibah’, in Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected 
Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986). 124 Ibid, p.192. 125al-Banna, Five Tracts, p. 60. 126 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, pp. 196-197, 199–200, 207. 127 Cooke, Women Claim Islam, p. 61, 100, 104. 
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as exceptional and historically contingent, how much space does al-Ghazali leave for most women, who do not have al-Ghazali's rather peculiar life circumstances? Al-Ghazali seems to essentialise gender in terms of prescribed social duties, even if the da'wa offers a temporary break from normal social time’.128  Roxanne L Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman argue that it is precisely because she promoted some conventional gender definitions that she was able to redefine 
‘women’s	  education	  in	  Islam,	  participation in jihad, and engagement in da’wa as a necessary expression of, rather than threat to, Muslim	  tradition’.129 Zaynab al-Ghazali wrote that her original society, the Muslim Ladies Group, had been established in 1936 with the goal of promoting Islamic da’wa.130  Like al-Banna, al-Ghazali stressed her group worked to ‘spread	  the	  message	  of	  
Allah, and to strive for the making of a Muslim umma.131  The organisation was 
not	  strictly	  a	  woman’s	  group;	  it	  recruited	  men	  as	  well,	  and	  aimed	  its	  efforts	  at	  society at large.132  It published a magazine, and, like the Muslim Brotherhood, was engaged in both social work and educational activities.133   From the start, al-Banna sought to co-opt al-Ghazali’s	  activities	  by	  asking	  her	  to take over as president of al-Akhawat al-Muslimat (The Muslim Sisterhood).  Al-Banna encouraged al-Ghazali to take an active political role, employing her as a diplomatic mediator to resolve tensions between Prime Minister Nahhas and his 
                                                 128 Marilyn Booth, Reviewed Work:  Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism Through Literature by Miriam Cooke, World Literature Today, Vol. 76, No. 2, Spring, 2002. 129 Roxanne L Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: texts and contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, ed. Roxanne L Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 282. 130  al-Ghazali, Return of the Pharaoh, p. 11. 131 Ibid, p. 12. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid, p. 13. 
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organisation in 1949.134  However, al-Ghazali maintained her independence and only properly merged her activities with the Brotherhood after al-Banna’s	  death.	   During the 1950s, Al-Ghazali used her Muslim Ladies magazine to 
denounce	  Nasser’s	  regime	  and	  argued	  that	  Brotherhood	  members	  should	  not	  
accept	  ministerial	  posts	  in	  ‘a	  government	  whose	  legislation	  is	  not	  Allah’s	  law’,	  implying they should be expelled from the group if they did so. She recalled the 
Brotherhood’s	  reaction: Abd al-Qadir	  ‘Awdah	  asked	  me	  to	  postpone	  any	  further	  writing	  about	  the	  
issue…yet,	  as	  I	  saw	  it,	  the	  issue	  was	  crucial	  and	  once	  again	  I	  began 
addressing	  it.….‘Awdah	  again	  visited	  me,	  but	  this	  time	  with	  an	  order	  from	  al-Hudaibi,	  asking	  me	  to	  stop	  my	  commentary…I	  obeyed	  the	  order.	  	  From	  then on, all my activities had to conform to my pledge of allegiance to the Ikhwan, even to the extent of requiring	  the	  Murshid’s	  prior	  consent	  for	  everything, including my participation in the Vienna Peace Conference.135  While al-Ghazali can initially be seen challenging some male Brotherhood leaders on the subject of ministerial posts, as state crackdowns increased on the Islamist movement and against her own group, she increasingly viewed merging her activities and conforming to its male-leadership as the better bargain.  She chose to stress her allegiance to the Brotherhood at this juncture, to encourage unity of the movement towards the common goal of an Islamic state.  The testimony of Muslim Sister Fatima Abdel-Hadi indicated that al-Ghazali was an exception within the movement.  Abdel-Hadi’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  
Muslim	  Ladies	  Group’s	  mixed	  lectures,	  her	  questions	  to	  al-Banna about al-
Ghazali	  causing	  a	  ‘split’	  within	  the	  da’wa movement (discussed in chapter 4), indicated she viewed her as a divisive and non-conformist figure.  While other female Islamists, particularly those who chose to remain in al-Ghazali’s	  Muslim	  
                                                 134 Ibid, p. 26. 135 Ibid, p. 29. 
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Ladies Group, may not have shared her views it is clear that al-Ghazali’s	  definitions of Islamic womanhood differed markedly from those upheld by the majority of the Muslim sisterhood.  While it can be argued that these differences or non-conformities were tolerated because of the particular political context, 
namely	  the	  state’s	  suppression	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  al-Ghazali nevertheless put forward a more political and active notion of Islamic womanhood that could be taken up by Islamist women should it provide the better bargain.     Abdel-Hadi’s	  writing illustrated how the Muslim Sisterhood was transformed from a society focused on da’wa and social work into an ideological 
and	  political	  one	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood’s	  own	  transformation	  in	  this direction.136  Hussam Tammam has argued that the reason al-Ghazali rose to prominence over leading Sisters like Abdel-Hadi or Amal al-Ashamawi, was because the	  former	  epitomised	  ‘the	  transformation	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Sisterhood	  from a social proselytisation movement	  into	  blatant	  political	  activism’.137 Yet, al-Banna’s	  successors	  did	  not	  emphasise independent political or professional activity for women, and Qutb in particular	  linked	  their	  ‘natural	  roles’	  to their 
‘biological	  capacities’:	  ‘There is the case of men being overseers over 
women…Because	  a	  man	  is	  free	  from	  the	  cares	  of	  maternity,	  he	  can	  attend	  to	  the	  affairs of society.138  He	  defined	  the	  family	  as	  ‘the	  basis’	  of	  society,	  and	  wrote	  that	  
the	  basis	  of	  the	  family	  was	  ‘the	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  husband	  and	  wife,	  and	  
                                                 136 Abdel-Hadi, Rihlati. 137 Hussam	  Tammam,	  ‘Egyptian Muslim Sisterhood and	  a	  new	  Historic	  Testimony’,	  Ahram Online, 15 September 2011, p. 2. 138 Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, trans. John B. Hardie (New York: Islamic Publications International, 2000), pp. 73-74. 
 300 
the	  upbringing	  of	  children’.139 He argued that any society whose division of work 
was	  not	  based	  on	  ‘family	  responsibility	  and	  natural	  gifts’	  was	  ‘jahili’. Where	  a	  woman’s	  role	  is	  merely	  to	  be	  attractive,	  sexy	  and	  flirtatious,	  and	  a woman is freed from her basic responsibility of bringing up children; and if, on her own or under social demand, she prefers to become a hostess or a stewardess in a hotel or ship or air company, thus spending her ability for material productivity rather than in the training of human 
beings…then	  such	  a	  civilisation	  is	  ‘backward’	  from	  the	  human	  point	  of	  
view,	  or	  ‘jahili’	  in	  Islamic	  terminology.140   Moreover, Qutb argued that women’s	  rights	  within	  both	  the	  western	  and	  communist contexts had resulted only in their sexual and economic exploitation, 
describing	  the	  ‘rubbish	  heap	  of	  the	  West’	  and	  ‘the	  evil	  and	  dirty	  materialism	  of	  
the	  East’,141 ‘[look] at this behaviour, like animals, which	  you	  call	  ‘free	  mixing	  of	  the sexes’;	  at	  this	  vulgarity	  which	  you	  call	  ‘emancipation	  of	  women’.142 Yet, despite his emphasis on gender segregation, Al-Ghazali wrote that Qutb would often visit her at her home to explain and answer questions to youth followers.143   On the one hand, al-Ghazali	  appeared	  to	  support	  Qutb’s	  view	  on	  women’s	  
‘natural	  roles’	  by	  arguing	  that	  once	  Islamic	  rule	  was	  realised,	  women	  would	  
retreat	  to	  their	  natural	  domain	  as	  nurturers	  of	  the	  nation’s	  men,	  and	  pointing	  to	  
Qutb’s	  written	  works	  such	  as	  ‘Social	  Justice	  in	  Islam’,	  as	  guides	  for	  model	  Muslim	  behaviour.144   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  she	  subverted	  limits	  on	  Muslim	  women’s	  social	  and political behaviour by defining her own activities as religious duty and linking them with modern nationalist notions of educated motherhood.  She 
defined	  women	  as	  teachers	  and	  nurturers	  of	  men,	  arguing	  ‘sometimes	  it	  takes	  
                                                 139 Qutb, Milestones, p.97 140 Ibid, p. 98. 141 Qutb, Social Justice, Milestones, p. 139. 142 Qutb, Milestones, p. 139. 143 al-Ghazali, Return of the Pharaoh, p. 42. 144 al-Gahzali, Ayyam min Hayati, p. 148, Talhami, p. 52. 
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very	  long	  to	  establish	  the	  Islamic	  government…women	  should	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  train the male members of the umma’,	  and	  defining	  herself	  as	  a	  leading educator, meeting with Qutb while he was in prison in 1962 to seek guidance on their Islamic education syllabuses.145  Furthermore, while endorsing the idea of 
women’s	  natural	  roles	  as mothers and wives, she simultaneously extended and challenged these definitions through her own activism.  Describing a conversation with her husband, al-Ghazali provided a definition of Islamic womanhood that placed da’wa above	  women’s	  ‘natural’,	  domestic roles.  You should not ask me about my activities with other mujahidin and let 
trust	  be	  full	  between	  us…in	  the	  event	  of	  any	  clash	  between	  the	  marriage	  
contract’s	  interest	  and	  that	  of	  da’awah	  [proselytising], our marriage will 
end…I	  accept	  that	  ordering	  me	  to	  listen	  to	  you	  is	  amongst	  your	  rights,	  but	  Allah is greater than ourselves.146  She wrote that her husband supported her and that when youth followers would 
visit	  late	  at	  night,	  he	  would	  wake	  her	  up	  to	  say	  ‘some	  of	  your	  children	  are	  in	  the	  study-room’.147  By	  defining	  Ikhwan	  youth	  as	  her	  ‘children’,	  al-Ghazali was able to justify gender mixing on the basis of da’wa	  and her role as a religious mother-educator figure.  Like the nationalist revolution of 1919, Islamist women were able to provide leadership and organisation when male Brotherhood members were arrested.  It was over this kind of social work that al-Ghazali’s	  activities	  overlapped with those of the Muslim Sisterhood148, who according to Abdel-Hadi were also very active in raising funds and donations for the families of Brotherhood members in detention.149  However, the Sisterhood was also 
                                                 145 Ibid, p.120, 41. 146 al-Ghazali, Return of the Pharaoh, p. 38. 147 Ibid, p. 39. 148 al-Gahzali, Ayyam min Hayati, p. 33. 149 Abdel-Hadi, p. 24 
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engaged in other social activities, which were very specific to them.  Abdel-Hadi describes the key role that sisterhood members played, in arranging proposals and marriages for members of the Brotherhood and Sisterhood.150  Inter-organisational marriages were encouraged, with Abdel-Hadi describing these arrangements as amongst their most important activities.  She explained how she would liaise with Muslim Brother Mahmood al-Jawhari, who oversaw the Sisterhood’s	  operations. I was key in many of these marriages, I would get the characteristics of the Ikhwan person from Mahmood al-Jawhari, and go about matching him to the appropriate Sister.151   As a result, ties between Brotherhood and Sisterhood members were further solidified through marriage, which was also used to attract new members to the organisations. Al-Ghazali indicated her activities had always been more political both within her own organisation and later on in the 1950s when she ‘swore allegiance’ to the Brotherhood.  She wrote that she joined forces with the Sisters, describing women like Amal al-Ashmawi and Aminah al-Jawjari as	  ‘mujahidas’,	  but making no mention of Abdel-Hadi.152 Al-Ghazali claimed that in the late 
1950’s she formed a triumvirate with	  ‘Abd	  al-Fattah Isma‘il	  and	  Qutb	  with	  permission form Brotherhood leader Hassan Hudaibi, highlighting her desire to portray herself as an influential/leading political figure within the group.153    Farid Abd al-Khaliq,	  who	  joined	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  in	  the	  1940’s	  argued that the increasing politicisation of the Brotherhood towards more revolutionary activity and al-Ghazali’s ‘role	  in	  the	  plans	  of	  1965,	  with	  ‘Abdul	  Fattah	  Isma‘il,	  
                                                 150 Ibid, pp. 30-33, 38-39, 45-46, 52. 151 Ibid, pp. 38-39. 152 al-Ghazali, Return of the Pharaoh, p. 32. 153 Ibid, pp. 33-25, 39. 
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‘Abdul	  Aziz,	  and	  Sayyid	  Qutb,	  to	  build	  secret	  cells	  to	  change	  the	  political	  system’,	  raised her prominence in ‘Aml	  al-niswi al-Islami (Islamic	  women’s	  work)	  from	  that point onwards.154 Al-Ghazali was eventually arrested in 1965, and sentenced to 25 years in prison for her activities with the Muslim Brotherhood, specifically her supposed part in a plot to assassinate Nasser.  Many members of the Muslim Sisterhood were also arrested, including Fatma Abdel-Hadi, although her recollections of prison, while harrowing, were not as dramatic.  Al-Ghazali described beatings, torture, and incessant interrogations throughout her imprisonment.155 She 
described	  many	  prophetic	  visions,	  presenting	  herself	  as	  a	  ‘chosen’	  Muslim	  guide,	  endorsed by the Prophet	  himself	  through	  his	  ‘conversations’	  with	  her,	  ‘Oh	  Zainab! You are following the path of Allah and His Prophet’.156   Euben and Zaman argue that al-Ghazali’s	  memoirs	  are	  more	  ‘reflexive	  
hagiography	  than	  autobiography’,	  a	  ‘self-creation’	  that	  presented	  al-Ghazali as a 
‘murshida’	  (female	  guide)	  and	  mujahida (female who struggles/fighter) and set a new precedent for	  women	  in	  the	  previously	  exclusive	  male	  arena	  of	  ‘Islamist	  
prison	  testimonials’.157 Ghazali thus presented herself as a superior Muslim guide by comparing her endurance and survival of prison beatings and torture to 
the	  breaking	  down	  or	  death	  of	  some	  ‘young’,	  Brotherhood	  members	  under	  the	  same conditions.158  It can also be argued that although she viewed and presented herself as an exceptional da’iya, her leadership of the Muslim Ladies Group, her activities within the Muslim Brotherhood, and her autobiographical 
                                                 154 Farid Abd al-Kahliq in Fatima Abd al-Hadi, Rihlati, p. 18 155 Ibid, p. 65. 156 Ibid, p.53-54, 138-139, 150. 157 R.L. Euben  p. 281 158 al-Gahzali, Ayyam min Hayati p. 60. 
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writing constituted efforts to revise patriarchal bargains within the Islamist movement, and by striking these bargains even temporarily, was able to put forward a more political and active model of Islamic womanhood.  
Conclusion  
 Chapter 5 showed how notions of authenticity changed from the early 20th century to incorporate anti-western/’westoxifixation’ and anti-capitalist discourses by the 1960s.  In this chapter it was shown how the ostentatious and ceremonial displays in late 1960s and early 1970s Iran alienated more people away from the state.  Similarly, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and 1971 foreign policy shift under Sadat encouraged notions of the Egyptian state as a jahili entity.   It was also shown how revolutionary ideologues in Iran reinterpreted 
women’s	  roles	  in	  response	  to	  these	  changes	  to	  put	  forward	  more	  militant and revolutionary definitions.   The recurrent themes of women’s loyalty and self-sacrifice, emphasised throughout the Constitutional period, were revised by Shariati using the figures of Fatima and Zaynab to produce more revolutionary interpretations than writers	  like	  Bint	  al	  Shati’, who had portrayed them as more passive, sad figures (as discussed in chapter 5).159 It is argued that women struck patriarchal bargains with groups like the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh as a way of challenging state authenticity and limits	  on	  women’s	  public	  activity	  through their revolutionary activities, arrest and martyrdom; the latter manifesting out of these revised themes of loyalty and sacrifice.   Islamist ideologues and activists in Egypt similarly responded to changing socio-political factors, creating more public and political space for some Islamist 
                                                 159 Bint al-Shati’, Banat al-Nabi p. 178; Aqilat Bani Hashim, pp. 146-147. 
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women, particularly during periods of heightened state suppression, such as the 1954 and 1960s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.  Women within the Islamist movement challenged the authenticity and authority of the patriarchal state on the basis of its Islamic illegitimacy.  In this context, jihad fi sabil Allah became a	  way	  of	  challenging	  state	  limits	  on	  women’s	  independent	  activities, with recurrent themes of female sacrifice and endurance of hardship revised through 
da’wa activities, social and educational work, covert political activity as in the case of al-Ghazali, and arrest and torture by the state. As a pioneering da’iya, al-Ghazali was able to challenge Islamist limits on gender mixing using modernist notions of gender equality in da’wa	  and nationalist notions of educated motherhood.  However, by the 1950s and 60s, as state repression against the Brotherhood increased, and the Muslim Ladies Group was eventually banned by the state, she moved to unify more directly with the Brotherhood as the better-perceived patriarchal bargain.  However, al-Ghazali nevertheless attempted to portray herself as equal or superior to male Brotherhood members in jihad fi sabil Allah by describing a greater endurance of torture and the occurrence of prophetic visions in prison.  While the writing of her memoirs can be viewed as an attempt to assert herself exceptionally within the Islamist movement, by publishing her experiences she put forward a more complex, political model of Islamic womanhood, contributing to academic debates	  on	  ‘Islamic	  feminism’.	   As notions of authenticity and historical figures are not static, their legacies can be renegotiated at any time; controversial figures like Qurrat al-Ayn who were once repudiated as inauthentic, or non-conformist figures like Zaynab al-Ghazali who did not represent the ideals of the 
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majority, can at a later time be taken up by others to represent or symbolise revised notions of authenticity and womanhood. 
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Chapter 7 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and The Fall of Sadat (1970-1980)  
 In the previous chapter it was shown how opposition groups in Egypt and Iran produced alternative models of authentic womanhood.  This chapter focuses on key developments in the lead up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution,	  and	  Sadat’s	  assassination in Egypt.  It relies on documents from the US National Archives on the WOI and Egyptian women in the 1970s, documents from the British National 
Archives	  on	  Sadat’s	  policies	  and	  its	  effects,	  the memoirs and writings of key actors in Iran including the Shah, Mahnaz Afkhami, Bamdad, Farmanfarmaian, Fatemeh Pakravan, Manouchehr Ganji, and figures within the anti-shah movement such as Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, Ali Shariati, Azar Nafisi, Shirin Ebadi.  These are complemented	  with	  samples	  from	  Khomeini’s	  speeches,	  interviews,	  and	  press articles from newspapers at the time, such as The Daily Telegraph, The New 
York Times, The Economist, and Persian Kayhan.  Similarly for Egypt, the memoirs, public diaries, and speeches of Anwar Sadat are used along with memoirs and published writings of Jehan Sadat, Nawal el-Saadawi, Zaynab al-Ghazali, Fatima Abdel-Hadi and Amina al-Said. This chapter will show that the state and opposition groups competed for power, in part through the production of different gender norms, each attempting to co-opt a new generation of educated women to validate their different models of cultural authenticity.  As the opposition movements in Egypt and Iran gained strength, state feminists had to manoeuvre around the regime 
and	  the	  opposition’s	  contradictory	  definitions	  of	  womanhood	  in	  order	  to	  effect	  changes.  The dual strategy of repression and limited liberalisation used by both 
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the Shah and Sadat is analysed to assess its effects on state feminism and 
women’s	  rights	  movements.  The chapter is split into 2 sections.  Section arguments, which are highlighted at the start, are used to make 3 comparative arguments.   The first comparative argument is that both the Iranian and Egyptian states entered into ‘patriarchal battles’ with the opposition, that is competition for political power centred on notions of womanhood and gender-relations, promoting the activism of state feminists as a way of weakening the opposition’s	  
models	  of	  womanhood.	  	  This	  chapter’s	  second	  comparative	  argument is that by employing a dual strategy of compromise and repression against the opposition, the Egyptian and Iranian states validated contradictory notions of modern 
womanhood	  by	  compromising	  on	  women’s	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  pacify	  their	  patriarchal rivals, thus hindering the effects of their own state feminist projects.   
In	  Iran,	  the	  Shah’s	  conciliatory	  gestures	  towards	  the	  religious	  opposition,	  
which	  included	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Women’s	  Affairs,	  helped turn some state feminists against the regime, and bolstered female support for 
Ayatollah	  Khomeini.	  	  In	  Egypt,	  Sadat’s	  attempts	  to	  co-opt the support of Islamists through the consideration of Islamic legislation proposals, such as the revision of Article 11 of the Constitution in 1971, and his suppression of independent feminists like Nawal el-Saadawi weakened the women’s	  rights	  movement. 
This	  chapter’s	  final	  comparative	  argument	  is	  that	  although	  ‘patriarchal battles’ between the state and the opposition were centred on state feminism and veiling, the re-veiling phenomenon in Iran and Egypt was different, and formed part of very different bargains with the opposition.  While in both cases unveiling/veiling was used to demarcate a line between western and authentic 
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female behaviour, as a way of signalling whether the state or the Islamist opposition was gaining power, it was only in Egypt that veiling formed part of actual bargains struck between women and the Islamic opposition.  Egyptian women promoted veiling as part of patriarchal bargains with the Islamists for greater social space, in order to continue pursuing university education, whilst 
projecting	  their	  modesty	  and	  promoting	  society’s	  Islamisation as a more authentic model of Egyptian womanhood.  However, in Iran, secular women donned the veil as an anti-imperialist and anti-Pahlavi symbol of the revolution, and did not necessarily promote the act of veiling as an authentic act outside the context of revolution.  Women like Ebadi and Farmanfarmaian, who came to support the revolution, did not negotiate for greater space in exchange for veiling, or the promotion of Islamic practices after the revolution.  As a result, 
once	  the	  regime	  was	  overthrown,	  and	  news	  spread	  of	  Khomeini’s	  enforced	  veiling law, thousands of women took to the streets in March 1979 to 
demonstrate	  against	  enforced	  veiling,	  and	  in	  defence	  of	  broader	  women’s	  rights.  
Section 1: Women, the WOI, and the 1979 Iranian Revolution Many writers like Bahar and Keddie have argued that the effects of the WOI on 
Iran’s	  female	  population	  were	  limited	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  grassroots	  demand,	  and	  the	  
WOI’s	  association	  with	  the	  regime.	  	  Keddie	  argues	  that	  the	  WOI	  was	  automatically shunned as an extension of the regime, turning women away from wholly feminist causes in general.1  Bahar points out that while Iranian women 
under	  the	  Shah’s	  regime	  enjoyed	  a	  better	  position,	  especially	  in	  legal	  terms,	  these	  changes were imposed from above and were not the result of a conscious 
                                                 1 Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 229. 
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grassroots demand.2  As demand did not come from the majority of women themselves, Bahar argues most women did not understand the essence of these changes or how to apply them.3  In contrast, this section argues that the limitations of the WOI, or the limited effects of its projects, were linked to patriarchal battles between the state and the opposition, which centred on state feminism and hindered much of the 
WOI’s	  work.	  	  WOI	  feminists	  had	  to	  balance between the state and the religious 
opposition’s	  conflicting	  constructs	  of	  womanhood,	  whilst often pushing for 
reforms	  outside	  ‘the	  sphere	  of	  traditional	  Islam’	  and	  ‘against	  the	  will	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  leaders’.4  It is argued that the Pahlavi state attempted to maintain dominance over patriarchal rivals in the opposition by balancing between repressive tactics, and compromise, which led to more contradictory 
notions	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  section	  women’s	  revolutionary activity and support for Khomeini is analysed.  It is argued that ideologically diverse women had different motives based on their social backgrounds, but that support for Khomeini was largely motivated by ideological trends promoted by thinkers like Jalal Al-i-Ahmed and Ali Shariati, which allowed various groups to unite around notions of Pahlavi westoxification and inauthenticity.   
Female	  support	  was	  encouraged	  by	  the	  Shah’s	  ineffective	  strategies	  in	  dealing with the religious opposition, such as his abandonment of the post of 
Ministry	  of	  Women’s	  Affairs,	  which	  according	  to	  Afkhami	  encouraged	  WOI	  
                                                 2 Sima Bahar, p. 182. 3 Ibid. 4 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organisation	  of	  Iran’,	  p.	  133. 
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women to join the anti-Shah movement.5  As a consequence, the veil was used as an anti-establishment and revolutionary symbol.  It is argued that this usage was 
the	  result	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Women’s	  Awakening	  reforms,	  which	  had	  linked	  unveiling with notions of westernisation and western dress, turning the veil into a symbol of authenticity against the Pahlavi state and imperialism.  Consequently, secular Tudeh and Fadayan women did not support protests 
against	  Khomeini’s	  enforced	  veiling	  decree	  in	  March	  1979,	  as	  unveiling was associated with the imperialist, westoxified Pahlavi state, and its westernised-bourgeois supporters. 
1.1 Totalitarianism, The Rastakhiz Party, and The WOI 
In	  many	  ways,	  the	  contradictions	  and	  inconsistencies	  of	  the	  regime’s	  policies	  came to a head during the 1970s.  Writing in 1973, Iranian journalist Pari Shayk al-Islami	  argued	  that	  in	  ‘today’s	  society	  in	  Iran,	  women	  still	  don’t	  have	  the	  status	  they deserve with regards to tasawu huquq (equality of rights)’	  but	  that	  many	  female intellectuals had surpassed their male peers, and were working on equal footing to men in fields such as her own.6  She	  argued	  that	  ‘men’s	  selfishness’	  had	  promoted Gom-namiy-i Zan (the loss	  of	  woman’s	  name)	  in Iranian history, and that researchers/journalists were working to fill these historical gaps and give 
women	  their	  rightful	  place	  in	  Iran’s	  intellectual and national history.7  In the previous chapters it was shown that in order to promote Iranian modernity, the Shah encouraged women to join the public sphere, promoting female employment and education as an extension of their responsibilities as educated 
                                                 5 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organization	  of	  Iran’,	  p.110. 6 Shaykh al-Islami, Bakhsh/chapter 4. 7 Ibid. 
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wives and mothers.  As such, the regime supported female social work in particular, as an extension of these roles.   Farmanfarmaian wrote that by 1973 her school of social work was expanding and admitting more students.8  Afkhami argued that the WOIs consistent work convinced the government that its services were necessary for national development. 9  As a result, she claimed an ideological turning point 
came	  in	  1973,	  when	  the	  WOI	  revised	  its	  constitution;	  ‘the	  revised	  constitution	  
made	  no	  mention	  of	  women’s	  role	  in	  the	  home…the	  goal	  was	  ‘defending	  the	  individual, family and social rights of women to ensure their complete equality’’.10 This was followed by the passing of the Family Protection Act in 1975, in stronger form than the original 1967 Act.  The act gave women the right to initiate divorce on the same grounds as men, transferred matters on child custody and alimony to a special family court, limited polygamy by requiring the 
first	  wife’s	  permission,	  legalised	  abortion	  with	  the	  husband’s	  consent,	  and	  
increased	  women’s	  marriage	  age	  to	  18.	  	  According	  to	  Afkhami,	  unmarried	  women could also have abortions up to the 8th week of pregnancy.11 Moreover, internationally the WOI was becoming very active and vocal.  This increase in international activity mirrored the shift in foreign policy between Reza Shah and his son towards greater western investment.  For instance in December 1974 the Iranian government contributed 30,000 USD to 
the	  International	  Women’s	  Year	  committee.12  The WOI became more active internationally than state feminists had been under Reza Shah.  Afkhami wrote 
                                                 8 Farmanfarmaian, p. 285. 9 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organisation	  of	  Iran’,	  pp.	  115-116; Ashraf Pahlavi, p. 155. 10Ibid, pp. 121-122. 11 Ibid, p. 132. 12 Memo from US Department of State to the United Nations, 2 December 1974, Document number: 1974, USUNN05600, USNA. 
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that	  at	  the	  1975	  International	  Women’s	  Year	  Conference in Mexico Iran played a principal role in establishing the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), which planned to host its 1980 conference in Iran.13   Correspondences between the US embassy in Tehran and the US Department of State in Washington show that before the WOI presented its proposal in Mexico, which included the plan for the establishment of the research centre, the Iranian government had requested and acquired the support of the US delegation to help	  secure	  approval	  for	  the	  WOI’s	  proposals.14  American 
association	  with	  the	  WOI’s	  initiatives	  contributed	  to	  the	  latter’s	  image	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  the Pahlavi regime.  Moreover, other than US backing, the Iranians failed to gain any contributions to the proposed centre from any other member countries.15  In fact, memos from meetings shows that the proposal for INSTRAW met with more 
‘silence	  than	  support’,	  as	  no	  other	  contributions	  were	  made	  other	  than	  a	  personal USD 1 million contribution from Ashraf Pahlavi on condition that the institute be located in Iran.16  Many member states showed a lack of interest in the institute, with Denmark expressing concerns it would duplicate other UN body efforts, and the African delegations opposing the idea it be located in Iran out of fears the Iranian government was seeking to control the proposed institute.17  
                                                 13 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organisation	  Of	  Iran’,	  p.	  123. 14 Memo from US Embassy in Tehran to US Department of State, 6 June 1975, Document number: 1975TEHRAN05294; Memo from US Embassy in Mexico to US Department of State, 24 June 1975, Document number: 1975MEXICO05530; Memo from UN Economic and Social Council, 24 July 1975, Document number: 1975GENEVA05913, USNA. 15 Ibid. 16 Memo from US mission at the United Nations to Department of State, 14 May 1976, Document number: 1976USUNN02115, USNA. 17 Ibid. 
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Despite	  the	  state’s	  support	  for	  social	  work,	  the Shah’s increasingly authoritarian style came to a head during this period.  In 1975 he ended the two-party system that had been in place since 1957, in favour of the single Rastakhiz or Resurgence Party, designed to control political participation and to mobilise the middle and lower classes.18  Manouchehr Ganji, Minister to the Shah and a member of the U.N Committee on Human Rights at the time, explained that very soon after the Party was created the Shah declared that any person who did not enter the Party would be seen as a traitor, and punished accordingly.19   Farmanfarmaian wrote that the Party intruded itself into every aspect of life, and anyone who did not cooperate with the regime was duly jailed or tortured.20  
Everybody	  was	  expected	  to	  join,	  and	  anyone	  who	  didn’t	  feel	  like	  doing	  so	  could go to the foreign ministry, get a passport and leave the 
country…humiliated	  and	  resentful like everyone else, I got a group membership application form, and signed my name to it.21  US government documents reaffirmed that although voter numbers were at a record high, people were under pressure to do so as their identity cards would be stamped to prove they had registered.22  Moreover, they added that the 
average	  ‘Iranian	  man	  in	  the	  street…generally	  presumes	  the	  outcome	  has	  been	  
decided	  in	  advance’,	  a	  view	  confirmed	  by	  the	  ‘election’	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  courtiers	  and ministers to top positions.23  Mahnaz Afkhami was originally named Deputy 
Chairman	  of	  the	  Party’s	  executive	  board,	  and	  although	  this	  was	  dropped	  at	  the	  
                                                 18 Stempel, pp. 31, 33-35. 19 Ganji, pp. 2-3. 20 Farmanfarmaian, p. 279. 21 Ibid. 22 Memo from US Embassy in Tehran to US Department of State, 17 June 1975, Document number: 1975TEHRAN05703, USNA. 23 Ibid. 
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June	  1975	  ‘elections’,	  she	  nevertheless	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  party’s	  first	  political	  bureau in October 1975.24  Farmanfarmaian added that tensions were further exacerbated by what she described as  
A	  government	  campaign	  of	  psychological	  degradation…No	  anniversary	  of	  
significance	  to	  the	  Pahlavis,	  could	  pass	  without	  a	  ‘festival	  of	  national	  
thanksgiving’…I	  was	  expected	  to	  send	  a	  quota	  of	  students and faculty to 
march	  in	  the	  parade.	  	  Needless	  to	  say	  nobody	  wanted	  to	  attend…but	  not	  going meant drawing the attention of SAVAK.25  As a result, instead of mobilising more Iranians towards the regime, the Resurgence Party built resentment amongst the educated middle classes, and amongst female activists like Farmanfarmaian, despite state funding for her school of social work.  Moreover, Farmanfarmian recalled how the oil-fuelled economic boom produced a new class of Iranian nouveaux riches whose ostentatious spending was not only exasperating to	  the	  poorest	  classes	  but	  ‘like	  a	  
heady	  explosive	  inhalant’	  to	  people	  like	  herself	  and	  her	  students.26 Even Ashraf 
Pahlavi	  admitted	  ‘the	  gap	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  became	  more	  pronounced,	  and	  more dangerous to the stability of the regime.27   According to Afkhami, by the late 1970s the WOI had some 2,000 paid specialists working in 120 centres throughout	  the	  country,	  writing	  that	  ‘by	  1976	  
more	  than	  a	  million	  women	  participated	  in	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  centres’.28 She credited the WOI Family Welfare Centres with playing a pivotal role in building legitimacy for the WOI at grassroots levels, by providing healthcare, hygiene, child care, and counselling services to the poorest classes, both within Tehran 
                                                 24 Ibid, Memos from US Embassy in Tehran to US Department of State, 8 May 1975, Document number: 1975TEHRAN04312, and 22 October 1975, Document: 1975TEHRAN10338, USNA. 25 Farmanfarmaian, p. 279. 26 Ibid, p. 278. 27 Ashraf Pahalavi, p. 187. 28 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organization	  Of	  Iran’,	  pp.	  116-117, 132-133. 
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and across the country.29 She added that 12 of these centres were located in the 
most	  ‘impoverished	  areas	  of	  south	  Tehran’,	  where	  the	  WOI’s	  school	  of	  social	  work was also located.30 Fatemeh Pakravan, wife of Iranian Minister General Hassan Pakravan, described the scenes of	  poverty	  in	  South	  Tehran’s	  slums	  between 1976 and 1977. 
I	  just	  couldn’t	  believe	  my	  eyes…some	  of	  them	  lived	  in	  pens,	  completely	  patched up with pieces of nylon on them.  The open-air canals were heaped with dirt and garbage...you cold not imagine what it was like.31  Yet, Afkhami	  insisted	  the	  WOI’s	  centres	  were	  crucial	  in	  improving	  the	  conditions	  in these slums.	  	  However,	  she	  did	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  WOI’s	  association	  with	  the regime tainted its initiatives.32  She wrote that leftist opponents disparaged the movement because acknowledging its impact would have been tantamount to praising the regime, while religious fundamentalists opposed the WOI because its activities conflicted with their version of Islam.33   Afkhami wrote that the WOI achieved most of its women’s	  rights	  reforms	  
‘outside	  the	  sphere	  of	  traditional	  Islam	  and	  against	  the	  will	  of	  conservative	  
religious	  leaders’.34  However, she also explained that the WOI consistently tried to compromise where possible with religious leaders to help advance their 
projects.	  	  She	  wrote	  that	  the	  Shah’s	  support	  for	  WOI’s	  proposals	  was	  not	  a	  given,	  
but	  depended	  on	  ‘sufficient	  social	  pressure	  from	  various	  power	  groups	  within	  
and	  outside	  the	  government…to	  convince	  him	  that	  a	  manageable	  convergence	  of	  opinion existed in favour	  of	  the	  move’.35 As such, the name of the WOI centres 
                                                 29 Ibid, pp. 115-117. 30 Ibid, p.117. 31 Pakravan, pp. 120-121. 32 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organization	  Of	  Iran’,	  p.	  123. 33 Ibid, pp. 128-129. 34 Ibid, p. 133. 35 Ibid, p.110. 
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was	  changed	  from	  Women’s	  Centres	  to	  Family	  Welfare	  Centres,	  in	  order	  to	  stress	  
their	  goal	  was	  to	  ‘strengthen	  the	  family’,	  as	  many	  men	  ‘resented	  any	  attempt	  to	  draw women out of the house and into society’.36  Moreover, a concerted effort was made to draw women from influential religious families to the centres. By consciously seeking the participation of female members of the families of the leading clergy in the centre’s activities wherever necessary, 
and	  by	  including	  religious	  instruction	  and	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  in	  special classes in some areas, the WOI minimized confrontation with the clergy, whose overt opposition would have drastically curtailed the expansion of the network.37  Afkhami described	  the	  WOI’s	  strategy	  of	  balancing	  religious	  opposition	  to	  their	  
projects	  against	  the	  Shah’s	  ‘modernising	  impulses’	  and	  the	  ruling	  elite’s	  
‘essentially	  unsympathetic	  attitude	  to	  women’s	  rights’.38  She compared the relatively smooth approval for a quota system to encourage female participation in technical and engineering fields, against the conservative backlash that 
erupted	  over	  the	  WOI’s	  initiative	  to	  abolish	  the	  requirement	  for	  a	  husband’s	  permission for women to acquire passports.  The latter cost women two senate seats, and led to the resignation of Senator Mehrangiz Manuchehriyan amidst 
accusations	  of	  the	  WOI	  ‘espousing	  loose	  moral	  standards	  and	  policies	  that	  would	  
weaken	  family	  ties’.39    Thus,	  Afkhami’s	  writing	  indicated that WOI feminists had to consistently toe a	  line	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  religious	  opposition’s	  conflicting	  constructs	  of womanhood.  However, many reforms were also passed against the will of most conservative leaders, such as the Family Protection reforms, when enough support was garnered from the ruling elite, and where those reforms coincided 
                                                 36 Ibid, p. 127. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid, p.133 39 Ibid, p. 126. 
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with	  the	  Shah’s	  modernisation	  goals.	  	  Thus,	  this	  section	  argues	  that	  the	  Iranian	  
state	  entered	  into	  patriarchal	  battles	  with	  the	  opposition	  around	  the	  WOI’s	  projects and initiatives, approving reforms that	  conflicted	  with	  the	  opposition’s	  notions of womanhood as a way of asserting its power. Thus, as the Islamic opposition gained more ground and support, the Shah was encouraged to 
forsake	  some	  of	  his	  women’s	  rights	  reforms	  as	  he viewed bargains with Iranian feminists too costly to keep, as later sections will illustrate. 
1.2 Protests Abroad and the Introduction of Limited Liberalisation Between 1972 and 1976 the government security forces were at their most brutal.40  Independent activism, which was unable to express itself on Iranian soil, was finding outlets in Europe and the US.  Azar Nafisi explained that the Confederation of Iranian Students, which was one of the strongest campus movements in the US, attracted youths by functioning as an umbrella organisation of different ideological groups.41  She explained that the organisation stress gender-neutrality and rejected the secular feminist movement as bourgeois.42 From 1976 onwards, social unrest rose critically, as did the effects of economic recession, inflation, urban overcrowding, glaring income gaps, and the lack of political freedom.43  
On	  9	  October	  1977,	  the	  US	  embassy	  in	  Tehran	  reported	  that	  ‘masked	  
students’	  at	  Tehran	  University	  ‘broke	  windows	  and	  burned	  a	  bus	  during violent 
demonstrations	  intended	  to	  bring	  about	  segregation	  of	  women	  students’.44  The 
incident	  led	  to	  protests	  by	  women’s	  organisations,	  and	  condemnation	  from	  the	  
                                                 40 Stempel, p. 41.  41 Nafisi, p. 203. 42 Ibid, pp. 203-204. 43 Keddie, Modern Iran, p. 168. 44 US Embassy in Tehran to US Secretary of State, 13 October 1977, Document number 1977TEHRAN09082, Film number D770380-0370, USNA. 
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Shah of	  the	  ‘traitorous,	  anti-revolutionary	  and	  regrettable	  incidents’,	  whose	  goal	  he said was to set the country back 2,000 years.45 In the same year, Ashraf 
Pahlavi’s	  car	  was	  also	  attacked	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  assassinate	  her	  while	  she	  was	  in	  France.46  Farmanfarmaian described how the incident allowed SAVAK to crack down even further on dissidents.47  Nafisi’s	  father	  was	  summoned	  by	  the	  secret	  police and forced to make promises about her future conduct as a result of her activism abroad.48    However, the situation suddenly changed in 1977 when the Shah introduced some limited liberalisation measures in an attempt to appease the opposition.49  This led to the publication of two open letters, one to the Shah by 
former	  National	  Front	  members	  ‘articulating	  liberal	  aspirations’,	  and	  a	  second	  
letter	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  by	  40	  intellectuals	  ‘calling	  for	  increased intellectual 
freedom	  and	  the	  reestablishment	  of	  the	  writers	  guild’.50 Farmanfarmaian 
recalled	  her	  optimism	  at	  these	  ‘abrupt	  and	  hopeful’	  changes.51  Ganji wrote that in November 1976 the Shah accepted his recommendation to conclude an agreement with the International Committee of The Red Cross (ICRC), to monitor prison conditions in Iran.52  He wrote that by early 1977 the Shah had become 
more	  cooperative	  over	  Iran’s	  human	  rights	  issues	  than	  ever	  before.53  The effects of this limited liberalisation did not bring about any positive results for the Shah.   
                                                 45 Ibid,US Embassy in Tehran to US Secretary of State, 17 October 1977, Document number 1977TEHRAN09143, USNA. 46 Ashraf Pahalavi, p. 190. 47 Farmanfarmaian, p. 288. 48 Nafisi, p. 204. 49 Stempel, p. 41. 50 Memo from US Secretary of State to US Embassy in Tehran, 26 October 1977, 1977STATE256506, D770394-0093, USNA. 51 Farmanfarmaian, pp. 286-287. 52 Ganji, p. 2. 53 Ibid. 
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As	  Farmanfarmaian	  recollected,	  ‘allowed	  to	  rise	  to	  the	  surface…people’s	  anger	  
was	  churning	  like	  magma	  in	  a	  crater’.54  Farmanfarmaian explained how anti-Shah demonstrations during the 
Shah’s	  state	  visit to the US in November 1977 smashed his image of invincibility.55  Nafisi was part of these demonstrations on 15 November 1977 in Washington DC, where she explained 2,000 male and female students had gathered around the White House, and where she, along with two other women 
gave	  speeches	  and	  shouted	  out	  ‘Death	  to	  the	  Shah;	  CIA	  agents,	  US	  advisors	  out	  of	  
Iran’.56  An important outcome of these demonstrations was that they set off more student demonstrations in Iran, particularly in Tehran and Isfahan.57  Internal US documents	  described	  these	  protests	  as	  the	  ‘effects	  of	  a	  well-publicised liberalisation undertaken by the government of Iran since last spring, 
which	  is	  universally	  attributed	  to	  United	  States	  government	  pressure’.58  Protests in Iran became more frequent as radical groups were encouraged to actively recruit members at universities and elsewhere, and the religious opposition began to organise more visible demonstrations and seminars calling 
for	  Khomeini’s	  return.59   On the 22 January 1978, the WOI	  coordinated	  a	  number	  of	  ‘counter-
demonstrations’	  throughout	  the	  country,	  with	  Afkhami	  forwarding	  a	  telegram	  to	  
the	  Shah	  ‘on	  behalf	  of	  Iranian	  women’	  declaring	  ‘war	  on	  agents	  of	  foreigners	  and	  
                                                 54 Farmanfarmaian, pp. 287-288. 55 Ibid, p.288. 56 Nafisi, pp. 211-212. 57 US Embassy Tehran to US Secretary of State, 15 December 1977, Document Number: 1977TEHRAN10993, USNA. 58 US Secretary of State/US Embassy in Tehran, 27 December 1977, Document Number: 1977TEHRAN11408, USNA. 59 Farmanfarmaian, p. 288. 
 321 
reactionaries who want women to return to the infernal period of	  the	  past’.60  This was	  followed	  by	  a	  congress	  to	  commemorate	  ‘Iranian	  Women’s	  Rights	  Day’	  on 27 February 1978.61  As	  Minister	  of	  State	  for	  Women’s	  Affairs	  and	  Secretary	  
General	  of	  the	  WOI,	  Afkhami’s	  statements	  regarding	  the	  revolutionary	  protests	  were not representative of the views of the majority of Iranian women, or indeed of all WOI members, as their subsequent participation in revolutionary protests testified.62 Afkhami recalled asking the secretary of their Kerman branch whom the veiled women leading the Kerman revolutionary demonstrations had been.  
‘She responded, ‘they	  were	  our	  own	  members.	  We	  kept	  saying	  ‘mobilize	  the	  
women,’	  now	  they’re	  mobilized,	  and	  they	  shout	  ‘down	  with	  the	  regime’’.63  
Thus	  the	  Shah’s	  actions	  led	  to	  splits	  within	  the	  WOI	  itself,	  with	  Afkhami’s	  
followers	  declaring	  a	  ‘war’	  against	  ‘reactionaries’/revolutionaries	  while	  their	  Kerman members demonstrated against the Shah in support of the revolutionary movement.  When hundreds of people were killed in the infamous Cinema Rex fire in August 1978, where exit doors had been deliberately blocked to prevent people escaping, the majority of Iranians believed it to be the work of SAVAK. Nafisi recalled, The callous brutality of the act was another argument for the overthrow 
of	  the	  Shah’s	  regime…later	  it	  emerged	  that	  fire	  had	  been	  planned	  by	  sympathisers of the religious opposition.64   
                                                 60 US Embassy Tehran to US Secretary of State, 23 January 1978, Document Number: 1978TEHRAN00810, USNA. 61 US Embassy Tehran to US Secretary of State, 2 March 1978, Document Number: 1978TEHRAN02173, USNA. 62 Afkhami,	  ‘The	  Women’s	  Organization	  Of	  Iran’,	  p.110 63 Afkhami,	  ‘An	  introduction	  to	  the	  Women’s	  Organization	  of	  Iran’,	  Foundation	  for	  Iranian	  Studies, http://fis-iran.org/en/women/organization/introduction 64 Nafisi, pp. 213-214. 
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Responding to outrage over the incident, the Shah made further concessions to 
the	  religious	  opposition	  hoping	  to	  ‘restore	  tranquillity’,	  replacing Prime Minister Amuzegar with Sharif-Emami because	  of	  the	  latter’s	  strong	  ties	  to	  the	  clergy.65  
The	  US	  ambassador	  to	  Tehran	  elaborated	  on	  the	  Shah’s	  motives	  in	  granting	  these	  concessions. He had deliberately contrived to present these changes so that they would be seen as	  concession	  from	  him	  personally…but	  he	  had	  no	  confidence	  that	  
‘these	  priests’	  can	  ever	  be	  fully	  satisfied…and	  cited	  their	  ‘insistence	  on	  no	  
women	  in	  the	  Cabinet,	  no	  women	  in	  high	  places.’66    The worst confrontation with the regime took place on 7 September 1978, a day 
that	  would	  be	  remembered	  as	  ‘Black	  Friday’.	  	  Around	  20,000	  demonstrators	  
gathered	  in	  Jaleh	  Square	  in	  Tehran	  and	  ignored	  the	  army	  commander’s	  orders	  to	  disperse.  The army subsequently opened fire, killing hundreds of men and women, and wounding thousands of others.   In further concessions to the Islamists, the government closed casinos, 
reverted	  to	  the	  Islamic	  Calendar,	  abolished	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Women’s	  Affairs,	  and	  
eliminated	  the	  ‘women’s	  portfolio	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  religious	  endowments	  portfolio’,	  
leading	  to	  threats	  of	  resignation	  from	  the	  head	  of	  the	  women’s	  organisation	  in	  Isfahan.67 Nafisi argued the overdue gestures of compromise were interpreted by the opposition as a loss of will.68 Consequently, these reactionary measures only helped embolden the opposition, who began to feel their actions were shaking 
the	  regime’s	  confidence.	  	   A widespread fear is that by going this far, the Shah has given the religious reactionaries a feeling of power, and now he must either 
                                                 65 US Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State, 28 August 1978, Document Number: 1978TEHRAN08187, USNA. 66 Ibid. 67 US Consulate in Isfahan to Secretary of State, 10 September 1978, Document Number: 1978ISFAHA00092, USNA. 68 Nafisi, p. 216. 
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continue to give in, or crack down on them—and either might provoke disturbances much worse than Iran has seen so far.69  The state’s fluctuation between repression and liberalisation was interpreted as a sign of weakness, as the Shah himself later admitted.70  Farmanfarmaian wrote 
that	  the	  Shah’s	  vacillation	  was	  all	  the	  more	  alarming	  to	  ‘moderate	  people’	  like	  herself, as increasing funeral processions and memorial demonstrations implied that the authority of the mullahs was growing.71  This section argues that the 
state’s dual strategy of repression and compromise vis-à-vis the opposition, which resulted in the granting-then-revoking	  of	  women’s	  rights	  reforms,	  validated different and conflicting notions of womanhood, splitting women within the WOI. 
1.3 Mixed Messages of 1979 Iranian Revolution  Increasing female support for Ayatollah Khomeini, the man who condemned 
women’s	  suffrage	  in	  1963,	  perplexed	  many	  international	  observers,	  as	  did	  increasing use of the veil by wider numbers of Iranian women.  Some writers like Mary E. Hegland and Janet Bauer stress that many women took part in the revolution as religious activity.72 While Bauer stresses that motives differed according to class, she argues women from middle-class homes participated as 
‘wives,	  mothers	  and	  sisters’,	  whilst	  among	  the	  poor,	  religion	  and	  the	  manipulation of religious symbols provided the motivation for their activity.73  Others like Bahar and Anne H. Betteridge	  stress	  women’s	  participation	  as	  
nationalist	  activity,	  downplaying	  religious	  and	  ‘feminist’ motives.  Bahar points 
                                                 69 US Consulate in Isfahan to Secretary of State, 10 September 1978, USNA. 70 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The	  Shah’s	  Story,	  p. 172. 71 Farmanfarmaian, p. 293. 72 Mary	  E	  Hegland,	  ‘Aliabad	  Women:	  Revolution	  as	  Religious	  Activity’,	  in	  Women and Revolution 
in Iran, ed. Guity Nashat (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 171. 73 Janet	  Bauer,	  ‘Poor	  Women	  and	  Social	  Consciousness	  in	  Revolutionary	  Iran’,	  in	  Women and 
Revolution in Iran, ed. Guity Nashat, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 142, 157, 161. 
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out	  that	  like	  the	  1906	  Constitutional	  Revolution,	  women’s	  participation	  was	  part	  
of	  the	  whole	  nation’s	  struggle,74 while Betteridge argues that women participated primarily as Iranians who opposed the Pahlavi government, and not 
as	  ‘women	  per	  se’,	  although	  there	  was	  a	  vague	  understanding	  that	  respect	  for	  
women’s	  social	  position	  was	  part	  of	  the	  revolution’s	  aims.75  The idea that some groups of women were motivated purely by religion, nationalism, or family ties, does not take into account the extensive overlap and interweaving of religious, oppositional politics, and nationalist ideas that characterised this period of Iranian history.  In the previous chapter it was shown how the models of Zaynab and Fatima within the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh combined religious ideas with notions of revolution, modernity, and Marxism.  Female Mojahedin members, many of whom came from more modest, lower-class backgrounds, were not purely motivated by religion or family links, but by these interconnected religious, political, nationalist, ideas, which directly 
confronted	  women’s	  roles	  and	  rights.	  	  Similarly,	  Fadayan	  women	  like	  Ashraf	  Dehgani who joined the organisation with her brother, maintained her struggle after his death, and based on her writing was motivated by her own political worldview and commitment to socialism.   Furthermore, motives differed not only according to class, education levels, and religious background, but also in response to the political climate and ideological changes that were taking place.   Jalal Al-i-Ahmad himself had experienced an evolution from socialism, as a leading Tudeh member, to a new form of political Islam as the revolutionary writer of Gharbzadegi, an ideological trend motivated	  by	  ‘gaining az nau 
                                                 74 Sima Bahar, p. 185. 75 Anne	  H.	  Betteridge,	  ‘To	  Veil	  or	  Not	  to	  Veil:	  A	  Matter	  of	  Protest	  or	  Policy’,	  in	  Women and 
Revolution in Iran, pp. 171-172, p. 109. 
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shinaktan-i khish (a renewed acquaintance with ourselves) rather than a simple 
‘return	  to	  Islam’.76  Al-i-Ahmad’s	  wife attempted to explain this transformation, emphasising it was a deliberate and carefully thought-out decision, ‘his partial return to religion and to the Hidden Imam was a path towards freedom from the evils of imperialism and towards gaining a national identity’.77 Rejection of westernisation was one of the key shared tenants across politically diverse revolutionary groups, which allowed ideologically opposed leaders to mix various revolutionary messages in an attempt to co-opt greater support.   Al-i-Ahmad	  and	  Shariati’s	  reformist	  brand	  of	  Islam	  attacked	  ‘fanatics’78 
like	  Khomeini,	  claiming:	  ‘in Islam, the scholars are	  not	  wise	  people…they	  do	  not	  
have	  a	  handful	  or	  a	  bucketful	  or	  a	  truckful	  of	  knowledge’.79  However, their re-interpretation of Shi‘a narratives was not only taken up by revolutionary groups like the Mojahedin, but by Islamist scholars like Khomeini as well.  In the blind fervour of the revolution, the ideas and messages of different ideologues became muddled and interchangeable.  Thus, while Al-i-Ahmad and Shariati denounced clerics like Khomeini, their messages nevertheless fortified his position by increasing the credibility of Islam as an alternative socio-political discourse.  It allowed clerics like Khomeini to selectively draw messages from reformist thinkers and use them to validate their leadership of the revolution.   While in exile in Paris, Khomeini released messages defining the movement as an independence struggle	  against	  ‘the	  superpowers,	  which have 
stolen	  our	  oil…who are working through the Shah to oppress the Iranian 
                                                 76 Al-i-Ahmad, pp. 12-13. 77 Simin	  Daneshvar,	  ‘Jalal's	  Sunset’,	  in	  A Stone on a Grave by Jalal Al-i-Ahmad, trans. Blake Robert Atwood (California: Mazda Publishers, 2008), p. 99. 78 Al-i-Ahmad, p. 117. 79 Shariati,	  ‘Fatima	  is	  Fatima’, p. 88. 
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nation’,80mirroring much of Al-i-Ahmed	  and	  Shariati’s	  arguments.  Moreover, the 
inconsistencies	  and	  ambiguities	  within	  Khomeini’s	  various	  tracts,	  declarations,	  and speeches, indicate that he often altered his messages or kept them vague to influence revolutionary support in his favour.  For instance, although Khomeini had attacked the White Revolution reforms on women, particularly female suffrage, during the revolution he attempted to reassure women with statements 
such	  as	  ‘Islam	  made	  women	  equal	  with	  men;	  in	  fact,	  it	  shows	  a	  concern	  for	  women that it does not show	  for	  men…woman	  must	  have	  a	  say	  in	  the	  
fundamental	  destiny	  of	  the	  country.’81  He	  stressed	  women’s	  roles	  as	  ‘mothers’	  
and	  ‘rearers	  of	  men’,	  and	  rather	  than	  discuss	  gender-discrimination, emphasised 
different	  ‘restrictions’	  on	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  	  ‘If	  nations were deprived of 
courageous	  women	  to	  rear	  true	  men,	  they	  would	  decline	  and	  collapse…if	  Islam	  has imposed certain restrictions on both women and men, it is for the benefit of 
both.’82   Furthermore, Khomeini assured women of their importance, and often gave them the impression the revolution would work in their favour. The Laws of Islam are for the benefit of both man and woman, and woman must have a say in the fundamental destiny of the country.  Just as you have participated in our revolutionary movement…now	  you	  must	  
also	  participate	  in	  its	  triumph…the	  country	  belongs	  to	  you.83  Khomeini thus appeared to signal a more active national role for women in contrast to the perceived token or state-controlled activity under the Shah.  These statements can be viewed as attempts to co-opt educated women and 
                                                 80 US Embassy in Paris to US Secretary of State, 13 October 1978, Document Number: 1978PARIS33871, USNA. 81 Ruhollah	  Khomeini,	  ‘Address	  to	  a	  Group	  of	  Women	  in	  Qum,	  6	  March	  1979’,	  in	  Islam and 
Revolution, p. 263. 82 Ibid, pp. 263-264. 83 Ibid. 
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female activists by indicating that they	  would	  take	  an	  equal	  part	  in	  the	  nation’s	  construction as part of new bargains with the post-revolutionary state.  That was 
how	  Farmanfarmaian	  came	  to	  believe	  Khomeini’s	  return might be beneficial. He now seemed to advocate political participation for women.  He had 
said	  publicly	  that	  the	  clergy	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  rule	  the	  country…his	  return	  
as	  Iran’s	  spiritual	  leader	  might	  act	  as	  a	  strong	  binding	  force	  the	  country	  so	  desperately needed.84  
As	  the	  revolution	  gained	  more	  strength,	  the	  Shah’s	  ineffective	  attempts	  to	  control the situation saw members of WOI become disillusioned with the regime.85   
The	  Shah’s	  abolition	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Women’s	  Affairs	  and	  the	  women’s	  portfolio showed	  that	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  forsake	  women’s	  rights	  to	  maintain	  power over his political rivals.  These unilateral acts abandoned earlier patriarchal bargains struck with the WOI and female activists working with government support, turning more educated women who had benefited from state support, such as Farmnanfarmaian and Ebadi, against the regime.  As Ebadi explained,   I found myself drawn to the opposition voices that hailed Ayatollah Khomeini as their leader.  It seemed in no way a contradiction or me—an 
educated	  professional	  woman…faith	  occupied	  a	  central	  role	  in	  our	  middle-class	  lives…who	  did	  I	  have	  more	  in	  common	  with,	  in	  the	  end:	  an	  
opposition	  led	  by	  mullahs…or	  the	  gilded	  court	  of	  the	  Shah?86  
Moreover,	  while	  women’s	  revolutionary	  activity	  was	  motivated by their specific social and ideological differences, the common goal of ousting the ‘westoxified’ Pahlavi regime meant that ideologically diverse women united in their support for Khomeini as a means to an end.   
                                                 84 Farmanfarmaian, p. 318. 85 Afkhami,	  The	  Women’s	  Organization	  Of	  Iran’,	  p.110.	   86 Ebadi, p. 33. 
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According to Nafisi, the Confederation of Iranian students abroad 
‘denigrated’	  family	  links	  and	  ties,	  and	  women’s activity was encouraged to be independent of social relationships.87  For women like Nafisi the priority of ousting the regime prevented them from supporting any leaders the regime put forward, including National Front leader Shahpour Bakhtiar, whom Nafisi 
accused	  of	  being	  a	  compromiser;	  ‘I	  like	  so	  many	  others,	  was	  for	  a	  complete break 
with	  the	  Shah,	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime	  would	  do’.88  This uncompromising position encouraged their support for Khomeini as a strong anti-imperialist, and anti-Pahlavi voice.   Too arrogant to think of him as a threat and deliberately ignorant of his designs, we supported him.  And yet everything was there for us to 
see…he	  had	  denounced	  women’s	  suffrage	  as	  a	  form	  of	  prostitution;	  he	  
had	  made	  countless	  pronouncements	  against	  minorities…we	  welcomed	  
the	  vehemence	  of	  Khomeini’s rants against imperialists and the Shah and were willing to overlook the fact that they were not delivered by a champion of freedom.89   This section argues that the different accounts of women like Farmanfarmaian, 
Nafisi,	  and	  Ebadi	  indicate	  that	  women’s	  support for Khomeini varied according to social class, education, and political backgrounds, and was the combined 
result	  of	  ideological	  trends	  within	  the	  revolutionary	  movement,	  the	  Shah’s	  ineffective attempts to regain control through concessions to the opposition, and growing unity around the notion of Pahlavi inauthenticity.  As such, the increase in veiling during this period can be seen as a manifestation of these developments.  In other words, secular women donned the veil as a means of challenging the cultural and political legitimacy of the Pahlavi regime.  However, in the following section it will be shown how the religious opposition promoted 
                                                 87 Nafisi, p.203. 88 Ibid, p. 217. 89 Ibid, p.210 
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this phenomenon as	  a	  rejection	  of	  Reza	  Shah’s	  Unveiling	  Decree	  of	  1936	  and	  
Mohammad	  Reza	  Shah’s	  White	  Revolution of 1963.   
1.4 Veiling during the 1979 Revolution Writers like Sanasarian, Afshar and Betteridge have argued that the veil was used during the revolution as an anti-Pahlavi symbol.  Afshar points to its use by women with communist ideas to argue similarly to Sanasarian that the veil during the revolution served two purposes: it was a way to prevent easy identification by SAVAK, and it was a symbolic gesture against the westernised regime.90  Betteridge similarly emphasises that the veil was used to represent 
morality	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ‘immorality	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  regime	  and	  to	  the	  west in 
general.’91 Farmanfarmaian’s	  account	  of	  the	  changes	  she	  witnessed	  amongst	  her	  own students supports the view that women veiled as an anti-western, anti-Imperialist symbol against the regime.  She wrote how discontent amongst men and women took on an increasingly religious character in the lead up to the revolution. 
In	  only	  a	  few	  months	  the	  doctrines	  of	  ‘Islamic	  Marxism’	  had	  gained	  enormous strength and visibility at the University and on other 
campuses…At	  my	  own	  school	  many	  male	  undergraduates	  were	  wearing	  buttoned shirts without ties to emphasise that they were not 
‘Westernisers’…many	  women	  students	  had	  defiantly	  put	  on	  the	  black	  
chador or black clothes to show their support.92  
Khomeini	  himself	  did	  not	  simply	  define	  veiling	  as	  ‘Islamic	  dress’,	  but	  encouraged	  the politicisation of its use as an anti-Imperialist symbol, equating Iranian authenticity, morality and freedom with the act of veiling.   
                                                 90 Sanasarian, The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, p. 11;	  Soraya	  Afshar,	  ‘The	  Attitude of the 
Iranian	  Left	  to	  the	  Women’s	  Question’,	  in	  Women of Iran, ed. Farah Azari p. 116. 91 Betteridge,	  ‘To	  Veil	  or	  Not	  to	  Veil’,	  p.	  110.	   92 Farmanfarmaian, p. 288. 
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Could any Muslim agree with this scandalous uncovering of women?  The women of Iran have risen up against the Shah	  themselves…‘we	  don’t	  want	  
to	  be	  forced	  into	  immorality!	  We	  want	  to	  be	  free!’93   The black coloured chadors worn during the revolutionary protests had historically been used during funeral, official, and religious ceremonies, such as 
Rowzeh and Ashura.	  	  Khomeini	  emphasised	  the	  Shah’s	  description	  of	  the	  Islamic	  revolutionary movement as the	  ‘Black	  reaction’,	  declaring	  ‘	  the religious scholars and Islam are Black Reaction! And you have carried out your White Revolution in 
the	  midst	  of	  all	  this	  Black	  Reaction!’94 The increasing use of specifically black chadors during the revolution, over the more frequently used light coloured and printed chadors common amongst Bazaari and working class women, was 
therefore	  not	  insignificant	  when	  placed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Khomeini’s	  scathing	  
condemnation	  of	  the	  ‘White’	  Revolution	  in	  1963.	  	   Moreover, increased veiling during the revolution allowed Khomeini to manipulate the images, arguing female activism was religiously inspired and that only veiled women had proved themselves useful to the Iranian nation.  The women who contributed to the revolution were, and are, women in 
the	  Islamic	  dress…the	  coquettes	  who	  put	  on	  makeup	  and	  go	  into	  the	  
street	  showing	  off…did	  not	  fight	  against	  the	  Shah…They	  do	  not	  know	  how	  to be useful, neither socially, nor politically, nor professionally.95   In this way, Khomeini used revolutionary veiling to link this act to his definitions of Iranian womanhood and nationalism.  However, his first attempt to enforce these ideas was met with substantial female resistance on the first International 
Women’s	  Day	  demonstrations	  following	  the	  revolution, on 8 March 1979.  Upon hearing that Khomeini had declared enforced veiling for all government 
                                                 93 Khomeini,	  ‘Speech	  delivered	  at	  the	  Mosque	  of	  Shaykh	  Ansari	  in	  Najaf,	  8	  Jan	  1978’,	  in	  Islam and 
Revolution, p. 222. 94 Ibid. 95 Orianna	  Fallaci,	  ‘An	  interview	  with	  Khomeini’,	  The New York Times, 7 October 1979. 
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employees, demonstrator numbers grew into the thousands.96  Although	  men’s	  
Shari‘a dress code only prohibited them from wearing shorts in public, they were unofficially encouraged to cease wearing ties, as Khomeini promoted the notion of kravatis (tie-wearing men) as cronies of the west.97    Women protested against the veiling decree, calling out for the preservation of their rights, including their right to choose what to wear.  The Family Protection Act had been nullified the previous month,98 and female 
marchers	  called	  out	  for	  their	  freedom	  and	  equal	  rights,	  chanting	  ‘we	  condemn	  all	  
forms	  of	  dictatorship’,	  ‘freedom	  is	  neither	  Eastern	  nor	  western.	  It’s	  universal’.99  Two female protestors in chadors interviewed during the march said that they were there to support freedom of choice, that they fought and died during the 
revolution	  like	  men,	  with	  one	  adding	  ‘our	  children	  have	  studied	  and	  become	  educated they want	  their	  freedom…I	  don’t	  want	  men	  to	  force	  my	  daughters	  to	  
wear	  the	  veil’.100  The Economist reported	  ‘middle-class women, leftist or westernised, demonstrated four times in the past few days, braving insult and 
harassment	  bordering	  on	  serious	  violence’.101   Writers like Sanasarian have argued that the refusal of groups like the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh, Fadayan-i-Khalgh, and Tudeh to back the 8 March women’s	  demonstrations was linked to the fact that the groups did not believe in a 
separate	  women’s	  rights	  movement, were male-led, and defined most of their 
                                                 96 Guy	  Rais,	  ‘Warning	  Shots	  At	  The	  Women’s	  Rights	  Demonstration	  In	  Tehran’,	  The Daily 
Telegraph, 9 March 1979, 2IAW/2/A/71, WLA. 97 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, (London: .B. Tauris &Co, 1993), p.30. 98 Elizabeth	  Mayer,	  ‘Restrictions	  on	  the	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  of	  Women’	  in	  Women	  in	  Islam,	  Critical Concepts in Sociology, ed. Haideh Moghissi (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.384 99 Movement for the Liberation of Women,	  MLF’s Video	  footage	  from	  the	  8	  March	  1979	  Women’s	  Demonstrations, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKkgCSBJ3aY. 100 Ibid. 101 Iran: On With Scarves Off With Veils, The Economist, 17 March 1979, 2IAW/2/A/71, WLA. 
 332 
goals in masculine terms.102  However,	  women’s	  political	  differences,	  and	  different definitions of womanhood/cultural authenticity, meant they did not all 
unite	  over	  the	  women’s	  demonstrations	  of	  March	  1979.	  	  Sansarian’s	  argument	  downplays the fact that many women agreed with the view of group leaders that the revolution had to be successful first before they could focus on gender-equality, or greater social changes.  Ebadi explained how in the wake of having her judgeship stripped, she was let down by the revolutionaries she had supported. 
I	  stood	  with	  this	  revolution.	  	  You	  owe	  me	  an	  answer…‘We’ll	  attend	  to	  your	  
rights	  later’,	  they	  promised.	  	  ‘But	  we	  have	  more	  urgent	  problems	  right	  
now’…in	  their	  hierarchy	  of	  priorities	  women’s	  rights	  would	  forever	  come	  last.103  The misleading statements of Islamist leader Khomeini, and the splintering of the opposition in the aftermath of the revolution, meant that women were left with little space and leverage with which to strike new patriarchal bargains to improve their position.  Women who did not veil, irrespective of their social, political, or professional achievements, were automatically shunned as inauthentic and anti-nationalist.   
These	  new	  notions	  allowed	  Khomeini’s	  regime to justify the execution of women like Dr Farakhro Parsa, first female parliamentarian and Minister of Education, as part of a political purge against	  hundreds	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  senior	  officials.  Dr Parsa, was arrested in February 1980104, and was found guilty of 
‘corruption	  on	  earth,	  warring	  with	  God,	  spreading	  prostitution,	  and	  working	  for	  the imperialists’.105 The interweaving of religious and revolutionary narratives, 
                                                  102Sanasarian,	  ‘An	  Analysis	  of	  Fida’i	  and	  Mujahidin	  Positions’,	  p.	  105. 103 Ebadi, p. 56. 104 ‘Dr	  Parsa	  and	  Husband	  Arrested’, Kayhan (Persian language), 18 February 1980. 105 Nafisi, p.68. 
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Khomeini’s	  lectures	  about	  women’s	  roles	  during the revolution, and the quotes from ideologically diverse women mentioned above indicate, in contrast to Hegland and Bauer,	  that	  many	  ‘poor’	  and	  ‘religious’	  women,	  like	  many women during the revolution, were not purely motivated by religion but by multiple factors that combined notions of political justice, religion, and cultural authenticity.  As such, this section argues that veiling during the revolution was used to symbolise resistance against imperialism and Pahlavi rule, which went back much earlier to the reign of Reza Shah in the early 20th century.   
Reza	  Shah’s	  modernisation	  reforms,	  particularly	  his	  western	  dress	  code	  for men in 1928, and the 1935 ban on veiling106, linked unveiling with westernisation or western dress and notions of inauthentic Iranian womanhood.  As such,	  women’s	  use	  of	  the	  veil	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  symbolise	  authenticity	  through a rejection of Pahlavi enforced reforms, rather than veiling as Islamic practice.  It	  was	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  protests	  against	  Khomeini’s	  enforced	  veiling	  in March 1979 were easily conflated with Pahlavi support, or western bourgeois behaviour by leftist groups, as black chadors/veiling became associated with revolutionary support against the inauthentic Pahlavi reforms of Reza Shah and his successor Mohammad Reza Shah, particularly the 1936 Unveiling Decree and the White Revolution reforms of 1963. 
 
Section 2:  Sadat, Egyptian State feminism, and the Islamic Opposition This section looks at definitions of womanhood and female activism under the leadership of Sadat.  Much of Sadat’s	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  were	  inspired	  
                                                 106 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 54. 
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by a desire to	  disassociate	  himself	  with	  Nasser’s	  political legacy.  However, like Nasser, Sadat suppressed any independent feminist activity, which did not complement	  his	  regime’s	  goals,	  such	  as	  the	  work	  of	  Nawal el-Saadawi.  This 
section	  argues	  that	  while	  Sadat’s	  definition	  of	  Egyptian	  womanhood	  emphasised	  
women’s	  role	  in	  the	  family	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  work	  force,	  the	  state	  entered	  into	  patriarchal battles with the Islamist opposition using the activism of women like Amina al-Said and Aisha Rateb to help challenge Islamist gender constructs.  
However,	  Jehan’s	  leadership	  of	  state	  feminism	  enabled women’s	  campaigns to be portrayed as inauthentic top-down policies, and tainted the efforts of women like Rateb and al-Said by association.    Sadat’s	  double	  standards	  on	  female	  activism	  and	  his vacillation between suppression and negotiation in dealing with Islamist/political rivals proved ineffective strategies.  Fury over the Camp David accords and outrage over 
‘Jehan’s	  laws’,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  frustrations	  with	  Sadat’s	  infitah policies, helped Islamists portray Sadat as an infidel/enemy of Islam and justifiable target of 
jihad.  Groups within the Islamic movement, which became known collectively as 
Jama’at	  al-Islamiya, became an increasingly dominant force on university campuses, calling for gender segregation and veiling.  Once again it is argued that the veil was not simply used as a religious symbol, but converted into a political one to symbolise political and cultural resistance against the secular Egyptian state.  Female students asserted themselves as symbols of cultural authenticity through the promotion of veiling as part of patriarchal bargains with the Jama’at	  
al-Islamiya for greater social space.  In other words the veil became the centre of patriarchal battles with the Egyptian state over gender norms, with state-
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feminists like al-Said publishing polemical attacks on veiling in her editorials against the promotion of veiling by the Jama’at	  al-Islamiya.  
2.1 Sadat’s	  Policies,	  Family	  Planning	  and	  Female	  Activism As mentioned earlier,	  Sadat’s	  s	  position	  was	  weakened	  as	  the	  state	  of	  ‘no	  peace,	  
no	  war’	  continued	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Israel	  following	  the	  1967	  War.107  By September 1971 diplomatic relations between Jordan, Egypt and Syria had been renewed, and in early 1973 coordination with Syria began.108  The 1973 War was far better planned than the 1967 War; the Egyptians had acquired long-range Scud Missiles, the Syrians FROG missiles, both had learned valuable lessons from their defeat in 1967, and coordination had been ensured with other Arab countries for reinforcements.109  Caught completely off-guard, US intervention, code-named	  ‘Operation	  Nickel	  Grass’,	  delivered	  more	  than	  22,000	  tons	  of	  material to the Israelis allowing them to drive the Syrians back to Damascus and encircle the Egyptians in the Sinai.110  American intervention compelled Sadat to accept a ceasefire, declaring ‘I	  am	  not	  prepared	  to	  fight	  America’.111  Following the 1973 War, Sadat turned his focus towards the Peace Process and balancing 
ties	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  US,	  a	  clear	  departure	  from	  what	  Nasser’s	  position	  had been 
We	  are	  now	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reorienting	  our	  [foreign]	  relations…a	  clear-
cut	  and	  positive	  neutrality	  between	  the	  two	  world	  camps…the	  world has abandoned cold war and adopted détente.112   
                                                 107 Herzog, p. 23. 108 Ibid, p. 30. 109 Ibid, p. 31. 110 Sadat, In search of Identity, p. 244; Oren, p. 534. 111 Sadat, ‘Press	  Conference	  Held	  by	  President	  Anwar	  El	  Sadat,	  Cairo,	  31	  October	  1973’,	  Speeches 
and Interviews by President Anwar El Sadat: July-December 1973 (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1974), pp. 221, 223. 112 Sadat, The Public Diary of President Sadat, Part II, ed. Raphael Israel (Leiden: Brill,1979), pp. 478-479. 
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Sadat’s	  political	  and	  economic	  disassociation	  from	  Nasser	  lead	  to	  the	  1974-1977 
infitah (opening the door) policies, which continued to promote greater private sector investment as explained in his October Paper.113  Infitah was motivated by 
Sadat’s	  need	  to	  attract	  the	  foreign	  investment	  he	  felt	  was	  necessary	  to	  solve	  
Egypt’s	  economic	  crisis.114 Internal British documents on the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975 refer to Sadat’s request for British technical assistance and consultancy on how to ‘expedite	  the	  movement	  of	  ships	  through	  the	  Canal’.115  In 
1975,	  he	  declared,	  ‘I	  need	  the	  new	  technology	  that	  is	  available	  in	  the	  world’.116   
Sadat’s	  ideological differences with Nasser resulted in a different approach to women’s rights.  Writers like Talhami have argued that Sadat had always been a staunch supporter of Egyptian feminism.117  His wife, Jehan, portrayed herself as the fundamental force behind	  women’s	  rights	  campaigns,	  but stressed	  her	  husband’s	  resistance	  to	  many	  of	  her	  ideas.	  	  She	  explained	  that	  right from the start she had decided to take a far more active public role than her predecessor, Tahia Abdel Nasser.118  Jehan explained Sadat would often grow impatient with her attempts to push him to support women-rights legislation.119  She wrote that he showed a less than enthusiastic reaction to her running for a 
seat	  on	  the	  People’s	  Council	  of	  Munufiyya,	  ‘Remember	  that	  the	  more	  you	  work	  
                                                 113 Ibid, p. 491. 114 Marvin	  G.	  Weinbaum,	  ‘Egypt's	  "Infitah"	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  US	  Economic	  Assistance’,	  Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, 1985, p. 2. 115 Implications of the Reopening of the Suez Canal-Suez Canal Movement Control Study, 14 March 1975, FO93/661, UKNA. 116 Sadat, The Public Diary of President Sadat, Part I, p. 2. 117 Talhami, p. 84. 118 Jehan Sadat, p. 256. 119 Ibid, p. 301. 
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outside	  the	  home,	  the	  more	  you	  will	  be	  criticised…run if you like and see if the 
men	  will	  vote	  for	  you’.120   
While	  Sadat	  publically	  appeared	  to	  encourage	  his	  wife’s	  active	  role	  and	  feminist campaigning, she wrote that he would often lose his temper over her activism, especially over the Family Planning campaign.121 She wrote	  that	  ‘her’	  
Family	  Planning	  campaign	  was	  aimed	  at	  curbing	  Egypt’s	  rising	  population,	  
something	  she	  struggled	  to	  get	  her	  husband	  to	  support.	  	  Sadat’s	  ideological	  departure from Nasserism meant moving away from socialist definitions of womanhood and socialist economic systems towards privatisation of the market 
and	  prioritisation	  of	  women’s	  roles	  within	  the	  family	  sphere.	  	  	  In	  his	  speeches Sadat equated the Egyptian family with the Egyptian nation, and defined 
women’s	  nationalist	  roles	  as	  teachers in the home, revising early 20th century Wafdist notions of the modern patriarchal family as the heart of the Egyptian nation (discussed in chapter 2).  I should like to draw your attention to one thing only, namely, the family.  The family is the nucleus	  of	  the	  homeland…when	  I	  speak	  of	  the	  family	  I	  refer very specially to the role of the woman.  It is she who forms the family, lays downs concepts and principals for our coming generations.122  This viewpoint helps explain both his hesitation to family-planning campaigns, 
and	  the	  state’s	  interference	  in	  the	  family	  sphere	  as	  a	  national	  issue	  towards	  the	  end of the decade (discussed later in the chapter). 
When	  it	  came	  to	  female	  activism,	  Sadat	  maintained	  Nasser’s	  strategy	  of	  creating space for feminists and women who generally complemented the 
regime’s	  agenda,	  such	  as	  Minister	  of	  Social	  Affairs, Aisha Rateb, and feminist-
                                                 120 Ibid, p. 310. 121 Ibid, p. 320. 122 Sadat, ‘Address	  by	  President	  Anwar	  El	  Sadat	  to	  the	  Arab	  Socialist	  Union	  Women	  Leaderships,	  
5	  July	  1973’,	  Speeches and Interviews by President Anwar el-Sadat: July-December 1973, pp. 7, 9. 
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journalist, Amina al-Said, whilst suppressing those who contradicted or criticised his ideas and policies, like Nawal el-Saadawi.  A medical doctor, and feminist writer with Marxist views, el-Saadawi’s	  books	  were	  censored	  by	  Sadat	  as	  they	  
had	  been	  under	  Nasser’s	  regime.  She explained how her writing became a way for her to challenge patriarchal society and the patriarchal state: Writing became a weapon with which to fight the system, which draws its authority from the autocratic power exercised by the ruler of the state, and that of the father or the husband in the family.  The written word for me became an act of rebellion against injustice.123   Thus, restrictions on independent political activism encouraged el-Saadawi to look for alternative ways to challenge the state’s	  limits	  through	  written	  word	  and	  biographical writing, as Egyptian women had done in the early 20th century.  However, el-Saadawi was too controversial in her views to be useful to the regime, pushing issues over which the state was unwilling to bargain, by publishing writing about Female Genital Mutilation, sexuality, religion, and politics.  The government responded in 1972 by banning her book Al-Mar’a	  wa	  
al-Jins (‘Women	  and	  Sex’),	  which	  also	  lead	  to	  her	  losing	  her	  job	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health, and saw her magazine Health banned.124   On the other hand, Amina al-Said’s	  rejection	  of	  Islamic	  fundamentalism	  
made	  her	  writing	  especially	  useful	  in	  challenging	  Islamic	  opposition	  to	  Sadat’s	  regime.  The power source of the Islamists and Jama’at	  al-Islamiya was based on university campuses and colleges, and involved a large number of women.  Their influence led to an increase in veiling or re-veiling, particularly among young female university students.  In 1973, on the 50th anniversary of the founding of 
                                                 123 Nawal el-Saadawi, A Daughter of Isis: The Autobiography of Nawal El Saadawi, trans. Sherif Hetata (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 352. 124 Nawal el-Saadawi,	  Interview	  with	  Saadawi,	  ‘The	  Bitter	  Lot	  of	  Women:	  An	  interview’	  in	  The	  Nawal el Saadawi Reader, (London: Zed Books, 1997), p.68. 
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the EFU and	  Sha‘rawi’s	  unveiling,	  al-Said wrote an editorial condemning the use 
of	  the	  veil,	  calling	  it	  the	  ‘greatest	  enemy	  of	  civilisation	  and	  advancement’.125  She 
finished	  the	  editorial	  by	  asking	  what	  the	  young	  women	  of	  the	  ‘modern	  Arab	  
feminist	  generation’	  had	  added	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  earlier	  feminist	  vanguards. 
I	  believe	  that	  if	  the	  modern	  Arab	  woman	  is	  honest…she	  will	  discover	  that	  she has not added anything new…	  and	  that	  she	  has	  not	  been	  part	  of	  any	  effort worth mentioning in advancing the feminist liberation movement.126  This was followed by another editorial in 1976, confronting a prominent religious leader who had attacked her and other feminists in the press for their Family Law reform campaign.   I wonder who among our feminist leaders who have spent the best years of their lives in the service of their nation deserves such defamation?...If 
the	  ‘Shaikh	  of	  Shaikhs’	  has	  forgotten,	  we	  remind	  him	  that	  the	  Quran says: 
‘Those	  who	  defame	  honourable	  women	  shall	  be	  cursed	  in	  this	  world	  and	  
the	  next’.127  
Thus,	  while	  Sadat’s	  definition	  of	  Egyptian	  womanhood	  emphasised	  women’s	  role	  in the family rather than in the labour force or work place, he made room for women like al-Said and Rateb who complemented his reforms and helped him counteract his political rivals.   In this way, the state entered into ‘patriarchal battles’ with the opposition over conflicting gender norms, using the activism of women like al-Said and Rateb to help challenge the Islamic opposition.  However,	  Jehan’s	  leadership	  of	  state supported feminist projects marked them as inauthentic top-down policies, and tainted women like Rateb and al-Said by association.  Women like el-Saadawi were dangerous to Sadat, as her overt criticism and independent 
                                                 125 Amina al-Said,	  ‘Feast	  of	  Unveiling,	  Feast	  of	  Renaissance,	  1973’,	  in	  Badran	  and	  Cooke,	  Opening 
the Gates, pp. 360-361. 126 Ibid, p. 361. 127 Amina al-Said,	  ‘Why,	  Reverend	  Shaikh?,	  1976’,	  in	  Badran	  and	  Cooke,	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activism	  challenged	  the	  regime’s	  legitimacy	  and	  authority,	  weakening	  its position and leverage within such patriarchal battles.  As economic and political frustrations with the regime intensified, the Islamist opposition engaged in far 
more	  frequent	  and	  overt	  attacks	  on	  these	  ‘western	  feminists’,	  as	  the	  next	  sections will show. 
2.2 Failures of Infitah and the Camp David Accords  While Sadat had wanted to appear more democratic than Nasser, in reality he was more contradictory in dealing with the opposition, vacillating between suppression and compromise.   After taking over as president, he initially released many of the Islamists who had been imprisoned under Nasser, including Zaynab al-Ghazali,128 giving addresses to delegations of ulama, and 
attempting	  to	  reassure	  them	  of	  Egypt’s	  role	  as	  a	  ‘bearer’	  and	  ‘defender’	  of	  Islam.129 In September 1971 Sadat revised the Egyptian Constitution.  Article 19 
of	  the	  1956	  Constitution	  had	  stipulated	  ‘the	  state	  shall	  guarantee	  tawfiq 
(agreement)	  between	  women’s	  work	  in	  society	  and	  her	  duties	  in	  the	  family’,130 however Article 11 of the 1971 Constitution added a significant final clause.   The state shall guarantee tawfiq/agreement between a woman’s	  duties	  towards her family, her work in society, and her equality with men in all the fields of political, social/economic, and intellectual/cultural life without prejudice to the provisions and laws of Islamic Shari‘a.131  Thus the revised Constitution only affirmed women’s	  equality	  with	  men	  where it did not contravene Shari‘a law.  At	  the	  1975	  World	  Conference	  on	  Women’s	  Year	  in Mexico, Sadat’s	  wife	  emphasised	  Islam	  as	  a	  ‘liberal	  system	  with respect to 
women’	  and	  blamed	  ‘foreign	  domination’	  for	  ‘alien	  attitudes’	  creeping	  into	  
                                                 128 al-Ghazali, Return of The Pharaoh, pp. 185-186. 129 Sadat, ‘Adress	  by	  Anwar	  El	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  to	  the	  Delegation	  of	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  16	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  1971’,	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Islamic society.132 Yet,	  according	  to	  Jehan,	  Sadat’s	  motive	  in	  opening	  up	  space	  for	  the Islamists was based on the threat that the Nasserists and other oppositionists posed to his leadership.133  As such, his tactics oscillated from co-optation and compromise, through the adoption of greater Islamic legislation, to more repressive measures when Islamic groups became more militant or more overtly challenged his authority.   The opposition began to argue that infitah’s	  programs	  had	  strayed	  from	  both the ideals of equity at home, and solidarity with the wider Arab world.134  Economically speaking, infitah policies had promoted class divisions and tensions as the gap between Egypt’s	  rich	  and	  poor	  widened.135 The British Foreign Office reported that the rising socio-economic	  problems	  of	  Sadat’s	  
infitah policies were clear for all to see by the end of the decade.136  A quarterly 
report	  from	  the	  US	  Embassy	  in	  Cairo	  recorded	  that	  ‘the	  absence of major foreign 
or	  domestic	  achievements	  has	  harmed	  Sadat’s	  leadership	  position.	  	  He	  is	  now	  
being	  cautiously	  but	  overtly	  challenged	  by	  elements	  of	  left,	  right	  and	  centre’.137  A letter from British Prime Minister Callaghan in September 1977 illustrated the importance of reaching a peace agreement with Israel.138  The Middle East Research and Information Project reported that other than a 1977 oil agreement with Ford (UK), serious investors had not followed,	  explaining	  ‘a settlement of 
                                                 132 US Embassy Mexico to US Secretary of State, 24 June 1975, Document number: 1975MEXICO05530, USNA. 133 Jehan Sadat, p. 256. 134 Marvin	  G.	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  and	  the	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  of	  US	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  p. 218, Marie-Christine	  Aulas,	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  MERIP Reports, No. 107, July-August, 1982, p. 8.  135 Ibid, p. 217. 136 A	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  15	  September	  1977,	  PREM16/2023,	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the Middle East crisis	  is	  central	  for	  assuring	  investors	  of	  the	  regime's	  stability’.139 Thus, against wider Egyptian and Arab opinion, and the growing Islamist opposition, Sadat chose to pursue peace with Israel motivated by these economic and domestic issues.   As early as 1975,	  Sadat	  had	  declared	  ‘when	  I	  decided	  to	  reopen	  the	  Canal,	  I wanted thereby to tell the entire world that I was not afraid of peace and that I 
was	  acting	  towards	  achieving	  it’.140  By November 1977, Sadat felt compelled to open secret communication channels with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  ‘psychological	  barrier’	  that	  separated	  their	  two	  sides.141  His	  new	  approach	  included	  an	  initiative	  to	  visit	  Israel	  himself;	  ‘I	  
therefore	  decided	  to	  go	  right	  to	  the	  Knesset…I	  wanted	  to	  put	  the ball in their 
court’.142 He described the opposition to this initiative from Arab leaders such as Hafez al-Assad, and from his own government, specifically his Foreign Minister, who objected to the initiative and resigned in protest.143 A British diplomatic 
report	  attributed	  the	  greatest	  criticism	  over	  these	  initiatives	  to	  the	  ‘Islamists’,	  
‘Pro-Arab	  leftists’,	  and	  ‘old	  Nasserites’.144  However, the reaction	  from	  Sadat’s	  Foreign Minister indicated many viewed the initiative as an attack on Egyptian nationalism, Arab unity, and Muslim solidarity.   Sadat attempted to appease and co-opt the Islamic opposition by considering proposals for additional Islamic legislation.145  According to internal US government documents, the Coptic community organised protests over the 
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proposed Islamic legislation, particularly concerned with the possible passage of an apostate bill.146  The US Embassy in Cairo reported that it was likely at lease 
one	  of	  the	  Islamic	  bills	  would	  be	  passed,	  ‘if	  only	  to	  demonstrate	  Egypt’s	  Muslim	  credentials’,	  however,	  it	  also	  reported	  that	  incidents	  of	  violence	  between	  Copts	  and Muslims had begun to increase across the country.147 By the following year Sadat had signed the historic and controversial Camp David Accords.  Mediated by Carter in 1978, and guaranteed by US aid and support, Begin and Sadat were able to agree on two interlocking treaties known collectively as the Camp David Accords.  In the first agreement, peace between 
Israel	  and	  Egypt	  was	  established	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Israel’s	  complete	  withdrawal	  from the Sinai and a normalisation of relations with Egypt.  In the second, a framework was set for peace between Israel and the wider Arab world, which included a five-year period of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza that would be followed by talks	  on	  territories’	  final	  status,	  potentially	  leading	  to	  statehood.148 Right from the start, the wider Arab world, led by Syria, Iraq and Libya, denounced the treaty as treasonous and announced a total boycott of Egypt, with the Palestinian leader Arafat calling	  for	  Sadat’s	  assassination.149 
Sadat’s	  speech	  on 18 September 1978 congratulating Egyptians and their Palestinian brothers, fell on deaf ears.150 Sadat’s	  attempt	  to	  redefine	  Egyptian	  nationalism through this shift in economic and foreign policy, away from Nasserism, pan-Arabism, and Islamism, alienated him from the Arab region and 
                                                 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Oren, p. 540. 149 Ibid, p. 541. 150 Sadat,	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  by	  President	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 344 
increasing segments of the Egyptian population.  Islamic opposition grew, capitalising on the failures of his Infitah policies, his visit to Israel, the Camp David Accords, and attacked any steps he took for social reform as inauthentic and heretical, particularly those concerning women.   
2.3 Jama‘at al-Islamiya	  and	  Jehan’s	  Laws 
Infitah’s	  economic	  failures	  coupled with Sadat’s	  shift	  towards	  peace	  with	  Israel	  encouraged the activity and growth of violent jihadi offshoots within the Islamic opposition.  Once such offshoot, which became active in the 1970s was Takfir wal 
Hijrah, created under the leadership of Shukri Mustafa who was among those jailed with Qutb in 1965.  Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, a one-time member of 
Takfir wal Hijra, claimed that the original split responsible for the creation of the 
group	  had	  occurred	  during	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  imprisonment,	  and	  that	  
disagreements	  centred	  on	  differing	  religious	  or	  ‘minor	  theological’	  interpretations.151 Al-Khayr, like Zaynab al-Ghazali, persistently denied the existence of violent offshoots like Takfir wal Hijrah, emphasising instead that 
there	  existed	  only	  the	  wider	  ‘Jama‘at	  Al-Muslimin (or Jama‘at al-Islamiya).152  Sadat continued to vacillate between compromise and suppression with the Islamist opposition,	  promoting	  contradictory	  notions	  of	  women’s	  rights.	  	  On	  the one hand, he amended the Constitution again in 1976, making Islam the main source of state legislation, promoting	  Islamist	  attacks	  on	  women’s	  rights	  reforms.153 On the other hand, the kidnapping and execution of former Minister of Islamic Trusts by Takfir wal Hijra in 1977 resulted in a massive crackdown 
                                                 151 Abu al-Khayr, pp. 43, 93. 152 Ibid, p. 124. 153 Keddie, Women in the Middle East: Past and Present (New Jersey, 2007), p.124 
 345 
and the arrest of 620 Islamists.154 According to Israeli sources, Takfir wal Hijrah was the only jihadi organisation that permitted women into its ranks, and in 1977, 27 of them were arrested as suspected members of the organisation upon the assassination of the minister of Islamic trusts.155 These developments suggest that ideological justification or endorsement of female participation in physical jihad, and the role of more political female Islamists like al-Ghazali in contributing to the increasing politicisation of the Brotherhood (discussed in chapter 6) helped move some women towards political jihadi groups within the Islamist movement. That the fall-out of the Camp David Accords coincided with the 
culmination	  of	  Sadat’s	  Family	  Planning	  campaigns	  and	  Personal	  Status	  Law	  Reforms only served to further inflame Islamic opposition against the regime.   
Jehan	  wrote	  that	  following	  much	  resistance	  Sadat	  only	  gave	  into	  ‘her	  demands’	  on Family Planning after watching a presentation given by an American family-
planning	  group	  about	  the	  ‘population	  explosion’	  that	  was	  threatening	  the	  country.156  US	  government	  documents	  indicate	  that	  Sadat’s	  interest	  in	  the	  
subject	  was	  motivated	  by	  US	  efforts	  to	  ‘press	  Egyptian	  Authorities	  to	  undertake	  a	  
more	  vigorous	  population	  control	  program’,	  encouraging	  the Egyptian press to 
report	  on	  the	  ‘catastrophic	  consequences	  of	  Egypt’s	  population	  explosion’.157 Sadat acted to restrict food allowances to families with more than five members, 
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supported a nation wide campaign to convince people to have fewer children, and whole communities were invited to attend birth-control seminars.158  The realm of the family had always been a scared area for Islamist leaders, and as such, when it came to the issue of Personal Status Law, Jehan wrote that both Aisha Rateb and Amina al-Said warned her of the strong backlash they were likely to receive from the Islamists.159 Despite three of the highest religious authorities in Egypt, including the Mufti, serving on the reform committee, Jehan recalled the backlash.  Atheist! Petty Dictator! Enemy of the Family! These were just a few of the names Islamic extremists began calling us in the spring of 1978 when the committee released the list of proposed and really quite mild reforms.160    In the previous chapter it was shown how al-Ghazali and other Islamists came to view religious institutions associated with the state, including al-Azhar, as inauthentic extensions of the regime.161  Among the reforms were the requirement that a husband inform his wife of his intent to take a new wife, the 
first	  wife’s	  right to seek a divorce within 12 months in such cases, and her right to retain the family home for her children.162  The reforms had apparently been written in accordance with Qur’anic laws, yet, Islamists nevertheless accused them of being un-Islamic, shouting,	  ‘These	  are	  Jehan’s	  laws,	  not	  Islam’s	  laws’.163  Jehan was accused, along with Rateb and al-Said,	  of	  ‘imitating	  western	  women’,	  with riots breaking out at al-Azhar University: Hundreds of male students screamed, marching around the university 
courtyard…’we	  want	  one,	  two,	  three,	  four	  wives!’…When	  the	  
                                                 158 Jehan Sadat, p. 321. 159 Ibid, pp. 356, 357. 160 Ibid, p. 358. 161 al-Gahzali, Ayyam min Hayati, pp. 21, 27. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 
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demonstrators spilled out into the street, the police had to disband the highly agitated crowd.164  Despite the religious backlash on 20 June 1979, Sadat issued the first of two presidential decrees about women, which included the Personal Status reforms and a bill to add 30 female seats to the Egyptian Parliament, with 20% of all seats 
on	  the	  26	  People’s	  Councils	  going	  to	  women.165   The 1979 Iranian Revolution had a significant effect on the wider region, and on Islamist opposition movements in particular.  In Egypt, the Islamists were emboldened by what they perceived as an Islamic victory over western 
imperialism.	  	  Sadat’s	  decision	  to	  offer	  the	  Shah	  and	  his	  family	  refuge	  in	  the	  wake	  of the revolution further aggravated Islamic opposition against him. Down with Sadat! Out with the Shah, the alcoholic, the dictator, the 
adulterer!	  	  On	  the	  campuses	  of	  Egypt’s	  universities,	  the	  fanatic	  minority	  
had	  been	  demonstrating	  steadily	  since	  the	  Shah’s	  arrival…now	  the	  fanatics were calling my husband a kafir.166  
Moreover,	  Sadat’s	  double	  standards	  and	  suppression	  of	  leftist	  opposition	  meant	  that he lost support from activists outside the Islamic movement as well.   For instance, his approval of the personal status law reforms for women was offset by his suppression of el-Saadawi’s	  feminist	  work.	  	   El-Saadawi’s	  condemnation	  of	  Sadat’s	  policies,	  and	  in	  particular the Camp David treaty, resulted in her imprisonment,	  ‘the president had ordered my incarceration with hundreds of others who had opposed the Camp David 
treaty’.167  The outrage over Camp David also resulted in direct attacks on Egyptian state-feminists abroad.  Jehan Sadat explained how at the 1980 World 
                                                 164 Jehan Sadat, p. 361. 165 Ibid, pp. 361, 364-365. 166 Jehan Sadat, pp. 425-426. 167 Nawal el-Saadawi, Walking Through Fire: A Life of Nawal el-Saadawi, ed. Sherif Hetata (London: Zed Books, 2002), p. 220. 
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Conference On Women in Copenhagen, the Palestinian delegation shouted as she delivered her speech,  
‘Down,	  traitor!...your	  husband	  betrayed	  the	  Arabs!’...’Traitor!	  Traitor!	  
Sadat	  is	  a	  traitor!’	  other	  Palestinians began to shout, their voices so loud 
that	  it	  was	  almost	  impossible	  for	  me	  to	  continue’.168    
Sadat’s	  double	  standard	  on	  female	  activism,	  his	  wife’s	  self-proclaimed leadership 
of	  the	  women’s	  movement,	  and	  the	  attacks	  on	  his	  authenticity	  were	  compounded by his ineffective balancing strategy in dealing with the Islamist opposition and the escalating violence between Coptic Christians and Muslims in Egypt.  Similarly to the Shah of Iran, Sadat vacillated between capitulation and suppression in dealing with political opposition and female activism.  From 1978 onwards the Jama’at al-Islamiya became an increasingly active and dominant force on university campuses from Cairo to Alexandria, calling for gender segregation and veiling.169   
2.4 New Forms of Veiling and Definitions of Cultural Authenticity Writers like El-Guindi have argued that veiling began shortly after the 1973 October War as part of an assertive movement beginning the synthesis between modernity and authenticity.170 Fatima Abdel-Hadi and Brotherhood member Farid Abd al-Khaliq’s	  autobiographical	  writing shed light on the political and ideological transformations that took place within the Islamist movement over the 1960s and 1970s.171  Abdel-Hadi described her first meeting with the Sisterhood	  in	  1942,	  arriving	  unveiled	  wearing	  a	  short	  dress,	  ‘which	  stopped	  at	  
the	  knee	  as	  was	  the	  fashion	  in	  those	  days’.	  	  When	  it	  came	  time	  to	  pray, 
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Amina	  Mohammad,	  the	  secretary,	  turned	  to	  me	  and	  said	  ‘how	  can	  you	  
pray	  with	  uncovered	  hair	  and	  bare	  legs?’…I	  took	  out an écharpe (scarf) and covered my hair and prayed in my short dress.172  Farid Abd al-Khaliq, who joined the Ikhwan in the 1940s, and whose wife was a member of the Muslim Sisterhood, mentioned that his sister was unveiled before her marriage, and that what was viewed as sufficient hijab was	  the	  ‘écharpe	  or	  
head	  cover’.173  Abdel-Hadi recalled how the Sisters used to wear long scarves and long 
‘jackets’,	  and	  how they would carry pins while they were on public transport to prick the bodies/legs of women in short skirts, only to apologise and use the opportunity to discuss modest clothing and call them into the Sisterhood.174  Although the Sisterhood was active in encouraging women to abandon western clothing (short dresses) and dress	  more	  ‘modestly’,	  Abd al-Khaliq emphasised 
that	  women’s	  ‘fashion’	  and	  the	  hijab were not crucial issues within the organisation during this early period.175   
We	  didn’t	  discuss	  fashion	  too	  much,	  but	  talked	  of	  adherence	  to	  
‘modesty’/’modest	  dress’,	  and	  avoiding	  vulgarity/nudity…the	  question	  of	  the veil, its shape, its colour, its length, its shortness did not concern us much.176   Abd al-Khaliq argued that the form and type of veiling changed over the 1970s 
to	  incorporate	  a	  style	  that	  was	  ‘foreign’	  to	  Egyptian	  people.	  	   As far as the Niqab (face veil) we did not hear of it at the time, or rather we never heard or saw a single case of Niqab wearing among the Sisters until after the changes of the 1970s in Egypt, which saw the entry of Wahhabi ideas from the Gulf states, which were foreign to the Islamic practices in Egypt and the Brotherhood.177  
                                                 172 Ibid, p. 21. 173 al-Khaliq in ibid, p. 16. 174 Abdel-Hadi, p. 28, 37. 175 Ibid, p. 15. 176 Ibid, p. 15-16. 177 al-Khaliq in ibid, p.16 
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Thus according to Abd al-Khaliq and Abdel-Hadi, a more Wahhabi form of veiling, increasingly became adopted by the Islamist groups in this later period. Hussam Tammam has argued that as the Sisterhood was politicised in response to wider changes following the 1952 Revolution, the veil was transformed into a political symbol.178 Expanding on this, this section argues that women were increasingly co-opted by the Islamist movement to illustrate the 
latter’s	  socio-political dominance through the adoption of imported Wahhabi practices, particularly stricter gender segregation and different Wahhabi-style veiling, as new definitions of cultural authenticity.  It is argued women, particularly students on university campuses where the Jama’at	  al-Islamiya was most active, asserted themselves as symbols of these new definitions by promoting veiling as part of patriarchal bargains with the Islamists for more educational and social/public space.   Furthermore, it is argued that veiling formed part of patriarchal battles between the state and the Islamic opposition, who used this female practice to attack each other along lines of cultural authenticity.  As such, state-feminists like al-Said published attacks on veiling to counteract calls for increased veiling by the Jama’at	  al-Islamiya.  Attempts to limit their influence on university campuses, through such measures as postponing student union elections 
because	  of	  the	  ‘predominance	  of	  the	  Islamic	  group	  in	  faculty	  elections’	  proved	  ineffective.179  Expansion of the Islamist movement and notions of Sadat as an enemy of Islam, and thus a justifiable target of jihad, lead to his assassination by a member of Islamic Jihad in 1981.   
                                                 178 Hussam Tammam, in ibid, pp. 9-10. 179 US Consulate Alexandria to US Embassy Cairo and US Secretary of State, 23 October 1978,  Document Number: 1978ALEXAN00872USNA. 
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Conclusion Whether Jama’at	  al-Islamiya or Khomeini, veiling was encouraged to 
demonstrate	  the	  image	  of	  	  ‘Islamisation’,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  asserting power over the secular Egyptian and Iranian states.  However, while re-veiling was used to illustrate dominance and cultural authenticity within the religious opposition movements in both Iran and Egypt, this was done in very different ways.  While in both cases revised and new forms of veiling were used as symbols of political resistance and cultural authenticity against the state, it was only in Egypt that some women promoted veiling as part of patriarchal bargains struck with the Islamic opposition in exchange for education, and public activity in a more authentic, Islamised society.  In Iran, many female revolutionaries had not defined veiling as an authentic Iranian act outside the revolution.  As a result, many women demonstrated against Khomeini’s	  enforced	  veiling	  and	  enforced	  Islamisation in March 1979.  Furthermore, the Islamisation of the Iranian State after the 1979 meant that the veil ceased to represent a political symbol of resistance against the state. This chapter has shown that both the Iranian and Egyptian states were engaged in patriarchal battles with the religious opposition, using their different models of womanhood to assert political power.  It was not that men simply used women to indicate what was authentic, but that some women were drawn towards these alternatives out of their own socio-political frustrations to represent what they viewed as culturally authentic.  However, by employing a dual strategy of compromise and repression against the opposition, the Egyptian and Iranian states under the Shah and Sadat validated contradictory notions of 
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womanhood	  by	  compromising	  on	  women’s	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  pacify	  their	  political enemies, thus hindering the effects of state feminist projects.   
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‘What	  we	  require	  is	  not	  a	  formal	  return	  to	  tradition	  and	  religion	  but	  a	  rereading,	  a	  
reinterpretation, of our history that can illuminate the present and pave the way to 
a	  better	  future’. Nawal el-Saadawi 
 
Conclusion 
 During the 1850s, Qajari male writers like Muhammad Sipihr labelled Qurrat al-
‘Ayn a polyandrous prostitute.  By the 1940s, Constitutionalist historian Kasravi 
was	  labelling	  her	  both	  ‘Shir-Zan’ (lion-woman/lioness) and mentally unstable.  Now, over 160 years after her death, some Iranian writers are calling her a 
‘trailblazer’,	  an	  ‘advocate	  of	  women’s	  equality	  in	  Iran’, referring to her as	  ‘the	  
first	  suffrage	  martyr’.1  The case of Qurrat al-‘Ayn offers a strong example of how myths and legends are revised in line with changing notions of authenticity to validate new notions of womanhood, nationalism, and national identity.  When notions of authenticity are understood as part of changing patriarchal bargains, it becomes easier to understand that historical figures are not static; even those who were once repudiated as completely inauthentic, can later come to symbolise cultural and national authenticity, and may similarly fall out of favour, or indeed ‘memory’, when they no longer fit or complement dominant discourses of a period. 
Similarly, while Zaynab al-Ghazali may have viewed herself as an exception, and been viewed as one by the majority of her peers, the model of Islamic womanhood that she put forward, which inspired a lively academic debate, is not static and is thus open to negotiation and renegotiation.  If she has 
                                                        1 Nina Ansary, Jewels of Allah: The Untold Story of Women in Iran, (California: Revela Press, 2015). 
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come	  to	  constitute	  a	  model	  of	  ‘Islamic	  feminism’	  for	  some	  writers	  or	  activists,	  perhaps it is because, as we have seen over the last 7 chapters, she has come, or some parts of her actions, have come to represent the better bargain for some women who are challenging the patriarchal ownership of Islamic scholarship and/or the definitions of the Islamic fundamentalist movement.  As we have also seen over the course of these 7 chapters, the same patriarchal bargain is not necessarily acceptable or upheld by similar groups of women, be they political activists, social activists, religious activists, state feminists or academic writers.  As women are not monolithic entities, their historic figures are similarly not viewed or interpreted monolithically, open to different and often conflicting interpretations by a diverse range of women at any point in time.   
Terminology, too, is historically interpreted in response to changing socio-political factors and notions of cultural authenticity.  As such, while terms may have one set of connotations at one point in time, those connotations can change over time to encompass different ideas, interpretations and implications.  In 1976, as the Islamic revolutionary movement was gaining greater ground, and more revolutionary models of Islamic womanhood were being put forward as discussed in chapter	  6,	  Farhat	  Qa’im	  Maqami	  wrote	  Azadi ya Isarat-i-Zan2 
(Freedom	  or	  slavery	  of	  women?).	  	  He	  argued	  that	  ‘freedom’	  and	  ‘slavery’	  with	  regards to women were not new terms, but that the state had manipulated the word azadi (freedom) to mean immorality and a loss of cultural and national heritage, whilst making slavery a synonym for morality and religion.  Thus, Maqami equated azadi-i zan or azadi-i zanan (women’s	  liberation)	  with	                                                          2 Farhat	  Qa’im	  Maqami,	  Azadi ya Isarat-i-Zan: Muqaddama-I bar Jamia Shinasi-i-Zan, (Tehran: Javidan, 1976). 
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immorality, promiscuity and a loss of cultural authenticity, a term that only a decade earlier was equated with female suffrage and the passing of the family protection laws by activists like Bamdad.  Similarly, Buthayna Sha‘ban argues that the word Nisa’i	  did not suffer from negative connotations at the start of the 20th century,	  but	  that	  some	  Arab	  thinkers	  in	  the	  1980s	  began	  to	  ‘blaspheme	  against it’.3 ‘ It is frustrating’, she writes, ‘that	  the	  word	  Nisa’i	  was	  absorbed	  in	  Arab thought much better at the beginning of the 20th century than towards the end of it’.4   
 Over the course of 7 chapters this thesis explored the development of 
notions	  of	  womanhood	  and	  women’s	  rights	  and	  how	  these	  definitions	  changed	  in	  Iran and Egypt over a100-year period.  It showed that none of these definitions could be taken for granted, and that at every juncture different women and different types of female activists had to find novel, different, and more sophisticated approaches to maintain certain patriarchal bargains whilst attempting to strike new or revised ones.     
Political Practices: Nationalist protests, Voting, and Revolutionary activism   
Tracing the development of Egyptian and Iranian women’s	  political	  practices	  from 1880-1980 has pointed	  to	  historic	  transformations	  in	  women’s	  political	  identities and roles.  More importantly it has highlighted how recurring themes 
of	  women’s	  loyalty,	  purity, and sacrifice were revised through bargains with competing patriarchal forces that helped validate and authenticate these new roles within different contexts.   The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-
                                                        3 Sha‘ban,	  p.	  51 4 Ibid. 
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1911 and the Egyptian Revolution and Independence struggle of 1919-1922 provided women with a platform to test and challenge patriarchal limits on their public and political activity.  While poor working class women had traditionally participated in riots and protests, often led by religious and community leaders, these two instances saw educated women from elite land-owning and wealthier upper class families participate in public protests for the first time.  Persistent themes of female modesty, purity, and sacrifice were promoted in both contexts, but defined differently according to women’s different social/class backgrounds.  For instance, the daughters of Quchan in 1905 and the story of the Iranian washerwoman in 1908, reaffirmed notions of class and female oppression, with 
women’s	  purity	  and	  sacrifice	  expressed	  through	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  bodies	  and	  livelihoods in these contexts.  Elite women like Sedigheh Dowlatabadi and Mohtaram Eskandari realised their loyalty and sacrifice by risking their safety to organise secret societies, plan and execute covert activities and boycotts, and participate in mass public protests in 1911 in support of the constitutional movement. 
 In	  Egypt,	  elite	  women’s	  loyalty	  and	  sacrifice	  was	  realised through notions of the WWCC as nationalist mothers, whose supportive activities kept the revolution alive, particularly when Wafd leaders were arrested.  Their relentless protesting in the face of British harassment as recounted by Huda Sha‘rawi, and their written communiqués to	  women’s	  organisations abroad and colonial diplomats during the revolution, pointed to their roles as protectors and sacrificial mothers of the poorer classes in the revolution.  Lower class women realised their nationalist sacrifice with their lives, dying at the hands of British 
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bullets during nationalist protests, symbolising the exploitation and destruction of the Egyptian nation at the hands of its	  colonial	  oppressor.	  	  Women’s	  experiences in these revolutions fostered their desire for more participation and 
representation	  in	  the	  nation’s	  political	  processes.	  	  However,	  while	  men	  
encouraged	  women’s	  activities	  in	  such	  anti-colonial contexts, they were less willing to accommodate their political activities in domestic contexts.   
Women’s	  roles	  as	  bearers of cultural authenticity were particularly heightened in anti-colonial contexts, allowing nationalist men to indicate to their 
enemies	  what	  the	  ‘true’	  nation looked like.  In Egypt notions of the modern bourgeois family and educated motherhood were used	  to	  demonstrate	  Egypt’s	  strength and readiness for independence.  Once independence was achieved, nationalist men felt that educated mothers had to focus on nurturing the next 
generation,	  viewing	  women’s	  political	  activity	  as	  a	  distraction	  from	  their	  domestic duties, and potentially divisive to the family, and thus the nation.  Similarly in Iran, the Iranian Constitution denied women political rights along with the criminal and insane.  In both countries some women chose to disassociate from nationalist men in the wake of such disappointment, choosing to pursue independent activity as a way of challenging existing limits on their political participation.  Some women were more political than others; 
Dowlatabadi	  pushed	  limits	  on	  women’s	  public	  activity	  by	  publishing	  her	  
opinions	  on	  Iran’s	  foreign	  policies	  in her Zaban-i-Zanan, while Eskandari linked the activities of her organisation, Jamiyat-i-Nesvan-i-Vantankhah, to those of her 
husband’s	  Socialist	  Party.  
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Subsequently, the	  EFU	  and	  various	  women’s	  rights	  activists	  in	  Iran	  forged alliances with international feminist groups as a way of asserting their political desires and changing political identities.  They used these experiences to signal to nationalist men their potential as cultural ambassadors and political players.  By the mid 1930s, however, events in Palestine were encouraging the EFU to shift its	  alliances	  from	  international	  to	  regional	  women’s	  groups,	  as	  the	  IAW	  was	  increasingly viewed as a colonial instrument within the Palestinian-Zionist conflict.  One again notions of cultural authenticity changed; the EFU went from defining itself as a cultural mediator between East and West, to the defender and protector of Arab feminism and wider Arab nationalism.  Once again, patriarchal bargains with nationalist men were revised around changing notions of cultural authenticity, in this case pan-Arabism, which in the context of another anti-colonial struggled became the better-perceived bargain over international alliances with western women.  This shift contributed to developing notions of Eastern versus Western feminism, affecting notions of authenticity within Egyptian feminism as it did so.   
 By	  the	  late	  1940s	  women’s	  bargains	  with	  the	  patriarchal	  state	  were	  increasingly focused on political representation and the vote.  Women struck common ground with the state by linking notions of modernisation with female suffrage, with many female activists accepting co-optation bargains in pursuit of these goals.  Women gauged the political context at every juncture, unifying to organise protests in pursuit of suffrage in 1951 Egypt and 1952 Iran, but turning to nationalist protests soon after because of the revolutionary instability of the period in both countries.  As the Iranian and Egyptian states became increasingly 
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intolerant of independent female activism by the late 1950s and 1960s, some women tread a line between the patriarchal state and oppositional patriarchal forces in order to subtly challenge limits on their activities, while some were 
increasingly	  drawn	  to	  the	  opposition’s	  alternative	  models	  of	  womanhood. 
 By	  the	  1970s,	  women’s	  participation in the revolutionary movement 
challenged	  state	  limits	  on	  women’s	  independent	  activity,	  which	  now	  included	  violent action within militant guerrilla and revolutionary groups.  Notions of 
Iranian	  women’s	  loyalty	  and	  sacrifice	  were	  revised	  to	  incorporate	  arrest	  and torture as a manifestation of these ideals, as illustrated by the Mojahedin-i-Khalgh and Fadayan-i-Khalgh groups.  In Egypt, women within the Islamist da‘wa 
movement	  challenged	  the	  state’s	  patriarchal	  control	  by	  defining	  it	  as	  jahili, and therefore illegitimate.  Female jihad in this context came to incorporate education activities and religious preaching in mixed gender groups, increasing public roles as social workers, and even arrest	  and	  torture	  as	  proof	  of	  women’s	  commitment, sacrifice, and dedication to jihad fi sabil Allah. 
Social Practices: Education, Family, Social work  
In	  both	  Iran	  and	  Egypt,	  women’s	  writing	  appears	  as	  one	  of	  the	  first	  acts	  of	  female	  self-assertion and challenge to existing patriarchal limits and bargains.  The writing and patronage of poems within 19th century Persian harems provides one of the earliest modes of self-expression and self-assertion in Iran.  By the late 19th century elite women like Bibi Astarabadi and Taj al-Saltaneh were pushing patriarchal limits	  on	  women’s	  seclusion	  and	  education	  within	  the	  royal	  court,	  the	  former launching a written attack in the 1890s on the Qajari tract Tadib ol-
Nesvan’	  (The	  Education	  of	  Women/	  The	  Chastisement	  of	  Women); an act that has 
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been defined by some more recently, as	  the	  ‘first	  declaration	  of	  women’s	  rights	  
in	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  Iran’.5  Astarabadi’s actions and her subsequent establishment of a	  girls’	  school	  in	  1907 indicated how definitions of womanhood were in a state of flux, and how women themselves were engaged in both individual and collective ways in contributing to that change.  Thus, 
Asatarabadi’s	  emphasis	  on domestic science alongside scientific subjects supported modernist/constitutionalist ideas of educated womanhood.   
Following the Constitutional Revolution many female nationalists focused on education, establishing private girls’ schools and founding journals, through which they promoted notions of female education, public activity and social work.  They had to be more careful and less overt with their activities initially as many in the Majlis remained extremely hostile to these ideas and notions of 
women’s	  national/political	  equality.  The modernisation reforms of Muhammad Ali helped create a less hostile environment in Egypt, where the emphasis on scientific education encouraged notions of female education at least to primary level.  The late 19th century biographical works, novels, and journalistic endeavours of pioneering women in Egypt were interconnected and woven throughout these modernist debates of the 19th/early 20th centuries.  Women like Zaynab Fawwaz and Aishah al-Taymurriya were seen challenging patriarchal limits using historical female figures to renegotiate notions of authentic womanhood.  Successors like Malak Hifni Nasif, May Ziyada and Nabawiya Musa extended their ideas to challenge patriarchal limits on women’s	  education, public activities, and work, striking common ground with modernist 
                                                        5 Nina Ansary. 
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nationalist men at the same time as subtly challenging their authority and limits 
on	  women’s reforms.   
Women’s	  experiences	  within	  the	  1919-1922 Revolution spurred their desire for independent activity, seeing groups like the EFU challenge existing 
limits	  on	  women’s	  higher	  education	  and	  international	  activities.	  	  By	  the	  1930s	  and 40s, women were travelling to international feminist conferences, and coming back with post-graduate degrees from abroad.  Women continued to use nationalist language as a way of maintaining and revising patriarchal bargains with men around their higher education and international	  activity.	  Women’s	  education was presented as a nationalist goal, as an endeavour that would strengthen the nation and produce a better generation of Egyptian men and women for the good of the country.  They drew upon the language of Islam to manoeuvre around criticism from Islamic clerics, but focused on striking bargains with nationalist men to continue their activities.  For some women, however, the perceived western and secular character of the EFU and its elite constructs of womanhood encouraged	  different	  women’s	  discourses	  and	  activities.  Women like Labiba Ahmed and Zaynab al-Ghazali promoted more 
Islamic	  women’s	  discourses,	  showing how Islamic womanhood and secular, modernist, nationalist ideas intersected with Islam from the beginning, encouraging revised definitions	  of	  women’s	  religious	  activity	  through	  da‘wa.  Other women from non-elite, lower middle and working class backgrounds like Ruz al-Yusuf	  and	  Munira	  Thabit	  challenged	  the	  EFU’s	  elitist	  definitions	  of	  
women’s	  roles	  through	  their promotion of journalism as professional work for women. 
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Sartorial Practices: Veiling 
Revised	  definitions	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  and	  the	  changing	  notions	  of	  authenticity	  that helped define these, incorporated changing ideas and definitions of veiling.  As a symbol of the harem and domestic seclusion in urban centres, the veil became part of modernist	  discourses	  on	  women’s	  rights	  and	  roles	  in	  the	  modern	  nation.  19th century reformers in Iran like Akhundzadeh and Kermani attempted to challenge the authenticity of veiling as an Iranian act, arguing it had been adopted as a result of the Arab Islamic invasion of Iran, and blaming it for a host of social ills.  However, Qurrat al-‘Ayn’s	  unveiling	  and	  public	  activity	  in	  the	  mid	  19th century had resulted in her peers labelling her promiscuous and inauthentic.  As such, women like Bibi Khanom Astarabadi and Taj al-Saltaneh initially challenged notions on	  women’s	  seclusion	  from	  within	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  Qajari	  harems, with Astarabadi establishing a girls’ school in 1907 from her own home.  However, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 provided nationalist women like Taj al-Saltaneh and Sedigheh Dowlatabadi an outlet through which to challenge existing limits on female seclusion and veiling, taking part in public protests outside the Majlis in 1911.    
In Egypt, British colonial discourse attributed the nation’s	  backwardness	  with the situation of its women, symbolised through their seclusion/veiling, the harem, and polygamy.  The veil became an important component of modernist debates, which included both men and women who challenged notions of female seclusion and adopted a gradual change approach to unveiling.  It was shown in chapter 1 how throughout the early 1900s female writers like Malak Hifni Nasif 
and	  women’s rights	  activists	  like	  Huda	  Sha‘rawi employed a gradual change 
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approach to unveiling (removing the face veil and long veils) in line with arguments of men like Qasim Amin.  Similarly, the 1919-1922 Nationalist struggle in Egypt saw large numbers of women from the elite classes join in political protests, challenging limits	  on	  women’s	  seclusion/veiling by promoting notions of the modern educated mother/family.   
Following these revolutions, Iranian and Egyptian women began serious educational activities, and continued to challenge notions of female seclusion and veiling through their activities and numerous journal publications.  By the late 1920s and 1930s some Egyptian women were pursuing independent female activism, and attending international conferences unveiled.  In Iran, the rise of Reza Shah in 1925, and the establishment of the Kanoun Banovan in 1935 saw the state co-opt	  and	  adopt	  issues	  that	  had	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  women’s	  campaigns in the early 20th century.  As such, unveiling was not only encouraged, but by 1936 had been converted to official state policy through the 1936 Women’s	  Awakening	  Project	  and	  Unveiling	  Decree.  However, the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 caused a conservative backlash on veiling, which saw the clerical establishment, epitomised by Khomeini’s Kashf al-Asrar in 1943, equate 
unveiling	  and	  the	  Women’s	  Awakening project with immorality and prostitution.  However, this backlash was partly offset by a period of limited liberalisation, 
which	  saw	  the	  rise	  of	  many	  political	  parties	  and	  women’s	  groups.	  	  Some	  
women’s	  groups	  unified	  under a coordinating committee after 1941 working on 
campaigns	  for	  their	  social	  and	  political	  ‘liberation’, while others forged alliances with new political parties as the better-perceived patriarchal bargain against this conservative backlash.   
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Contrastingly in 1940s and 1950s Egypt, the veil/unveiling had become a less necessary part of ongoing patriarchal bargains, as	  attitudes	  to	  women’s	  public/social activities had changed, with organisations like the EFU focused on 
women’s	  higher	  education,	  and	  the	  vote	  becoming	  a	  more	  central	  part	  of 
women’s	  campaigns	  by	  the	  1950s.	  	  Muslim	  Sister Fatima Abdel-Hadi recalled how by the 1950s veiling had become an anomaly in cities like Cairo, and how the Muslim sisterhood had been less concerned with their outward appearance, stressing only modest clothing, such as long jackets and shorter headscarves in keeping with normal religious Egyptian dress.  The rise of Mohammad Reza Shah after 1953, and the launch of his White Revolution a decade later encouraged Iranian women to unveil by linking the image of	  unveiled	  women	  with	  the	  Shah’s	  
ideas	  of	  educated	  modern	  womanhood;	  the	  image	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  wife,	  as	  perfectly	  poised, beautiful, and elegant in the latest western fashions providing the ideal of modern Iranian womanhood and femininity as defined by the Pahlavi state.   
The rise of revolutionary ideas and groups in the 1970s led to alternative models of Iranian womanhood that stressed Islamic/Shi‘a authenticity through a revolutionary remodelling of figures like Zaynab and Fatima.  Once again notions of female purity, loyalty, and self-sacrifice were upheld as representations of the 
‘true’	  Iranian nation.	  	  Reza	  Shah’s	  enforced	  Unveiling Decree in	  1936,	  his	  son’s	  emphasis on women’s	  femininity	  and	  his 1963 White Revolution, promoted the use of black chadors throughout the revolution as symbols of resistance against the Pahlavi state and a rejection of its ideals.  However, unlike women within the Islamist movement in Egypt, many female revolutionaries in Iran did not endorse veiling/chadors as symbols of authenticity outside the revolution, as 
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illustrated	  by	  their	  demonstrations	  against	  Khomeini’s	  enforced	  veiling	  order in March 1979.  By the 1970s in Egypt, veiling within the Islamist movement had begun to change, taking on Wahhabi influences, shaped by the changing ideas of Muslim Brotherhood members who had travelled to the Gulf countries to escape political and economic repression during the 1960s and 1970s.  We see former Muslim Brotherhood/Sisterhood members like Farid Abd al-Khaliq and Fatima Abdel-Hadi describing such practices as alien, foreign and inauthentic, pointing to how definitions of veiling changed to redefine notions of cultural authenticity 
through	  women’s	  bodies	  as	  representations	  of	  moral/national purity.  
Thus, practices like veiling, similarly to historical terms and figures, are not static but open to renegotiation, their interpretations constantly in flux, changing in response to wider socio-political developments.  Changing notions of authenticity, which redefined such ideas, both influenced and were influenced by 
women’s	  patriarchal	  bargaining	  within	  a	  variety	  of	  developing	  political	  and	  social contexts.  Moreover,	  patriarchal	  forces	  engaged	  in	  ‘patriarchal	  battles’	  around changing notions of womanhood as a way of competing for power.  Throughout the period under investigation, women often sought the role of cultural carriers and symbols of cultural authenticity, particularly at times of political instability when this role became a more urgent part of patriarchal bargains with men.   
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